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NOTE TO FIRST EDITION.

The following collection of cases has been made primarily
for use in connection with the writer's lectures on Partnership
in the Law School of this University and to accompany his
''Elements of Partnership" recently published. It is hoped,
however, that it may prove of value to students generally.
The collection makes no pretention to being complete in any
sense. What has been aimed at is to give, in· small compass
and inexpensive form, some illustrations of the, rules governing
the more important phases of the subject, and particularly to
illu8trate with some fullness the difficult question of the tests of
partnership. Statements of facts have been condensed where
practicable and portions of cases not germane to the subject
have usuaHy been omitted. Nothing has been attempted in
the way of annotation beyond a reference to those sections in
the text-book named where the same subject is discussed.
F. R. M.
UNIVERSITY OF MIOHJGAN,

Ann Arbor, December 1; 1896.

NOTE TO SECOND EDITION.

In this edition the number of cases has been considerably
increased. The work of selecting and editing these additional
cases has been almost wholly performed by Professor Sage.
F. R. M.
UNIVERSITY 01!' MICHIGAN,

Ann Arbor, June 15, 1903.
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WHAT IS A PARTNERSHIP.

THE QUEEN vs. ROBSON.
Croten Ca8e reserved, 1885.
English Law Reports, 16 Q. B. D. 137.

The prisoner was tried and convicted on an indictment
framed under 31 & .32 Viet. c. 116, s. 1, charging that he, being
a member of a copartnership called the Bedlington Colliery
Young Men's Christian Association (hereafter called the at:~soci
ation), feloniously did embezzle three several sums of money
of and belonging to the said copartnership.
The object of the association was, to use the language of
one of its printed rules, "the extension of the Kingdom of the
Lord Jesus Christ among young men and the development of
their spiritual life and mental powers." It was composed of
mE-mbers and associates. The number of members did not
exceed twenty. Any person was eligible for membership
"who gave decided evidence of his conversion 't o God," but,
before he could become a member, be must be proposed and
seconded by two members of the association and elected by
the committee on their being satisfied as to his suitability.
Trustees for the time being in whom the real property belong·
ing to the association was vested became members by virtue
of their appointment as trustees. Members were required to
subscribe three shillings per annum. The affairs of the asso-
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ciation were in the bands of a general committee of management, consisting of a president, two vice presidents, a treasurer, two secretaries, and at least nine members. The
committee had power to suspend or expel any member whose
conduct was found inconsistent in their judgment with the
Christian character. The agencies for the attainment of the
objects of the· association were, 1st, the . personal efforts of
the m-embers; 2d, devotional meetings; 3d, social meetings;
4th, classes for Biblical instruction; 5th, the delivering of
addresses and lectures; and, 6th, the diffusion of Christian
and other suitable literature.
Before the first of the offenses charged against the prisoner
was committed, the members of the association· proposed to
build and afterward built a ball or place of meeting for the
purposes of the association at a cost of nearly £200, of which
about £40 was still owing. To this building every member
had the right of entry and was entitled to a latch-~ey.
The prisoner became a member of the association in 1878,
and had continued to be a member up to the time of the trial.
As and being such member he solicited and obtained for the
-Hsociation from divers persons many sums of money as donations or subscriptions on account of and for the general purposes of the association, toward the building fund, and toward
the liquidation of the aforesaid debt of £40. Three of these
sums it was that the prisoner was charged with and found
guilty of embezzling.
If the association was a copartnership within the meaning
of 31 & 32 Viet. c. 116, s. 1, the conviction was to stand
aft:irmed.1 If it was not the conviction was to be reversed.

Walton, for the prisoner.
The only question is whether this aseociation is a copartnership. The
terms of the statute clearly show that the copartnerships contemplated
thereby are copartnerships in the ordinary esnae of the term, viz., for the
J 31 and 32 Viet. c. 116, a. 1, provides that "it any person being a mem•
ber of any copartnership, or being one of two or more beneficial owners of
any money, goode or effects, etc., shallste11l or embezzle any such money,
goode or effects, etc., of or belonging to any such copartnership or to such
joint beneficial owners, every such person shall be liable to be dealt with,
tried, convicted and punished for the same aa if such person had not been
or waa not a member ot such copartnership or one of such beneficial
owners."

.--.. ~
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purpoee of eain or profit. Lmour, L. J., in hia work on Partnership, p.
l,eivee an explanation of the term "partnership," which showa that the
neoeesaey idea of a partnership is that it should have for ita object the
acquisition and dirieion of gain. He says: "Without attempting to define
the terms • partners' and 'partnership.' it will aumce to point out u
accurately u poaeible the leading ideas involved in tbeee words. The
terma in question are evidently derived from to part in the •enae of to
divide amongst or share; and this at once limite their application, although
not very preoieely: for peraoDB may share almost anything imaginable,
and may do eo either by agreement or otherwise. But, in order that per·
eons may be partners in the legal acceptlon of the word, it is requisite that
they shall share eomething by virtue of an agreement to that effect, and
that that which they have agreed to ahare shall be the profit arising from
aome predetermined busineea engaged in for their oommon benefit; ..••
to use the word 'partnership' to denote a aooiety not formed for gain is to
destroy the value of the word, and can only lead to oonfusion. Nor ie it
ooneieteot with modern usage. Lord HALt: and older writers use oopar~
oerehip in the 1181188 of co-ownership, but this is no longer customary, and,
u will be ahowo hereafter, there are many important differences between
the two." This is not an BBBOciation for the purpoeee of profit or gain.
Lord CoL'£Btooa, 0. J. The only point reserved ia whe,her this ie a oopartnerehip. The prisoner wu not indicted u one of 11everal joint beneficial OWD8l'L

No counsel appeared for the prosecution.
J. It seems to me that this conviction
cannot be supported. I cannot find any authority throwing
any doubt on the accuracy of the passage in Lindley on Partnership, which makes the participation in profits essential.to
the English idea of ·partnership, and states that, although in
former times the word "copartnership" was used in the sense
of "co-ownership," the modern usage bas been to confine the
meaning of the term to societies formed for gain. A number
of definitions given by writers from all parts of the wor·ld are
appended to the passage, and in all of thee the idea involved
appears to be that of joint operation for the sake of gain.
The associBtion in the present case is not a copartnership in
any sense of the word into which the notion of co-operation
for the purpose of gain enters. We must construe the word
•'copartnership" as used in the act acc~rding to the meanin~-t
ordinarily attached to it by the decisions and text-books on
the subject. This a.__ociation does n?t come within that
meaning. The only point reserved for us is whether this asso·
-dation is a copartnership within the act. Inasmuch as we
are of opiuton that it is not, the conviction muHt be re\"ers~.
Lord

CoLERIDGE, C.

.
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DBINMAN, J. I am of the same opinion. The word Hcopartnership" in the act must be construed according to the well·
known legal meaning of the term. If the section had only
mentioned the case of a copartnership I should have thought
it impossible to say that this case was within the statute.
The conclusion to which we come is, in my opinion, much
strengthened by the fact that the section contains another
expression which covers the case of co-ownership where there
is no copartnership. Here we are dealing only with the term
"copartnership," for the only question reserved . is whether
this association was a copartnership within the section. I am
clearly .of the opinion that it was not.
FIELD, HAWKINS, and WILLS, JJ., concurred.
Conviction reversed.
Nou: See Mechem'• Elem. of Partn., § § 'J, 7 and oasee there cited.

BURT vs. LATHROP.

Supreme Court of Michigan, 1883.
62 Mich. 106, 17 N. W. Rep. 716.

Error to Wayne. Plaintiff appeals.
0. 0. B-urt, in pro. per., and John Atkinson, for plaintiff and
appeJlant.
0 • .A.. Kent and Julian G. Dickinson, for defendants.

CAMPBJIILL, J. ·Plaintiff sued a large number of defendants
as jointly liable to him for his services as attorney in defending some patent suits ce>ncerning the rights to use certain
hard-rubber material in dentistry. He declared speciaJJy and
with the common counts fe>r these services, and also set up
two judgments rendered in Jat-kson ce>unty for the same caus~s
of action. Upon trial the court below e>r<!ered a verdict for
defendants. The counts which describe the judgments do net
eet them eut in such a way as to make out any legal liability
und~r them ag<tinst all these defend~nts, hnd the proofs are
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not any more definite. It appears affirmatively that no jurisdiction existed to bind more than a part of them, and there
can be nothing claimed for them under the issue as presented.
They may, therefore, be laid aside. The ground for asserting
a claim against the defendants jointly is that they are claimed
to have become members of an association combined for the
purpose of legal resistance to the claims of a patentee, and
that plaintiff was employed by their officers.
There is no testimony tending to show any immediate per·
sonal employment of plaintiff by the defendants, jointly or
individual(y, so as to justify this joint action. But it was
claimed that they stood on the footing of partners, bound by
the action of their designated ~anaging ~embers. The testimony indicates that several of the defendants, at various times,
became members of an association which, so far as pertinent
to this inquiry, required them to pay five dollars each into
the treasury, and to pay such assessments as should be levied
pro rata, on pain of being left out of the asso,ciation and its
privileges. The officers were to employ counsel, and money
was to be paid on the order of the president and secretary.
We can find in this arrangement nothing analogous to a
partnership. There was no common business, and nothing
involving profit and loss in a business sense. No one was
empowered to make contracts binding on the sub.s cribers per·
sonally, and no -one was to be liable ex~ept for assessment",
nor even for those except as he saw fit to pay them to keep
his membership. It was nothing more than a combination
which may have made the parties in some respects responsible
to each other, but which did not, we think, authorize any contract with third persons which should bind any member personally beyond his assessments. As plaintiff was not only
aware of the articles, but showed that he acted under them
and in furtherance of them in various ways, no question arises
in the nature of an equitable estoppel. ·we are not concerned
on this record to consider whether plaintiff has any other
adequate means of securing compensation. The only question now is whether these defendants are his joint debtors.
We think they are not.
The judgment must be affirmed with costL
(The other justices concurred.)
NOTII: See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., '§ 7.

•
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DUNHAM vs. LOVEROCK.
S ·upreme Oourl of Pennsylvania, 1893.
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138 P&. St. 197, 27 Atl. Rep. 990, &3 Am. St. Rep. 888.

Dunham and Loverock were tenants in common of a leasehold ~tate in oil lands. Dunham drilled a new well in pursuance of an agreement with Loverock to that effect. DunhaiD
claimed a balance due to hlm from Loverock on account of the
well. In the meantime one Pickett bought Loverock's half of
the property, and Dunham alleged that he and Loverock were
partners, and therefore that Pickett took subject to a se~tle
ment of the accounts between Loverock and the ftrm. The
court below held that there was no partnership and Dunham
appealed.
Roger Sherman and Samuel Grumbine; for appellant.
George 8. O,riBwell and J. W. Lee, for appellee•.
WILLIAMS, J.
(After stating the facts.) No ·contract of
partnership, written or oral, is shown, but it is contended that a
partnership resulted from the agreement to drill another well
on the leasehold at the common cost of the owners. It must be
remembered that this question is not raised between third persons and the tenants in common, but inter sese. What other
persons may have thought, or in what manner they may have
charged goods furnished for the work on the well, is not now
the question; but what was the actual fact as between themselves? When the new well was proposed they were simply
tenants in common of the ten acres covered by the lease,
and of the well and machinery thereon. As such they con·
tributed to the cost of operating the well, and divided the
product. The new well was on the same lease. It was to
the interest of each of the cotenants that · it should be put
down, and it was an undertaking which was appropriate to
tenants in common, since it would increase tle product of
the common property. In the absence of a distinct agreement
between them that their relations to the property and to each
other should be changed, the presumption is that the old rel~-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 16:46 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112102486216
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

DUNHAK VB. LOVEROOK.

7

tion continued, and that they treated with each other as own·
ers of separate interests in an undivided lease.
It is elementary law that a partnership is created onlJ by a
contract, express or implied. The burden of showing its exist·
ence is on him who alleges it, and this burden the court below
rightly held had not been lifted by the plaintiff. To be sUl'e
there was undivided possession of the lease, but unity of possE>s·
sion is one of the distinguishing characteristics of a tenan9 in
common. There was contribution to the cost of operating the
well, but this could be compelled between tenants in common
by bill or by account render. · There was division of the prod·
net, but this was in accordance with .the rights of the co-ten· .
ants. Each had a right to share in the product in proportion
to his interest in the estate. It may be said that there was a
resulting division of profits, since, if the product exceeded the
cost of production, there was a profit to each part owner; but if
so it was shown by the settlement of his individual accounts
only, and grew out of the fact that he received from his share
of the product more than it cost hlm to secure ft.
So ~t may be :said there was a contribution to losses, since
each tenant sustained a loss when the value of his share of the
produce fell below its cost to him, but this was the individual
Joss of each, with which no on~ else had any concern, and to
which no one was bound to contribute. There is, therefore, no
circumstance relating to the business done upon, or the development of, the lease not fairly and naturally referable to the
relations the parties sustained to each other as tenants in com·
mon. There is no agreement shown that tenants in common
might not properly mak~ with each other for the development
of the property iin which each held a separate title, but an undivided possession. Between persons w situated a partnership
does not result by implication of law. It must be created by
agreement. As we fully agree with the court below that no
such agreement was shown, it is not necessary to consider the
authorities cited by the learned master, and by counsel to their
printeu briefs, showing what are the ordinary indicia of a part·
nership. There can be no controversy over such questions iu
this case, for the plaintiff fails for want of proof sufficient to
furnish a foothold for him on the facts. Tenants in common
may become partners, like other persons, where they agree to
assume that relation towards each other; but the law will not
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oreate the relation for them as the consequence of a course of
conduct and dealing naturally referable to a relation already
existing between them, which made such a course of conduct
to their common advantage. The plaintiff and defendants,
upon the facts before us, were tenants in common.
Affirmed.
·

.

NoTJC: See Mecbem'a Elem. of Partn., § 8, and casee there cited. See
a1ao Coope v. E11re post, p. 64.

EATON vs. W ALI~ER.
Supreme Court of Michigan, 1889.
76 Mlcb. 579, 48 N. W. Rep. 638.

This action was brought by Eaton against Walker, Hop·
kina and Livingston, to recover the sum of f3,562.68, alleged
to be due from them. There was no dispute as to the amount.
The defense was that the debt was contracted by and due
from the corporation of Walker, Hopkins & Co., of which the
defendants were the members, but which bad become insolvent.
Prior to the organization of Walker, Hopkins & Co., the defend·
ant Walker, with others, bad carried on a partnership busi·
ness under the firm name of Walker, Summer & Co. Plaintiff
had bad dealings with both concel'ns. Hopkins and Livingston
had no connection with the business of Walker, Summer &
Co. Defendants had assumed to organize as a corporation
under a statute purporting to authorize such organization, and
had done all that was neeessary to comply with the statute.
Defendants Livingston and Hopkins had paid in cash for their
stock, and Walker had turned in the assets of Walker, Summer & Co., of which he had ber.ome the owner. The coun
below found that the plaintiff had dealt with Walker, Hopkins
& Co., as a corporation, and that the debt sued upon was due
from the corporation as such. The plaintiff contended that
the statute under which defendants had assumed to organize
as a corporation was unconstitutional, because it violated th<~
constitutional provision that "no law shall embrace more than
one object, which shall be embraced in its title." The Supreme
Court held the statute unconstitutional for this reason.
Henry M. Duffield, for plnintiff and appellant.
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Dick,inson, Thurber and Stevenson, and F. H. Canfield, for,

defendants.
LoNG, J. (After declaring the statute unconstitutional.)
Defendants' counsel, however, insist that Walker, Hopkins _
& Co. were a corporation de facto, if not de jure. But there
being no valid law of this State under which the defendants
could legalJy be incorporated, could they, even colorably,
become a corporation, or have any existence as a corporation
de facto, or would the plahiti1f be estopped from inquiry into
their corporate existence under such circumstances? Two
things are necessary to be shown in order to establish a corporation de facto, viz.: (1) The existence of a charter or some
law under which a corporation, with the powers assumed,
might lawfully be created; and (2) a user by the party to the
suit of the rights claimed to be conferred by such charter or law.
Bank vs. Stearns, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 314. If the law exists, and
the record exhibits a bona fide attempt to organize under it,
very slight evidence of user beyond this is all that can be
required. Methodist Church vs. Pickett, 19 N.Y. 487. In Heaston vs. Ra-ilroad Oo., 16 Ind. 275, 79 Am. Dec. 430, the court
says: "The estoppel goes to the mere de facto organization;
not to the question of legal authority to make an organization.
A de facto corporation, that by regularity of organization might
be one de jure, can sue and be sued. And a person who contracts with such corporation while it is acting under its de
facto organization~who contracts with it as an organized cor·
poration-is estopped, in a suit on such contract, to deny its
de facto organization at the date of the contract; but this docs
not extend to the question of legal power to organize. Hence,
if an organization is completed where there is no law, or an
unconstitutional law, authorizing an organization as a corporation, the doctrine ,o f estoppel does not apply." The same
rule was laid down by implication by this court in Stoartwout
.,,, Railroad Oo., 24 Mich. 393, as follows: "Wb~re there is thus
a corporation de facto, with no want of legislative power to
Its due and legal existence; where it is proceeding in the performance of corporate functions, and the public are dealing
with it on the supposition that it is what it professes to be;
and the questions suggested are only whether there has been
exact regularity and strict compliance with the provisions of
the law relating to incorporation,-it is plainly a dictate, alike
2
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of Justice and of publfc policy, that in controversies between
the de facto corporation and those who have entered into con·
tract relations with It, as corporators or otherwise, such
questions should not be suffered to be raised." And again it was
laid: ''But both in reason and on authority the ruling should
be the same where an attempt bas been made to organize a
corporation under a general law permitting it. If due authority existed for the organization, and the question is one of
regularity merely, 'the rule established by law, as well as reason, is that parties, recognizing the existence of corporations
by dealing with them, have no right to object to any irregularity in their organization.'" In the present case, however,
there was no law authorizing the parties to file their articles
of association, or to become incorporated; and there could,
under such circumstances, be no corporation de facto. It can·
not, therefore, in any proper legal sense, be said that the carryJog on of the business in the corporate name is evidence of
user which can be considered in aid of their legal corporate
existence.
Counsel for the defendants contend that the case of Bank
"'· Stone, 38 Mich. 779, is decisive of this case. In that case
the defendants claimed to be incorporated a.s the Charles Stone
Timber Company. It appeared that the plaintiff transacted
a large amount of business with the defendants, upon the
Apecific understanding that the concern was contracting as a
corporation, and not otherwise; and this court said: "Now,
the proof that, as matter of fact, t~e company carried on business as a corporation in the name of the Charles Stone Timber
Company when the bank dealt with it, established, pdma fac:ie.
that it was a corporation pursuant to law; and certainly th·e
evidence the bank adduced in regard to the operations of the
company, the attitude it maintained, and the character in
which the two concerns dealt together, showed that fhe company was a corporation de facto, and so acknowledged by the
bank." In the present case the plaintiff offered evidence to
show that he never knew, or bad any information, that the
defendants claimed that Walker, Hopkins & Co. were a corporation, but, on the contrary, that Mr. Walker, of that firm,
asked him to continue his business with the firm as he had
carried it on formerly with Walker, Summer & Co., and that
the firm was composed of himself, William Livingston, Jr.,
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and Mark Hopkins, Jr., and that he always believed and onder·
stood that Walker, Hopkins & Co. were a firm. This testi·
mony the court below excluded. In addition to this, and upon
this point, this case differs radically from the case of Bank vs.
StCJnC. The whole facts show that the firm never had any cor·
}lOrate existence, and never was a corporation, even de facto.
It Is very evident to us that the facts here presented do not
bring this case within the ruling of the former case. In the
present case, as in that, the name would not indicate that tb(>
firm was a corporation. It gave no clue to the nature of the
company as being corporated or unincorporated, and there is no
pretense of proof that the plaintiff dealt with it as a corpora·
tion, exoopt the fact that defendants were doingousiness as a
corporation, and had published such fact in two of the Detroit
papers, and mailed circulars to their customers announcing that they had organized as a corporation under the laws
of the State of Michigan, and also that their lettcr heads
showed this fact, some of the circulars being mailed to plaint·
iff, and the corporation having also sent by mail statem(>nts of
Its accounts to plaintiff written upon such letter heads. The
plaintiff testified that he had no recollection of receiving such
circulars, or of ever having seen such announcements in the
public press. Plaintiff also testified that be had no recollection
of ever having received any letter heads containing the information that defendants were a corporation; and it appears
that when the account was made up by defendants showing
their indebtedness to plaintiff, and transmitted to him, it waa
upon the letter head of 'Valker, Summer & Co., which did not
contain a10y showing that Walker, Hopkins & Co. were a corporation. Plaintiff's counsel also offered to show by the testimony of the plaintiff that Mr. " 'alker solicited the plaintiff
to do business with.Walker, Hopkins & Co., stating to him that
it was a partnership composed of Walker, Li;ingston, and
Mark Hopkins, Jr., and that in the faith of that statement
the plaintiff commenced business with them: . This testimony
the court excluded. Defendants' counsel, however; contend
that inasmuch as the trial court found as a fact that ·wan~er,
Hopkins & Co. were a corporation. and that during the time it
continued to do business plaintiff bad full knowledge that they
were a corporation, and not a copartnership, and continued to
do business with them as a corporation, such finding is con-
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olnsive, and will not be disturbed by this court. It would be
true that, if there was any proof to support the finding, this
court would be bound by it, though, upon the facts, it might
not be able to agree with the circuit court in its conclusions.
But the fact is made to appear, by the evidence returned, that
the court excluded the evidence of the plaintiff that be did not
know that they were a corporation, and did not deal with them
as such, but was infonned by Walker that they were a partnership, and dealt with them in the belief that they were a partnership; and yet the court below finds, under the evidence
which defendants were permitted to offer, that plaintiff did
deal with them as a corporation, and bad full knowledge that
they were such, and bases such finding and conclusion upon
the fact that defendants published the statements in the puhlic
press, and mailed circulars and letter beads to plaintiff which
it is not shown be ever received. Under such circumstances,
the court was in error in excluding the testimony, and we think
there is no proof to sustain the finding.
It is undoubtedly well settled that a person who bas entered
tnto contract relations with a de facto corporation cannot, in an
action thereon, deny its corporate character, or set up any
informality in its organization, to defeat the action. The distinction between :such cases and the present one is to my mind
clear. If there bad been any law under which defendants had
a right to incorporate, and the offer bad been to show a mere
abuse or excess of its corporate powers, or had it appeared that
it was a de facto corporation, and the question related to the
regularity of its organization merely, there could be no doubt
that the plaintiff would be estopped from questioning its corporate existence. But the two things necessary to show a
corporation, even de facto, do not exist. There is no law under
which the powers they assumed might lawfully be created;
and the mere fact that they assumed to act as such, even in
the full belief that they were legally incorporated, would not
constitute them a corporation de facto.
It is admitted upon this record that an indebtedness was due
to the plaintiff in the sum of $3,562.68 at the date of the trial,
July 19, 1888, and plaintiff seeks to bold defendants liable
therefor as partners, and in this contention we think be ia
right. The defendants were not a corporation. They bad asso·
ciated together, each sharing the profits and losses of the busi-
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ness equally, according to the money each put in as capital
stock, each holding and owning one-third part of the shares.
The fact that they took counsel and acted in good faith in
orgenizing under what they were advised was a valid law
does not relieve them of their liability. It is well settled that
obligors are bound, not by the style which they give to themselves, but by the consequences which they incur by reason of
their acts. They have ha~ the beneftt of the plaintiff's means;
they are indebted to him, aa is conceded; but have sought to
shift individual liability to a corporate one. There is no such
corporation, and the mere fact that defendants assumed to
act as such does not relieve them from personal liability. Under
the circumstances of this case the defendants must be held
liable as partners. The judgment of the court below must be
set aside and vacated, and judgment entered here in favor
of plaintiff for the sum of f3,562.68, with interest from July
27, 1883, being the date when the parties, claiming to be a corporation, made an assignment for the benefit of their creditors,
together with costs of both this and the circuit court.
and CHAMPLIN, JJ., concurred with LoNG, J.
SHERWOOD, C. J., and MORSE, J., did not sit.
CAMPBELL

Nora: Compare with the two oa11ea followina.

FINNEGAN vs. NOERENBERG.
Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1893.
52 Mlna 239, 58 N. W. Rep. 1150, 38 Am, St. R~p. 55!?, 18 L. R. A. 778.

This was an action to recover of the defendant for the debts
of a Building Association upon the ground that the association
bad failed to become a corporation and, therefore, the associates were liable as partners. The court below held the defendant not liable. Plaintiff appealed.

Savage & Purdy, for appellant.
Ankeny &

If"!M~

GILFILLAN, C.

for defendant.

J. Eight persons 1igned, acknowledged, and
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caused to be tiled and recorded in the office of the city clerk
in Minneapolis, articles assuming and purporting to form,
n:nder Laws 1870, c. 29, a corporation, for the purpose, as specified in them, of "buying,owning,improving,selling!and leasing
of lands, tene~nts, and hereditaments, real, personal, and
mixed estates and property, including the construction and
leasing of a building in the city of Minneapolis, Minn., as a
hall to aid and carry out the genera~ purposes of the. organization known as the 'Knights of Labor.'" The association
received subscriptions to its capital stock, elected directors
and a board of managers, adopted by-laws, bought a lot,
erected a building on it, and, when completed, rented different
parts of it to different parties. The plaintiff furnished plumbing for the building during its construction, amounting to
$599.50, for which he brings this action against several subscribers to the stock, as copartners doing business under the
firm name of the "K. of L. Building Association." The theory
upon which the action is brought is that, the association having
failed to become a corporation, it is in law a partnership, and
the members liable as partners for the debts incurred by it.
It is claimed that the association was not an incorporation
because-First, the act under which it attempted to become
incorporated, to wit, laws 1870, c. 29, is void, because its subject is not properly expressed in the title; second, the act does
not authorize the formation of corporations for the purpose or
to transact the business stated in the articles; third, the place
where the business was to be carried on was not distinctly
stated in the articles, and they had, perhaps, some other minor
defects.
It is unnecessary to consider whether this was a de jure corporation, so that it could defend against a quo warranto, or an
action in the nature of quo warran.to, in beh:1.lf of the State;
for, although an association may not be able to justify itself
when called on by the State to show by what authority it
assu~s to be, and act as, a corporation, it may be so far a
corporation, that, for reasons of public policy, no one but the
State will be permitted to call in question the lawfulness of its
organization. Such is what is termed a corporation de factothat is, a corporation from the fact of its acting as such.
though not in law or of right a corporation. What is essential
to constitute a body of men a de facto corporation is state~ by
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SET.DEN, J., in Methodist, etc.. Church vs. Pickett, 19 N. Y. 482,
as "(1) the existence of a charter or some law under which a corporation with the powers al).-3Urned mig:.t lawfully be created; and (2) a user by the party to the suit of the rights
claimed to be conferred by such charter or law." This statement was apparently adopted by this court in East Noncay
Ch-urch vs. Froisl-ie, 37 Minn. 447, 35 N. W. Rep. 260; but, as it
leaves out of account any attempt to organize under the charter or taw, we think the statement of what is essential defective. The definition in Taylor on Private Corporations (page
145) is more nearly accurate: "When a body of men are acting
as a corporation, under color of apparent organization, in pursuance of some charter or e1_1abling act, their authority to act
as a corporation cannot be questioned collaterally." To give
a body of men assuming to act as a corporation, where there
has been no attempt to comply with the provisions of any law
authorizing them to become such, the status of a de facto corporation might open the door to frauds upon the public. It
would certainly be impolitic to permit a number of men to
have the status of a corporation to any extent merely becaus'~
there is a law under which they might have become incorporated, and they have agreed among themselves to act, and
they have acted, as a corporation. That was the condition in
Johnson t'S. Corser, 34 Minn. 355, 25 N. W. Rep. 799, in which
it was held that w-hat had been done was ineffectual to limit
the individual liability of the associates. They had not gone
far enough to become a de facto corporation. They had merely
signed articles, but ha~ not attempted to give them publicity
by filing for record, which the statute required. "Color of
apparent organization under some charter or enal)ling act"
does not mean that there shall have been a full compliance with
what tbe law requires to be done, nor a substantial compliance.
A substantial compliance will make a corporation de jure. But
there must be an apparent attempt to perfect an organization
under the law. There being such apparent attempt to perfect
an organization the failure as to some substantial requirement
will prevent the body being a corporation de jure; but, if there
be user pursuant to such attempted organization, it will not
prevent it being a corporation de facto.
(The court then discussed the alleged invalidity of the act
to authorize the formation of such a corporation, and held
the act valid for that purpose.)
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The omission to state distinctly in the articles the place
within which the business is to be carried on, though that
night be essential to make it a de jure corporation, would
not prevent it becomil"g one de facto. The foundation for a
de facto corporation having been laid by the attempt to organ·
ize under the law, the user shown waa sufficient.
Judgment affirmc.d.
NOTa: Compare with the preoediq and following oaeee.

KAISER vs. LAWRENCE SAVINGS BANK.
Supn~me
~6

Oourt of Iowa, 1881.

Iowa 104, 8 N. W. Rep. 772, 41 Am. Rep. 83.

Action by Kaiser against a number of persons, of whom
Hoag alone waa served with process to hold them liable as
partners doing business aa the Lawrence Savings Bank.
Defense that the bank was a corporation under the laws of
Kansas, and that therefore the defendant waa not personally liable. Verdict for plaintiff and Hoag appeals.
Hanna, Fitzgerald & Hughes, for appellant.
Hoffman, Pickler & Brown, and L. M. Fisher, for appellee.
ADAMS, 0. J. The e-ridenoe tends to show that certain
individuals attempted in good faith to become incorporated
under the laws of Kansas for the purpose of doing business
as a savings bank, and subscribed for shares in the supposed
corporation. For several years they did business as a sa-ring~
bank, under the nupposition that they were duly incorporated.
Prior to the time that plaintiff became a creditor of the bank,
the defendant Hoag purchased an interest in the bank, and
remained the owner of such interest from that time forward.
The question presented is whether the shareholders so far complied with the incorporation law~ of Kansas as to become
incorporated and secure an exemption from inoividual liability,
and if they did not strictly become incorporated whether the

KAISBB
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fact that they did business as a corporation, not only with
the general public but with the plaintiff, was suttcient to
secure to them. exemption from individual liability.
(The court here considered the statutory requirements nod
held that the papers executed and filed by the shareholders
were defective both in form and substanee.)
The defendant insists, however, that in order to establish
·the corporate existence of the LawrE•nce Savings llank as
against plaintiff it is sufficient to show authority to create the
corporation, a bona fide attempt on the part of the corporators to become incorporated, and the doing of business as a
corporation. In support of this proposition the defendant cites
The Buffalo ~ .A.lleffhany Railroad Co. v. Cary, 26 ~. Y. 77.
In that case the court said, "that if the papers fileC: are colorable, but so defective that, in a proce£>ding on the part of the
State against it, it would for that reason be dissolved, yet
by the acts of user under such organization it becomes a col'·
poration de facto, and no advantage can be·taken of snch defect
in its constitution collaterally by any person." Substantially
the same doctrine was enunciated in Krutz -vs. The Paola, Tor.cn
Co., 20 Kan. 403, and Pape va. The Capitol Bank, 20 Kan. 440, 27
Am. ~p. 182. It should be observed, however, that in th(}Se
cases the defendant set up a want of incorporation of the
plaintiff and sought to escape liability upon that ground. In
the case at bar the defendant sets up, exemption, averring that
the attempt to become incorporated and the doing of business
under a claim of incorporation were sufficient to create .the
exemption.
It will be seen at once that the principle involved in tho~e
cases is essentially different from that in the case at bar.
It is hardly necessary to say that where incorporation has
once taken place no act of forfeiture can be set up in a
collateral action, until forfeiture has been judicially declared
in an action brought for that purpose. See Angell & Ames on
Corporations, Sec. 636, and cases cited. But the principle
involved in those cases is essentially different from that in
the case at bar.
In Humphreys va. Mooney, 5 Colorado, 282, a creditor of an
assumed corporation sought to hold a member as a partner.
It was held that as his right of action was based upon an
express contract with the assumed corporation he was
8
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estopped to deny that it was in fact a corporation. The doc·
trine of that case is subst....ntially that rdied upon by the
defendant. But it seems to us that it is not sustained by
the weight of authority. The court cited in support of the
decision, Eaton vs. Aspinwall, 19 N. Y. 121, and Buffalo, eto.,
R. R. Co. vs. Cary, 26 N. Y. 77, but neither of the cases, it
appears to us, is in point.
There may, indeed, be certain irregularities, or omissions
to comply with pro\isions merely directory, which would be
sufficient to sustain an action brought to declare a forfeiture,
but insufficient to su,gtain a collateral action brought to
enforce an individual liability of a member. But where the
attempt at incorporation is under a general law, and there
is a non-compliance with the law in a material respect, there
is, we think, such want of incorporation that exemption from
individual liability is not secured. In Mokelumne Hill Min·
ing Co. vs. Woodbury, 14 Cal. 424, 73 Am. Dec. 658, the court
said: "There is a broad and obvious distinction between such
acts as are declared to be necessary steps in the process of
incorporation, and such as required of the individuals seeking to become incorporated, but which are not made prerequisites to the assumption of corporate powers. In respect to the
former, any material omission will be fatal to the f.Xistence
of the corporation, and may be taken advantage of collaterally
in any form in which the fact of incorporation can properly
be called in question."
I[u·r t vs. Salisbury, 55 Mo. 310, was an action brought upon
a promissory note purporting to be executed by the directon
of the North Missouri Central District Stock, Agricultural and
Mechanical Association. The action was brought against the
directors upon the ground that t~e association was not incorporated at the time the note was given, and that the directors
were, therefore, individually liable. It appeared that the association at the time the note was given was fully incorporated
in every respect except that it had failed to file its articles
of incorporation with the secretary of state, as the statutes
required. It was held that the directors were individually
liable.
In Bigelow vs. Gregory. et aZ., 73 Ill. 197, the defendants were
held liable as partners for goods sold to an assumed corporation of which they were members. The defect in the

....,.
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lncox-Poration consisted in a failure to file the articles of incorporation with the clerk of the city where the corporation was
to transact its business.
In that case the court said: "There is a manifest difference
where a corporation is created by a special charter, and there
have been acts of user, and where individuals seek to form
themselves into a corporation under a general law. In the
latter case it is only in pursuance of the provisions of the
statute for such purpose that corporate existence can be
acquired. And there would seem to be a distinction between
a case where, in a suit between a corporation and a stockholder or other individuals, the plea of nul tiel corporation
is set up to defeat a liability which he may have contracted
with the other, and the case of a suit against individuals who
claimed exemption from individual liability on the ground of
their having become a corporation formed under the provisions of a general statute. In the latter case a stricter measure of compliance with statutory requirements will be required
than in the former." This is a late decision, and seems to
have been made with a full recognition of the authorities
claimed to bold an adverse doctrine.
See also, Abbott vs. Omaha Smelting Co., 4 Neb. 416, and
Harris 1:18. McGregor, 29 Cal. 125.
In our opinion, the proprietol'B of the Lawrence Savings
Bank failed to become incorporated, and there was nothing
in what they did or claimed wh_ich can properly be held as
auftlcient to secure them exemption from individual liability.
The judgment, therefore, of the District Court must be
a:f!irmed.
NOT~~:: For other oasee upon the question whether the members of a
defect.ive!y orpnized corporation are liable u partners, ... Mechem's
Elem. of Partn., §§ 10-11.
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GUCKERT vs. HACKE, et al.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1898.
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159 Pa. St. 803,

2~

Atl. 249.

Appeal from Court of Common Pleas Allegheny Co., Porter,
Judge.
At the trial before Porter, J., it appeared that plaintiff entered into a contract to make some alterations and repairs in a
building occupied by the Hughes & Gawthrop Co., composed
of Paul H. Hacke, C. C. Hughes, J. B. George and E. B.
Gawthrop. In October, 1~90, a certificate of incorporation in
proper form was presented by The Hughes & Qawthrop Co., ·
to the Governor asking for a charter. The certificate was
approved and letters patent were duly issued. All the details
of the act of April 29, 1874, P. L . 'i7, were complied with
excepting only the recording of the certificate in the recorder's
office of Allegheny county. The certificate was not recorded
until June, 18fll. In the meantime plaintiff without knowledge
of these steps looking to incorporation made the contract with
Gawthrop upon which he sued defendants as partners. The
other facts sufficiently appear from the opinion.
From a judgment against defendant Gawthrop and in favor
of the other defendants plaintiff appealed.

Robb & Fitzsimmons, for appellant.
RobertS. Frazer, for appellees.
STERRETT, C. J. It is essential to the creation of a corporation un~er an enabling statute that all material provisions should
be substantially followed; and, exemption from personal liability being one of the chief characteristics distinguishing corporations from partnerships and unincorporated joint stock companies, it follows that those who transact business upon the
strength of an organization which is materially defective are
individually liable, as partners, to those with whom they have
dealt. What provisions are material must be gathered from the
relation of each to the purpose and scope of the act; and when,

..----
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therefore, successive steps are prescribed for the creation of
corpora't ions these must obviously be regarded as imperative.
Enabling statutes, on the principle of expressio uni'lts est
exclusio alterius, impliedly prohibit any other mode of doing
the act which they authorize; they mm~t be strictly construed:
Sutherland on Stat. Construction, Sec. 454. Hence it bas been
uniformly held that requirements in respect of filing charters
are imperative: Childs V8. Smith, 55 Barb. 45; Smith vs.
Warden, 86 Mo. 382; Abbott vs. Smelting Co., 4 Neb. 416;
Beach on Corporations, Sec. 162.
.
It is plain even from a cursory reading of the act of April
29, 1874, P. L. 77, that recording of the certificate ''in the
office for the recording of deeds, in and for the county where
the chief operations are to be carried on," was intended to be
made one of the conditions precedent to corporate existence.
That was the last of successive steps tequired to be taken, and
the right to begin the transaction of corporate business was
ma4e to depend upon the taking of that step. ''From thenceforth," the act expresRly declares, the subscribers and their
associates and successors "shaH be a corporation for the purposes and upon the terms named in the said charter." One of
the purposes of the act being exemption from personal liability in the transaction of business, it is obviously material that
the public should have notice, and notice by record was accordingly prescribed. Failure to record was failure to comply with
one of the express conditions of incorporation, and consequently
of exemption from liability.
It may be conceded that had plaintiff dealt with defendants
as a corporation he would have been estopped from claiming
against them in any other capacity, even though they failed to
record their charter: Spah-r vs. Bank, 94 Pa. 429. But it is
not pretended that he had any knowledge of the existence of
the charter; and there was certainly nothing, either in the
name under which tbey did business or in their conduct, which
should have put him upon inquiry. In these circumstances be
was amply justified in dealing with them as partners. It was
through their default-not his-that they were so treated; and
it would be manifest injustice that he should lose his admittedly
honest claim.
In the absence of an expresR agreement the acceptance of a
note from the defendants, as a corporation, after plaintiff had
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performed his part of the contract, cannot operate by way of
election or estoppel. The relation of the parties was fixed by
their status when the original contract was made and cannot
be changed by gratuitous inference. The members of the
alleged corporation were the defendants, and were not injured
by the acceptance of the note. The principle which treats the
acceptance of a note as additional security to and not as satisfaction of a mechanic's lien (Jones vs. Sha-w han, 4 W. & S.
257) is, with even more justice, applicable here.
It follows from what has been said that the instructions complained of are erroneous.
Judgment reversed and a venire facias de novo awarded.
NOTE.- See Mechem's Elements of Partn.,

OWENSBORO WAGON CO.

§~

10, 11.

YS.

BLISS, et al.

Supreme Court of Alabama, 1901.
132 Ala. 253; 31 So. 81.

Appeal from circuit court, Lauderdale county; E. B. Almon,
Judge.
Action by the Owensboro Wagon Company against R. L.
Bliss and others. From a judgment in favor of the d~fend
an1:.8, the plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

John T. Ashcraft and Robt. E. Simpson, for appellant.
C. E. Jordan and Emmet 0' Neal, for appellees.
HARALSON, J. "A corporation de facto exists, when from
irregularity or defect in the organization or constitution, or
from some omission to comply with the conditions precedent, a
corporation de jure is not created, but there has been a colorable compliance with the requirements of some law under which
an association might be lawfully incorporated for the purposes
and powers assumed, and a user of the rights claimed to be
conferred by the law-when there is an organization with
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color of law, and the exercise of corporate franchises." Snider'& Sons' Co. vs. Troy, 91 Ala. 224, 8 South. 658, 11 L. R.
A. 515, 24 Am. St. Rep. 1:387; Central Agricultural & ·.ltfe
chanical Ass'n vs. Alabama Gold L~fe Ins. Co., 70 Ala. 120.
" Corporations may exist either de jure, or de facto. If of
the latter class, they are under the protection of the same law,
and governed by the same legal principles as those of the former,
so long as the State acquiesces in their existence and exercise of
corporate functions. A private citizen, whose rights are not
invaded, who has no cause of complaint, has no right to inquire
collaterally into the legality of its existence. This can only be.
done, by a. direct proceeding on the part of the State, from
whom is derived the right to exist as a corporation, and whose
authority is usurped." Id. "; Lehman, Durr &: Co. vs. Warner, 61 Ala. 455.
It is also well settled, as a corollary to the foregoing principles, that when one contracts with a corporation, which is in
the exercise of corporate functions, but which is a de facto corporation merely, he will not, in a suit by the corporation on a
contract made by him with it in its corporate name, be allowed
to deny and disprove the rightfulness of its existence. 4 Am.
& Eng. Enc. Law, 198; Swartwout vs. Railroad Co., 24 Mich.
390. In the case la~t ~ted, CooLEY, J., declares, that "it is
plainly a dictate, alike of justice and public policy, that in controversies between the de facto corporation and those who have
entex:ed into contrart relations with it, as corporators or otherwise, that such questions should not be suffered to be raised."

Snider's Sons' Co. vs. Troy., supra; Cahall vs. Association,
61 Ala. 232.

In the Snider vs. Troy case, it was further held,
that the same principle applied, whether in suits against stock·
holders to enforce uni>a.id subscriptions,-in which case the
stockholder will not be allowed to dispute the due incorporation
of the compa.ny,-or by a creditor of the corporation, who by
denying the existence of the corporation, seeks to recover his
debt against the stockholders, by suing them. as partners. It
is a. correct and well settled principle, that "persons who have
contracted with the corporation as such, and have acquired
liens against it, are estopped from denying its corporate existence for the purpose of holding its shareholders liable as ·partners." Snider's Sons' Co.'s Case, supra; Tayl. Corp. § 14:8.
"A corporation de facto bas an independent status, recognized
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by the law, as distinct from that of its members. A partnership is not the necessary legal cpnsequence of an abortive
attempt at incorporation." Adopting the language in Fay vs.
Noble, 7 Cush. 188, this court said in Snider's Sons' Co.'s case,
"Surely, it cannot be, in the absence of all fraudulent intent,
that such a legal result follows, a.s to fasten on parties involuntarily, for such a cause, the enlarged liability of copartners, a
liability neither contemplated nor assented to by them."
The facta in this case, without conflict, show that the defendants and a. nu.mber of other persons, pursuing closely the provisions of the statute for the pur}lose (Code, p. 425, art. 11 ),
associated themselves together for the purpose of incorporating
the Farmers' Implement Company. They filed their declaration in the office of the probate judge of Lauderdale county, in
accordance with the provisions of section 1252 of the Code.
This declaration was indorsed: "Farmers' Implement Co.
Declaration." "I hereby certify that the within conveyance,
was filed in the office for record, on the 5th day of February,
1898, and duly recorded in Vol. - - of - - on page - - .
- - - , Judge of Probate." The word ''conveyance," in this
certificate, was a mere self-corrective clerical error, used for
the word "declaration;" an(:l the fact that the name of the
judge of probate is not signed thereto, amounts to nothing.
In the absence of statute prescribing what constitutes the filing
of a paper, it is said to be filed whenever it is delivered to and
is received by the proper officer. A bill in chancery, for instance, is to be considered as filed, when it is put in the custody and power of the court, by depositing it with the register,
or with his assistant in his office, with the intentiqn of filing it,
although the fact and date of filing are not then indorsed on it.
:Ex parte Stow, 51 Ala. fi9; Truss vs. Harvey, 120 Ala. 636,
24 South. 927; 8 Am. & Eng. Enc. Pl. & Prac. 928.
On the same day the declaration was filed, the judge of probate issued to two of the proposed incorp(>rators, a commist:rlon
to open books of subscription to the capital stock of the corporation, as per section 1253 of the Code. Afterwards, the commissioners, acting under this commission, opened books of subscription, and more than 50 per cent. of the capital stock was
cluly subscribed by parties deemed solvent, a list of whom was
returned to the court, as a part of the report of the commissioners, and payments in money were made by each of the sub-
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scribers of at least 20 per cent. of t.h e stock subscribed by them,
respectively. The subscribers met and organized the corporation by the election of a board of directors, a· president, a secretary and general manager, and a treasurer, all of which was
duly certified and returned in writing to the judge of probate,
as provided by section 1255 of the Code. The only missing
links for the perfection of a corporation de jure under the
statute, as appears, were, that these papers, so returned and
filed with the probate judge. were never recorded in his office,
and no certificate of incorporation was issued by said judge,
declaring said corporation fully organized, as provided by said
section 1255 of the Code. It is too plain•for controversy, that
a corporation de facto was thus created, there being no allegation or evidence of fraud on the part of defendants and associates in the premises. The evidence shows, and the fact is
undisputed, that under such incorporation, the compat;1y entered upon the transaction of business; that it was understood
in the community to be a corporation, and, as such, it instituted
and maintained suits in the justice's court of Florence. It was
shown, that these defendants took no part in the management
of the corporation; that they each paid in full, the stock subscribed by them, and never knew that a de jure corporation
was not in fact organized, but supposed and believed it had
been done. The defendant, Young, was preshlent of the company, and testified that one J. M. Lassiter, the secretary and
general manager, transacted all the business, and he, the witness, had nothing to do with its management, and never examined the books of the concern. The defendant, Bliss, testified to the same thing, as for himself. There was no evidence
tending to show, that defendants had anything to do with contracting the account on which they are sued, or knew anything
about it; nor that they ever consented to become partners in
said· corporation, or agreed to be anything more than stockholders therein, or ever held themselves out, or agreed that any
one else should hold them out as partners therein, or were
guilty of any fraud in the organization of said company. So
far as the evidence shows or tends to show, their conduct was
characterized by good faith towards their associates nnd the
persons transacting business with the company.
The evidence of plaintiff tended to show that it had no actual
notice of the incorporation of said company as a de facto or·
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ganization, even. Its secretary and treasurer, W. A. Steele,
testified by deposition, that no member of the Farmers' Implement Company, ev~r informed the plaintiff that said implement
company was a corporation; that plaintiff never heard that it
was such an organization, and that he thought that J. M. Lassiter, deceased, who was the secretary and managing agent of
said implement company, informed the plaintiff by letter that
defendants were members of a copartnership by that name,
though he cou]d not find or produce said letter. The evidence
does not show, however,-even if that statement were taken
as evidence of the fact, a question we need not decide,-that
either of defendants ever authorized Lassiter to make such an
admission as to them, or that they ever knew he made any such
statement, without which, they were not bound by his declarations. The declarations of one partner, not made in the presence of his copartner, are never competent to prove the existence of the partnership between them. It is only when the
partnership has been otherwise proved, that the declarations of
one partner are evidence against the other, as to the conduct of
the partnership business. The existence of a partnership can
never be established by general reputation or on hearsay evidence. Bank vs. Leland, 122 Ala. 289, 25 South. 195.
· In the absence of an agreement to become partners in the
company, defendants cannot be held liable as such, unless they
hold themselves out as partners. Holding one's self out, or
permitting himself to be held out as a partner in a firm, will
make him liable as such, to third persons who have been misled by, or who have acted upon such holding out; and in such
case, the one so held out would be estopped as to them to deny
that he was a partner. 17 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 879; George,
Partn. p. 80; Marble vs. Lypes, 82 Ala. 32~, 2 South. 701;
Fertilizer Co. vs. Rey~olds, 85 Ala. 19, 4 South. 639. _<\.s we
have said, there is an entire absence of evidence tending to show
that defendants ever knowingly or intentionally entered into a
partnership relation with their associates, or ever held themselves out as copartners with them, or permitted any other person to do so.
The evidence shows, furthermore, beyond conflict, that at the
time the plaintiff's contract with the Farmers' Implement Co.
was entered into,-on the 2d July, 1898,-the papers abo'"e referred to for the incorporation of said company, were on file in
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the office of the probate judge, having been filed therein. on
the 5th of February, preceding. and remained there on me,
until the 28th of October following, when the judge of probate
allowed J. M. Lassiter to take them away,-for what purpose,
is not shown. The judge took the receipt of Lassiter for the
papers, which receipt the judge himself wrote or dictated, reciting what papers they were, and that they were "all the papers
that were ever filed in the office of the said probate judge, of
said corporation."
The plaintiff, at the time it contracted with said association,
had thus, constructive notice of what was done towards the incorporation of the company, and that it had, at least, a de facto
existence, which status was unaffected by the action of said
Lassiter, in taking said papers from the probate office.
The fact that the Farmers' Implement Company had not, at
the time it purchased the goods from plaintiff, paid the State
and county license to do business, could not affect the status of
the de facto corporation· differently from what it would have
affected ·a de jure corporation. The only possible effect such
failure could haYe, would have been to render the company
liable to the penalty prescribed by statute in such cases.
It is contended, again, that the failure to pay the f~e prescribed by section 1287 of the Code, rendered the effort at incorporation abortive, and that the company, in consequence,
did not have a de facto existence, even. In Christian &
Craft Grocery Co. vs. Fruitdale Lumber Co., 121 Ala. 340,
25 South. 566, we held, that if a commission is issued to a corporation organized under the statutes, the fact that the required
fee was not paid, would not, of itself, prevent the corporation
from having a de facto existence; but its contracts as stated,
would be void. The statute under which that decision was
made (Acts 1894-95, p. 1024 ), provided that all contracts by
any corporation which had not firs~ complied with the requirement for the payment of this fee, e;hould be wholly void. That
provision was not carried into the Code of 1896, but was omitted therefrom. Section 1287. Without reference to that fact.,
however, the failure to pay the fee, would not, as stated, of
itself have prevented the formation of a de facto corporation.
If they never intended, and did not agree to become partners,
but desired in good faith to organize under the statute a corporation, which they failed to fully perfect, but did organize
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one de facto, under. color of law, which came into the exercise
of corporate functions, the stockholders of such an organization, cannot be made liable·as partners. Authorities supra.
Under the pleadings, and the legal evidence as developed on
the trial, the court, in trying the case without a jury, very
properly, as we think, found in favor of the defendants, and
rendered judgment accordingly.
Affirmed.
NoTE.-See Mechem's Elements of Pa.rtn., §§ 10, 11.

STAVER & ABBOTT MANUF'G CO. vs. BLAKE et al.

Supreme ·court of Michigan, 1896.
111 Mich. 282, 69 N. W. 508.

Error to circuit court, Kent county; William E. Grove, Judge.
Action by Staver & Abbott Manufacturing Company against
Catherine A. Blake and others. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

Wylie &: Clapperton (Bundy &: Travis, of counsel, for
appellant.

Charles B. Blair (Fletcher &: Wanty, of counsel), for
appellees.
GRANT, J. The defendants are the members and owners of
the stock of the Grand Rapids Storage & Transfer Company,
Limited, an association organized May 13, 1890, under chapter
79, How. Ann. St. The plaintiff is a manufacturing corporation of Chicago, Ill. It sues for merchandise alleged to have
been BOld and delivered to the defendants. The declaration is
upon the common counts. The bill of particulars is for merchandise sold, for which notes were given, "executed by the
name of Grand Rapids Storage & Transfer Company, Limited,"
dated January, May and July, 1895. No claim is made
that these defendants made individual promises, upon the faith
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of which these goods were sold and delivered, or that they had
ever expressly formed a partnership, or that they had ever held
themselves out to plaintiff as co-partners. The sole basis for
the right of recovery against them is the failure of the originaJ.
organizers to comply with the statute in organizing, and noncompliance with the statute in carrying on the business after it
was organized. These defects are stated by the learned couusel to be as follows: (1) The articles did uot state when and
how $7,000 was to be paid. (2) They falsely stated that 813, 000
in cash had been paid in, when, as a matter of fact, property
instead of money had been paid in, without any schedule containing the names of the parties contributing, with a description
and valuation of the property contributed. {3) No yearly or
other meetings of the members of the association were held for
five years. (4) No managers of the association were elected
for upward of five years. (5} No subscription book waR kept,
as required by the statute. (6} The statute was not obsarved
in the matter of contracting debts. (7} The statute w~s not
observed in using the word '' Limited " in connection with the
associate name. The defendants contend (1) that the company
was properly organized; (2) that the plaintiff was estopped to
deny that the association was legally organized, and to assert
partnership relations, because it dealt exclusively with the association, and not with its members as a partnership; (3) that
partnership association limited ~re corporations; (4} that the
expressed penalties imposed by the statute for its violation exclude all others; {5) that these defendant!:! are subsequent stockholders, are innocent purchasers, and therefore not liable for
irregularities in the organization of the association or its management.
1. The Original Organization. There is no evidence of any
dishonesty or bad faith in the formation of this association.
It was organized under the advice of eminent counsel, who
drew the articles. On March 29, 1890, eight citizens of Grand
Rapids signed an agreement to form an association to be known
as the Grand Rapids Storage & Transfer Company, Limited.
This agreement specified the amount each was to contribute.
812,800 were thus contributed, and, when the articles were
formed, this was so stated therein. This money was invested
in the purchase of property and the erection of a building for
the business of the association. The capital stock was fixed at
820,000. 87,200 remained unpaid, and the articles did not
specify when or bow it should be paid. Technica1ly, the
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$12,800 of capital was not paid in cash at the time of the execution of the articles. It was, however, paid in shortly before,
and for the purpose of, forming the association, and had been
expended in the purchase of property for it, and to use in its
business.
Subsequent Management. It is true that meetings were not
held, and managers elected, and debts incurred, in strict compliance with the statute. The business was conducted in the
name of the association, and without any fraudulent intent or
acts.
2. The Provisions of the Law. This act was passed in 1877,
ana is entitled "An act authorizing the formation of partnership associations, in which the capital subscribed shall alone be
responsible for the debts of ·the association, except under certain circumstances." Section 1 declares that 4 ' the capital shall
alone be liable for the debts of such association. * * * Contributions to the capital stock may be made in real or personal
estate, at a valuation to be approved by all the members subscribing to the ca}5ita.l of such association." It also requires a
schedule containing the names of such contributors, and the
description and valuation of the property so contributed. Section 2 provides that the members shall not be liable on any
judgment, decree, or order which shall be obtained against such
association, or for any debt or engagement of such company,
otherwise than is provided by the act. This section further
provides for proceedings in such cases, and makes the members
liable for labor debts. It limits the liabilities of stockholders to
the amount of their unpaid subscriptions, and requires a subscription list to be kept, which shall be open to inspection by
creditors and members at all reasonable times. Section 6 prohibits division of profits to diminish or impair the capital of the
association, and makes any one consenting to such a division
liable to any persons interested or injured thereby, 4 ' to the
amount of such diminution or impairment." Section 3 provides
that "the omission of the word 'Limited' in the use of the
name of the partnership association shall render each and every
member of such partnership liable for any indebtedness, damage or liability arising therefrom."
3. Plaintiff's action is based upon contract, not upon tort.
It insists that the lett.er of the law, in the formation and conduct of the partnership association limited, has not been complied with, and therefore the law makes the defendants either
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partners or members of a joint-stock company at the common
law, arrd . therefore individually liable. None of these defendants was interested in this association at its organization.
The husband of Mrs. Blake was one of the principal stockholders. She advanced to him the money which be originally
paid in, and also the money with which be purchased, soon
after the organization, most· of the other stock. The stock was
assigned to her as security. Subsequently, she discharged the
liability of her husband, and took the stock, and now owns all
but S~OO worth, owned by the defendants Aldrich and Pantland. None of these was aware of any irregularity in the
original organization or in its subsequent management. Plaintiff had for several years dealt with this association as such.
Its correspondence was carried on with it. Its contracts were
made with it. It had no belief that it was making any contract
with these defendants, or that they were individually liable, for
the correspondence and course of business ref~te any such con·.
elusion. The very name of the association implied a warning
to plaintiff that it was not dealing with the members or stockholders of this association in their individual capacity, but in
their associate capacity, with their liability limited. It is presumed to know the law, and a reading of the statute would
have shown it that the members of this association could only
be held liable for the amount of stock subscribed. It therefore
dealt with this association with full knowledge of the extent of
the liability of its members. The liability fixed by statute is
still open to it. If the managers or members of the association
committed a fraud by which the plaintiff or any other creditor
suffered damage, the law provides a remedy in tort, but not in
contract. The law does not make contracts for parties. The
law takes the contracts which have been made, and interprets
them. The law does not permit A. to deal and make contracts
with B. in one capacity, and then hold him liable in another.
A partnership can only be held to exist inter sese when the
parties have so agreed. When no such partnership in fact ex. ists, but a party bas held himself out as such to third persons,
who have dealt with him upon the faith of that relation, the
law esto~ him to assert the true relation in order to avoid
liability. Under no other circumstances does the law hold one
liable as a partner who is not in fact a partner. This court
said, speaking through Justice Cooley, in Beecher vs. Bush,
45 Mich. 193, 7 N. W. 785; 40 Am. Rep. 466: "If parties in-
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tended no partnership, the courts should give effect to thsir
intent, unless somebody has been deceived by their acting, or
assuming to act, as partners; and any such case must stand
upon its peculiar facts, and upon special equities." See, also,
Webb vs. Johnson, 95 Mich. 330, 54 N. W. 947. We cite no
other authorities, as the rule is elementary.
These defendants have never agreed to be partners, and have
never held themselves out to plaintiff or to the world as such.
By the purchase of stock, they became members of a body,
organized under a law, which made its capital and assets alone
liable for its debtS. This is the legal entity-and it is immaterial what name you give it-with which plaintiff dealt, made
contracts, and to which it gave credit. The statute contains
not a sentence from which any individual or partnership liability can be inferred. Upon what principle of common sense,
justice, or equity can it now be held that plaintiff, having
trusted this entity, can recover its entire debt from one with
whom it never contracted, and who never promised to pay? It
is unnecessary to determine wether these associations are corporations under our constitution, which provides that the term
"corporations" shall be construed to include all associations
and joint-stock companies having any of the powers or privileges of corporations not possessed by individuals or partnerships." Article 15, § 11. It is the established rule that those
dealing with corporations are estopped to deny the lawful existence thereof, and cannot, therefore, hold the stockholders individually liable, unless such liability is imposed by the statute.
This rule is based upon two grounds· (1) That it is against
public policy to permit the existence of these corporations to be
attacked collaterally in suits between them and others. It is re~::~orved for the State alone to question their legal e.xistence through
its law department. (2) Because parties have dealt with it as a
corporation, and not upon the faith of the individual liability of
its stockholders. We see no reason why the doctrine of estoppel
should not be ~pplied in the one case as well as in the other.
There is no difference in principle between the two. Each is a
legal entity, whose sole warrant for existence is found in, and
whose powers and liabilities are fixed by, s~tute.
The doctrine of estoppel in this case need not, however, be
based upon the determination of the question as to whether the
Grand Rapids Storage & Transfer Company, Limited, was a
corporation. If these defendants, in the absence of any statute,
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had associated themselves together upon the same terms as
those provided by this statute, had limited their liability in the
same manner and for the same amount, had furnished plaintiff
with a copy of that agreement, and it had sold them goods, the
law would not permit it to recover against them, either as
individuals or as partners. It had dealt with them and trusted
them upon the strength of their limited liability. It had agreed
to look to this alone, and the law will hold it to its undertaking.
This rule is founded in good morals, as well as good law. The
policy of the law for partnership associations limited is to relax
the common-law rule, to permit parties to limit their liability,
and exempt themselves from a liability which may be ruinous.
Whether .the policy is wise or unwise is a question for the legislature, and not for the courts.
The injustice in sustaining the plaintiff's contention is manifest. The law, as construed by counsel for plaintiff, says to
A., who does not wish to actively engage in business, and be
held responsible for its management: "You may in vest $1,000
in the stock of one of these associations; and, although the law
limits your liability to the amount of capital subscribed, still if
there has been any defect, however innocently made, in the
original articles of asc;ociation, or in its subsequent management, you can be held liable for all the debts of the association." Such a rule is not founded in justice, common sense,
sound logic, or good morals. Even in construing the statutes
for the formation of liniited partnership, no such harsh rule is
always applied. Buck vs. Alley, 145 N. Y. 488, 491i, 40 N. E.
236. The law of Michigan prohibited a corporation from doing
any business before filing its articles of association. A corporation was formed under this law, but, before it had completed
its organization by filing its articles, its prudential committee
purchased goods. Suit was brought against this committ-ee,
who were directors, based upon the personal liability of the
members. The court, in deciding the case, said: "It seems to
us entirely clear that both parties understood and meant that
the contract was to be, and in fact was, with the corpot·ation,
and not with the defendants individually. The agreement
thus made could not be afterwards changed by either of the
parties without the consent of the other. Utley vs. Donaldson, 94 U. S. 29. * * * The corporation having assumed,
by entering into the contract with the plaintiff, to have the
requisite power, both parties are estopped to deny it." Whit-
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ney vs. Wyman, ro1 U. S. 392, 396. See, also, American
Mirror & Glass-Beveling Co. vs. Bulkley, 107 Mich. 447,
65 N. W. 291.

We are aware that this decision is not in harmony with the
decisions of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, but in so far
as those decisions adopt the rigorous rule that the members of
these associations are liable as partners because of some irregularity or defect in their organization or management, and thereby read into the statute a penalty which it does not impose, but
which, by a fair construction of the statute, is excluded, we
cannot follow them.
Other interesting and important questions are raised and ably
discussed by counsel, but, inasmuch as the entire controversy
is disposed of by the above opinion, we refrain from discussing
them.
In one instance in dealing with the plaintiff, the manager of
this association omitted the word ''Limited." No testimony
was introduced on the part of plaintiff to show that any "indebtedness, damage, or liability" arose to it in consequence of
this single act, and therefore no right of action from this cause
was shown to exist. The judgment is affirmed.
Mo~TGOMERY, J ., did not sit. The
NOTE.-See Mechem's Elem. of Partn. § 'i.

other justices concurred.

CHILDERS, et al. vs. NEELY.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, 1899,
47 W . Va. 70.

84 8. E . 828.

Appeal from circuit court, Tyler county; R. H. Freer,
Judge.
Bill by J. M. Childers and another against S. H . Neely.
Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals. Reversed.

F. L. Blackma1·r, for appellant.
Robert ]fcEldowney and G. 1lf. McCoy, for appellees.
BRANNON, J . Childers and Ramey filed a bill in equity in
the circuit court of Tyler against Neely, praying that a partnership between them be dissolved , an account taken "of all
its accounts, dealings, and transactions whatever," and that a
manager be appointed to take charge of the property. The
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business was oil production. Neely admitted the joint enter·
priAe, but denied the partnership; and he joined in request for
account, anQ. did not resist a dissolution, if a partnership. ·The
decrees made a partial account, decreed its balance against
Neely, and denied him further participation in the partnership,
and he appealed.
This cRSe raiRes an interesting and important subject in this
mining state; that is; whether, and when, joint tenants or tenants in common, jointly operating for oil, are partners, or
merely co-owners. The bill asserts a partnership, while Neely
denies it; asserting· that it is a case, not of partnership, but coownership.
In two leases of town lots for oil and gas purposes, Childers
owned a one-fourth interest; Raney, a three-eighths interest;
Neely, a three-eighths interest. They were so far joint tenants.
They agreed to develop the lots for oil, but made no written
articles of partnership, -in fact, no oral express formation of a
partnership. They simply, by an indefinite understanding,
agreed to develop their common property, each giving his skill,
paying his share of outlay proportionate to his ownership, and
getting his share of the product proportioned to such ownership.
I use the word "product," instead of "profits," because there
was no contract explicit on this point to distinguish product
from profit. "Partnership must be distinguished from joint
management of property owned in common. Where two part·
ners own a chattel, and make a profit by the use of it, they are
not partners, without some special agreement which makes
them so." T. Pars. Partn. § 76. Two heirs or other coowners of a farm, jointly farming it for profit, are not partners.
There is a peculiar partnership, called a " mining partnership,"
partaking partly of the nature of an ordinary trading or general
partnenthip, on the one hand, and partly of a tenancy in common, on the other. It is au important question to those engaged in the oil and other mining business wbethP-r each one is
jointly and severally liable for all the doings of every or any
other of the associates in the venture, as in ordinary trading
partnerships.
What is a mining partnership? 15 A111. & Eng. Enc. Law,
p. 609, says: "When tenants in common of a mine unite and
co-operate in working it, they constitute a mining partnership."
Many authorities there cited thus define it. See the California
case of Skillman vs. Lachman, 23 Cal. 108, 83 Am. Dec. 96,
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and note discussing it fully; Lamar's Ex'r vs. Hale, 79 Va. 147.
Mere co-working makes them partners, without special contract.
Barring. & A. Mines & M. Courts of equity take jurisdiction
of them as if general partnerships. 2. Colly. Partn. o. 35. Of
course, owners of mines, oil leases, or farms can by agreement
make an ordinary partnership therein; but "where tenants in
common of mines or oil leases or lands actually engage in
working the same, and share, according to the interest of each,
the profit and loss, the partnership relation subsists between
them, though there is no express agreement between them to
be partners or to share profits and loss." Duryea vs. Bur:t, 28
Cal. 569. The presumption in such case would be that of a
mining partnex:ship, rather than an ordinary one, in absence of
an express agreement forming an ordinary general partnership.
Perhaps the case of Bank vs. Osborne, 159 Pa. St. 10, 28
Atl. 163, and other cases in that State cited in Bryan, Petroleum & Natural Gas, 283, would justify the inferenc.e that the
partie8 operated as tenants in common; but the current of
authority elsewhere t·ecognizes the inference of mining partnerships. That State does not recognize such a partnership. Justice Field said in Kahn vs. Smelting Co., 102 U. S. 645, 2G L.
Ed. 266; '"Mining partnerships, as distinct associations, with
different rights and liabilities attaching to their members from
those attaching to members of ordinary partnerships, exist in
all mining communities. Indeed, without them successful
mining would be attended with difficulties and embarrassments
much greater than at present."
One leading distinction between the mining partnership and
the general one is that the general one has, as a material element of its membership, the delectus person(e (choice of person), while the other has not. Those forming an ordinary
partnership ~:~elect the persons to form it, always from fitness,
worthiness of personal confidence; but we know such is not
always or often the case in oil ventures. It is because of this
delectus pe1·son(e that the law gives such wide authority of one
member to bind another by contracts, by notes, and otherwise.
One is the chosen agent of the other. Hence, when one member dies or is bankrupt, or sells his interest to a stranger, even
to an associate, the partnership is closed, one chosen member is
gone, the union broken, because he may have been the chief
dependence for success. and the newcomer may be an unacceptable person, who would entail failure upon the firm. In
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the mining partnership those occurrenceH make no dissolution,
but the others go on ; and, in case a stranger has bought the
interest of a member, the stranger takes the place of him who
sold his interest, and cannot be excluded. If death, insolvency,
or sale were to close up vast mining enterprises, in which many
persons and large interests participate, it would entail disastrous consequences.
From the absence of this delectus personre in mining companies flows another result, distinguishing them from the common partnership, and that is a more li~ited authority in the .
individual member to bind the others to pecuniary liability.
He cannot borrow money or execute notes or accept bills of exchange binding the partnership or its members, unless it is
shown that he had authority; nor can a general superintendent
or· manager. They can only bind the partnership for such
things as are necessary in the transaction of the particular business, and are usual in such business. Charles vs. Eshleman,
5 Colo. 107; Skillman vs. Lachman, 83 Am. Dec. 96, and note;
McConnellvs.Denver, 23 Cal. 198,35 Cal. 365 ;Jonesvs. Clark,
42 Cal. 180; Manville vs. Parks, 7 Colo. 128, 2 Pac. 212; Congdon vs. Olds, 18 Mont. 487, 46 Pac. 261; Judge vs. Braswell, 13
Bush, 67; Waldron vs. Hughes, 44 W.Va. 126, 29 S. E. 505.
In fact~ it is a rule that a nontrading· partnership, as distinguished from a trading commercial firm, does not confer the
same authority by implication on its members to bind the firm;
as e. g. a partnership to run a theatre or other single enterprise
only. Pease vs. Cole, 53 Conn. 53, 22 Atl. 681; Deardorf's
Adm'r vs. Thacher, 78 Mo. 12S.; Smith, Mere. Law, 82; T.
Pars. Partn. § 85, 10 Heisk. (Tenn.) 629; Pooley vs. Whitmore, 27 Am. Rep. 733.
A mining partnership is a nontrading partnership, and . its
members are limited to expenditures necessary and usual in the
particular business. Bates, Partn. § 329~ Members of a minmg partnership, holding the major portion of property, have
power to do what may be necessary and proper for carrying on
the business, and control the work, in case all cannot agree,
provided the exercise of such power is necessary and proper for
carrying on the enterprise for t.he benefit of all concerned.
Dougherly vs. Creary, 30 Cal. 290, 89 Am. Dec. 116.
These principles settle much of this case. The demurrer was
properly overruled, because there was a partnership, and equity
only bas jurisdiction to settle partnership accounts.
The remainder of the opinion is omitted.
N<Yl'E.-See Mechem's Elem. of Partn.

~

29.

It
FOR WHAT PURPOSE ORGANIZED.

CHESTER vs. DICKERSON.
Commission of Appeal~ of New York, 1876.
M N. Y. 1, 18 Am. Rep. MO.

ActJon brought by Chester and others against Dickerson,
Reed, Jones and· Dewitt for damages arising from fraud and
deceit in the sale of lands. It appeared that in November,
1864, defendants entered into written agreement whereby they
agreed to purchase, lease and take refusals of lands on their
joint account, and that they should sell, lease or work the
Jande thus taken. They further agreed that the expenses and
losses, gains and profits, should be shared equally. There
was evidence that this agreement bad existed by parol from
September, 1864. Lands were accordingly taken, and Reed
entered into negotiation.s with plaintiffs, and represented tb1!
lands to be oil-producing, showing the indications of oil, which
it appeared bad been produced by petroleum poured on the
lands by one Higgs, through the connivance of Jones. The
plaintiffs purchased the lands on the faith of these representations and indications, and the purchase money was dividecl
among the defendants. There was evidence that Reed participated in the fraud, but Dickerson was not implicated by
the evidence. Dewitt died pending the action. Plaintiffs
brought suit against defendants, on discovering the fraud.
The court charged that the partnership could exist by parol,
and that all of the defendants were liable for the fraud committed by either in and about the partnership. The plaintiffs
obtained a verdict and judgment. The general term affirmed
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the judgment, and defendants, Dickerson and Reed, appealed
to this court.

James Emott, for appellants.
A.• .A.nthony, for respondents.
EARL, 0. It cannot be questioned that two or more persons
may become partners in buying and selling land. ThE>re is
nothing in the nature or essence of a partnership which
requires that it should be confined to ordinary trade and com·
merce, or to dealings in personal property. Story on Part., sec.
82, 83; Collyer on Part., sec. 3, 51, and note; Dudley vs. Little.
field, 21 Me. 418; Sage VB. Sherman, 2 N.Y. 417; Mead VB. Shep:
cwd, 54 Barb. 474; Pendleton VB. WamberBie, 4 Cranch, (U. S.)
73; Thompson t'B. Bowman, 6 Wall (U. S.) 316; Ho:rie VB. Oan·,
1 Sumner (U. S. C. C.) 173.
Kent says: "A pa~tnership is a contract of two or more per·
sons to place their money, effects, labor and skill, or some or
all of them, in lawful commerce or business, and to divide the
profit and share the loss in certain proportions; and that it
is not ess('ntial to a legal partnership that it be confined to
commercial business. It may exist between attorneys, con-veyancers, mechanics, owners of a line of stage coaches, arti·
sans or fa.rmers, as well as between merchants and bankers,.,
3 Kent's Com. 24, 28; and why may it not exist between deal·
ers and speculators in· real estate?
Hut, as it is claimed that the partnership in this case existed
by parol before the execution of the written agreement, dated
November 28, 1864, it is necessary to inquire whether a part·
nership, in r~ference to lands, can be formed and proved by
parol. Upon this question there is considerable conflict in the
authorities. On the one hand it is claimed that a parol agree·
ment for such a partnership would be within the statute of
frauds which provides that no estate or interest in lands shall
be created, assigned or declared, unless by act or operation of
law, or by a deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the
party creating, granting, assigning or declaring the same; and
to this effect is the case of Smith vs. Burnham, 3 Sumner 435.
On the other hand it is claimed that such an agreement is not
aft'ected by the statute of frauds, for the reason that the real
estate is treated and administered in equity as personal pt·op·
t>rty for all the purposes of the partnership. A court of equity
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ha'\1ng full jurisdiction of all cases between partners touching
the partnership property, it is claimed that it will inquire into,
take an account of, and administer upon all of the partnership
property, whether it be real or personal, and in such cases will
not allow one pa~ner to commit a fraud or a breach of trust
upon his copartner by taking ad,·nntage of the statute of
frauds; and to this effect are the following authorities: Dole
va. Hamilton, 5 Hare 369; Esse:c vs. Esse:c, 20 Beavan 449; Bunnell vs. 'l'aintor, 4 Conn. 568. A full discussion of the question
is found in Dale VB. Hamilton; and the reasoning and review
of the cases there by Vice Chancellor Wigram are quite satisfactory. The general doctrine is there . laid down that "u
partnership agreement between A and B that they shall be
jointly interest~ in a speculation for buying, improving for
sale and selling lands may be proved without being evidenced
by any writing, signed by or by the authority of the party to
be charged therewith within the statute of frauds; and ~uch an
agreement being proved, A or B may establish his interest
in land, the subject of the partnership, without such interest
being evidenced by any such writing." I am inclined to think
this doctrine to be founded upon the best reason and the most
authority. But whether it is or not~ it is not very important
to decide in this case. Most of the conflict in the authorities
has arisen in controversies about the title to the real est~te
after the dissolution of the partnership or the death of one of
the partners. But suppose two persons, by parol agreement,
enter into a partnership to speculate in lands, how do they
come in conflict with the statute of frauds? No estate or inter·
est in land has been granted, assigned or declared. When the
agt'eement is made no lands are owned by the firm, and neither
party attempts to convey or assign any to the other. The contract is a valid one, and in pursuance of this agreement they
go on and buy, improve and sell lands. While they are doing
this, do they not act as partners and bear a partnership relation to each other? Within the meaning of the statute in such
case neither conveys or assigns any land to the other, and
hence there is no conflict with the statute. 'fhe statute is not
so broad as to prevent proof by parol of an interest in lands;
it is simply aimed at the creation or conveyance of an estate
in lands without a writing. If there was a parol agreement
'in this case before the written one, it was just like the one
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embodied in the writing, to wit, a partnership to purchase,
lease and take refusals of land and then sell, lease or work
them for the joint benefit of the parties. This is not a con·
troversy about the title to any of the lands taken or owned by
the partners, but it simply relates to the conduct of the defend·
ants while they were acting as partners; and in such a case
the statute of frauds certainly can present no obstacle to
relief.
\-\ie then come to the question whether th~re was sufficient
proof of the existence of this partnership by parol before the
28th of November.• 1864, and I cannot doubt that there was.
Jones distinctly testified that the partnership between all tlle
defendants did exist as early as September, and that it was
afterwards put into writing. Neither Reed nor Dickerson, in
their testimony, denied this, and neither of them claimed that
they did not become partners until the writing was executed.
There is abundant evidence that Reed was associated with
Jones as early as the later part of September, or the fore part
of October. It does not appear how or by what negotiation
the members of the firm were brought together in partnership, and it does not appear through what agency Dickerson
was induced to join with the others. . As to him, all we ha \·e
is the evidence of Jones, above referred to, and the writing,
and the fact that he, subsequently, without objection, in the
division of the money received from the plaintiffs, allowE'd his
share of the sums paid for the services of Higgs, who was
employed to pour oil upon the lands, from some time about
the first of September. Hence we must take it as proved, in
this case, that this partnership existed as early as September,
1864. But it is claimed, on the part of the appellants, that all
the rules of commercial partnerships do not apply to partnerships in real estate. They apply to every other kind of partnership, and why not to this? This kind of partnership is
formed .like every other, for the mutual profit and advantage
·o f the parties, and there is no reason why ·it should not be
governed by the same rules.
In all partnerships one partner is the general agent of all
the partners for the transaction of all the partnership business, and I can perceive no reason for not applying the same
rule of agency to partnerships in real estate. In fact, all the
powers, duties and rights which usually appertain to partner· ·
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ships must appertain to partnerships in real estate, except
as they are modified by the character of the property;
and the only di1ference grows out of the rules of law
in referenre to the conveyance and transmission of real
estate. One partner cannot convey the whole title to real
estate unless the whole title is vested in him. Van Brunt vs.
Applegate, 44 N. Y. 544. But he can enter into an executory
contract to convey, which a court of equity will enforce. While
a contract for the conveyance of land must be in writing. yet
an agent to execute the contract may be appointed by parol.
Willard on Real Estate, 376. And hence, when the partnership
business is to deal in real estate, one partner has ample power,
as general agent of the firm, to enter into an executory contract for the sale of real estate. I find DO authority holding
that the rules of ordinary commercial partnerships do not
apply to partnerships in real estate, except the case of Pittll
vs. Waugh, 4 MRB~. 424. It was there held that the law·met·chant respecting dormant partners did not extend to speculators in land. The learned judge writing the opinion did not
cite any authority for the decision he made, and his reasons
for the conclusions which he reached are not satisfactory.
Dormant partners are held liable for the debts and contracts
of the firm, because they are, in fact, members of the firm, and
share in its profits, and the law will not allow them sect·etly
to share in the profits of the firm without taking their share
·of the risks and bearing their share of the losses, as to third
persons. And there is precisely the same reasons for holding
a dormant partner in a real estate partnership liable to all
persons dealing with the finn. In. Pattet·son vs. Bre1cstcr, 4
Edw. (N.Y.) Ch. 352, the vice chancellor expressed the opinion
that the law merchant does not apply to partners in buying
and selling land. This case and Pitts vs. lVa.ugk are commented on by Judge Mitchell in Benner vs. Har·rison, 19 Barb.
53, and are there shown not to be precise authority for the doc·
trines announced. It follows, therefore, that the court committed no error in holding that all the partners were liable for
the frauds committed by either in the transaction and prosecution of the partn<>rship enterprise, for it is well settled that
the firm is bound for the fraud committed by one partner in
the course of the transactions and business of the partnership,
even when the other partners have not the slightest connection

WooDWORTll vs.

BBNNBTT.

with, or knowledge of, or participation in the fraud. Story
on Part., sec. 108. Collyer on Part., sec. 445; Grilwold va.
Haren, 25 N.Y. 595, S2 Am. Dec. 380.
[The remainder of the opinion ia unimportant.)
Judgment affirmed.
NOTZ: For other ca'IM bearing upon partnerahipe organized for the
purpoee of deal ina in land, eee Mechem'e Elem. or Partn., § 17 and not...

WOODWORTH vs. BENNETT.
Courl of Appeal8- of

New

York, 18"10.

48 N. Y. 278, 8 Am. Rep. 706.
Ap~al

from a judgment of the supreme court atftrmlng a
JUdgment allowing a counter claim, in favor of the defendan\
Bennett and against the plaintift Woodworth for flOO. Opin·
ion states the facts.
G. F. Bicknell, for appellant.
Charles Mcuon, for respondent.

CHunca, C. J. The point in this case is, whether the court
below erred in allowing to the defendant the sum of flOO as
an offset. The facts are substantially as follows: The plaint·
111, defendant, Stephens and Truesdell, made an agreement
in the nature of a copartnership, to ·propose or bid for public
work on the Seneca river improvement. The bid was to be
put in in the name of the plaintiff alone, the defendant and
Stephens to become sureties. Truesdell was at the time au
engineer in the employ of the State on the canals. The bid
was made in the name of the plaintiff, in accordance with thParrangement. Before the work was awarded, the said parpes
made an agreement with one Haroun, to withdraw their claim
to the work, and sell their bid to him for $400 (he being a
higher bidder for the same work), which was consummated,
and he gave his note for the amount. It was then arranged
that the note should be left with the plaintiff for collection,
and that when collected each of said persons should be entitled
4
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to '100. The plaintiff collected the note, paid to Stephens and
Truesdell each $100, and promised to pay the defendant, and
.apply it on their deal, but never did. It is claimed that it cannot be allowed, on account of the illegality of the transaction
out of which it arose. To enable the court to apply correct
legal principles, it is necessary to analyze the transaction and
ascertain its true nature and character.
The original arrangement for a joint interest or copartnership was illegal, and contrary to a positive statute in two
respects. The law of 1854, chapter 329, in substance requires
that every proposal for work shall contain the names of all
persons wh.o are interested, and prohibits any secret agreement or understanding that any person not named shall
become interested in any contract that may be made, and engineers, and all other persons in the employ of the State on the
canals, are also prohibited from becoming interested in any
contract or job on the public works.
In the next place, the transaction with Haroun was contrary
to public policy, and illegal. It is manifest that the object and
purpose of the purchase of the bid was to have it withdrawn
so as to enable Haroun to take the contract upon a higher
bid. This was directly against the interests of the State, and
tended to destroy that honest competition which public bidding is designed to secure; and when, as in this case, it was
done partly for the benefit of an officer·of the State, whose
duty it was to protect its interests, it was not only contrary
to public policy, but was grossly corrupt.
The supreme court placed its decision in favor of the defendant, upon the ground tha$ as between these parties, the illegal
contract had been fully executed when Haroun paid the money,
and that the plaintiff then became a mere depositary, and held
the money ·f or the use of the other parties:
It is undoubtedly true that, if the contract or obligatiQn
does not depend upon nor require the enforcement of the unexecuted provisions of the illegal contract, it will be carried out.
It has been laid down as a test, that whether a demand connected with an illegal transaction is capable of being enforced
at law depends upon whether the party requires any aid from
the illegal transaction to establish the case: Chitty on Con.
657. So it has been settled that where a party pays money to
·a third person for the use of another, which, on account of
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the illegality of the transaction, he was not obliged to pay,
such third person cannot interpose the defense of illegality
[to an action for the money brought by the person for whose
use it was so paid]. Tenant tJB. Elliott, 1 Bos. & Pull. 3; Mer·
riU tJB. Millard, 4 Keyes, (N. Y.) 208. This principle is based
upon the undoubted right of a person to waive the illegality,
and pay the money; and that when once paid, either to the
other party directly or to a third person for his use, it cannot be reealled; and that the third person, who waa in no
way connected with the original transaction, cannot avail
himself of a defense which his principal saw ·fit to waive.
If the only illegal transaction waa the contract with Haroun
for the sale of the bid, these principles might be applicable,
and would probably constitute a good answer to the objection
to this counter claim. The payment of the money by Harouu
completed that contract, and nothing remained unexecuted.
But here the original partnership was illegal; not because of
its purposes and objects, but its composition was prohibited
by law,' If a lawful firm should receive funds from an illegal
traffic or business, it may be that the illegality would be
regarded at an end, and a division of the money enforced by
virtue of the rights of the members under the contract of part·
nership. 'i'his is the utmost limit to which the rule can be car·
ried: Brooks tJB. Martin, 2 Wall. (U. S.) 70.
In such a case the obligation to divide would not arise out
of the illegal purposes of the firm, nor would the division carry
out any of those purposes, but the obligation would arise out
of the contract of partnership itself. Here this contract waa
illegal. The object of the statute was to enable the State
officers to know with whom they contracted, and also to see
that the statute, prohibiting engineers and other canal officers
from becoming interested, was not violated, and to prevent
all secret combinations in relation to obtaining work.
The money obtained by this bid belongs to the firm; and the
plaintiff could have been compelled to divide, if the firm had
bt-en lawful, by force of the contract organizing it. In this
case he also agreed to pay the money, and defendant asks the
court to compel him to perform this obligation. The answer
to it is obvious. There is no obligation, because it was incurred
contrary to law. It rests upon the contract of partnership,
and that is void for illegality.
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In law there was no partnership, and none of the parties
obtained any rights under the contract creating it: Armatrot~g
VB. Lewis, 3 Mylne & Keene 45.
The sentiment of '~honor among thieves" cannot be enforced
in courts of justice. Suppose the engineer bad sued for his
share after an express promise, would any court have tolerated
his claim for a moment in the face of a statute prohibiting him
from being interested? If not, in what respect does the defendant occupy any better position? The first step in his case is
to prove that he was a secret partner and entitled to a share
of this money. The law prohibits secret partners, and he is,
therefore, not a partner.
The express promise does not aid the defendant, because the
promise was only to carry out the unexecuted provision of the
contract of partnership to divide the money. The two cases
'cited by the counsel for the defendant, if they are to be reregarded as good law, are distinguishable from this. In the case
of Faikney vs. Ren008, 4: Burr. 2069, one of two partners had
paid £3,000 to settle differences in illegal stock-jobbing opera·
tions, and the defendant executed his bond to secure the share
of the other partner. The court overruled the defense recognizing the exploded distinction between acts malum prohibitum
and malum in se, and held that as between those parties the
bond was to secure the.plaintiff for money paid, and the purposes of the payment would not be inquired into. A similar
decision was made upon the authority of this case in Petrie
vs. Hannay, 3 Term Report 4:18, Lord KENYON dissenting. The
distinction between the above cases and this is in the circumstance that there the illegal transactions had been closed up
and settled, and the obligations sought to be enforced were
for the money advanced for that purpose. Here it is sought
to consummate the illegal contract by a new agreement that
it shall be performed. No case has gone this length, and the
two cases above cited have been very much shaken by subsequent decisions, and are, to say the least, questionable
authority, especially the latter: Aubert VB. Maze, 2 Bos. & Pul.
370; Mitchell vs. Oockburne, 2 H. Blqckstone 380; E:» parte Daniels, 14 Ves. 190; Lowt·y vs. Bourdieu, 2 Douglas 4:67; Brown vs.
Turner, 7 Term Rep. 630; Belding vs. Pitkin, 2 Caines (N. Y.)
14:7, note a.
The general rule on this subject is laid down in this court,

.
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In Grag "'· Hook, 4 N. Y. 499, by MuLLETT, J., as follows:
"The distinction between a void and a valid new contract in
relation to the subject-matter of a former illegal one deptnds
upon the fact whether the new contract seeks to carry out or
enforce any of the unexecuted provisions of the former con·
tract, or whether it is based upon a moral obligatio~ growing
out of the execution of an agreement which could not be
enforced by law, and upon the performance of which the law
will raise no implied promise. In the first class of cases, no
change in the form of a contract will avoid the illegality of
the first consideration, while express promises based upon the
last class of considerations may be sustained."
It is sometimes difficult to apply general rules to particular
cases, but this case comes clearly within the first class men·
tioned in the above rule. It is not from any regard to the
rights of the party setting up this defense that courts refuse
to enforce illegal contracts, but it is for the protection of the
public. The plaintiff in this case is ent_itled to no sympathy
or favorable consideration. He must have made an affidavit
that no other person was interested with him in-the proposal,
and when he received this. money, as between him and the
dt>fendant, the latter was entitled to it; and while we have no
di!iposition to justify his conduct, his position enables him to
secure the advantage of a decision which we are compelled to
maJ~e in obedience to a principle of public policy which is indispPnsable for the protection of the community against the corrupting influences of illegal transactions.
The observation of Lord MANSFIELD in Holman va. Johnson,
1 Cowper 343, is applicable here. He said: "The objection
that a contract is immoral or illegal as between plaintiff and
defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the
defendant (in this case the plaintiff). It is not for his sake,
however, that the objection is ever allowed, but it is founded
in general principles. of policy which the defendant has the
advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as between him and
the plaintiff, by accident, if I may so say."
Judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered, costs
to abide the event.
All the judges concurring.
Judgment reversed and a new trial ordered.
Non: See following cue.
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CRAFT vs. McCONOUGHY.
8upreme Ocmrt of Illinoi8, 1815.
'19 lllinois, 846, 22 Am. Rep. 171.
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BiJJ in equity by 1\IcConoughy against Craft and others for
an account and distribution of the profits of an alleged partner·
ship existing under the contract referred to in the opinion.
The defense was that the contract was void as in restraint of
trade and oppos.ed to public policy. Decree below for complainant and defendants appeal.
M.D. Hathatoay, Wm. Barge and 8. Dia:on, for defendants.
Jas. K. Edsall, for oomplacinant.

CnAIG, J . (After stating the facts.) Two questions arise
npon thP record: First, wh~ther the contract set out in tbe
bill is void. Second, if illegal and void, will a court of equity,
after it has been executed, require one of the parties to account
to anoth(>r for a portion of the g~ins arising under the contract?
Prior to and up to th(> time of the execution of the agreement
set out in the bill, the four parties were engaged in the grain
business in the town of Rochelle, each one on his own account.
and in competition with each other, but, after the agreement
was executed,· all competition ceased. All the wnrehouses itt
the rity, and every lot suitable to erect a warehouse upon, were
controlled by the combination. Some we~ purchased and
others were leased, so that the combinations formed effectually
excluded all opposition in the purchase, sale, storage and shipment of grain in that market. .
Secret meetings were held in the night time by the parties to
the contract, at which the price to be paid for grain was ngrecrl
upon , rates for storage and shipment fixed, in order that t lw
public should be kept in ignorance of the plans and operation~
of this iJlegal combination.
To the public the four houses were held out as competing
firms for business. Sec.retly they had conFipired togcther. ancl
wf're working in a common cause, in the sole interest of each
other.

~~
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The language used in the contract itself leaves no room for
doubt as to the purpose for which the agreement ,was entered
into, as a few extracts will show: "Each separate firm shall
conduct theit" own business as heretofore, as though there was
no partnership in appearance, keep their accounts, pay their
own expenses, ship their own grain, and furnish their own fund
to do business with.." • . • • "Prices and grades to be- fixed
!rom time to· time as convenient, and each one to abide by
them. All grain taken in store shall be charged one and onehalf cents per bushel monthly." • • • "No grain to be
shipped by any party at less rates than two cents per bushel."
. While the agreement, upon its face, would 'seem to indicate
that the parties had formed a copartnership for the purpose
of trading in· grain, yet, from the terms of the contract, and thP
other proof in the record, it is apparent that the true object
was to form a secret combination which would stifle all compe·
tition, and enable the parties, by secret and fraudulent means,
to control the price of grain, coat of storage, and expense of
· shipment. In other words, the four firms, by a shrewd, deeplaid, ·secret coa1bination, attempted to control and monopolize
the entire grain trade of the town and surrounding country.
That the effect of this contract was to restrain the trade and
commerce of the country is a proposition that can not be successfully denied.
V\7e underst~nd it to be a well settled rule of Iaw, that an
agreement in general restraint of trade is contrary to public
policy, illegal and ,void, but an agreement in partial or particular restraint upon trade bas been held good, where the
restraint was only partial, consideration adequate, and the
restraint reasonable.
This subject was ably discussed in the leading case of
Mitchel vs. ReynoU!s, 1 P. Williams 181; see, also, 1 Smith's
Lead. cases, 172, and notes, and the rule of l~w established,
which has been followed and adhered to in numerous cases
since.
In reference to the point, what might be regarded a reasonable restriction, numerous cases might be cited, but what was
said in Horner vs. Graves, 7 Bing. 743,20 Eng. Com. L. 330, will
illustrate the principle. Tindal, C. J., said: "'We do not see
bow a better test can be applied to the question, whether reasonable or not, than by considering whether the restraint is
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such only as to afford a fair protection to the interest of the
party in favor of whom it is given, and not so large as to interfere with the interests of the public. Whatever restraint is
larger than the necessary protection of the party, can be of
no benefit to either: It can only be oppressive, and if oppressive, it is, in the eye of the law unreasonable. Whateve~ is
injurious to the interest of the public is void, on the ground
of public policy."
If, therefore, the restraint imposed by the contract in question was but partial, as insisted upon by the compiainant, as
it was unreasonable, oppressive and injurious to the public,
it cannot be sanctioned in a court of equity.
'While th.ese parties were in business, in competition with
each other, they had the undoubted right to establish their
own rates for grain stored and commissions for shipment and
sale. They could pay as high or low a price for grain as they
saw proper, and as they could make contracts with the producer. So long as competition was free, the interest of the
public was safe. The laws of trade, in connection with the
rigor of competition, was all the guaranty the public required,
but the secret combination created by the contract destroyed
ni l competition and created a monopoly against which the public interest had no protection. Morris R-un Coal Co. vs. Barclay
Coal Co., 68 Penn. St. 173, 8 Am. Rep. 159.
It is, however, insisted that, even if the contract was contrary to public policy, as it has been executed, a court of equity
will requir~ an account.
The rule i~, however, well settled in this State, that a court
of equity will not lend its aid in the division of the profits of
an illE-gal transaction between associates. Neustadt vs. Hall,
58 Ill. 172 ;, Skeels -vs. Phillips, 54 Ill. 309; Jerome vs. Bigelow,
66 Ill. 452.
The complainant and the defendants were equally involved
in the unlawful combination. A court of equity will assist
neither.
The decree will be reversed and the cause remanded.
I>ecree reversed.
NOTE: For other cases upon the e1feot of illegality in the purpose, see
Mechem's Elem. of Partn., §§ 18, ~.

~· ~ , . - -,

III.
WHO MAY BE PARTNERS.

ADAMS vs. BEALL.
Supreme Court of Maryland, 1881.
67 Md.

~.

1 Am. St. Rep. 3i9, 8 AU. Rep. 664.

Appeal from the Baltimore city court.
Albert Ritchie, for appellant.
William Colton, for appellee.

RoRINSON, J. The appellee, while a minor, paid to the appel·
Jant $2,900, as a consideration for being admitted as a partner
in the appellant's business. The partnership continued for
more than a year, and, finding it unprofitable, the appeJlee,
without formally dissolving the partnership, withdrew from
the business. The question in the case is whether the appellee
is entitled to recover of the appellant the money thus paid.
His right to disaffirm the partnership contract, and to avoid
all liabilities under it, including the partnership debts, is not
denied. Being an infant when the contract was made, thiA
is a privilege to which for his protection he is entitled. But
when he seeks to recover money paid for a consideration which
be has enjoyed or has bad the ben<'fit of, this presents quite
another qu<>stion. The $2,900 was paid to the appeJlant in
consideration of being admitted as a partner in his business.
He was ildmitted as a partner, and continued to be a member
of the firm for at least a year. The business was not, it is true, •
a successful one, but this, in the absence of fraudulent repre.
sentations on the part of the appellant, cannot affect the question. We are dealing with a ~ontract between an infant and
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adult, executed on both sides, and upon the faith of which
money was paid by the infant for a consideration which he has
enjoyed. The privilege of infancy, says Lord :a!A.~SI<'IELD in
Zouch vs. Parsons, 3 Burrows 1804, was intended as a shield
or protection to the infant, and not to be used as the instrument of fraud and injustice to others; and to hold that an
infant has the right, not only to withdraw from a partnership
at his own pleasure, and to subje<.'t the adult partner to the
payment of all the partnership debts, but has the right also to
recover money paid by him as a consideration for being admitted into the partnership, would be, it seems to us, to extend
the privilege beyond any just principles upon which it iH
founded.
So long ago as Braton.er vs. Franklin, 4 Gill (Yd.), 463, it was
held that, where an infant advances money upon a contract,
he cannot disaffirm the contract and recover the mont-y advanced, if he has enjoyed the consideration for which the
money was paid. Holmes vs. Blogg, 8 Taunt. 508~ is to the same
effect. There the infant paid a sum of money as his share of
the consideration for a lease of premises in which he and his
partner carried on the business of shoemaking. They occupied
the premises from March till June, when the infant dissolv('d
the partnership, and brought an action to recover back the
money he had paid the lessor for his lease. Gmas, C. J ., said:
"He may, it is true, avoid the lease; he may escape the burden
of the rent, and avoid the covenants; but that is all he can do.
He cannot, by putting an end to the lense, recoYer back any
consideration which he has paid for it. 'l'he law does not enable
him to do that."
It is a mistake to suppose that the principle on which this
case was decided was either overruled, or even questioned, in
Corpe vs. Overton, 10 Bing. 252. In the latter case, the plainti.tl', while an infant, signed an agreement to enter into part·
nership with the defendant, and to pay him £1,000 for a share
in the- business; and to execute, on the first day of January,
a partnership ·deed, with the usual covenants. He also paid
£100 as a deposit for the fulfillment of his part of the contract.
The plaintiff afterwards disaffirmed the pat·tnership contract,
and never did in fact become a partner. The suit was brought
to recover of the defendant the £100 paid by the infant ns
a deposit. TINDAL, C. J., said: The case was distinguishable
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from Holmes vs. Blogg. In that case the plaintiff and partnE"r
occupied the premises from Ma reb till June, and the money
was paid for something available, that is, for three months
enjoyment of the premises. "In the present case, the plainti11
bas paid to 0¥erton £100, for which be bas not received the
slightest consideration. The money was paid either with a view
to·a present or a future partnership. I understand it as having been paid with & view to a future partnership. Now, the
partnership was not to be entered into till January, 1833, and
in the meanwhile the infant bas derived no advantage whatever from the contract." BosANQUET, J.: "We are far from
impeaching -Holmes vs. Blogg, as applicable to the facts of that
case. • • • Here the infant bas derived no benefit whatever from the contract, the consideration of which bas wholly
failed. • • • The £100 paid here was in the nature of
a deposit. Money paid on a deposit may generally be recovered
back where the contract goes off, and here the contract was
defeated before the infant derived any benefit from it."
ALDERSON and GASELEE, JJ., were of the same opinion. The
plaintiff was allowed to reoover the deposit money paid by
him, while an infant, because the partnership contract was
disaffirmed by Corpe before the time agreed upon for it to be·
gin. As it was said by ALDERSON, J., "Before the contract is
performed, one of the parties revokes it, and remits the other
to the same situation as if the contract bad never been
made." The distinction between Holmes vs. Blogg, and CO'rpe
vs. Overton is this: In the former the plaintiff was not
allowed to recover the money paid by him while an infant,
because it was paid on a consideration which be bad in part
enjoyed, while in the latter the plaintiff was allowed to recover
as upon an entire failure of consideration.
Passing, then, from these cases, we come to EJJ pa-rte Taylor,
8 De Gex, M. & G. 254, which is a case directly in point. There
a.n infant paid a premium on entering into a partnership, and,
before be came of age, disaffirmed the contract, and, upon the
bankruptcy of the firm, attempted to prove for the premium
thus paid. Lord Justice KNIGHT BaueE said: "In my opinion,
a case of fraud bas not been established. That being so, the
matter remains one of a contract fairly made, or as fairly made
as a contract with ~n infant could be made, a contract upon
which the infu.nt acted during his minority, and which during
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his minority has been in part performed on each side. In such
a state of things, I conceive that, if the bankrupts had con·
tinued solvent, and an action had been brought against them
by the minor, either before or after majority, for the purpose
of recovering the money in question, there must have been
either a nonsuit or a verdict against him.'' Lord Justice TuRNER said: "It is clear, an infant cannot be absolutely bound
by a contract entered into during his minority. He must have
the right upon his attaining his majority to elect whether he
will adopt the contract or not. It is, however, a different question, whether, if an.infant pay·s money on the footing of a con·
tract, he can afterwards recover it back. If an infant buys an
article which is not a necessary, he cannot be compelled to pay
for it; but, if he does pay for it during his minority, he .cannot
on attaining his majority recover the money back."
We have quoted at length from the preceding cases, because
the question at issue is an important one, and comes before
us for the first time for decision. And while fully recognizing
the privilege which the law accords to minors in regard to contracts made during their minority, yet, in a case like the present, where money is paid by a minor in consideration of being
admitted as a partner in the business of the appellant, and he
does become and remains a partner for a given time, he ought
not to be allowed to recover back the money thus paid unless
he was induced to enter into the partnership by the fraudulent
representations of the appellant. Whether an infant Ca.n avoid
a contract and sue thereon during his minority, or must wait
nntil he arrives at age, is a question about which the decisions
are conflicting. To hold that he cannot disaffirm a voidable
contract until he attains his majority would in many cases
work the greatest injustice to an infant. And where the con·
tract is of a personal nature, or relating to personal property,
we see no good reason why such a contract may not be avoided,
either before or after his majority. Stafford vs. Roof, 9 Cow.
626; Shipman v1. Horton, 17 Conn. 481; WUli8 vs. Twambly, 13
Mass. 204.
The court having erred in granting the plaintiff's first and
lilecond prayers, the judgment must be reversed. Judgment
reversed, and new trial a warded.
NOTB: For other oases respecting tbe rights end liabilities of infant
partners, aee .Meohem'e Elem. of P.utn., § 23 and note&
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BUSH vs. LINTHICUM.
Court of Appeals of Maryland,

188~.

o9 Md. 844.

Appeal from the circuit court for Anne Arundel County, in
Equity.
The following facts appear from the opinion delivered in the
Circuit Court:
Complainant Linthicum·and defendant Weir entered into a
written agreement of partnership which specified no time for
the continuance of the partnership.
After the business bad been conducted some time Linthicum
filed this bill against Weir making numerous charges and praying for dissolution, for a receiver and for an injunction. The
court appointed a receiver and granted the injunction. The defendant filed his answer admitting the partnership, denying the
charges, and moved to dissolve the injunction and for a revocation of the order appointing a receiver. An order was granted
to take testimony to be used upon the hearing of the motion to
dissolve and for tile revocation of the appointment of a receiver.
The court continuing, says:
"Afterwards on the 22nd of May, and before any testimony
was taken under thiij order, the defendant, by next friend, and
by way of rejoinder to the complainant's replication, interposed
the plea of infancy, alleging that be was born on the 3rd of
July, l~t.i2, and charging that the complainant is not therefore
entitled to maintain this suit against him. To this the complainant, on the 7th of June, entered a motion of ne recipiatur,
upon the grounds:
"1st. That the defendant having filed his answer to the bill,
and not having alleged his minority in th~t imswer, it is now
too late to avail himself of such plea in rejoinder to the complainant's replication.
" 2d. Because, admitting that the defendant was not twentyone years of age when he entered into the partnership, and bas
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not yet attained that age, still these facts will not, under the
pleadings in this case, prevent the court from granting the complainant relief.
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" 3d. Because the defendant held himself out to the complainant and to the world as of the age of twenty-one years
when the c.opartnership was formed, and the complainant
believed that be was of full age, and that the complainant having been imposed upon by the fraud and deceit of the defendant,
he will not now be allowed to take ad vantage of his own wrongful acts, and the Court should not therefore sustain his defense
of infancy.
"The case has been argued up<)n a general demurrer by the
defendant to this motion, and on the part of the defendant it is
strenuously insisted that this plea of infancy is a flat and absolute bar to all the relief asked by the complainant in his bill, and
that the same must be dismissed with costs, and tlie proceedings ended.
''To this proposition thus broadly stated and insisted upon,!
cannot yield assent. I concede that the law casts its protection
'and guardianship around infants, as to all their contracts, except those for necessaries, and that it is not competent for the
Court in this case to pass any decree which will impose any
personal liability upon the infant defendant for the debts of this
firm, or enforce upon him any of the terms or conditions of this
partnership contract, or even compel him to pay any of the costs
of these proceedings. So far I agree that his infancy protects
him, but I am clearly of opinion that it is perfectly competent
for the Court to decree a dissolution of the partnership, and to
wind up its affairs through the medium of a receiver-that is, to
collect the debts due to the firm, sell its assets, and apply the
same to the payment of its debts. In doing this, no wrong is
done to the infant, no executory contract is enforced against
him, and he is thereby merely restrained from using his infancy
as a means of doing injustice to, or perhaps perpetrating a fraud
upon, his copartner. If the Court has not the power to grant
relief to this extent, then the adult will, in every case, be placed
at the mercy of the infant partner. All the books upon partnership lay down the proposition that an infant may become a
partner with an adult. It is a contract not absolutely void, but
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one which the infant may stand to or repudiate, at his election.
While be remains a pat-tner be has the rights and powers of a
partner. He bas equal right, with his copartner, to the possession of the assets of the firm, to collect the debts due it, and he
has also the pow~r to contract debts in the name of the firm,
which though he may himself subsequently repudiate, and get
rid of personal responsibility therefor, are still binding upon his
copartner. Take then the case of an aduit who bas unfortunately entered into a partnership with an infant, who misrepresented himself at the time to be of full age. After a short time
both become dissatisfied, mutual confidence is destroyed, and
each becomes odious to the other. The .infant then knowing
the security from responsibility which his infancy affords him,
and at the same time availing himself of his powers as a partner, and seeking to defraud and injure his copartner, proceeds to get possession of the partnership assets to sell them,
and to put the proceeds in his pocket, and goes on contracting
debts which he knows he is not responsible for, but which he
also knows will work the absolute bankruptcy of his copartner.
Is it possible that a court of equity bas no power, at the instance of the adult partner, to lay its hands upon such a concern, stay the consummation of his ruin, and release the tie
which binds him to the body of such a death? In my opinion
there is no such lack of remedial power in courts of equity, and
infancy cannot be availed of as a bar to such relief. If authority be needed in supp~rt of this position, it seems to me that it
is abundantly sustained by the decision of the Chancellor in the
case of Kitchen v. Lee, 11 Paige 107."
In accordance with, and accompanying the foregoing opinion,
the Court passed the following order:

It is, thereupon, this lOth day of June, 1882, adjudged and
ordered, t~at the plea of infancy filed in this case by the defendant, on the 22d day of May last, be, and the same is hereby
ovetTUled and rejected in so far as it is sought to be used as a
bar to so much of the relief prayed by the bill as asks for a dissolution of the partnership, the granting of the injunction
prayed for, and the appointment of a receiver to take charge of
and wind up the affairs of the firm by collecting the debts due
to it, by taking possession of and selling its assets, and by

·CASES ON PARTNERSHIP.

applying the same to the payment of its debts; and it is further
adjudged, that the order of the 9th of May last, granting the
injunction and appointing the receiver, be and the same is
hereby continued, until the further order of this Court.
From· the above order the present appeal was taken.
The cause was argued before Alvey, Yellott, Stone, Robinson, Irving and Ritchie, JJ.

Frank H. Stockett, Jr., and F'r ank H. Stockett, for the
appellant.

John Ireland and James Revell, for the appellee.
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IRVING, J., delivered the opinion of the court.
The ap~llee (Linthicum) having filed a bill for the dissoluti6n of the partnership between himself and one Richard H.
Weir, the case proceeded to answer and replication; and then
an order to take testimony upon the motion to dissolve the
injunction, and discharge the receiver, who had been appointed
at the granting of the injunction. At this stage of the case,
the defendant, who had answered under oath, and appeared by
a solicitor, interposed, through the appellant (Bush), his next
friend, a plea of infancy, and prayed that the bill might be dismissed. Upon this plea being filed, a motion of ne recipiatur
was made and filed. by the complainant, to which the appellant
demurred; and the demurrer having been overruled, appeal
was taken. The sole question therefore is, was the Court
right in overruling the demurrer and rejecting the plea of
infancy, to the extent expt·essed in the order of the tenth of
June, 1882, appealed from?
The facts of the cafle are so fully set out in the opinion of the
Circuit Court, which we adopt, that it is useless to re-state
them. The reasoning of the Court, in support of the order
passed, is so cogent that we can add nothing to its force, and
shall rest our affirmance mainly upon the ground taken in that
opmton. By the demurrer to the motion and reasons assigned,
the defendant admitted the facts stated in the third reason,
that the complainant had no knowledge of the defendant's minority, and had been deceived by his representations that he was

Bus H vs. LINTHICt:M.
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of full age. Had the complainant discovere~ that the defendant had so deceived him, before filing his bill, he could and
would have made that allegation as an additional ground for
the· court's interference, and it would have justified the relief
prayed for. The fact that he did not, upon the interposition of
the plea, ask leave to amend that he might so charge, cannot
operate to his prejudice. Where an injunction has been granted and a motion to dissolve has been made, it is not usual to
ask for, or for the court to grant, leave to amend ; and the
reasons are so obvious we need not give them. The plea interposed new matter, infancy, by way of defense, but the plea
does not aver that the complainant had knowledge of it, and
entered into the partnership notwithstanding complainant's
motion sets up the want of knowledge and the defendant's
deception as reasons against receiving the plea; and the demurrer, as we have already said, concedes the facts so set up.
Upon the demurrer the matter was considered, as if the complainant instead of filing his motion that the plea be not received, bad replied alleging the facts stated in the third reason
assigned for the motion, and the defendant bad then demurred.
'Vhether complainant had knowledge of defendant's infancy
and was deceived about it, is not an open question, as the
demurrer admits the facts charged. It would be strange indeed,
if a court of equity could regard infancy pleaded under such
circumstances as good ground for abating the suit, when the
same facts, if alleged in the bill, would have given claim to
relief. The inconsistency is so apparent that we cannot doubt
the correctness of the court's ruling that the plea was not a bar
to the whole proceeding.
The court was right also in refusing to make the defendant
personally answerable even for costs, for although be may be a
partner he cannot be held for contracts of the firm individually
unless he affirms, or does that which amounts to affirmance
after reaching majority. In Dunton vs. Broten, 31 Mich. 182,
it was decided that an infant who had made a partnership could
not disaffirm it until he arrived at age, aud could not by next
friend, a guardian, recover back what had been put into the
concern. The same doctrine was again affirmed by Judge
Cooley in Armitage vs. Widoe, 36 Mich. 130. Having formed
this partnership, he cannot so far repudiate it during minority
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as to escape such consequences of partnership as do not involve
personal liability for claims against the firm, or costs incident
to the legal settlement of its affairs. Such partnership must
be dissolvable as any other; and the partnership assets must
be assignable to partnership creditors. What his rights may
be, as against his adult co-partners, when he reaches majority,
we do not decide.
Approving the court's order it will be affirmed, and the cause
remandP.d.
Order affirmed, and cause remanded.
NOTE.-See Mechem's Elements of Partn., § 23.

.ARTMAN VS. J!'.BROUSON.
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:ARTMAN vs. FERGUSON.
Supreme Court of Michigan, 1888.
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'18 Mich. 146, 16 Am. St. Rep. 572, 40 N. W. Rep. 907, 2 L. R. A. 843.

This action is brought in the circuit court for the county
of Jackson, on the common counts in assumpsit, to recover
for goods sold and delivered to the defendants, doing business at Jackson as Peter Ferguson & Co. 'l'he defendants are
husband and wife, and the plaintiff sought to show that, after
their marriage, they formed a copartnership, and carried on
the retail carpet business in the city of Jackson under the firm
name of Peter Ferguson & Co., and that during such time the
goods involved in this suit were sold to them; that Margaret
W. Ferguson was, at the time of .the formation of such copartnership, possessed of property in her own right, of the value
of f20,000, and furnished the entire capital for the business,
and provided a place to carry on such business; that Peter
Ferguson had <flO means, and was to and did manage the business; that the copartnership continued until after the last item
of goods mentioned in the bill of particulars was sold. This
evidence was objected to by defendants' counsel, on the ground.
that it was not competent for husband and wife to enter into
a copartnership with each other. 'fhe circuit court sustained
the objection, and direeted a verdict for defendants. PlaintU1s bring the case to this court by writ of error.
Thomas A. Wilson, for appellants.
Richard Price and A.usti·n Blair, for appellees.

Lo:so, J . The only question arising is whether the husband
and wife can enter into a contract of partnership between themselves, and thus render themselves jointly liable for the contracts of the firm thus established. At the common law married.
women were incapable of forming a partnership, since they were
disabled, generally, to contract or to engage in trade; and the
husband and wife were wholly ineapicitated to contract with
each other. Whatever rights or powers the husband and wife
have to contract with each other, or that the wife may have to
enter into a copa·r tnersbip to carry on trade or business, must
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be conferred by our constitution and statutes. There was never

any impediment to the acquisition of property tllrough ·purchaae by a married woman. The difficulty was that at the
. common law the ownership passed immediately to the husband by virtue of the marriage relation. Our statute has not
removed all the common-Jaw disabilities of married women.
Jt has not conferred upon her th~ power of a feme sole, except
in certain directions. It has only pro-vided that her real and
personal estate acquired before marriage, and all property,
real and personal, to which she may afterwards becom~ entitled
in any manner, shall be and remai.n her estate, and shall not
be liable for the debts, obligations, and engagements of her
husband, and may be contracted, sold, transferred, mortgaged,
conveyed, devised, and bequeathed by her as if she were unmarried; and she IDllY sue and be sued in relation to her sole prop·
. erty as if she were unmarried. How. St. §§ 6295-6297. In all
other respects she is a feme covert, and subject to all the
restraints and disabilities consequent upon that relation.
A partnership is a contract of two or more competent persons
to place their money, effects, labor, and skill, or some one or all
of them, in lawful commerce or business, and to divide the
profit and bear the loss in certain proportions. That a married
woman may, when she has separate estate, be a copartner with
a person other than her husband, is held in many states under
the married woman's statutes. But where the statute gives
-her no power, or only a limited power, to become a partner,
the rule of the common law provides that she cannot enter a
ftrm. It has been held by a great preponderance of authori·.
ties, even under the broadest statutes, that a married woman
has no capacity to contract a partnership with her husband,
or, in other words, to become a member of a firm in which her
husband is a partner, even in those states in whi<!h she may
embark in another partnership; and though she holds herself
out as such partner, nnd her means give credit to the firm, she
is held not liable for the debts, as she cannot, by acts or declarations, remove her own disabilities. Lord vs. Parker, 3 Allen,
127; Bowker vs. Bradford, 140 Mass. 521, 5 N. E. Rep. 480; Haas
vs. Shaw, 91 Ind. 384, 46 Am. Rep. 607; Payne vs. Thompson.,
44 Ohio St. 192; Ka1t{man vs. Schoeffel, 37 Hun 140; Co3J vs.
Miller, 54 Tex. 16; Mayer t·s. Soyster, 30 Md. 402.
In this State a married women was subject to the com-
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mon-l&w disabilities of coverture until the passage of the
married woman's act of 1855. How. St. §§ 6295-6299. This
act d~s not touch a wife's interests in her husband's
property, and these remain under the restrictions of the
common law, unless they are removed by some other statute. The wife's common-law disabilities are only partially
removed by the act, and one who relies on a wife's contract must show the facts in order that they may a.ppear
whether slle had capacity to make it. Edwards vs McEnhill,
51 Mich. 161, 16 N. W. Rep. 322. Under our statutes a
wife has no power to contract except in regard to her separate property. The constitution and statutes are clear against
her right to make a mere personal obligation unconnected wit:&
property, and not charging it, so that she cannot become personally bound jointly with her husband, nor as a surety, by
mere personal promise. De Vries VB. Conklin, 2~ Mich. 255;
lVeBt VB. Lamway, 28 Mich. 464; Emery vs. Lord, 26 Mich. 431.
In Jenne vs. Marble, 31 Mich. 319, Mr. Justice C.AMPBELL, speaking with reference to a lease, said: :'The language of the statute
is no broader than the equitable rules concerning separate
property laid down in the same words in most of the old decisions. • • • The disabilities of testimony are entirely
inconsistent with the idea th.a.t husband and wife may deal
with each other as third persons can. This is impossible, if
they cannot testify concerning these contracts; and when the
law reoognizes, as it always has done, the peculiar power of
substantial coercion possessed by husbAnds over wives, it
would not be proper to infer any legal intent t"o remove protection against such influence from any vague provisions which
no one supposes were ever actually designed to reach such a
result, and which can only be made to do it by an extended
construction. Any one can readily see the mischiefs of allowing persons thus related to put themselves habitually in business antagonism, and legislation which c.a n be construed as
permitting it is so radically opposed to the system which is
found embodied in our statutes generally that it should be
plain enough to admit of no other meaning."
It is the purpose of these statutes to secure to a married woman the right to acquire and hold property separate from her husband, and free from his influence and
control, and if she might enter into a business part-
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ne.rship with her husband it would subject her property. to his
oontro~ in a ·manner wholly inconsistent with the separation
which it is the purpose of the statute to secure, and might sub·
ject her to an indefinite liability for his engagements. A con·
tract of partnership with her husband is n9t included within
the power granted by our statute to married women. This
doctrine was laid down in Ba.ssett vs. Shepardson, 52 Mich. 3,
17 N. ,V. Rep. 217, and we see no reason for departing from it.
The important and sacred relations between man and wife,
which lie at the very foundation of civilized society, are not
to be disturbed and destroyed by contentions which may arise
from such a community of property and a joint power of disposal and a mutual liability for the contracts and obligations
of each other. The judgment of the court below must be
affirmed, with costs.
The other justices concurred.
NoTE: For other cues to nme effect, eee Mechem's Elem. of Partn.,
§ 25. Compare also with following caae.

SUA U vs. OAFFE.

COflrl of Appeals of New York, 18M.
122 N. Y. 808, 23 N. E. Rep. 488, 9 L. R. A. 698.

On the 29th of January, 1881, the defendants, George and
Adele Marie Catie, then and now husband· and wife, executed,
and, on June 1, 1881, recorded in the office of the clerk of
the city and county of New York a certificate by which
they assumed to form a limited partnership pursuant to the
Revised Statutes, for the purpose of importing and dealing
in foreign goods, at the city of New York, under the firm
name of George Oaffe, which was to continue from February 1, 1881, to February 1, 1886. The husband was the
general and the wife the special partner, she contributing
'25,000. Thereafter, they carried on a business of the kind
specified at the city of New York, under the firm name
selected, until after the debt to the plaintiff was contracted.
Between .May 23, 1882, and December 6, 1883, the plaintiff
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loaned money to George CatYe on account of which the defendants conceded that there was due the plaintiff January 1, 1884,
$26,799.93, to recover which this action was brought. The
defendants interposed two defenses: (1) That the partnership or business relation, whatever it was, which had existed
between them before May 16, 1882, was on that day dissolved
·with the knowledge of the plaintiff; (2) that a husband and
wife cannot, under the law of this State, be partners in business, and that, although they agree to become so, transact business and incur liabilities as such, the wife is not liable to the
creditors of the firm. The first question-an issue of factwas contested before a jury, and determined in favor of the
plaintiff. The second question, an issue of law, was decided in
favor of the plaintiff at the circuit, which ruling was affirmed
at the general term. From this judgment the defendants
•
·
appealed to this court.
William Tharp, for appellants.
Abram Kling, for respondent.
FoLLETT, C. J. But a single question Is involved In this
appeal, which is whether a married woman who contracts a
debt with her husband in a business carried on for their joint
benefit, can avoid liability for it on the ground of coverture.
The second section of chapter 90 of the Laws of 1860 provides
that "a married woman may • • • carry on any trade or
business • • • on her sole and separate account." It is
urged that this language is not bro~d enough to authorize
married women to engage in business as partners, or jointly
with others, or at least with their husbands, but that the statute simply confers power on them to contract by themselves
and apart from others. This construction is too narrow, and
fails to express the evident intent of the legislature, which
was not to presciibe the mode in which married women should
carry on their business, but to free them from the restraints
of the common law, and permit them to engage in business
in their own behalf as free from tbe control of their husbands
as though unmarried. nefore this statute, the profits of their
business belonged to their husbands, and the words "sole and
separate account" were intended to convey the idea that the
beneficial interest of any business in which they might engage
6
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belonged to them and not to their husbands. Since the enactment of this statute, it bas been held that husbands and wives
may legally contract with each other in reference to their sepate estates (01Cen 'VB. Cawley, 36 N. Y. 600; Bodine 'VB. Killeen,
53 N. Y. 93); that they mey become agents for each other
(Knapp vs. Smilh, 21 N.Y. 277); and that a husband may assign
to his wife a cho8e in action (Smjmour VB. Fel'towB, 77 N. Y. 178j.
In Frecking vs. Rolland, 53 N.Y. 422, it was held that a wife
could not escape liability on a joint promissory note given by
herself and her husband, In payment for property purchased
by her, by reason of her coverture, nor by reason of the fact
that she contracted jointly with her husband. In Sootl 'VB. Conway, 58 N.Y. 619, the defendant and her husband were engaged
in running a theater, under the name of "Mrs. F. B. Conway's
Brooklyn Theater," pursuant to a contract by which the profits
and losses were to be equally shared between them. To an
action brought for the recovery of the value of goods sold, the
wife interposed the defense that she was not liable for the
debt, because it was not contracted in any trade or business
carried on for her sole or separate account or benefit, but for
the benefit of a business carried on by herself and husband
for their joint benefit. This defense was overruled in the
supreme court and in t.be court of appeals. Bitter vs. Rathman, 61 N. Y. 512, was an action for an accounting between
partners. The plaintiff, a married woman, had been engaged
in business with the defendant under the name of B. Rathman & Co. The trial court found "that the plaintiff, in secret
trust for her husband, was the partner of the defendant," and
that, "in respect to the public, she was to be regarded as the

real partner," and ordered an accounting as to the partnership
affairs. GRAY, C., said: "Yet she, having suffered herself to
be regarded by the public as a partner, was liable, as such,
to the creditors of .the ostensible firm; and, having thus
exposed herself to such liabilities, if any should be found to
exist, she had, to any such extent, no right, as against either
the defendant or her husband, to be protected out of the share
which would belong to her in her capacity as trustee for her
husband, at whose instance she undertook the trust." This
case does not decide that a wife may or may not be a partner
in business with her husband, but it in effect decides that a
married woman may be a partner with a third person, and
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that her husband may act as her agent in the business of the
firm.
In NoeZ vB. Kinney, 106 N.Y. 74, 12 N. E. R~p. 351, reversing·
15 Abb. N. C. 403, an action was brought against the husband and wife on a note signed, "J. P. Kinney & Co.,"
and payable to the plaintiff. The complaint charged that
the defendants were liable, as partners, under the name signed
to the note. The husband made default, but the wife answered
that she was a married woman, and that the note was executed by her huftband. On the trial, the plaintiff put the note
in evidenc~, and it appeared that the defendants were husband nnd wife, and there was evidence that the note was given
for mirrors placed in houses owned by the wife. A motion to
dismiss the complaint, on the ground that the note on its
face showed that it was not given in respect to her separate
business, or her estate, was overruled. In considering this
question DA~FORTH, J., speaking for a unanimous court, said:
"In the case cited (Frecking t:8. Rolland, 53 N. Y. 422), she
became a joint contr-actor with her husband, but she was as
much bound to perform the joint engagement as if the undertaking had been several, and she did not escape liability
because her joint contractor was her husband. It was not
necessary to inquire, in that case, whether the one paying
could obtain contribution from the other, nor is it necessary
to go into that question here. In that case, both undertook
to pay the creditor. Can it make a differenee in the measure
of liability that, in one case, the married woman entered in
her own name, and her husband in his name, in the execution
of a joint obligation, and in the other case adopted a name
which represents a joint Iiablity, which may, in effect, also
be several? Partners are at once principals and agents,--each
represents the other,-and if, in the relation of partnership,
there are obligations which a. married woman cannot enforce
against her husband, or the husband against the wife, they
involve no feature of the present action, which asserts only
the obligation of a debtor to discharge her debt, or the obligation of a promisor to fulfill her promise."
Partners are the agents of each other, and are jointly and
severally liable for the debts of the firm; these being two
of the essential elements of a contract of partnership. It
being settled that husbands and wives may be the agents
of each other, and that they may bind themselves by joint
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contracts entered into with' third persons, we see no warrant in the statute for exempting them from liability to
creditors for debts incurred by firms of which they are members. It has also been so held· in Graff VB. Kinney, 37 Hun
~05, which affirms 15 Abb. N. C. 397; Zimmerma.n. VB. Erhard,
8 Daly, 311, affirmed 83 N. Y. 74. Opposed to these are
Ohambovet vs. Cagney, 35 N. Y. Super. Ct. 474; Kaufman ts.
Schoeffel, 37 Hun, 140; Fairlee vs. Bloomingdale, 61 How. Pr.
292; same case, 14 Abb. N. C. 341, was reversed in 38 Hun
220. Upon principle and authority, we think that when a husband and wife assume to carry on a business as partners, and
contract debts in the course of it, the wife .cannot escape liability on the ground of coverture. The judgment should be
affirmed, with costs.
V ANN, PARKER and RROWN, JJ., concur.
HAIGHT, POTTER ·and BRADLEY, JJ., dissent.
NOTJt: For other ~s to same e1!eot, see Mechem's Elem. of Partn.,
§ 25. Compare with preceding oaae.

WHITTENTON MILLS vs. UPTON.
Supreme Oourt of Massachusetts, 1858.
10 Gray 582, 71 Am. Dee. 681.

Petition by a manufacturing corporation to set aside tnsolv·
ency proceedings instituted against it and William Mason as
partners, upon Mason's petition to restrain the assignee appointed under these proceedings from further meeting with
petitioner's estate, and to compel the judge of insolvency to
entertain a petition of the corporation for the benefit of the
insolvent laws, respE-cting insolvent corporations. The opin·
ion states the facts.
Bartlett and Ourlis, for the petitioners.
Hoar and Gray, Jr., for the assignees.

TaoBous, J. This is a petition to this court sitting tn equity,
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and as such, having by the statute of 1838, c. 163, the juris·
diction and the supervision of all proceedings in insolvency.
The averments of the petition are admitted by the answers
of the respondents. Nor is there a question upon the facts
agreed that a copartnership was entered into by the Whitten·
ton Mills and the said Mason, and for the purposes stated if
the corporation was capable, in law, of entering into and forming such partnership, and for such ends.
But the petitioners say: (1) That the Whittenton Mills
could not enter into any legal partnership. (2) That if it were
so capable, it could not form a copartnership for the prosecution of a business foreign to the purpose for which alone it
was created. (3) That if such legal partnership e;x:isted, the
petitioners were not liable to be declared insolvent upon the
petition of 1\lason, and under the statute of 1838, c. 1G3, and
the acts in addition thereto; such acts respecting only natural
persons, and making no provisions for bodies corporate.
At the threshold of the cause and of its elaborate discussion
is the question, was this corporation capable of forming a
partnership, of entering into the contract? This question presents itself in two forms. The more general one is: "Has a
corporation, as one of its usual, inherent powers, the capacity
to form a contract of copartnership?" The narrower question,
but for this case the practical and pertinent one is: "Can a
manufacturing corporation in this commonwealth, incorporated since February, 1831, and subject to the provisions of the
thirty-eighth and forty-fourth chapters of the revised statutes,
enter into a contract or society of copartnership?''
This corporation was created in March, 1836, as a manufacturing corporation, for the purpose of manufacturing cotton goods in the town of Taunton, and for that purpose was
invested with all the powers and privileges, and made subject
to all the duties, restrictions and liabilities, set forth in the
thirty-eighth and forty-fourth chapters of the revised statutes,
passed on the 4th of November preceding, but not to take effect
till the first of May, 1836: Stats. 183G, c. 19. This charter,
with the provisions of the chapter referred to and made part
of it, is the origin and source of the powers and fmictions of
the corporation. What powers are granted expressly or by
implication, because necessary or usual for the purposes which
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the charter was given to effect, the corporation has, and no
more.
There is one obvious and important distinction between such
a society as this charter creates and that of a partnership.
!An act of the corporation, done either by direct vote or by
agents authorized for the purpose, is the manifestation of the
collected will of the society. No member of the corporation
as such can bind the society. In a partnership, each member
binds the society as a principal. If, then, this corporation
may enter into partnership with an individual, there would be
two principals) the legal person and the natural persop, each
having, within the scope of the society's business, full authority to manage its concerns, including even the disposition of its
property.
The second section of chapter 38 of the revised statutes,
provides that the business ofeverysuch manufacturingcorporation shall be managed and conducted by the president and
directors thereof, and such other officers, agents, and factors
as the company shall think proper to authorize for that purpose. It is plain that the provisions of this section cannot be
carried into etfect where a partnership exists. The partner
may manage and conduct the business of the corporation, and
bind it by his acts. In so doing, he does not act as an officer
or agent of the corporation by authority received from it, but
as a principal in a society in which all are equals, and each
capable of binding the society by the act of its indh·idual
will.
Indeed, in examining this chapter, it will be found that there
is scarcely a provision for the conduct of the business of a manufacturing corporation that is not inconsistent with the existence of a contract by which the power to manage the business
of the company, and to bind the corporation by his acts, ls
vested in one not a member of the corporation, nor its officer or
agent. Such are the third, fourth and fifth sections, providing
how the president and directors, and other officers, agents and
factors of the corporation shall be chosen. Such, too, is the
sixth section, which authorizes every such company to make
by-laws for its own regulation and government. Such are the
several provisions authorizing the stocl{bolders to fix the
amount of the capital stock, to increase the same within the
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limit fixed by law, or to reduce it: aecs. 9, 11, 19. And such
is the provision req~iring the president and directors to give
annual notice of the amount of the debts of the corporation, the
means of stating which would not be in their power if anothE:r
principal had the power of creating the debts: Sec. 22. Of
the same character is the twenty-fifth section, by which it is
declared that the whole amount of the debts which the corporation shall at any time owe shall not exceed the amount of the
capital stock actually paid in, and which renders the directors,
under whose administration an excess shall occur, liable per·
sonally to the extent of such excess-a provision evidently
based upon the ground that the exclusi;ve power to contract
debts is vested in such directors, and that they cannot be
diveRted of it, and which is wholly inconsistent with the existence of a power in the corporation to enter into a contract of
partnership by which another principal would be created, having equal power to contract debts, and to bind the partnership
and the corporation in solido.
·
Indeed, the effect of all our statutes, the settled policy of our
legislature, for the regulation of manufacturing corporations,
is that the corporation is to manage its affairs separately and
exclusively; certain powers to be exercised by the stockholders
and others by officers who are the servants of the corporation,
and act in its name and behalf. And the formation of a contract, or the entering into a relation by which the corporation,
or the officers of its appointment, should be divested of that
power, or by which its franchises should be vested in a partner,
with equal power to direct and control its business, is entirely
Inconsistent with that policy.
The power to form a partnership is not only not among th~
powers granted expressly or by reasonable implication, but is
wholly inconsistent with the scope and tenor of the powers
expressly conferred, and the duties expressly imposed, upon a
manufacturing corporation under the legislation of the com·
monwealth.
·
The diffic'u lties would be obviously greater in holding such a
.partnership to be valid, when formed and carried on for the
prosecution of a business other than that, if not foreign from
that, for which the corporation was created. It is difficult to
see how the corporation should engage in such business, even
when under its own control 1 still less to enter into copartner·
ship with third persons for that purpose.
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By the statu~e of 1852, c. 195, not adverted to in the argo·
ment, corporations created for the manufacture of woolE-n and
cotton goods are authorized to carry on certain other manufactures, but this only when four-fifths of the stockholders shall,
by vote at a special meeting, called for the purpose, consent to
the same. This statute furnishes a pretty strong implication
that the power to earry on a different business from that fo.r
which the corporation was chartered did not exist before the
sta tote was ·passed.
We are, therefore, all of the opinion that in the formation of
the alleged partnership the corporation exceeded the powers
given by its charter expressly or by implication, and that the
contract of copartnership was illegal and void. • • •
If .the assent of all the stockholders were shown to the forma·
't:ion of the partnership-which is not the fact-it could not
enlarge the powers of the corporation, or make that legal
which was inconsistent with the law limiting their powers and
prescribing their duties. Whether, if such assent were avail·
able, it could be manifested in any other mode but a vote of tbe
stockholders, it is not necessary to inquire.
The decision of the question as to the existence of the part·
nership between the Whittenton Mills and WHliam .Mason in
the negative renders unnecessary the inquiry whether, if a
partnership had existed~ the petitioners could be subjected to
the provisions of the insolvent law of 1838, c. 163, and the acts
in addition thereto.
The proceedings in insolvency, founded upon the petition of
Mason as the partner of said Whittenton Mills, under the firm
of WiJliam ~Mason & Co., were illegal, and must be vacated and
set aside, so far as they affect the estate of the Whittenton
Mills. A mandamus must issue to the judge in insolvency for
the county of Bristol to proceed upon the petition of the Whit·
tenton Mills to hear the parties, and, good cause being shown,
to issue Ws warrant thereon.
Decree accordingly.
NOTE: For other caeee as to the power of oorporatiou to enter into
partnership, aee Mechem's Elem. of Partn., 126.
Conceding, however. that a corporation has no implied power to enter
into a partne111hip, it by no means follows that such an arrangement, i(
wholly executed, may be repudiated by the corporation upon that ground.
See Boyd va. A mer. Carlxm Black Co.. 182 Pa. St. 206; Sabine Tram Co.
V3. Bancroft, 16 Tex. Civ. App. 170.

CATSKILL BANK

vs.

GRAY.

73

C,ATSKILL BANK vs .. GRAY.

Supreme Court of New York, 1861.
14 Barb. 471.

The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion.
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John Van Vleck for plaintiff.
John C. Spencer for the Ulster Iron Co.
By the Court, WRIGHT, J.
The agreement of September, 1843, is set forth in the com·
plaint, and not being denied by the answer, is to be taken as
true. By that agreement the Ulster Iron Company leased to
Horace Gray for the term of five years certain real property in
Saugerties, in the county of mster, on which were mills,
machinery and water power for the manufacture of iron. As
rent of the demised premises, Gray etipulated to pay to the
company "one·fourth part of the net profits arising from the
premises, and the manufacture of iron thereon, after deducting
all charges, excepting. commissions on sales at New York, the
person~l services of Gray and the general superintendence at
Saugerties, which were not to be charged in making up profits."
Gray was to provide all the funds necet~sary for the manufac·
ture of l:>ar iron to the best advantage on the demised premises,
and all the necessary capital in cash or otherwise, as should
be required for such manufacture. He was authorized to
expend in putting the works in order, and in additional ma·
chinery, a sum not to exceed $5,000, for which sum so expended,
the company was to allow him interest, \lntil the accruing rent
should be equal to the expenditure.
·
It was further stipulated that any loss that might occur
should be charged to the profit and loss account, but the com·
pany was not to be liabl~ to repay any moneys already pre·
viously received by them as rent, or be liable for any loss or
deficiency at the end of the demised term. Of the fourth part
of the profits which were to be paid as r~nt, one-half was to be
paid annually, and the balance at the end of the term, with in·
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terest; such interest to be yearly added to the principal. Gray,
in furnishing the capital to carry on the business, was authorized to charge interest on his advances, at the rate o( six per
cent per annum, and was to allow interest on all moneys in his
hands arising from the manufacture. It was alsQ agreed that
the Stockbridge and Port Henry pig iron might be used· in the
manufacture of iron on the demiSE}d premises, and if so used
should be charged at its fair market price; the price, and all
other questions under the agreement, to be decided by Joseph
Tuckerman of the city of New York, who was to make up the
yearly accounts of the profits.
Is thi8 a stipulation for a proportion of the profits as a measure of compensation for the use and occupation of the demised
premises, or is it, in contradistinction thereto, an agreement for
a specific interest in the profits as profits? I think that it is
clearly of the latter character. The provisions of the agreement look to a direct interest, by the company, in the profits to
be actually made from the manufacture of bar iron on the
premises. The contract between the parties, is in effect this.
A company, incorporated for the manufacture of iron, having
mills, machinery and water power, agree with an individual for
the use of the same for five years. The object of the contract
is the manufacture· of iron. The funds needed are to be advanced, the labor performed, and the business actually superintended by Gray. Gray is to procure and disburse tha money·
for the purchase of materials, the payment of workmen, and to
meet all the expenses incident to the manufacture, to the best
advatage to the parties. An acc.ount of the net profits is to be
annually made up. In making up this account, Gray is to be
allowed by the company, interest on his advance of funds, and
to pay interest on all moneys in his bands arising from the
manufacture. All charges are to be deducted, except .commissions on sales at New York, Gray'8 personal services and the
general superintendence of the establishment. Should a certain description of pig iron be used, it is to be charged in the
account at its fair market price, and in case of disagreement as
to the price, it is to be adjusted by the person named to make
up the yearly account of profits. The lo88e8 that might occur
are to be charged in the profit and loss account, although the
company are not to be liable to repay any moneys already previously received by them, or be liable for any loss or·deficiency
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at the end of Gray's term. The account of actual profits being
annually made up in accordance with the stipulations, the company is to have the one-fourth.part thereof.
It is unnecessary to decide whether under this agreement, as
between the parties themselves, they would be partners; but
as res~cts third persons, it appears to me that that relation
legally exists. What was to be received by the company was
only payable out of profits actually made in the manufacture of
iron. They had then a direct interest in such profits. As was
said in Dob. vs. Halsey (16 John. 40), "he who takes a part
of the profits indefinitely shall by operation of law be made
liable for losses; upon the principle that by taking a part of the
profits he takes from the creditors a part of that fund which is
the security for the payment of their debts." (See also E-verett
vs. Coe, 5 Denio 180; Hasketh vs. Blanchard, 4 East 14:4.)
The case is not like that of Heimstreet vs. Howland ( 5 Denio
68), where one leased a ferry to another, the latter to take
charge of the business, pay all the expenses and pay·over to the
lessor one-half of the gross receipts for ferriage; and it is clearly
distinguishable from Boyer vs. Anderso~ (2 Leigh 550) and
Perrine vs. Hankinson, 6 Haist. 181.
It is urged that the Ulster Iron Company, being a corporation, could not legally form a partnership with an individual.
This company was incorporated in 1831, for the purpose of
manufacturing iron. It might, therefore, lawfully exercise the
powers expressly granted to it, and those necessarily to be implied, to enable it to answer the specific purpose of its creation.
I entertain no doubt that under its charter the company was
capable of making the contract with Gray set forth in the pleadings. That contract related to the business for which the com·
pany was incorporated, and was but a mode of furthering the
specific purpose of its creation. Strictly, perhaps, corporations
should be, and are, restricted from contracting partnerships
with individuals or corporations, and as between the parties to
the contract, acting upon equal knowledge, a question of validity might be raised; but a corporation may contract with an
individual in furtherance of the object of its creation, the effect
of which contract may be to impose upon the company as respects the community, the liabilities of a partner. I cannot
think that a corporation may so shape its contracts relating to
the business for which it was incorporated as to share jointly
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with an individual in the profits of such business; subtract ita
interest in the profits, from the fund on which the creditors of
the concern had a right to rely for the payment of the debts due
to them; and when called upon by such creditors, be permitted
to escape liability altogether, on the ground that the profits
were realized as the partner of an individual, which relation
the corporation could not legally occupy. I know of no sound
reason why a corporation, more than a natural person, who participates in the profits, as such, of a particular business in which
it may lawfully engage, should not be holden liable to the public for losses.
It is further insisted by the counsel for the company that the
money was not loaned to the supposed partnership, or to the
agent of the partnership as such; that the loans were made to .
·_ Burt a& agent of Horace Gray, on his drafts on H. Gray &
Co. ; that the transaction was a discount and purchase of negotiable paper, and the plaintiffs' remedy is confined to the paper;
that the fact that the money received by Burt was applied to
the business of the partnership, does not entitle the plaintiffs to
recover it of the copartners. The money sought to be recovered
was loaned to Burt, as superintendent of the Ulster Iron
Works, and applied by him to the business being conducted
under the agreement of September, 1843. The plaintiffs do not
seek to directly charge the defendants as parties to the bills of
exchange, but on a joint liability for nioney had and received.
The fact that Burt was superintendent of the iron works when
the loan was effected and applied, is found by the judge. He
was the superintendent or agent at the works, in carrying out
the agreement between Gray and the company. The money
was obtained by him as .such superintendent and applied for
their joint and mutual benefit. The bank certainly knew that
Burt was acting as the agent of third persons in procuring the
loan. He professed to act for others; and it is not unreasonable to conclude that the plaintiffs, in loaning these funds, had
regard to the eventual liability of the principals, whoever they
might be, if it should become necessary to resort to them.
In Emly, et al. vs. Lye, et al., (HS East 6), the action being
upon a bill of exchange drawn by one of the partners of a eoncern, in his own name, which was discounted by the plaintiffs,
and the money went to the use of the firm, it was held that the
plaintiffs could not recover, either upon the bill or the money
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counts. Lord Ellenborough observed that the counts on the bill
bad been properly abandoned, for unquestionably on a bill of
exchange drawn by one only, it cannot be allowed to supply by
intendment the names of others, in order to charge them; anrl
considering it a mere discount or sale of the bill, be also held
· that there was no joint liability of the defendants for money
bad and received, and that it was the.individual transaction of
tb~ partner who drew the bill; and all the other judges expressed
similar opinions.
·
I do not however deem this case in all its aspects similar to
the one under consideration. The agreement of September,
1843, contemplated that there should be a general superintendent of the' business of manufacturing iron, though as between
the parties thereto, payment for his services was not to be
charged in making up the account of profits. This superintendent draws the bills that were discounted by the plaintiffs,
signing them in the character of superintendent. He must
have acted exclusively as the agent of Gray, in drawing and
negotiating the bill~, to render the facts of this case similar to
those of Emly vs. Lye. The facts must have shown the trans- ·
action to have been a mere discount or sale of bills .. But it
seems to me necessarily to be implied from the decision of the
judge that he found the fact that Burt acted as the agent of
the defendants, anrl not exclusively as the agent of Gray.
Whether that finding is sustained by the evidence, is not a
question to be entertained on a bill of exceptions.
New trial denied.
Note.-See Mechem's Elements of Pa.rtn., § 26.

IV.
WHAT CONTRACTS AND ACTS CREATE PARTNERSHIP.
1. Of th• Conltruction of Contraols Gemrallg.

ATKINS vs. HUNT.

Supreme Court of New H amps1z.ire, 1843.
14 N. H. 20a.
A!'4SUMPSJT on three promissocy notes, all dated in the year
1840, and payable to the plaintiffs, or order, and signed ''Farmers' and Mechanics'Company, by Greenleaf Cummings, Agent:•
There were numerous defendants, aU of whom were defaulted
except two, who severaUy pleaded the general issue. It was
proved that in the month of August, 1839, the defenda nts
atigned written articles of association in trade, under the name
and style of "The Farmers' and Mechanics' Store." One of the
articles provided as foUows: "If any stockholder wishes to
withdraw from the concern, he may do so, taking the amount
by him paid in, by giving six months' notice of his intent, to the
executive committee in writing." It was also provided by the
second by-law that each subscriber should become a pa rtner,
and the defendant was a subscriber of a certain sum; anc.l
article 12 provided that aU matters relating to the business of
the company should be decided by a major vote of those preltent at any meeting duly notified, ex·c ept in relation to certain
speci6ed acts.
It was proved that Greenleaf Cummings, who signed the
notes, was duly employed from the first of February, 1840, to
the first of July, 1R41, and acted as agent of the compan~·, provided it shaH appear from this case that the company con7

so

0A.SBS ON

p A.BTN'BBSBIP.

tinned Its legal existence, and that the notes in suit were given
in pursuance of his agency, for goode purchased to be used in
the business of the company.
A verdict was taken for the plaintiffs, upon which judgment
ls to be rendered, or it is to be set aside and judgment rendered
for the defendants, according to the opinion of the Court upon
this case.

Livermore, for the defendants.
Morrison, for the plaintiff.
GILORRIST, J. The question before the Court ts, whether the
defendants are liable as partners of the Farmers nod Mechanics' Company. The plaintiffs alJege that they are thus liable,
because it appears that they subscribed certain articles consti·
toting that company; that provision was made for the with·
drawal of persons from it; that the business of the company
was to be managed according to the vote of those present, and
that the second by-law provides that each subscriber shall
become a partner. These facts it is said render them liabl~ to
the world as partners for the performance of the contractR
made by their agent, and constitute them actually partners
among themselves.
It is said, on the other hand, that what was done amounted
merely to a proposition to form a partnership ; that no money
was paid in, so as to cause them to be affected by any eventual
profit and loss; that no mimes were published to the world, 11s
those of the partners; that the defendants might have with·
drJ.wn at any time, and that consequently they could not be
bound by the acts of the agent of the company. The ques tion
rnised by the case is, whether the defendants were actually
members of a partnership.
There is of course an essential difference between n mere
proposition to form a partnership, and its actual consti tution.
Persons may take a deep interest in the objects t o be nccom·
plisbed by the company; may make donations to aid its progress; or may sign their names to subscription papers for the
same Pnd, without being liable for debts which other p('rsons
may contract in the prosecution of the same purpose. Hut a
difficult question often arist-s, as to where the proposition to
make the contract end!!!, nnd the contr·act itself bt-gins. In
Bourne ""· Freeth, 9 B. & C. 632, 17 Eng. Com. Law 285 a
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prospectus was issued, stating the conditions upon which
the company was formed; that the concern was to be divided
into twenty shares, to be under the management of a committee, and ten per cent of the subscriptions to be paid in
by a certain date. It was held that this prospectus imported
only tha~ a company was to be form-ed, and not that it
was actually formed, and that the signature to the prospectus did not indicate to any person who should read it
that the signer had become a member of a company alre~dy
formed. So ·in a case where all the acts proved and relied
on were equally consistent with the supposition of an
intention on the part of the defendant to become a part- ·
ner in a trade or business to be afterward carried on, provided certain things were done, as with that of an existin~
partnership, it was held that he was not a partner: Dickinson
vs. Valpy, 10 B. & C. 128, 21 Eng. Com. Law 63, per l'ARKE, J.
And where a prospectus for a company was issued, to be conducted pursuant to the terms of a deed to be drawn up, it was
held that an application for shares, and payment of the first
deposit, did not constitute one a partner who bad not otherwise interfered in the concern: Fo:c vs. Cl·i fton, 6 Bing. 776,
19 Eng. Com. Law, 347. It was an important element in
that decision, that the deed was not executed by the defendant who was sought to be charged as a partner. In
Howell vs. Brodie, 6 Bing. N. C. 44, 37 Eng. Com. Law
272, the defendant from 1829 until 1833 advanced various
sums, with a view to a partnership in a market about
to be erected; knew that the money was applied toward the
erection, and was consulted in every stage. In October, 1833,
it was settled by a written agreement that he should have a
seventh share of it-; but it was held that he was not liable as a
partner until October, 1833, although profits bad been made
but not accounted for to him before that time. Lord C. J.
TINDAL mentions the fact that no account of profits was rendered previous to October, 1833, as being in favor of the
defendant.
'·
Thf>se cases sufficiently illustrate and authorize the general
position taken by the defendantR, that a mere agreem~nt to
constitute a partnership in futuro does not make the contracting parties liable as partners. A partnership is a contract,
imposing certain liablities npon its members. "rhether par-
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ties have agreed that they will at some future time enter into
such a contract, is a very different question from the one
whether they have actually entered into the contract. But we
are not called upon to make a critical examination of the
numerous cases on the subject of partnership which fall within
one or the other of these categories, furtfler than to recognize
their division into the two classes referred to. Our opinion is
that the defendants are clearly liable as partners, for the acts
of Cummings. There was an association doing business under
a certain name. The defendants signed the articles which constituted this association, the defendants were subscribers, and
a by-law provided that each subscribe!" should become a part·
ner. The business of the company was to be done in pursuance of a major vote of those present, and an agent was
appointed, who purchased goods for the use of the company.
Here, then, there was not simply an agreement that a partnership should be formed at soine future day, but an actual existing reality, a subscription to articles, making a present association, and a by-law designating the subscribers as partners. A
right to pat1:icipate in the profits of a joint concern is one of the
tests of a partnership, where a party has fulfilled all the COil ·
ditions incumbent on him to perform: Fo:IJ vs. Clifton, 6 Bing.
776, 19 Eng. Com. Law 233; s. c., 9 Bing. 115,23 Eng. Com. Law
~73, per TINDAL, C. J. The defendants do not appear to have
failed in this regard, and upon this case they would certainly
be entitled to a share in the profits of the business. It is not
necessary that persons should hold themselves out to the world
as partners, in order to become liable in that capacity. That is
only one mode of charging them, and when that is done it di.s·
penses with the necessity of proving that they actually signed
the articles of partnership. In this caae, as the defendants
were partners in fact, the opinion of the Court is that there
should be judgment on the verdict.
NoTE: As to oontemplated partnerahipa, eee Mechem's Elem. of Partn.,
§ § 1!-J.H, and caees there cited.
As to when the contract takes etrect, eee Id. § 3t and caaee cited: also
Kerrick vs. StevelUI, post; Chester vs. Dickerson, ante.
See also Jacobe vs. Shorey, post.
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LANEY vs. FICKEL, et al.

Court of Appeals of Missouri, 1899.
88 Mo. App. 00.

Appeal from the Knox Circuit Court.
McKee, Judge. Affirmed.

Hon. Edwin R.
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0. D. Jones, for appellant.
Chas. D. Stewart and G. R. Balthorpe, for respondents.
BoND, J. Plaintiff and thirty-nine other citizens of Knox
county, Missouri, organized a joint stock company for the purpose of establishing a fruit canning factory, and to that end
elected a president, secretary, treasurer, and appointed a committee to locate a site for a building and empowered it to purchase material and employ laborers to erect such building. In
the prosecution of these ends the association became indebted
to certain laborers and materialmen, and also to a lumber firm,
of which plaintiff was a member. All of these accounts were
assigned to plaintiff, who brought suit against defendants, and
prayed judgment for the several sums so assigned to him.
When the fact was developed during the trial by the admission
of plaintiff that he was a member of said joint stock company
and attended its meetings and consented to what was done by
it in the matter of constructing the building and incurring the
indebtedness sued for, the trial court directed a verdict for
defendants. From a judgment in accordance, plaintiff appealed.
The first question presented is as to the nature of the association in which plaintiff engaged. Under the facts stated it was
clearly a joint stock company which went into practical operation so far as to elect officers, construct a building and incur
indebtedness. Such associations were recognized at commonlaw and may exist by statute. The members thereof are liable
in solido for all of its indebtedness in the same manner as the
members of an ordinary partnership. While there is some
variance in the authorities as to what steps must be taken before the members become liable in this manner to third parties,
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all the cases are agreed that such liability is consummate upon
a showing that the member joined the association, attended its
meetings and consented to the engagement out of which the
liability arose. Hunnewell v. Willow Springs Canning
Company, 53 Mo. App. 245. The case at bar presents all
these elements of liability in plaintiff's connection with the
company. He was therefore liable as a copartner with his
other associates for the claim sued upon by him, since they
were valid obligations against the joint stock company it-self.
This being so, and there being no pretense that the affairs of
the joint stock company had been adjusted or settled, nor that
any accounting between its members had taken place, nor that
there remained only a single item of dispute, it ·is obvious that
plaintiff could not bring an action at law against any of the
members of the association for a liability against it, since the
rule is universal that "a partner cannot maintain an action at
law against his copartner on a partnarship claim or liability."
George on Partnership, 302; Bambrick v. Simms, 132 Mo.
48; Rankin v. Fairley, 29 Mo. App. 587. It matters not in
the application of thil~ rule whether the liability of the partnership arose upon a contract dealing with one of its members, or
whether the latter purchased a claim against it. In neither
can the action at law therefor be maintained. Lyons v. ];furray, 95 Mo. 23. ·The ruling of the circuit court in this case is·
supported by the admission of the foregoing facts made by
plaintiff on the witness stand. It was to the effect that the
present action, which is strictly a legal one, could not be main- •
tained. It was manifestly correct, and the judgment therefor
is affirmed. All concur.
NOTE.-See Mechem's Elements of P&rtn., §§ 7, 180 and 181.

----T'i-.

S.&ILOBS

n.

NIXoN-JoNES PlUNTI.NO Co.

S5

SAILORS vs. NIXON-JONES PRINTING CO.
Appellate Court of Illinois, 1886.
30 Ill. App. GOO.

Action by the Printing Company against Sailors, Woodward
and Guibout, to recover for printing done for the "Union Mercantile Agency," under which name it was alleged that defendants were partners. Each of defendants owned an interest in
certain books and business of a commercial agency, and on
January 2, 1885, they agreed to unite their interests as a partnership under the name of Union Mercantile Agency. It was
agreed, however, that for two years Sailors was to be relieved
from any participation in the business, and during that time he
was neither to share in the management nor in the profits or
losses of the business. At the expiration of that time, he was
to take an active part. In May, 1885, Guibout ordered the
printing for which the action was brought. Guibout, in his
deposition, testified that he told the plaintiff when the order
was given that the firm consisted of himself, Woodward ancl
Sailors. He also testified that he told Sailors of the order and
t!.tat the latter agreed to help pay. This Sailors denied. No
participation by Sailors in the business was shown. Judgment
for plaintiff, and Sailors appealed.
J. D. Hubbard, for appellant.
Flower, Rem11

~

G-regory, for

appellee.

MoRAN, J. The contract of January 2,1885, between Woodward and Guibout and appellant, did not constitute appellant
a partner in the business which Woodward and Guibout were
to conduct in St. Louis. True, the word "partnership" is used
to designate the relation of the parties, but the whole agreement shows plainly that Sailors was a joint owner merely,
and that the business was to be conducted wholly by the
others, and they were to have the entire profits accruing, and
bear all losses that might happen in running the business till
' '
at the end of two years, Sailors was to come into a participation of the business, and thereafter share the profits and
losses of the business that should be done. It was a contract
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whieh bound appellant to become a partner at the end of
two years, but such contract would not make him liable for
debts coBtracted b~fore his relation as partner commenced.
The agreement is very explicit that he shall not share the
profits nor be liable for the losses. He retained only his one·
third ownership in the books and good-will of the business,
and had no control over its management and no right beyond
seeing to the preservation of the property. The fact that the
parties to such relation themselves call it a partnership will
not make it so. Where the question of partnership is to be
determined from a contract bet~een the parties to it, the rell:l·
tion must be found from the terms and provisions of the contract, and even though parties intend to bec~me partners, yet
if they so frame the terms and provisions of their contract as
to leave them without any community of interest in the busi·
ness or profits, they are not partners either in fact or in law:
Parsons on Partnership, 91. A partnership inte-r Be must result
from the intention of tke parties as expressed in the contract,
and they cannot be made to assume toward each other a relation which they have expressly contracted not to assume. The
terms of the agreement, where there is one, fix the real status
of the parties toward each other.
If there is no agreement, then if they deal with each other
as partners, sharing losses and profits, their interest will be
gathered from their acts, and they will be partners inter Be.
Collyer on Partnership, § 2 and note. A mere community
of interest in property will not make the owners- partners.
There must be an agreement for a joint v ··ture and to share
profits and losses; and in the absence of such a mutual agreement they are mere tenants in common of the property and
the act of one will not bind the other: Chase vs. Ban·ett, 4
Paige (N. Y.) 148; Niehoff VB. Dudley, 40 Ill. 406; Smith vs.
Knight, 71 Ill. 149, 22 Am. Rep. 94.
As the contract did not make appellant a partner, he could
~nly be held on the ground that he had held himself out as
one, or authorized or assented to his being so held out. Nixon
says that he knew appellant was a partner when the books
were ordered, but he does not state how he knew it, and it maJ
. well be inferred that he only knew from what Guibout told
him at the time the books were ordered. The question
whether the appellant had been, with his consent, held out as
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a· partner to the plaintitl', was one of fact for the jury; and it
was important that in determining that question the jury .
should be confined to whatever competent testimony was
before them. The statement in Guibout'sdeposition that he told
Nixon that appellant was one of the firm without proof. that
appellant authorized the statement, was incompetent, and in
view of all the evidence in the case was calculated to mislead
the jury. A party has a right to insist that' irrelevant and
incompetent testimony shall be excluded. Incompetent testimony in a deposition, though not objected to when the deposition is taken, may be objected to on the trial. The objection
is not as to mere form, it is substantial: Cooke 'VB. Orne, 37 Ill.
186;. Lockwood VB. Mills, 39 Ill. 602.
Nor did appellant lose his right to have the evidence
excluded by failing to object to it when read from the deposition. When incompetent testimony gets into the case in the
shape of depositions or otherwise, it is the duty of the Court,
when required, at any stage of the trial, to exclude it or direct
the jury to disregard it: Pittman vs. Gaty, 5 Gilm. 186; Greenup
vs. Stoker, 2 Gilm. 688; Wickenkamp VB. Wickenkamp, 77 Ill. 92.
The refusal of the Court to exclude the evidence on appellant's motion was material error, and, while we are much
Inclined to the opinion that there was no legal evidence before
the jury to support a verdict that appellant was jointly liable,
still we prefer to rest the reversal on the error above specified,
and remand the case for such further action as the parties may
desire to take.
Reversed and remanded.
Nan: See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., § 4L

KERRICK vs. STEVENS.

Supreme Court of Michigan, 1BB,f..
M Mich. 167; 20 N. W. Rep. 888.

:Action by Kerrick against Stevens, Riches and McCormick,
of whom Stevens alone defended.
Judgment below for the defendants, _and plaintitl' appeals.
The opinion states the facts.
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N. 0. Gri8wold, for plaintiff.
P• .R. 8hield8 and J. 0. 8hield8, for defendants.

J. Defendants were sued as partners for a debt
incurred by the firm for machinery furnished by plaintiff f~r
a factory in Hastings, Minnesota. Under the charge of th~
court below a verdict was rendered for defendants, whieh
depended on a denial of the existence of any part;nership
liability against Stevens. On the first of March, 1882, the
defendants entered into articles which recited the ownership
by Riches of a patent for folding ladders, in which he agreecl
to give the others each one-third interest in Minnesota. Stevens
agreed to furnish $5,000 for the purpose of putting up fac·
tory in Hastings, and buying machi~ery and material, and was
not to do any work in the factory unless he chose. Riches was
to assist in putting up and setting in order the factory and
machinery, anq McCormick to attend to sales and manufac·
ture. When the factory was completed they were all to be
equal partners. As soon as this was signed the parties begun
operations, and bought machinery and property for the pur·
pose of the manufacture, and Riches moved to Hastings from
Michigan for that object. In the latter part of May, or early
iu June, Stevens went there, and spent some weeks, as it is
claimed, in looking after the business. He did not furnish
the full amount which be agreed to.
·
The notes in suit were given for machinery purchased for
the business and put up in the factory, which was nearly ready
for use. There was testimony that during his visit at Hastings
Stevens was introduced as a partner, said he was a partner,
and acted as a partner, going twice with one of the witnesses
to St. Paul to purchase property which was in Hastings, as
a site for the factory, and requested the same witness to keep
an eye on the operations of the other partners and report to
him. In October, 1882, being written to on behalf of plaintiff ·
for payment of this claim, he wrote back a letter treating the
matter as a liability of the partnership, urging plaintiff to take
ba~k the machinery, and promising to arrange the balance sat·
isfactorily. Evidence was also given that Stevens, on the
thirty-first day of July, 1882, sent out various notices that he
would not be liable for any future debts. Defendant was
allowed to introduce some talk after the contract was
0AHPBELL,
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executed, to the effect that the partnership was oot to commence until after the factory was finished. But it was not
claimed that this was for the purpose of changing the agreement, but only to construe it; and Mrs. Stevens spoke of this
as being said both before and after, on the ~ame day.
There are- several questions raised on the cha.rges, but one
is sufficient to decide the case. The court charged that the
written contract did not make the parties partners, but only
provided for a future partnership after the factory shoultl
be put in operation. We think it created a partnership from
the beginning. It contemplated action to be taken at once
and continuously for the joint benefit. Stevens was to fur·
nish the money in advance, and Riches was to give his time
and attention to putting up the factory and machinery. These
were the capital of the firm to enable it to get into prosperous
operation. It lVOnld be an anomaly to have capital paid in
and expended without any partnership existing, and without
any provision for future emergencies or failures. The purpose
must be derived from the nature of the agreement, and not
from the ·technical meaning of words as present or future,
standing alone. It was quite proper to use future words as
to t'he interest to be owned in future property, but this will
not do away with the necessary inference to be drawn from
the immediate action of parties and expenditure of time and
money in such a way as to be practically lost in case of there
being no partnership carried out. We think the partnership
began at once.
The judgment must be reversed and a new trial granted.
The other justices concurred.
Non: Compare with preceding oase11.

DURYEA vs. WHITCOMB.
Supreme Court of Vermont, 1858.
81 Vt. 895.

This was an action at law brought by A. & W. E. Duryea
against Whitcomb, to recover what plaintiffs claimed to be
their share of a joint enterprise entered into by plaintiffs,
~
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defendant and one Lewis. Plaintiffs and Lewis resided in New
York city and Whitcomb in Vermont. The agreement was
that Whitcomb should, on the joint account, buy potatoes in
Vermont and New Hampshire, to be sent to New York and
other markets. 'Vhitcomb was to have a fixed price per bushel
for buying, and the net profits were to be divided in accordance
with the contributions of the parties. The auditor who heard
the case found defendant indebted to plaintiffs in the sum of
f845.45. Defendant claimed that the arrangement constituted
a partnership, and that therefore the affairs could not be
adjusted in this form of action. The auditor found that the
parties said nothing about partnership and that neither of the
parties supposed they were forming a partnership or intended
to form one. Defendant appealed.
0.

a.

Dewey, and A.. Undertcood, .for defendant.

A. M. Dickey and a. B. Leslie, for plaintiffs.

ALDIS, J. · As this is a case where the rights of the partners
$nter Be merely are concerned, where no question as to third
persons is involved, the criterion to determine whether the
contract is one of partnership or not, must be, what did the
parties intend by the contract which they made as between
themselves?
If we regard the agreement itself, as set forth in the audi·
tor's report, it is clearly a partnership. The agreement was
verbal, bot by the finding of the auditor may be considered as
in· writing at this time. Giving to the contract, as stated in
the report, the same construction that we should to articles in
writing of the same tenor, it appears to ns to have every ingredi~nt of a partnership.
The parties all furnish a share of the capital, Whitcomb onehalf, Lewis one-quarter, the Duryeas one-quarter. They _jointly
own the property when purchased. It is purchased in order
to be sold again for their joint and mutual benefit, thereby
negating the idea of separate control and disposition of their
interests in the property purchased, and of separate interests
in the proceeds. Each is to share in the final profit or loss;
at the close of the season the profits or losses are to be divided,
to Whitcomb one-half, to Lewis a· quarter, to the plaintiffs a.
quarter. Each is to aid in selling, and to contribute his aid,
akill, and knowledge to get the highest price.
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The case of Griffith vs. Buffum, 22 Vt. 181, 64 Am. Dec.
post, where the defendants were held to be partners
as between themselves, is not so strong to show a partnership
as this; for there the agreement to share in the losses seems
to have been implied, whilst here it is expressed.
The fact that each was to be accountable for his own sales,
amounts only to this, that each should sell for cash; if either
did not, he was to be accountable for his sale as cash. The
proceeds of the sales by each would belong to them jointly, not
severally. This provision is as consistent with an agreement
for a partnership as with anyother: Noyes vs. Cushman, 25
Vt. 390. So that Whitcomb was to have the control of the
potatoes, and to run them to the best market, taking the
advice of Lewis and the Duryeas on the subjeCt, is, when we
consider where the parties resided, where the potatoes were to
be bought, and to what markets they might be sent, and that
Whitcomb was to buy them, as consistent with a contract of
partnership as with any other.
I. This agreement does not belong to the class of caseH
where the parties are jointly interested in certain proportiona;
in the property purchased, but not in the final profits or losses;
where each of the part owners has the power of separate dis·
position of his interest. Such is the ~se of Ooope vs. Eyre, 1
H. Bl. 37 post, a leading illustration of the class.
II. It is not of the class where a party receives a portion ot
the profits as a compensation for his labor as an agent or
servant. Each furnished a portion of the capital, each was a
part owner of the property when purchased, and of the proceeds when sold. Neither could be said to be the servant or
agent of the other. An agent who receives a share of tb('
. profits as a compensation for his services, is not expected to
share in losses; if there are no profits he loses his labor or
wages, but he loses no more, though there are further losses to
be borne by the partners.
Of this class is Kellogg vs. Gristoold, 12 Vt. 291; and Mason
vs. Potter, 26 Vt. 722.
III. Nor is it a case where a share of the gross or net earnings is to be paid as a compensation for the use of capital, or
as rent; and where the party receiving such compensation has
no interests in the business, the property and the proceeds, but
only a right of action against the other parties. Here the
64
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parties jointly contributed capital, labor, and skill, were joint
ownerJI of the property from the time of its purchase till the
final division of profits or loss. No severance of their interests
could be had, no ascertainment of their respective shares or
interests could be made till a final accounting. They must
have relied on the property and its proceeds to secure to each
his final share, no matter by whom the property might be sold,
or its proceeds held.
Hence the cases of Tobias va. Blin, 21 Vt. 544; Bot.Oman N.
Bailey, 10 Vt.- 170, and Ambler vs. Bradle1J, 6 Vt. 119, do not
apply. Of the same class are Denny vs. Cabot, 6 Met. (Mass.)
92; Holmes vs. The Old Colony R. R. Co., 5 Gray (Mass.) 68;
Loomis vs. Marshall, 12 Conn. 69, 30 Am. Dec. 596, and various
other cases cited by counsel.
It is said, however, that the auditor finds that the parties did
not intend to form a partnership, and that such intention most
gcvern.
It is with contracts of partnership as with all other con·
tracts, that as between the parties to them their ·intention
must govern. Hence an express stipulation in a contract that
the parties thereto shall not thereby become partners, is bind·
ing and of great significance in giving construction to the
instrument, especially if the terms are doubtful or susceptible
of more than one meaning.
1. It is to be noted that in this case there was no such
express stipulation. The auditor's report sa)'S, "at the time
of the arrangement In New York, August 20, 1854, nothing
was said about a partnership, and neither of the parties at
that time supposed they were forming a partnership, or
intended to form a partnership." As nothing was said about
a partnership, the parties could not have stipulated that their
contract should not create one.
2. The report states what was the arrangement of August
20, 1854-. That was a contract for a partn~rship. If their contract was for a partnership by necessary legal construction
(which we have found that it was), and they intended to make
the contract (and this appears from the report), the legal effect
of their contract could not l>e varied by their n<>t supposing it
to be what it was. The further statement in the report that
they did not intend to form a partnership seems inconsistent
with the other facts. One is at a loss to perceive how the
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auditor could discover such an intention when nothing was
said about a partnership, and when the contract~ which they
made, waa a partnership. Probably the fair construction of
the report is that the parties were not aware of the legal
extent and obligation of the contract into which they entered.
As the contract imports a partnership, we must hold, in the
absence of any express stipulation and of any other circum·
stances to show the contrary, that they intended to create the
relation which the contract expresses.
IV. The action is book account. The accounts presented
for adjustment are all partnership accounts. None of them
are properly chargeable on book. The case of Green vs. Cha-p·
man, 27 Vt. 236, has settled the construction of the statute
of November 18, 1852, viz.: that where there are .no items
properly chargeable on book, the action of book account will
not lie for the adjustment of other items proper for the action
of account.
The result is that the judgment of the county court is
reversed and judgment rendered for the defendant to recover
his costs.
NorB: See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., § ~. aa to the efJeot of contracts.
See also Jacobe va. Shorey, po4t.

I. Of their Effect in Creating Partmrahip.

GRACE vs. SMITH.

King's Bench, Easter Term, 171$.
2 Wm. Bl. 998.

AssuMPSIT for goods sold and delivered. Motion for new
trial after a verdict for the defendant.
This was an action brought against Smith alone as a secret
partner with one Robinson, to whom the goods were delivered,
and who became bank~pt in 1770. On the 30th of March,
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1767, Smith and Robinson entered into partnership for seven
years, but in the November afterward, some disputen arising,
they agreed to dissolve the partnership. The articles were
not cancelled, but the dissolution was open and notorious, and
was notified to the public on the 17th of November, 1767. The
terms of the dissolution were that all the stock in trade and
debts due to the partnership should be carried to the account
of Robinson only. Smith was to have back £4,200 which he
brought into the tra'de, and £1,000 for the profits then accrued
since the oomme ncement of the partnership; that Smith was to
lend Robinson £4,000, part of this £5,200, or let it remain in
his hands for seven years at five per cent interest, and an
annuity of £300 per annum, for the same seven years. For
all which &binson gave bond to Smith. In ,Tune, 1768, Rob·
in80n advanced to Smith £600 for two years' payment of the
annuity and other sums by way of interest, and gratuities, and
other large sums at different times, to enable him to pay the
partnership debts, Smith having agreed to receive all that
was due to the partnership, ~nd to pay its debts, but at the
hazard of Robinson. On the 1st of August, 1768, the demands ·
of Smith were all liquidated and consolidated into one, viz.,
£5,200 due to him on the dissolution of the partnership, £1,500
for the remaining five years of the annuity, and £300 for
Smith's share of a ship; in all £7,000, for which Robinson gave
a bond to Smith. On the 22d of August, 1769, an assignment
was made of all Robinson's effects to secure the balance then
due to Smith, which was stated to be £10,000. Soon after the
commission was awarded.
Dat71, for the plaintiff, insieted that the agreement between Robinson
and Smith was either a secret continuance of the old partnership, or a secret
commencement of a new one, being for the retiring partner to leave his money
in the visible partner's bands, in order to carry on his trade, and to receive
for it twelve and a halt per cent profit, which could not be fairly done unleao
it be understood to arise from the profits of the trade; and that he ought
therefore to be considered as a seoret partner. And he relied much on theoase
of Bloxham & Fourdrinier against Pell & Brooke, tried at the same sittings
(7th of March, 1775) before Lord M.ucsFIELD in the King's Bench, as in point.
"This was also a partnership for seven years between Brooke & Pell; but
at the end of one year agreed to be dissolved, but no express dissolution
was bad. The agreement recited that Brooke being desirous to have
the p-rofits of the tr.ade to himself, and Pelf being deeirous to relinquit.h hie
right to the trade and profite, it. was agreed that Brooke should give Pell
a bond for £2,485, which Pell had brought into the trade, with interest at
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ftve per cent, which wu accordingly done. And it wu further agreed
that Brooke should pay to Pall £200 per annum for six years, if Brooke eo
long lived, aa in lieu of the profit& of the trade; and Brooke covenant& that
Pellahould have free liberty to inspect his books. Brooke became a bank·
rupt before anything W88 paid to P~ll. And this action being brought for a
debt incurred by Brooke in the oouree of trade, Lord MANsl'tKLD held that
Pell W88 a eeoret partDer. This was a device to make more than legal
intereet of money, and if it was not a partnership it W88 a crime. And it
ahali not lie in the defendant Pell'e mouth to aay, 'It is usury and not
a partnership.' "
Groae and .Adair, for the defendant, argued that the present oaae ia very
diatinguishablefrom that of Blo:z:ham and Pell. . Pall was to be paid out of
the protlta of the trade, 88 appears from the cov81lant to inspect the books,
which elae would be useleaa. Hie annuity waa e:z:preaaly given, as and in lieu
of those protlta. It was contingent in another view, 88 it depended on the life
of Brooke, by whom thoee protlta were to be made. In ouroase the annuity
is certain, not casual; it doee not depend on careying on the tradt-1 nor to
cease when that is left otJ, but is due out of the estate of Robinson. It ia
not a neceasary dilemma, that it must be either usury or partnership. It
may be, and probably waa. a premium for the good will of the trade.
Two thousand guineas is no uncommon price for turning over the protlta
of a trade eo benetloial tbat it appears to have been rated at £1,000 to each
partner in the apaoe of lea9 than eight months. And whether that sum
is agreed to be paid at once, or by seven instalments, it is the same thing.
Besides, whether there be or be not a aeoret constructive partnership ia a
queation proper for a jury, who han here decided it on a consideration of
all the oircumetancea.
DR GREY~ C. J. The only question is: What constitutes a
aecret partner? Every man who has a share of the profits of
a trade ought also to bear his share of the loss. And if uny
one takes part of the profit he takes a part of that fund on
which the creditor of the trader relies for his payment. If any
one advances or lends money to a trader it is only lent on his
general personal security. It is no specific lien upon the profits
of th.e trade, and yet the lender is generally ~nterested in those
profits; be relies on them for repayment. And there is no dif·
ferencewhether that money be lent de novo or Zeft behind in trade
by one of the partners who retires. And whether the tenns of
that Joan be kind or harsh makes also no manner of difference.
I think the true criterion is to inquire whether Smith agreed
to share the profits of the trade with Uobinson, or whether he
only relied on those profits as a fund of payment; a distinction
not more nice than usually occurs in questions of trade or
usury. The jury have said that this is not payable out of the
profits, and I think there is no foundation for granting a n.ew
trial.
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GouLD, J., same opinion.
BLACKSTONE, J., same opinion. I think the true criterion
·(when money is advanced to a trader) is to consider whether
the profit or premium is certain and defined, or casual, indefinite, and depending on the accidents of trade. In the former
case it is a loan (whether usurious or not is not material to the
present question), in the latter a part:Bership. The hazard of
loss a.n d profit is not equal and reciprocal, if the lender can
receive only a limited sum for the profits of his loan, and yet is
made liable to all the losses, all the debts contracted in the
trade, to any amount.
N An:ms, J., same opinion. Rule discharged.
NOT&: COmpare wit.h · tollowine oasea. See
Partn., §§ 6, 6, et. seq.

aleo~

Mechem's Elem.. of

COOPE vs EYRE.
Engli8h Oourt of Oommon Pleas,

17~8.

1 H. Bl. 37.

:Action by Coope and others against Eyre, Atkinson, 'Walton,
Hattersley, Stephens, and Pugh, to recover the purchase pr!re
for a shipload of oil, purchased in the name of Eyre & Co.
Eyre & Co., composed of Eyre, Atkinson & Walton, had become
bankrupt, and did not defend, so that the real defendants were
Hattersley & Co. (Stephens) and Pugh & Co. (Pugh's son).
These defendants contended that the contract of sale wa~
made by the plaintiffs with Eyre & Co. only, ~d that the con·
tract between t,hese defendants and Eyre & Co. was not such
as to create a :-:trtnership. Verdict for defendant~ under
direCtion of the court (Lord LouoanoRouoa), and motion made
for a new trial on the ground of misdirection.
Adair, for the motion.
Bcmcl and Le Blanc, contra.
GouLD, J. The facts of the prf>sent case are shortly these:
The defendants and Eyre & Co. order one Oarforth, a brokf>r,
t ... buy quantities of oil. The defendants, Hattersley & Co.
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and Pugh & Co., were to have for their respective shares each
one-fourth. The broker buys divers shiploads; and to some of
the vendors, the defend~nts during the treaty declare it to be .
a common concern between them and Eyre & Co., in whose
name the purchases were made. But with respect to the plaintiff's, the purchase was made singly in the name of Eyre & Co.,
without any notification that the defendants bad any concern
in it. These purchases were made on speculation, there being
a prospect that oil would rise in price; but it afterwards fell,
and then the defendants contend that they are not liable to
make good the difference, Eyre & Co. having failed.
Upon these facts, two questions arise: 1st. 'Yhether the
defendants are partners with Eyre & Co.? 2d. If not, whether
they are to be deemed joint contractors in the purchase for
Eyre & Co. and -so liable for the whole?
As to the first, I think they cannot be considered as partners
with Eyre & Co. in this 'purchase from the plaintiffs. Although
there may be partnerships in many other instanoes besides
what are merely commercial, as in the case of farms rented
by several persons jointly, and of partnerships of attorneys,
and the like, yet I think the true criterion is as stated by Mr.
Justi~ BLACKSTONE, in the case of Grace vs. Smith, ante,
"whether they are concerned in profit and loss," and the same
doeti·ine is in effect held by Chief Justice DE GnEY, in that
case. This is strongly illustrated by Bloxatn vs. Pell, which
was cited in Grace vs. Smith. [Here follows a statement of
these two cases.] It was held in both the cases that the
inequality of the concern as to profit and loss was immaterial
to those who dealt with them, however, it might be a regulation between themselves. But in the present case there was
no communication between the buyers as to profit or loss.
Each party was to have a distinct share of the whole, the one
to have no interference with the share of the other, but each
to manage his share as he judged best. The pro~t or loss of
the one might be more or less than that of the other. In this
light I am of the opinion there is no foundation for the court
to adjudge the present case a partnership; and the jury having
found for the defendants, there is no reason to disturb the verdict. [The second question was also answered in the
·negative.]
HEATH, J., said, among 'O"ther things: This is a sub-conI
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tract-by a sub-contract I mean a contract subordinate to
anotlier contra.ct made or intended to be made between the
contracting parties on one part, or .some of them, and a
stranger. Eyre & Co. are the only purchasers known to the
plaintiffs; entire credit was given to them alone; Pugh, Hattersley and Stephens can be liable only in the event of a con·
cealed partnership, on this principle, ''that the act of one partner binds all his copartners on account of a communion of
profit and loss." In truth they were not partners, inasmuch
as they were only interested in the purchase of the commodity
and not in the subsequent disposition of it.
Lord Louoanoaouou. The first impression on my mind was .
against the defendants, but in the course of the trial my opiu·
ion changed, and I thought they were not liable as partners; I
still continue to think so, and consequently that the verdict
was proper.
This being an action on a contract of sale, the vendor can
have no remedy against any person with whom he has not con·
traded, unless there be a partnership, in which case all the
partners a.re liable as one individual. It has been justly
observed that a secret partnership can be no consideration to
the vendor, though for reasons of policy and general expedi·
ence the law is positive with respect to the secret partner that
when discovered he shall be liable to the whole extent. In
many parts of Europe, limited partnerships are admitted, pro·
vided they be entered on a register, but the Jaw of England is
otherwise, the rule being that if a partner shares in advan·
tages he also shares in all disadvantages. In order to consti·
tute a partnership a communion of profits and loss is essential.
The shares must be joint, though it is not necessary they
should be equal. If the parties be jointly concerned in the
purchase, they must also be jointly concerned in the future
snle, otherwise they are not partners. • • • Here Eyre
was a mere s}X'culator, and the other defendants were to share
in the purchase, but were not jointly interested in any sub~equent disposition of the property. Though they may by
other purchases have concluded themselves as to some particular vendors, yet in the transaction in question there was
not that communion between them necessary to make them
partners; their agreement was a sub-contract which, as my
Brother HEATH observed, may be executory; it was to share
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In a purchase to be made. The seller looked to no other
security but Eyre & Co.; to them the credit was given, and
they only were liable.
WILSON, J., dissented.
New trial denied.

WAUGH vs. CARVER.
English Cou·r t of Common Pleaa, 119:1.
9 H. BI. 2M.

Assumpsit by Waugh against Erasmus Carver, William Carver and Archibald GieslerJ as partners. It appeared that the
two Carvers were in business at Gosport, and Giesler at
Plymouth as shipping agents. On February 24, 1790, th~se
parties entered into a written agreement which provided that
Giesler should remove to Cowes, and that thereafter the two
concerns should cooperate in the transaction of the ship agency
business. In consideration of the Carvers' recommendation and
assistance to support the house at Cowes Giesler was to allow
the Carvers a moiety of the commission on ships putting into
that port, or remaining in the road to the westward, addressed
to him, and a moiety of the discount on the tradesmen's bilJs
employed on such ships; he also agreed to advise with the
Carvers, and to pursue such measures as might appear to them
to be to the interest of all concerned. On the other hand, the
Carvers agreed to pay Giesler three-fifths of the proceeds from
all vessels which should come from Cowes to Portsmouth, and
put themselves under the direction of the Carvers upon the
recommendation of Giesler, one·half per cent on all trademen's
bills, and a certain proportion of warehouse rent, etc. They
were to meet once a year at Gosport to settle their accounts
and pay over the balance. It was expressly agreed also that
neither should in any way be liable for the losses of the other
or in any way accountable or responsible for 1:he acts of the
other, but that each should "in his own proper person and with
his own goods and effects, respectively, be answerable and
accountable for his own losses, acts, deeds and receipts.''
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PlaJntitr 1old goods, etc., to Giesler in his own name, but not
being paid he sued him and the Carvers as partners. The ques·
tion was whether they were partners on a true construction of
the articles.
Clayton and LeBlanc, for the plaintiff.

Rooke and Lawrence, for the defendants.
EYRE, Ch. J. This case has been extremely well argued, and
the discussion of it has enabled me to make up my mind, and
removed the only difficulty I felt, which was whether, by construing this to be a partnership, we should not determine that
if there was an annuity granted out of a banking house to the
widow, for instance, of a deceased partner, it would make her
liable to the debts of the house, and inv:olve her in a bankruptcy. But I think this case will not lead to that consequence.
The definition of a partnership cited from Puffendorf (Lib.
5, cap. 8) is good as between the parties themselves, but not
with. respect to the world at large. If the question were
between A and B, whether they were partners or not, it would
be very well to inquire whether they bad contributed, and in
what" proportions, stock or labor, and on what agreements they
were to divide the profits of that contribution. Dut in all these
eases a very different question arises, in which the definition
is of little service. The question is, generally, not between
the parties as to what shares they shall divide, but respecting
creditors claiming a satisfaction out of the funds of a particular house, who shaH be deemed liable in regard to those funds.
Now, a case may be stated in which it is the clear sense of the
parties to the contract that they shalJ not be partners; that A
is to contribute neither labor nor money, and, to go still
further, not to receive any profits. Rut if be will lend his name
as a partner, be becomes, as against all the rest of the world, n
partner, not upon the ground of the real transaction between
them, but upon principles of gt>m~ral poli cy, to prevent the
frauds to which creditors would be liable if they were to sup·
pose that they lent their money upon the apparent credit of
three or four persons, when in fact they lent it only to two of
them, to whom, without the others, they would have lent nothing. The argument gone into, however proper for the discus·
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lion of the question, is irrelevant to a great part of the case.
Whether these persons were to interfere more or less with their
advice and directions, and many small parts of the agreement,
I lay entirely out of the case; because it is plain upon the con·
struction of the agreement, if it be construed only between the
Carvers and Giesler, that they were not nor ever meant to be
partners. They meant each house to carry on trade without
risk of each other, and to be at their own loss. Though there
was a certain degree of ·control at one house, it was without
idea that either was to be involved in the consequences of the
.f ailure of the other, and without understanding themselYes
responsible for any circumstances that might happen to the
loss of either. That was the agreement between themselves.
But the question is, whether they have not, by parts of their
agreement, constituted themselves partners in respect to other
persons. The case therefore is reduced to a single point,
whether the Carvers did not entitle themselves, and did not
mean to take a moiety of the profits of Giesler's house gener·
ally and indefinitely as they should arise, at certain times
agreed upon for the settlement of their accounts. That they
have so done is clear upon the face of the agreement; and upon
the authority of Grace vs. Smith, ante, he who takes a
moiety of all the profits indefinitely shall, by operation of law,
be made liable to losses, if losses arise, upon the principle that,
by taking a part of the profits, he takes from the creditors a
part of that fund which is the proper security to them for the
payment of their debts. That was the foundation of the deci·
sion in Grace tlB. Smith, and I think it stands upon the fair •
ground of reason. I cannot agree that this was a mere agency,
in the sense contended for on the part of the defendants, for
there was a risk of profits and loss. A ship agent employs
tradesmen to furnish necessaries for the ship; he contracts
with them and is liable to them; he also makes out their bills
in such a way as to determine the charge of commission to the
ship owners. \Yith respect to the commission, indeed, he may
be considered as a mere agent, but as to the agency itself he
is as much a trader as any other man, and there is as much risk
of profit and loss to the person with whom be contracts in the
transactions with him ns with any other trader. It is true he
will gain nothing but his discount, but that is a profit in the
trade, and there may be losses to him as well as to the owners.
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If, therefore, the principle be true that he who takes the general profits of a partnership must of necessity be made liable
to the losses in order that he may stand in a just situation with
regard to the creditors of the house, then this is a case clear of
all difficulty. For though with respect to each other these persons were not to be considered as partners, yet they have made
themselves such with regard to their transactions with the rest
of the world. I am thet-efore of opinion that there ought to be
judgment for the plaintiff.
The other judges concurred.
Nal'l:: See Mechem's Elem. of Parto., §§ 5, 8, el ttq.

COX vs. HICKMAN.
English H OU8e of Lords, 1860.
8 H. of L. Cas. 268.

Thi1 wo.s an action brought by Hickman against Cox and
Wheatcroft to recover upon three billsof exchang{',given by one
of the managers of the Stanton Iron Company, for goods supplied to that company. The declaration contained a count in
the usual form as against acceptors on each bill, alleging it to
have been "directed to the defendants by and under the name
of the Stanton Iron Company;" also counts for goods sold and
delivered, and the money counts. The defend~ts severed in
pleading, each denying the acceptance of the bills, and, as to
the other counts, pleading never indebted.

For some time previously to the year 1849, Benjamin Smith
and Josiah Timmis Smith carried on business at the Stanton
Iron Works, in Derbyshire,as iron masters and corn merchants,
under the name of B. Smith & Son. In that year they became
embarrassed in their circumstances, and a meeting of their
creditors took place. Among these were Cox and Wheatcroft.
On the 13th November, 1849, a deed of arrangement was executed by more than six-sevenths in number and value of the
creditors. The parties to this deed were the Smiths, of the
ftrst part; Francis Sanders, John Thompson, James Haywood,
David Wheatcroft, and Samuel Walker Cox, all of whom were
creditors, of the second part; and the general creditors (includ-
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i.n g those previously named as trustees), whose names were
also set forth in a schedule, of the third part. The deed
recited a lease from 1846 for twenty-one years to the Smiths;
that they were unable to pay. their debts, and that it bad bee a
agreed that there should be an assignment by them to the
parties of the second part, as trustees on behalf of the creditors, to have and bold the premises for the term of the lease,
the machinery, etc., and all the estate, etc., subject to the powers and provisions thereinafter C{)ntained. The trusts were
then enumerated, and, iri substanee, t•hey were to carry on th~
bustnees under the name or style of "The Stanton ll•on Company," with power to do whatsoeve.r was necessary for that
purpose, and to pay the net income, after answering all expenses; which net income was always to be deemed the property
of the two Smiths, among the creditors of the Smiths. And
provision was made for the meeting of the creditors, and, at
any such meeting, a majority in value of the creditors present
was to have the power to make rules as to the mode of conducting the business, or to order the discontinuance of it. And
when all the debts had been paid, the trustees were to hold
the trust estates, etc., in trust for the two Smiths. The deed
contained a covenant by the parties executing it, not to su~
the Smiths for existing debts. Cox never acted a.s trustee; antl
Wheatcroft resigned six weeks after the execution of the deed,
and before the goods for which the bills were given bad been
supplied; no new trustee was appointed in the room of either.
The business of the company was carried on by the three
other persons named as "parties of the second part." In the
course of it goods were supplied by Hickman, who, in March,
April, and June, 1855, drew three bills of exchange in respect
thereof. The first of these bills, which was the same in form
as those afterwards a.ccepted, was in these words:
"Grafton Iron Ore Works, Blisworth,
"£300.
lOti\ March, 1855.
"Four months after date pay to my order, in London, three
JoaN HICK.MAN."
hundred pounds, value received.
"To the Stanton Iron Company, near Derby."
The acceptance was in the following form: "At Mestiu·~.
Smith, Payne & Co., London. Per proc. The Stanton Iron
Company.--JAMES HAYWOOD." The cause was tried in 185fl,
before the late Lord Chief Justice JERVIs, when a verdict was
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found for the defendants; but on motion on leave reserved,
the verdict was entered for the plaintiff (18 C. B. 617).
The case was taken to the Exchequer chamber, when three
judges, Justice CoLERIDGE, ERLE, and CROMPTON, 11rere for
affirming the judgment of the Common Pleas, and three other
judges, Barons MARTIN, BRAMWELL, and WATSON, were for
reversing it. [3 C. B. N. S. 523.1 The judgment, therefore,
stood, and was afterwards brought up to this House.
The judges were summoned, and Lord Chief Baron PoLLOCK,
Mr. Justice WIGHTMAN, Mr. Justice \VILLIAMs, Mr. J'ustice
CROMPTON, .Mr. Baron CHANNELL, and .Mr. Justice BLACKBURN,
attended.
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The Attorney-General (Sir B. !Jethell, Mr. Millward was with

him), for Wheatcroft.
Mr. Welsby (Mr. Boden was with him) for Cox.

Mr. Roll (Mr. Field was with him) for the respondent in both

cases.
The Lord Chancellor (Lord Campbell) proposed the followIng question for the judges: "Are the defendants in this case
liable as acceptors of the bills of exchange declared upon?"
Agreed to.
BLACKBURN, J. The defendants in this case are liable as
acceptors of the bills of exchange declared upon. The. question entirely depends on the effect of the deed of alTangement.
If the effect of that deed is such that creditors executing it
thereby give authority to those managing the Stanton Iron
Company, to bind them to third persons in the usual course
of business by accepting bills, the defendants have given such
a.uthority. If the effect of the deed is not such that creditors
executing that deed give authority to birid them as to third
persons, the defendants are not shown to have given any such
authority, for they have never acted as trustees; nor does it
appear that they have done any act beyond what was proper
to ca.rry out the arrangement contained in that deed.
The principal object of the deed of arrangement is to divide
the property of the Smiths amongst the creditors according
to the rules observed in bankruptcy; and for this purpose their
property ls a.ssigned to trustees. The good will of the business which bad been carried on by the Smiths was part of
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their joint estate, and those who had the making of the
arrangement appear to have thought it a valuable part of the
joint estate. Instead of disposing of it to thlrd persons, or
suffering it to be lost, the arrangement made was, that the
business should in the future ~ carried on under a new style,
that of "The Stanton Iron Company," by the trustees, in the
manner stipulated for in the deed to which the creditors are
parties. The question is, whether the stipulations are such
as to render those creditors, whp are parties to the deed, part·
ners in the Stanton Iron Company, so far, at least, as regards
liability to third persons.
Some of the judges in the court below have expressed an
opinion that there is a distinction between the present question and that which would have arisen if the question bad
been whether the defendants were Uable for the considera·
tion of these bills. I am, however, of opinion that no such
distinction exists. I apprehend that all cases as to liability
of partners to contracts are branches of the law of agency,
and that the question always is, whether the contract entered
into is within the scope of the authority conferred by those,
who are sought to be charged, upon the persons actually making the contract. But I take it that, as matter of law, those
who are partners in a trading firm, do confer upon those who
are permitted to manage the concern authority to make all
contracts which, in the exigency · of the business, are neces's ary and proper and customary. The prima facie authority
may be restricted by express agreement, but unless those who
deal with the firm have notice of this restriction, they are entitled to hold all who are partners bound by the prima facie
authority conferred on the manager, and that equally whether
the persons sought to be charged were persons to whom the
creditors gave credit, or dormant partners, of whose existence
they were unaware. I think the justice of this rule, as appli·
cable to dormant partners, very questionaple, but I do not
think it open to question that it is the rule of Inw. I think
that where, as in the present case, the accepting of bills is a
necessary and customary part of the business, the authority to
accept them is conferred as much as the authority to contract
the debts for which they are given. It is true the authority is
limited to accepting the bills in the name of the firm, and bindB
10
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only thoee included in that ft_rm, but all who ue partners
are included in the firm.
I think, therefore, as already said, that the question is,
whether the stipulations in the deed are such as to constitute
a partnership quoad third persons, and to determine that question we must look to the terms of the deed. The material
stipulations, as it seeiiMiJ to me, are the following: [The provisions of the deed are then quoted.]
These, I think, are the whole of the material parts of the
deed. There is no stipulation in the deed, as to who is to provide for payment of the partnership liabilities in case the
lQSSes should. be so great as to exceed the sum of £4,000, which
the trust~ were authorized to retain for the purpose of carrying on the business. The parties seem not to have anticipated,
or at all events not to have provided for such a contingency,
which, though a probable one, is often overlooked by those
entering on a trade, but the rule of law is clear enough, that
those who are partners in the concern must bear such liabilities; so that I once more repeat, the question comes round to
whether the stipulations are such as to constitute a partnership amongst the creditors.
Now, on looking at the provisioDB of the deed, it seems to ·
me t'bat they are, in substance, such as would be proper if
the creditors constituted themselves a joint stock company,
such as it would have been at common law, and made the
trustees their managing directors, but agreed that the partnership ehould cease as soon as a certain sum, in this case
the amount of their debts, was realized. I find that the business is to be carried on by the trustees under the control of
the creditors, who may give what directiors they think fit
as to the management of the business; that the creditors are
to have a voice in nominating fresh trustees in case they are
changed; and that the creditors. are to have a right to inspect
the books. And, moreover, I find that the creditors alone are
to have these powers, no similar powers being given to the
Smiths. Then I find also that the trustees are bound to pay
over the net income, after paying all expenses of the concern,
ratably among the creditors. It was suggested at your Lordship's bar, that there was some distinction between the net
income, after paying all out-goings, and the net profits, but J
am unable to uDJ}erstand what that distinction is.

.

.._.---~.- - -

"Y-

~

. .

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 16:46 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112102486216
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

Cox vs.

HICKKAN.

107

The arrangement is that the trading might terminate on the
·c reditors being paid, which perhaps was the termination which
the persons entering into the arrangement hoped for. In that
case, the deed provides that the property shall be made over
to the Smiths, but by so doing the trade of the Stanton Iron
Company ceases. Whoever the partners in that firm might be,
they are no longer to carry on the business after the property
is assigned to the Smiths. It might terminate by the concern
being stopped by the creditors whilst it was yet solvent; that
ev~nt is anticipated by the deed, and in that case it is provided .
that the surplus, after paying all losses, should be divided
amongst the creditors. It might continue for an indefinite
period, neither so productive as to pay the creditors in full.
· nor so bad as to be stopped; and whilst it was so continued,
the creditor! were to have the net income or profits, and the
control of the management of the concern, and they were only
to have these powers. Does this make them interested in the
property or profits so as to make them partners? That question depends on the effect of the deed, and it will be answered
when we have determined the extent of their interest in the
property of the firm. Suppose, a not impossible case, that the
trustees had, as individuals, contracted a joint debt for some
purpose unconnected with the Stanton Iron Company; could
the partnership property of the Stanton Iron Company have
been taken to pay the debt? Or, if the trustees had become
reduced to one person, and he had become a bankrupt, would
the assets of the Stanton Iron Company have passed to his
assignees? Or would the creditors, who are parties to the
deed of arrangement, have been entitled in either case to say
that the property was in equity theirs, and that the trustees,
except in so far as they were creditors, had no beneficial interest in it? That is a question that depends on the construction
of the deed. I think the construction of the deed is such, that
the creditors, parties to the deed, have bargained that they
shall have a hold over the whole property of the firm, divided
or undivided, and I think th~s bargain is effectual, and, if so,
that the creditors do take the profits of the concern, so as to
make them their property before they are divided.
T~e deed does not provide what is to be done in the c.ase
which has actually happened, viz.: That of the concern prov·
.ing insolvent; bot the law declares that those who take the
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profits of a trading concern as such are liable to the losses,
even if they have stipulated to the contrary. Waugh. va. Oarver,
Smith's Lead. Cas. 786, ante, and the notes thereto.
The phrase, taking the profits aa_such, is not a happy one,
and there is some difficulty at times in defining what it means,
but I think it means at all events this. It Is not possible,
according to thE" common law, to cause a trading concern to be
carried on, on the terms that the advantages of a partnership,
including the participation in profits, and the partnership lien
and security over the assets of the firm, s~all belong to those
~ho have but a limited liability. I am aware of no case or
.a uthority inconsistent with the proposition thus guarded.
Now, it seems to me, that the present defendants have, by the
deed to which they are parties, stipulated that the business
shall be carried on for their benefit, and under their control;
that they shall be interested in all the property of the firm to
such an extent as to have a partnership lien upon it.
This shows that they are not merely persons permitting the
Smiths or the trustees to carry on the business and relying on
rt as a fund for payment, but that they take the profits as such,
and having done so, they are partners as regards third persons.
I agree that the question is one of agency, viz., whether the
defendants authorized the managers of this firm to bind them;
but I think it is an incident attached by law to a participation
in the ~rofits to the above extent, that such authority is given
to those managing the concern. I think, for the reasons I have
given, that this arrangement deed does amount to a stipulation for a participation in the profits as such by the creditors.
For these reasons, I am of opiniQn that the defendants are
liable as acceptors of the bills of exchange declared upon.
Lord CRANWORTB. In this case the judges in the court of
exchE>quer chamber were equally divided, and unfortunately
the same difference of opinion has existed among the learned
judges who attend~ this house during the argument at your
lordships' bar. Except, therefore, from an examination of the
grounds on which their opinions are founded, we can derive no
benefit in this case from their assistance. We cannot say
that in the opinions delivered in this house, there is more
authority in favor of one view of the case than of.the other.
We must not, however, infer that your lordships have not
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derived material aid from the opinions expressed by the judges.
These opinions have stated the arguments on the one side and
the other with great clearness and force, and what we have to
do now is to decide between them.
In the first place let me say that I concur with those of the
learned judges who are of the opinion that no solid distinction
exists between the liability of either defendant, in an action
on the bills, and in action for goods sold and delivered. If be
would have been liable fn an action for goods sold and deliv·
ered, it must be because those who were in fad carrying on the
business of the Stanton Iron Company were carrying it on as
his partners or agents; and, as the bills were accepted, according to the usual course of business, for ore supplied by the
plaintiff, I cannot doubt that if the trade was carried on by
those who managed it as partners or agents of the defendant,
he must be just as liable on the bills as he would have been in
an action for the price of the goods supplied. His partners or
agents would have the same authority to accept bills in th~
ordinary course of trade, as to purchase goods on credit.
The liability of one partner for the acts of his copartner is
In truth the liability of a principal for the acts of his agent.
'Where two or more persons are engaged as partners in an
ordinary trade, each of them has an implied authOiit;\' from the
others to bind all by contt·acts entered into according to the
usual course of business in that trade. Every partner in tradf:'
is, for the ordinary purposes of the trade, the agent of his
copartners, and all are therefore liable for the ordinary trade
contracts of the others. Partners may stipulate among themselves that some one of them only shall enter into particular
contracts, or into any contracts, or that as to certain of their
contracts none shall be liable except those by whom they are
actually made; but with such private arrangements third persons, dealing with the firm without notice, have no concern.
The public have a right to assume that every partner has
authority from his copartner to bind the whole firm in contracts made according to the ordinary usages of trade.
This principle applies not only to persons acting openly and
avowedly as partners, but to others who. though not so acting,
are, by secret or prh·nte agreement, partners with those who
appear ostensibly to the world as the persons carrying on the
business.
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In the case now before the house, the court of common pleas
decided in favor of the re~pondent that the appellant, by his
execution of the deed of arrangement, became, together with
the other creditors who executed it, a partner with those who
conducted the business of the Stanton Iron Company. The
judges in the court of exchequer chamber were equally divided,
so that the judgment of the court of common pleas was
aftlrmed. The sole question for adjudication by your lordships
is, whether this judgment thus affirmed was right.
I do not propose to consider in detail all the provisions of
the deed. I think it sufficient to state thE-m generally. In thP.
first place there is an aasignment by .M<.ssrs. Smith to certain
trustees, of the mines and all the engines and machinery used
for working them, together with all the stock in trade, and
in fact all their property, upon trust, to carry on the business;
and, after paying its expenses, to divide the net income ratably
amongst the creditors of Messrs. Smith, as often as there shall
be funds in hand sufficient to pay one shilling in the pound;
and, after all the creditors are satisfied, then in trust for
Messrs. Smith~
. Up to this point the creditors, though they executed the
deed, are merely passive; and the first question is, what woul~
have been the consequence to them of their executing the deed
if the trusts had ended there? \Yould they have become partners in the concern carried on by the trustees ·merely because
they passively assented to its being carried on upon the terms
that the net income, i. e., the net profits should be applied in
discharge of their demands? I think not; it was argued that
·as they would he interested in the profits, therefore they would
be partners. But this is a fallacy. It is often said that the
test, or one of the tests, whether a person not ostensibly a
partner, is neverthE-less, in contemplation of law, a partner, iR~
whE-ther he is entitled to participate in the profits. This, no
doubt, is, in general, a sufficiently accurate test; for a right to
participate in profits affords cogent, often conclusive evidencE'~
that the trade in which the profits have been made was carried
.on in part for or on behalf of the person setting up such a
claim. But the real ground of the liability is, that the trade
has been carried on by persons acting on his behalf. \Ybeu
that is the case he is liable to the trade obligations, and
entitled to its profits, or to a share of them. It is not strictly
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correct to say that his right to share in the profits makes him
liable to the debts of the trade. The correct mode of stating
the proposition is to say that the same thing which entitles
him to the one makes him liable to the other, namely, the fact
that the trade has been carried on on his behalf, i. e., that he
atood in the relation of principal towards the persons acting
ostensibly as the traders, by whom the liabilities have been
incurred, and under whose management the profits have been
made.
Taking this to be the ground of liability as a partner, it
seems to me to follow that the mere concurrence of creditors
in an arrangement under which they permit their debtor, or
trustees for their debtor, to continue his trade, applying the
profits in discharge of their demands, does not make them
partners with their debtor, or the trustees. The debtor is still
the person solely interested in- the profits, save only that he
has mortgaged them to his creditors. He receives the benefit
of the profits as they accrue, though he has precluded himself
from applying them to. any other purpbse than the discharge
of his debts. The trade is not carried on by or on account of
the creditors; though their consent is necessary in such a: case,
for without it all the property might be seized by them in exe·
cution. But the trade still remains the trade pf the debtor or
his trustees; the debtor or the trustees are the persons by or
on behalf of whom it is carried on.
I have hitherto considered the case as it would have stood tf
the creditors had been merely passively assenting parties to
'the carrying on of the trade, on the terms that the profits
should be applied in liquidation of their demands. But I am
aware that in this deed special powers are given to the creditors, which, it was said, showed that they had become part·
ners, even if that had not been the consequence of their concurrence in the previous trust. The powers may be described
briefly as, first, a power of determining by a majority in value .
of their body, that the trade should be discontinued, ot•, if not
discontinued, then, secondly, a power of making rules and
orders as to its conduct and management.
These powers do not appear to me to alter the case. The
creditors might, by process of law, have obtained possession
of the whole of the property. By the earlier provisions of the
deed they consented to abandon that right, and to allow the
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'trade to be carried on by the trustees. The effect of these
powers is only to qualify their consent. They stipulate for a
right to withdraw it altogether; or, if not, then to impose terms
as to the mode in which the trust to which they had agreed
should be executed. I do not think that this alters the legal
condition of the creditors. The trade did not become a trade
carried on for them as principals, because they might have
insisted on taking possession of the stock, and so compelling
the abandonment of the trade, or because they might have prescribed terms on which alone it should be continued. An!
trustee might have refused to act if he considered the terms
prescribed by the creditors to be objectionable. Suppose the
deed had stipulated, not that the creditors might order the discontinuance of the trade, or impose terms as to its management, but that some third person mi~ht do so, if, on inspecting the accounts, he should deem it advisable; it could not be
contended that this would make the creditors partners, if they
were not so already; and I can see no difference between stipulating for such a power to be reserved to a third person, and
reserving it to themselves.
I have, on these grounds, come to the conclusion that the
creditors did not, by executing this deed, make themselves
partners in the Stanton Iron Company, and I must add that a
contrary decision would be much to be deprecated. Deeds of
arrangement, like that now before us, are, I believe, of fre·
quent occurrence; and it is impossible to imagine that creditors who execute them have any notion that by so doing they
are making themselves liable as partners.
This would be no reason· for holding them not to be liablE>,
tf, on strict principles of mercantile law, they are so; but t-he
very fact that such deeds are so common, and that no such
liability is supposed to attach to them, affords eome argument
in favor of the appellant. The deed now before us was executed by above a hundred joint creditors; and a mere glance
at their names is sufficient to show that t~re was no intention
on their part of doing anything which should involve them in
the obligations of .a partnership. I do not rely on this; but.
at least, it shows the general opinion of the mercantile world
on the subject. I may remark that one of the creditors I set•
ts the Midland Railway Company, which is a creditor for a
sum only of £39, and to suppose that the directors could imagine that they were making tbem~lves partners is absurd.
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ne a~thorities cited in argument did not throw much light
upon the subject. I can find no case in which a person has
be€n made liable as a dormant or sleeping partner, where the
trade might not fairly be said to have be€n carried on for him,
together with those ostensibly conducting it, and when, there·
fore, he would stand in the position of principal towards the
ostensible members of the firm as his agents. This was cer·
tainly the case in Waugh vs. Carver, 2 H. BJ. 235, ante.
There Messrs. Carver, who were ship agents at Portsmouth,
agre€d with Giesler, a ship agent at Plymouth, that if be
would establish himself as a ship agent at Cowes, they would
share betwe€n them the profits of their respective agencie~
in certain stipulated proportions. "-Then, therefore, Geisler,
in pursuance of the agre€ment, did establish himself at Cowes,
and there carry on the business of a ship agent, he, in fact,
carried it on for the benefit of Messrs. Carver as well as of
himself; and the court held that, in these circumstances, the
stipulation which they had entered into that neither party
to the agreement should be answerable for the acts of the
other, was a stipulation which they could not make so as
thereby to affect third persons. Each firm was carrying on
business on account not only of itself but also of the other firm;
this, therefore, made each firm the agent of the other.
The case of Bond vs. Pitta1·d, 3 M. & ·w. 357, could admit of
no doubt.. The question was, whether G. H. Watts and P. H.
Watts could sue jointly for business transacted by them as
attorneys. They had agreed to become partners on a stipulation that P. H. Watts should always receive £300 yearly out
of the first profits as his share, and should not be liable for any
losses. It was arg!led that this latter stipulation prevented
them from being partners; but the court held the contrary.
Each of them worked for the common benefit of both, and
ea.ch of them, therefore, acted as agent of the other. The produce of the labor of each was to be brought into a common
fund, to be afterwards shared according to certain arrange·
ments between themselves. The case was really fre€ from
doubt.
A similar principle explains and justifies the decision of
the Court of Common Pleas in Barry vs. N esham, 3 C. B. 641.
The question was, whether the defendant was liable for goods
furnished to one Lowthin in the way of his business as the
11
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printer and publisher of a newspaper. Nesbam bad sold the
stock and good will of the paper to Lowthin, in consi.df'ration
of £1,500, and on a further stipulation, that for seven years
the profits were to be applied as follows: that is to say, Lowthin was to have the first £150 of the annual profits, then
Nesham was to have them t() the extent ()f £500, if they made
so much, and Lowtbin was to have all beyond. It is clear
that L<>wthin was conducting the business for the common
benefit of both, subject to their private arrangements as to
the shares they should separately be entitled to; Lowthin
was, therefore, clearly the agent of Nesham.
Owen vs. Body is at most a ca.se in which ·a dictum may be
found. The Court of Queen's Bench was quite right in holding that the creditors were justified in refusing to execute
the deed tendered to them; and that is all which was decided.
None of the other cases cited carried the doctrine farther
than those I have referred to, and I therefore think that in
this case the judgment appealed against ought to be reversed.
Lord WENSLEYDALB. These two cases oome before your
lordships on appeal from the Exchequer chamber by which
court a judgment of the court of common pleas was affirmed.
They both involve the same question. The court of common
pleas was unanimous in favor of the plaintiff below. The
court of exchequer chamber, consisting of six learned judges,
and the six learned judges who have given their advice to
your Lordships, have been equally divided. I am of opinion
that the judgment of the court of common pleas was wr()ng,
and that it ought to be reversed.
The question is, whether either of the defendants, Cox or
w .h eatcroft, was liable a.s acceptor of certain bills ()f exchange,
dated in March, April, and June, 1855, drawn by the plaintiff
bel()W on the Stanton Iron Company, and accepted by one
James Haywood as per proc that company. And the simple
question will be this, whether Ha:ywood was authorized by
either of the defendants, as a partner in that company, to bind
him by those acceptances.
Haywood must be taken to have been authorized to accept
for them by those who actually carried on business under that
ftrm. Were the appellants partners in it? The case will depend
entirely on .the construction of the deed of the 13th N()vember,
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1849. There is no other evidence affecting either of them. And
the question is, whether the subscription of both, as creditors
of the Smiths, made them partners in the business carried on
by the trustees in the name of the Stanton Iron Company.
Wheatcroft could not be liable in the character of trustee,
for he had ceased to be such before the bills were drawn, and
the plaintiff knew it.
The terms of the deed have been so fully brought before
y-our lordships, that I do riot consider it necessary to state
them at any length. One of the provisions in the deed was
this authority to the trustees to execute all contracts and
instruments in Carrying on the business, which w.ould certainly authorize the making or accepting bills of exchange.
The question then is, whether this deed makes the creditors
who sign it partners with the trustees, or, what is really the
same thing, agents,· to bind them by acceptances on account
of the business.
The law as to partnership is undoubtedly a branch of the
law of principal and agent; and it would tend to simplify and
make more easy of solution the questions which arise on this
subject, if this true principle were more constantly kept in
view. Mr. Justice STORY lays it down in the first section of
his work on Partnership. He says: "Every partner is an
agent of the partnership, and his rights, powers, duties, and
obligations, are in many respects governed by the same rules
and principles as those of an agent; a partner virtually
embraces the character of both a principal and agent." Pothier
says: "Contractus societati8 non secus ac contractus mandati."
Pand. lib. 17, tit. 2, Introduction.
A man who allows another to carry on trade, whether in
his own name or not, to buy and sell, and to pay over all the
profits to him, is undoubtedly the principal, and the person
eo employed is the agent, and the principal is liable for the
agent's contracts in the course of his employment. So if two
or more agree that they should carry on a trade, and shar'}
the pro.fi.ts of it, each is a piincipal, and each is an agent for
the other, and each is bound by the otlwt·'s contract in carrying on the trade, as much as a single principal would be by
the act of an agent, who was to give the whole of the profits
to his employer. Hence it becomes a test of the liability of
one for the contract of another, that he is to receive the wholt!
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or a part of the profits arising from that contract by virtue of
the agreement made at the time of the employment. I believe
this is the true principle of partnership liability. Perhaps the
maxim that he who partakes the advantage ought to bear the
loss, often stated in the earlier cases on this subject, is only
the consequence, not the cause, why a man is made liable as
a partner.
Can we then collect from the trust deed that each of the
subscribing creditors is a partner with the trustees, and by themere signature of the deed constitutes them his agents for
· carrying on the business on the account of himself and the
rest of the creditors? I think not. It is true that by this deed
the creditors will gain an advantage by the trustees carrying
on the trade; for, if it is profitable, they may get their debts
paid; but this is not that sharing of profits which constitutett
the relation of principal, agent, and partner.
If a creditor were to agree with his debtor to give the latter
time to pay his debt till he got money enough out of his trade
to pay it, I think no one could reasonably contend that he
thereby made him his agent to contract debts in the way of
his trade; nor do I think that it would make any diffe-rence
that he stipulated that the debtor should pay th~ debt out
of the profits of the trade.
T.he deed in this case is merely an arrangement by the Smiths
to pay their debts, partly out of t~e existing funds, and partly
out of the expected profits of their trade; and all of their
effects are placed in the hands of the trustees, as middlemen
between them and their creditors, to effect the object of tlw
deed, the· payment of their debts. These effects are placed
in the hands of the trustees as the property of the Smiths,
to be employed as the deed directs, and to be returned to· them
when the trusts are satisfied. I think it is impossible to say
that the agreement to recei¥e this debt, so secured, partly out
of the existing assets, partly out of the trade, is such a participation of profits as to constitute the relation· of principal
and agent between the creditors and trustees. The trusteE-s
are certainly liable, because they actually contract by theh·
undoubted agent; but the creditors are not, because the
trustees are not their age~ts. The case of Otcen vs. Body, 5
A. & E. 28, on which some reliance was placed, is really no
authority for holding that the creditors by subscription became
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actually partners. In the short judgment of Lord DE~MAN,
the expression used is not that the deed imposed such conditions as would have constituted a partnership amongst these
who subscribed it, but as might have had the effect, which is
a much more doubtful expression. It was quite enough for
the decision of that case, that the subscription exposed them
to the peril of being considered partners, of which peril the
opinions of a majority of the judges leave no doubt; and that
prevented the deed from being a fair deed, and good against
creditors. So did the provision that the effects which ought
to have been divided equally amongst the creditors, should
be put in peril by being employed in trade.
The case of Janes vs. Whitb·read, 20 Law J., N. S., C. P. 217, ·
which was distinguished as authorizing a trader to wind up,
can hardly be supported on the ground of that distinction. It
exposed the creditors signing to perils, though not in the
l'lame degree.
The case of Bond vs. Pittard, 3 M. & W. 357, cited on thP.
pnrt of the plaintiff, turned entirely upon the special circumstances, it being perfectly clear that both the two attorney'i,
of whom the plaintiff was assignee, were the parties with
whom the contract was made, independent of the circumstance
of a payment of fixed sums being made to one out of the
profits. It was not that fact that was considered to make them
partners; it was not necessary to decide that point.
I, therefore, advise your lordships to reverse the judgment.
CnoMPTON and WILLIAMS, J. J ., ga n~ opinions concurring
with BLACKBURN, J., in holding the defendants liable.
CHANNELL, B., WIGHTMAN, J., POLLOCK, Ch. B., Lord Chancellor CAMPBELL, Lord DROUGHAM and Lord CHELMSFORD gave
opinions holding the defendants not liable.
Judgment reversed.
NOT&: See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., §§58, 62.
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BEECHER vs. BUSH.
Supreme Cot4rt of Michigan, 1881.

e

Mlcb., 188, 40 Am. Rep. 465, 7 N. W. Rep. 785.

Action by Bush against Beecher and Williams to charge the
latter as partners for gooqs supplied by Bush. Judgment for
plaintiff and Beecher appeals.
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H . M. Cheever, John Atkinson and J. _P. Wh ittemore, for
defendant.

W. B. Jack8on and C. I. Walker, for plaintitf.
Coor.EY, J. The purpose of the action in the court below
was to charge Beecher as partner with Williams for a bill of
1upplies purchased for the Biddle House in Detroit. The facts
are all found by special verdict, and are few and simpl~.
Beecher was owner of the Biddle House, and Williams propoeed in writing to ''hire the use" of it from day to day, and
open and keep it as a hotel. Beecher accepted his proposals
and Williams went into the house and began business, and in
the course of the business made this purchase. The proposals
are set out in full in the special verdict.
The question is whether by accepting the proposals Beecher
made himself a partner with Williams in the hotel business;
and this is to be determined on the face of the writing itself.
It is conceded that Beecher was never held out to the public
as a partner, and that the bill of supplies was purchased on
the sole credit of Williams and charged to him on the· books of
the plantiffs below. The case, therefore, is in no way embarrassed, by any questions of estoppel, for ~her has done
nothing and suffered nothing to be done which can precludf>
him from standing upon his exact legal rights as the contract
ftxed them.
Nor do we understand it to be claimed that the parties
intended to form a partn(~ rship in the hotel business, or that
they supposed they had done so, or that either has ever
claimed as against the other the rights of a partner. It is perfectly clear that many things which are commonly incident to
a partnership these parties meant should be wholly excluded
from their arrangement. Some of these. were of primary
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importance. It Is plain, for example, that Beecher did not
underst_and that his credit was to be in any way involved in
the business, or that he wa.S to have any interest in the supplies
that should be bought, or any privilege to decide upon them, or
any legal control whate,•er until proceeds were to be divided,
or any liability to losses if losses were suffered. These are
among the most common incidents to a partnership; and while
some of them, and possibly all of them, may not be necessary
incidents, yet the absence of all is very conclusive that the
parties bad no purpose whatever to form a partnership, or to
give to each other the rights and powers, and subject each
other to the obligations of partners. In general this should be
conclusive. If parties intend no partnership the courts should
give effect io their intent, unless somebody has been deceived
by their acting or assuming to act as partners; and any such
case must stand upon its peculiar facts, and upon special
equities.
It is nevertheless possible for parties to intend no partnership and yet to form one. If they agree upon an arrangement.
which is a partnership in fact, it is of no importance that they
call it something else, or that they even expressly declare that
they are not to be partners·. The law must declare what is the
legal import of their agreements, and names go for nothing
when the substance of the arrangement shows them to be
Inapplicable. But every doubtful case must be solved in favor
of their intent; otherwise we should "carry the doctrine of constructive partnership so far as to render it a trap to the
unwary:" KENT, C. J., in Post vs. Kimberly, 9 Johns. (N. Y.j
470,504.
We have then a case in which the party it is sought to
charge bas not held himself out, or suffered himself to be held
out as a partner either to the public at large or to the plaintiff,
and bas not intended to form that relation. He is not, therefore, a partner by estoppel nor by intent;.and if he is one at
all, it must be by constn1ction of law.
What then are the indicia of partnership in this case; the
marks which for~ that construction upon the court irrespect·
ive of the intent of the parties; that in fact control their in tent,
and give to the parties bringing suit rights which they were
not aware of when they sold the supplies?
:n the elaborate and able brief which has been presented
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in behalf of the defendants in error, it is conceded that the
fact that Beecher was to receive each day a sum "equal to
one-third of the gross receipts and gross earnings" for the
day would not necessarily make him a partner. What is
claimed is that the fact is "cogent evidence" that Beecher
was to participate in the results of the business in a manner
that indicated he was a principal in it, and was not receiving
compensation for the use of property merely. The view of
the law here suggested is undoubtedly correct. There may
be a participation in the gross returns that would make the
receiver a partner, and there may be one that would not. The
question is in what capacity is participation ha.d. Gross returns
are not profits, and may be large when there are no profits,
but it cannot be predicated of either gross returns or profits
that the right to participate is conclusive evidence of partner·
ship. This is eettl9d law both in England and in this country
at this time, as is fully shown by the authorities cited for the
defendants in error. It was recognized in Hinnw.n vs. Littell,
23 Mich. 484; and in New York, where the doctrine that par·
ticipation in profits proves partnership has been adhered to
most closely, it is adll)itted there are exceptions: Eager vs.
Oratoford, 76 N.Y. 97.
But we quite agree with counsel for defendants in error that
no case ought to turn upon the unimportant and mere verbal
distinction between the statem~nt in the papers that Beecher
was to have a sum "equal to" one-third of the gross receipts
and gross earnings, and a statement that he was to have onethird of these receipts and earnings. It is perfectly manifest
it was intended he should have one-third of them; that they
should be apportioned to him regularly and daily, and not that
Williams was to appropriate the whole and pay a sum "equal
to" Beecher's proportion when it should be convenient. 'Ve
can conceive of cases where the difference in phraseology
might be important, because it might give some insight into
the real intent and purpose of the parties, and throw light
upon the · question whether that which was to be received
was to be received as partner or only by way of compensation for something supplied to the other, but the intent in this
case is too tOOnifest to be put aside by any mere ingenuity in
the use of words: Loomi8vs. Marshall, 12 Conn. 69, 79, 30 Am.
Dec. 596.
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In Cox vs. Hickman, 8 H. L. Cas. 268, 306, ante, Lord
CRANWORTH stated very clearly his views of what should be
the test of partnership. "It is often said," be says, "that the
test, or one of the tests whether a person not ostensibly a partner, is nevertheless in contemplation of law a partner, is
whether he is entitled to participate in the profits. This, no
doubt, is in general a sufficiently accurate test; for a right to
participate in profits affords cogent, often conclusive evidence,
that the trade ~n which the profits have been m.Qde was carried on in part for or on behalf of the person setting up such
a claim. But the real ground of the liability is that the trade
bad been carried on by persons acti.ng on his behalf. When
that is the case, he is liable on the trade obligations, and
entitled to its profits, or to a sha:re of them. It is not strictly
correct to say that hi's right to share in the profits makes him
liable to the debts of the trade. The correct mode of stating
the proposition is to say that the same thing which entitles
him to the one makes him liable to the other, namely, the
fact that the trade bas been carried on in his bebalf--4. e., that
be stood in the relation of principal toward the persons acting ostensibly as the traders, by whom the liabilities have been
incurred, and under whose management the profits have been
made." There is something understanda1ble by the common
mind in this test; there is nothing artificial or arbitrary about
it; lt falls in with reason and enables every man to know when
he make&his business arrangements whether he runs the risk
of extraordinary lirubilities contracted without his consent or
approval.
It is said, and we believe justly, in Bullen vs. Sharp, L. R. 1
C. B. 86, that the decision in Cox vs. Hickman brought back
the law of England to what it should be, and Mr. Baron BRAMWELL, referring to what was declared to be law in Waugh. vs.
Carver, 2 H. Bl. 235, 2 Smith's Lead. Cases, 9th Amer. ed. 1178,
ante, expressed the hope "that this notion is overruled,,
adding that it is "one which I believe bas caused more injustk-e
and mischief then any bad law in our books :~' p. 128. It is
certainly overruled very conclusively in Great Britain: Kilshaw
v~. Jukes, 3 B. & 8. 847, 113 Eng. Com.L. 846; Sha10 vs. Gault, 16
Irish C. L. R. 357; Holme vs. Hammond, L. R. 7 Exch. 218; E:e
parte Delbasse, 7 Cb. Div. 511. And though in New York, th~
courts, hampered somewhat by early cases, have not felt them12
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selves at Uberty to adopt and follow the decision in Oo:D ~~. ...
Hickman to the full extent, it w~uld be easy to show that the
American authorities in the main are in harmony with it.
Indeed, that is vecy well shown in Eastman vs. Clark, 53 N.H.
276, 16 Am. Rep. 192, where the authorities are collated. It
must be admitted, however, that the attempts at an application
of the test to the complicated facts of particular cases have not
been productive of harmonious results. A few cases may be
mentioned which, in their facts, have a resemblance, more or
less strong, to the one before us.
Ohampion vs. 'Bostwick, 18 Wend. 175, 31 Am. Dec. 376, was
a case where parties who were severally owners of horses and
stages on different parts ·of one stage line made an arrangement that the fares received by both should be divided between
them in proportions agreed upon. This was held to constitute
them partners, so that a third person injured by the carelessness of a driver employed by one might bring suit for the negligence of aJI. But in the somewhat similar case of Eastman
~~.Clark, 53 N.H. 276, 16 Am. Rep.192, the conclusion of partnership or no partnership, it was said, must be drawn as one
of fact. "The real and ultimate question," says SMITH; J. (p.
289), "in all cases like the present, is one of agency. Did the
person sought to be charged stand in the relation of principal
to the person contracting the debt? Participation in the profits
Is not decisive of that question, 'except so far as it is evidence
of the relation of principal and agent between the persons ·~k
ing the profits and those actually carrying on the business.'
Whether such relation existed is a question of fact. • • •
There is no sound foundation for an arbitracy rule of law
requiring courts or juries to regard participation in the profits
as a decisive test which will, in all instances, necessitate the
conclusion that the participator is liable for the debts."
In Farmers' Ins. Co. ~~. Ross, 29 Ohio St. 429, it appeared
that by arrangement one party furni8hed the ground and the
material for making brick, and also the fuel, and another was
at the expense of burning the brick. The brick were then to
be divided, the former receiving one-fourth and the latter threefourths, and the latter was also to pay the former ten dollars
on each one hundred thousand bricks. This was held to create
a partnership, and Murier tiS. Trumpbour, 5 Wen~. 274, and
Everitt ~~- Chapman, 6 Conn. 347, were relied upon as
authority.

BBBCHER VS. BUSH.

The New York cases might support this decision, but ·the
of Loomi8 vs. Marshall, 12 Conn. 69, 30 Am. Dec. 596, can
hardly be considered in accord with it. The facts were these:
B ·had a cloth factory. A agreed with him to furnish a full
supply of wool for two years, B to devote the factory for two
years exclusively to manufacturing and the net proceeds, after
deducting the incidental expenses and costs of sale, were to be
divided in the proportion of 55 per centum to A and 45 per
centum to B, and the cost of manufacture was to be shared
in like proportion. This was held no partnership. Says HuNTINGTON, J . : "This oomm.unity Of profit iS the test to deter·
mine whether the contract be one of partnership; and to constitute it: a partner must not only share in the profits, but
share in them as a principal; for the rule is now well established that a party who stipulates to receive a sum of money
in proportion to a given quantum of the profits, as a reward
for his labor, is not chargeable as a partner." And of the share
set off to B he says it "is not expressed in terms to be for such
compensation; but this is its legal meaning:" pp. 77, 79. Moore
t18. Smith, 19 Ala. 774; Bowman vs. Bailey, 10 Vt. 170, and Price
t18• .A.le~ander, 2 Greene (Ia.), 427, 52 Am. Dec. 526, may be
referred to for similar views.
One of Chief Justice GIBSON's short but very lucid opinions
is in point here. Between Bronson, a manufacturer, and Dunham, a country merchant, there was an agreement that the
former should furnish wooden handles made to order to the .
latter, at a tariff of prices to be paid out of the store, on the
proceeds of the handles; Bronson finding the labor and stuff,
and receiving a further compensation for skill and the rent of
the storehouse, in the form of a commission of fifty per centum
on the net profits of the whole. It was sought to charge Dunham as a partner with Bronson for the price of raw material
the latter had bought. Upon these facts it is said: "Now, it
has been so often and so inyariably ruled in _E ngland and
America that a commission on profits is not such an interest in
the concern as constitutes partnership that the point is at rest.
What staggers the mind in this instance is the apparent shallowness of the distinction when it is considered that a commission of fifty per cent is no more nor less than an equal division
of the profits; but it must not be forgotten that the distinction
is an ·arbitrary one, resting on authority, not principle; and
~

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 16:46 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112102486216
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

123

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 16:46 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112102486216
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

124

CASES ON PARTNERSHIP.

that, whatever be the proportion, the relation produced by a
compensation in the form of a commission is in every instance
the same. But by the terms of the contract Bronson and not
Dunham was to procure and pay for the stuff; and they were
not to be partners in that part of the business. This provision,
I admit, would be inoperative against strangers, if the parties
had held themselves out to the public as partners, both in buying and selling; but assuming for the moment that there was
indeed a partnership in the handles when furnished, and in the~
store when stocked with goods, yet it is to be borne in mind
that the handles, as well as the store goods, were to be put into
the concern as separate contributions to the joint stock; and
that, as the stuff for the handles was to be procured by Bronson it was cons£>quently to be paid for by him, just as the store
goods were to be procured and paid for by Dunham, having
been purchased on separate account. There may be a partnership for selling and not for buying; or for buying and not for
selling; or for both buying and selling, which is the most usual:
as if sevet·al put separate quantities of wheat into a common
stock to be ground into flour and sold on joint account; or
agree to buy jointly and divide the article when bought; or
agree to buy nnd sell on joint account. In th~ first case each
would be liable for his own purchases only; but in the second
and thl_rd cases, each would be liable for the whole. Now if
there were any partnership in this instance it would be of the
first class; and in any view of the case the defendant would not
be ljable :" Dunham vs. Rogers, 1 Pa. St. 255, 262.
Not dissimilar to this is the case of Denny vs. Cabot, 6 Met.
82, which was also a case in which one party supplied the raw
materal and another manufactured it, and was to receive onethird part of the net profits. This proportion, it was found,
was to be received by the manufacturer only as a compensation
for his labor and services; and it was held perfectly competent
to provide for making compensation by such a standard without constituting a partnership. Perrine vs. Hankinson, 11 N .•J.
181, is relied upon as authority, among other cases. The same
doctrine. was reiterated in Holmes vs. Old Colony R. R. Co., 5
Gray 58; Bradley vs. Wllitc, }()Met. 303, 43 Am. De~. 435; and
by DAY, J., In a careful opinion in Harvey vs. Childs, 28 Ohio
St. 819, post, already referred to.
It is needless to cite other cns('s. They cannot alJ be. recon-
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cUed, but enough are cited to show that in so far as the notion
ever took hold of the judicial mind that the question of partnership or no partnership was to be settled by arbitrary tests
it was erroneous and mischievous, and the proper correcti ;e
had been applied. Except when one allows the public or indi·
vidual dealers to be deceived by the appearances of partner·
ship when none exist, be is never to be charged as a partner
unless by contract and with intent be has formed a relation
in which the elements of partnership are to be found. And
what are these? At the very least the following: Community
·of interest in some lawful commerce or business, for the con·
duct of which the parties are mutually principals of and agents
for each other, with general powers within the scope of the
business, which powers, however, by agreement between the
parties themselves, n:tay be restricted at option, to the extent
even of making one the sole age~t of the other and of the
business.
In this case we have the lawful commerce or business,
namely, the keeping of the hotel.
e have also in some sense
a community of interest in the proceeds of the business, though
these are so divided that all the profits and all the losses are t<t
be received and borne by one only. But where in the mutual
arrangement does it appear that either of the parties clothed
the other with. an agency to act on his behalf in this business?
We speak now of intent merely, and not of any arbitrary impli·
cation of intent which the law, according to some authorities,
may raise irrespective o·f and perhaps contrary to the intent.
Could Beecher buy for the business a dollar's worth of provi·
sions? Could he hh:e a porter or a waiter? Could be discharge~
one? Could hfl say the bouse shall be kept for fastidious
guests exclusively and charges made in proportion to what the~·
demand, or on the other band that the tables shall be plain and
cheap so as to attract a greater number? Could be persist in
li~bting with gas if Williams chose something different, or
reject otl if 'Williams saw fit to use it? ~v:~·s a servant in the
bouiiJe at his beck or disposal, or could be turn off a guest that
WilJiams saw fit to receive, or receive one that Williams
. rejected a.s unfit? In short, what one act might he do or
authority exercise which properly pertains to the business of
keeping hotel, except merely the supervision of accounts, and
this for the purpose of accounting only? And bow could he be

"r
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principal in a business over which he had absolutely no con·
trol? Nor must we forget that this is not a case in which
powers which might otherwise be suppose~ to exist are taken
away or excluded by express stipulation;·but they are powers
which it is plain from their contract the parties did not suppose
would exist, and, therefore, .have not deemed it necessary to
exclude.
On the other hand, what single act are we warranted in
inferring the parties understood Williams was to do for, and
as the agent of, Beecher? Not to furnish supplies surely, for
these it was expressly agreed should be furnished by Williams ·
and paid for daily. Not to contract debts for water and gas
bllls and other running expenses, for by the agreement there
were to be no such debts. Nor was this an agreement merely
that expt>nses incurred for both were to be met without the use
of credit, but it was expres~:tly provided that they were to be the
expenses of one party only, and to be met by him from his own
means. There was to be no employment of credit, but it was
the credit of Williams alone that was in the minds of the
parties.
It is difficult to understand how the element of agency could
be more perfectly eliminated from their arrangements than it
actually was. Beecher furnished the use of the hotel and ll
clerk to supervise the accounts, and received for so doing onethird ·the gross returns. It was not understood that he wa14
to intermeddle in any way with the conduct of the business
so long as Williams adhered to the terms of hfs contract. If
the business was managed badly Beecher might be a loser, but
how could be help himself? He had reserved no right to correct the mistakes of Williams, supply his deficiencies, or overrule his judgments. He did, indeed, agree to take and account
for whatever furniture should be brought into the house by
Williams, but the bringing any in was voluntary and so far
was Beecher from undertaking to pay to the sellers the purchase price, that on the contrary the value was to be offset
against the deterioration of that which Beecher supplied; and
It was quite possible that, as between himself and William~,
there might be nothing to pay. And while Williams was not
compellable to put any in, Beecher, on the other hand, had no
authority to put any in at the cost of 'Williams.
It Is plain, therefore, that if there Is any agency in this case
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for Beecher to act for Williams, or 'Villiams to act for Beecher,
it is an agency implied by law, not only without having
expressed a purpose that an agency shall exist, but in spite of
their plain intent that none shall exist. If, therefore, we shall
say that agency of each to act for the other, or agency of one
to act for both in the common business, is to be the test of
.partnership, or to be one of the tests, but that the law may
imply the agency irrespective of the intent, and then imply the
partnership from the agency, we see at once that the test disappears from all our calculations. To imply something in
order that that something may be the foundation whereupon
to erect an implication of something.else is a mere absurdity.
The test of part,i~~·rship must be found in the intent of the
parties themselves. They may say they intend none when
their contract plainly shows the contrary; and in that case the
intent sha.U control the contradictory assertion; but here the
intent is plain.
We have not overlooked anyone of the circumstances which
on the argument were pointed out as peculiar to this case.
None of them is inconsistent with the intent that Beecher was
to be paid for the use of his building and furniture merely. He
retained possession; but a reason for this appears in the power
he reserved to terminate the arrangement whenever the contract was broken by \Villiams. Being in possession he might
suppose he could eject 'Williams without suit. He might ·also
think it important to the reputation of the hotel that no landlord should be in debt for supplies or for servants' wages; and
for that reason require cash payments. It is easy to see that
as lessor he might have had an interest in all the stipulations to
which " 71lliam's assent was required.
·
There is another view of this case that seems to us concluBive. It is urged on behalf of defendants in .error that Beecher
wal!l a dormant partner. Now a. dormant partner is a secret
partner; one who becomes such by a secret arrangement, while
his associate is held out to the world as sole proprietor and
manager of the business. Was this the case here? Nothing
tn the record indicates it. Beecher was in possession of the
hotel, and we must suppose had his clerk there. These were
facti!! open and patent to the whole world who had occasion to
go there or to deal with Williams. They naturally suggested
the inquiry what was the arrangement between the pa.rties;
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and there is nothing in the case to indicate that plaintiffs in
error would not have learned all the details of the arrangement
had they made the necessary inquiries. There is no indication
anywhere of intended secrecy. If, therefore, there was any
partnership at all, it existed because the contract and the
open and public conduct of business under it created one, and
the right of the defendants in error to recover must depend
upon whether they had a right, with the contract before them,
to understand that they were furnishing supplies on the credit
of Beecher. Would they have had this right? If so, no interference of Beecher, and no notice to them not to sell to
Williams relying on Beecher's credit, would have been
of the least avaiL If he had said to them, "Gentlemen, by our contract, Mr. Williams furnishes all
the supplies; I do not and cannot control in respect to quality,
quantity, or cost; he alone, by our understanding, is to pay for
them, and I forbid you to sell on my credit;" it would all haYe
been useless. On their view of the case he was bound by au
iron rule of the law, from which it would have been impossible
to rescue his credit until the arrangement with "~illiams
should in some manner be terminated. And this would have
been the case also even if the arrangement with Williams had
been a secret one, and Beecher had attempted to protect himself by disclosing its tenns. This is as much as to say that
parties are not at liberty to contract as they please, even wht.•n
they propose nothinA" ~rong and do nothing unfair to any one.
But we cannot bring our minds to this result.
.Onr conclusion is that Beecher and Williams, having neYcr
tntendP.d to constitute a partnership, are not as between themselves partners. There was to be no common property, no
agency of either to act for the other or for both, no participation in profits, no sharing of losses. If either had failed to perform his part of the agreement, the remedy of the other would
have been a suit at law, and not a bill for an accol}nting in
equity. If either had died, the obligations be had assumed
would have continued against his representatives. ·we also
think there can be no such thing as a partnership as to third
persons when as between the parties themselves there is no
partnership and the third persons have not been misled by concealment of facts or by deceptive appearances.

'
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The judgment must be reversed with costs and a new trial
ordered.
NOTa: See Mechem's Elem. of Parto., § 63.

HARVEY vs. CHILDS.
8upreine Court of Ohio, 1816.
28 Ohio St. 319, 22 Am. Rep. 887.

Action for money. The case is sufficiently stated in the
opinion of the court.
Matson & Dirlam, for plaintiff in error.
Brinkerhoff & Dickey, for defendants in error.

DAY, J. The original action was brought by Harvey against
Childs and Potter, to recover f158.40, for seventeen hogs sold
by Harvey to Potter.
Potter is in default. Childs denies his liability. His liability
is claimed solely on the ground that he was a partner of Potter in the adventure for which the hogs were purchased.
The partnership claimed rests on the following state of
facts: Potter went to Childs, and told him that he bad contracted for about two car loads of hogs, to be deliv-ered at
Loudonville the next day, and bad not the money to pay for
them. He asked Childs to advance the money and take au
interest ·in the hogs. Childs refused. Thereupon Potter proposed that if he would let him have the money to enable him
to pay for the hogs he had bought, and others be might have
to buy to make the two car loads, he (Childs) should take
possession of the hogs when carred at I..oudonville, as security
for the money, take them to Pittsburg, sell them, and take his
pay from the proceeds of the sale; that he might have onehalf the net profits of the adventure, and that in no event
should Childs sustain any loss, but the money advanced by
him should be fully paid by Potter in case the amount realized
from the sale of the liogs was insufficient. Childs accepted the
proposition, and, it being agreed that $2,500 would be enough
13
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to pay for the two car loads he advanced that sum to Potter.
Afterward, without the knowledge of Childs, Potter bought
the hogs in question of Harvey, on his own credit, and they
made part of the two car loads of hogs which were taken podsession of by Childs, sold in Pittsburg, and the avails of the
sale were appropriated in payment of the money advanced to
him. No profits were made. The avails of the ·sale were
insufficient to pay the amount advanced by Childs, and Potter
paid him the deficiency, and for his time and expense in the
· transaction.
The question to be considered, then, Is, are the defendants,
by construction of law, to be regarded partners as to the
plaintiff, being a third person, in the debt incurred to him
by Potter in his own name?
What shall be regarded, as to third pei'SQnS, a test of part-.
nership between parties who did not consider themselves to
be partners, and who have done nothing to estop them from
denying that they are such has been much discussed by
courtB and elementary writers, and the problem seems to be
one of difficult solution. It is needless to review here the
numerous cases on the subject; a statement of results
is sufficient.
No little difficulty has been experienced in determining the
meaning and limits of phrases that have been recognized as
tests of a partnership in s~ch cases, and in their application
to the varying cases that arise.
The effort bas been to draw a distinct line between cases
where one has a community of interest in the profits of a
business, as distinguished from those where one is entitled
to receive a sum of money out of the profits as a creditor, or a
sum proportioned to a quantum of profits, or a share of the
profits as a compensation for services or labor.
Although a partnership may be said to rest upon the idea
of a communion of profits, nevertheless the foundation of the
liability of one partner for the acts of another is the relation
they sustain to each other, as being each principal and agent.
That relation, it would seem, then, constitutes the true test of a
partnership liability, and rests upon the just foundation tha.t
the joint liability was incurred on the express or implied
authority of the party sought to be charged.
But if. the relation of principal and agent be regarded as
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the test of a partnership and consequent joint liability, the
question still remains, what shall be deemed sufficient. evi·
dence of that relation, or to raise the implication of authority
to incur the liability in question?
To this end numerous tests have been supposed to exist;
but the best considered and least objectionable is that of a
community of interest in the profits of a business or transaction as a principal or proprietor. Pars. on Part. 71, and note;
Coli. on Part., sees. 25, 44. See, also, Story on Part., sees. 36,
38, 60; Berthold vB. Goldsmith, 24 How. 536.
But this ,test is valuable as a rule chiefly because it evinces
a relation between the parties, where each may reasonably be
presumed to act for himself and as agent for the others, and
to that extent establishes the fact that the liability was incurred on the authority of a.ll so participa.ti~g in the pt·ofits.
Participation in the profits of a business, however, cannot be
regarded as a rule so universal and unrelenting as to be
unjustly applied to a case where a debt is incurred by one
who cannot be said to be acting, in the particular transaction, as the agent or on behalf of the party sought to be
charged. Therefore, on principle, the true test of a partner·
ship, at last, is left to be that of the relat.ion of the parties
as principal a·nd agent, to be proved by any competent evi·
dence; for when they sustain that relation, a joint liability may
be said to have been incurred by the authority, or on behalf of
each of the parties so related. The . tendency of the more
modern authorities, both English and American, is to this
eonclusion.
·
The case of Co:» 'VB. Hickman, decided by the House of Lords
In 1860, has become a leading case on the subject. 99 E. C. L.
47; 8 House of Lords Cases, 268. It is summarized in the suh·
sequent case of Bullen VB. Sharp, L. R. 1 C. P. 86, by BLACK·
RURN, J., as follows: "I think that the ratio cUJc.idendi is
that the proposition laid down in Waugh VB. Carver, viz., that
a participation in the profits of a busin(>SS does of itself, by
operation of law, constitute a partne1·ship, is not a correct
statement of the law of England; but that the true question
is, as stated by Lord CnANWORTH, whether the trade is carried
on on behalf of the person sought to be charged as a partner,
the participation in the profits being a most important element in determining the question, but not being in itself deci-
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sive; the test being, in the language of Lord WE!I!SLEYDALE,
whether it Is such a participation in the profits as to consti·
tute the relation of principal and agent between the person~
taking the profits and those actually carrying on the business."
Add. on Cont. 163.
These cases were decided before the passage of the act of
parliament in relation to pa.rtnerships. But, so far as relates
to this question, in a subsequent case, BRAMWELL, J., declared,
in effect, that the act was only declaratory of the common law,
as held in Oo:» ~B. Hickman. Holme ~s. Hammond, L~ R. 7 Ex.
218.
The question was much considered in Eastman ~8. Clark, S:l
N. H. 276, where the authQrities are fully collated and ably
reviewed. The case was decided in 1872. The conclusion ·
arrived at is stated by SMITH, J., as follows: "The real ulti·
mate question in all cases like the present is one of agency.
Did the person sought to be charged stand in the relation of
principal to the person contra.cting the debt? Participatioa
in the profits is not decisive of the question; except so far as
lt is evidence of the relation of principal and agent between
the persons, taking the profits and those actually carrying on
the business. Whether such relation actually exists is a que.:~·
tion of fact. Upon the trial of that question, proof of a right
to participate in the profits would be a cogent and often practically oonclusive piece of evidence to establish the existence of
that relation, but ther~ is no sound foundation for an arbitrary
rule of law requiring courts or jurors to regard participation in the profits as a decisive test which will in all instances
necessitate the conclusion that the participator is liable for the

debts."
In the absence of any known stipulation to the contrary,
every party of a trading firm, within the scope of the joint
business in contemplation of law, is clothed. with implied
authority to enter into simple contracts on behalf of the firm
in furtherance of the business of the partnership, and thereby
bind each member of the firm. Where, therefore, as in the
case of Wood vs. Vallette, 7 Ohio St. 172, and in the later case
of Leggett va. Hyde, 58 N. Y. 272, money is advanced, to be
used in a trading b1Uiiness, and returned in a year with d.
share of the profits made during that time, it may well be
implied that the business was conducted on behalf and by the
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authority of the person advancing the money and sharing the
profits, for it is to the continuing trade, in the ordinary way,
that be looks for his profits.
But such cases a:re plainly distinguishable from one where
money is advanced, to be embarked in a single transaction,
where no credit is contemplated. In such case there is no
ground for the implied authority to incur debts, such as exists
in regard to a general trading business. Xdd. on Cont. 161.
In the case before us it is obvious that it was not contemplated in the arrangement between Childs and Potter that
any indebtedness should be incurred in the purchase of bogs
for the contemplated adventure, to which the whole business
was to be confined. There is, then, no ground for the implication of authority from Childs to incur the debt in question.
On the contrary, such implication is rebutted by the advancE.>ment of money to pay for all the hogs that were to come to
his hands.
Moreover, Childs had no legal interest in any of the hogs ·
until they were delivered to him at the cat-sr nor bad he any
equitable interest in hogs, before such. delivery, that were
bought by Potter and not paid for by money received from
Childs. He had, then, no interest whatever in the hogs bought
of Harvey on credit, when the debt to him was incurred; and
Potter, before delivery to Childs, might have sold them without being lia.ble to Childs. The fact is apparent that it was
the understanding of the parties that Potter had bought for
himself, and, if need be, was in like manner to buy enough
more hogs to make two car loads; and it cannot be doubted
that, until their delivery at least, all the bogs belonged to
Potter alone, and at most were only regarded as his oontribution to the enterprise. If so regarded, the case is li~e that
of Wilson vs. Whitehead, 10 :M. & W. 503, where it was agreed
between three parties that one should edit, another print, and
the other publish a paper, and share equally in the net profits.
The printer was ~o furnish the paper and charge the firm at
cost prices. It was held that the printer alone was liable to
the per13.9n of whom he bought the paper. PARKE, B., said:
"The question is, did the other defendants authorize Whitehead to purchase the paper on their account or on his own. It
appears to me, on the true construction of the contract, that
the latter was the case. When the paper was in his possession
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he was at liberty to have appropriated it to any other purpose."
But the truth is, Potter was the owner of the bogs until•
they were sold by Childs, for Childs declined to take any inter·
est in the hogs other than as security for the money advanced
by him to Potter. Looking to the wh~le matter, it is clear
that the transaction was a loan of money by one party to the
other, on the security afforded by the p088e8sion of the hogs.
Childs, therefore, was the mere pledgee of the hogs, with a
power of sale by agreement of the parties, and, as such, had
only special property in the hogs. The general property in
the hogs, from first to last, remained in Potter. He was the
owner, and if they bad died on the way to market, without
the fault of Childs, the loss would have fallen upon Potter.
both by the positive agreement of the parties, and the legal
etfect of the transaction between them as bailor and bailee.
There was, then, strictly speaking, no mutuality or community of interest between them in the bogs. Childs had no
interest in them other than as security for a debt, and to
ftnd in half the profits of their sale the measure of his reward
for the use of his money, to be paid out of Potter's property.
The relation of the parties was that of debtor and creditor,
of bailor and bailee, and not that of partners. They had no
mutual interest in the hogs in common as principals or proprietors, nor was either acting as principal for himself and
agent for the other. If, however, that relation could be said to
exist after the bogs were delivered to Childs, there is no
ground for an inference that the debt to Harvey, previously
contracted by Potter, was incurred upon the authority of
Childs. On the contrary, the facts rebut any implication of
such authority, and a.re consistent only with the supposition
that the debt was incurred without authority from Childs, who
was doubtless no less surprised to learn of the debt than
Harvey was, after the failure of Potter, to ftnd the existence
of a rule of law under which he bad unwittingly given credit
to another and responsible party. We ma.y, in conclusion,
therefore, well adopt in this case the language of Judge STORY
(Part., sec. 36): "Now, it is incumbent upon those who insist
that a partnership exists between the parties, as to third
persons, by mere operation of law, in opposition to their own
intention, to establish that in the given case, under all the
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elrcum~tances, there is such a rule, and that It Is strictly
applicable."
This disposes of the material questions made by the record.
The oourt of common pleas gave judgment in favor of the
plalntltT, against both Childs anc;l Potter.
The District Court, on error reversed the judgment as to
Childs. It follows that the judgment of the District Court
must be affirmed.
Judgment accordingly.

Non: See Mechem's Eltm. of Partn., §§ 64, 65.

MEEHAN vs. VALENTINE.
Supreme Court of the United States, 189!.
14:5 U. 8. 611, 86 L. ed. 835, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 971.

This was an action of assumpsit brought by Thomas :,.
Meehan, a citizen of Maryland, against John K. Valentine,
executor of \Villiam G. Perry, both citizens of Pennsylvania,
alleging Perry to have been a partner with Lawrence W. Conn·
selman and Albert L. Scott, under the name of L. W. Conn·
selman & Co., and oounting on promissory notes of various
dates from August 10, 1883, to November 25, 1884, signed by
that firm, indorsed to the plaintiff, and amounting in all to
about '10,000, with interest. The defendant denied that Perry
was a partner in the firm.
At the trial, the plaintiff put in evidence the following
agreement:
"L. W. Counselman, Albert L. Scott, Office of L. W. Conn·
selman & Co., Oyster and Fruit Packers, corner Philpot and
Will streets. Baltimore, Md., March 15, 1880. For and in
consideration of loans made and to be made to us by Wm.
G. Perry, of Philadelphia, amounting in all to the sum of ten
thouAand dollars, for the term of one year from the date of
said loans, we agree to pay to said Wm. G. Perry, in addition
to the interest thereon, one-tenth of the net prodtFt over and
above the sum of ten thousand dollars on our business for the
year commencing May bt. 1880, and ending May 1st, 1881,-
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,. i. e., if our ~t profits for said year's business exceeds the sum
of ten thousand dollars, then we are to pay to said W. G.
Perry one-tenth of said excess of profits over and above the
eaid sum of ten thousand dollars; and it is further agreed
that if our net profits do not exceed the sum of ten thousand
dollars, then be is not to be paid more than the interest on
said Joan, the same being added to notes at the time they art:given, which are to date from ·the time of said loans, and
payable one year from date. L. W. Counselman & Co."
Also the following indorsemen·t thereon: "March 2, 1881.
This contract and agreement is to continue one year longer
on the same basis,-i. e., from May 1st, 1881, until May 1st,
1882. L. W. Counselman & Co."
Also three further renewals of the agreement from year to
year, the first of which was by letter, dated March 18, 1882,
from L. W. Counselman & Co. to Perry, with the same heading as the original agreement, and saying: "We hereby renew
the agreement made with you May 1, 1880, which is to the
effect that we will guarantee you ten per cent. interest upon
loans amounting to f10,000; and that if the net profits of our
business are over f10,000 for the year commencing May 1,
1882, and ending April 30th, 1883, we will in· lieu of the ten
per cent. interest give you ten per cent. of the profits. '\\·c
have two propositions for partnership May 1st, and if we
accept either we will then, if you desire, return YO'lr loan."
The other renewals, dated April 4, 1883, and March 15, 1884,
were substantially like the original agreement of March 15,
1880, except that in the agreement of April 4, 1883, the rate
of. interest was specified as 6 per ce~t.
The plaintiff further offered in evidence six promissory
notes, amounting in the aggregate to f10,600, given by the
ftrm to Perry in the months of March, May, and June, 1884.
The plaintiff also called Scott as a witness, who testified that
the ftrm was composed of L. W. Couselman and himself; that
it was engaged in "the fruit and vegetable packing and oyster
lmsiness" in Baltimore; that Perry was In the stationery business in Philadelphia; that the f10,000 mentioned in the agreement was paid by him to the firm, receiving their notes for it,
and remained in the business throughout, no pn.rt of it having
been repaid; that from time to time he lent other sums to the
ftrm, which were repaid; that he was an intimate friend of the
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witness, and visited him every few weeks; that these visits
were not specially connected with the business, though on such
occasions Perry "usually went down to the place of businesP
and talked business;" that he annually asked and received
from the firm accounts of profit and loss; that the accounts
showed an annual profit, which varied from year to year,
amounting for the second year to fll,OOO or $12,000; that, it
being then found difficult to tell at the end of the year exactly
what the profits would be, it wa.s agreed with Perry that he
should thenceforth receive $1,000 each year, leaving the final
settlement until the whole business was settled up; and that he
received under the agreement about f1,500 the first year, and
fl,OOO each subsequent year. On cross-examination, the witness stated that the firm made an assignment to the plaintiff
for the benefit of creditors on April 30, 1885; that their liabilities were from f60,000 to f70,000, about half of which was with
collateral security, and he did not know whether it had been
paid out of such security; that the assets realized less than
f2,000; that, so far as he knew, no dividend had been paid; and,
in regard to the flO,OOO received from Perry, the witness testi- .
fted u follows: "Question, Mr. Counselman and yourself did
owe this $10,000 to the estate of Mr. Perry, did you? Answer.
They had my notes for it. Q. Did you or did you not owe it?
A. It was capital he had in the business the same as ours. \Ve
owed it to him; of course we owed it to him, if we did not
lose it."
At the close of the plaintiff's evidence, the defendant movetl
for a nonsuit, on the ground that there was no evidence to show
that Perry was liable as a partner. The court so ruled, and
ordered a nonsuit. 29 Fed. Rep. 276. The plaintiff duly excepted to the ruling, and sued out this writ of error.
8. Shelabarger and J. M. Wilson, for plaintiff in error.
Samud Dickson and R. 0. Dale, for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice GRAY, after stating the case as above, delivered
the opinion of the court.
The granting of a nonsuit by the circuit court, because in its
opinion the plaintiff had given no evidence sufficient to maintain his action, was in aecordance with the law and practice of
Pennsylvania, prevailing in the courts of the United State•
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held within that state, and is subject to the revision of this
court on writ of error. Central 1'rans. Oo. 'VB. Pullman'B Car
Oo., 139 U. S. 24, 38-40, 11 Sup. Ct. !rep. 478. The real question in this case, therefore, is whether the evidence introduced
by the plaintiff would have been sufficient to sustain a verdict
in his favor.
The requisites of a partnership are that the parties must
have joined together to carry on a trade or adventure for their
common benefit, each contributing property or services, and
havilig a community of interest in tb.e profits. Ward vs.
Thompson, 22 How. 330, 334.
Some of the principles applicable to the question of the lia·
bility of a partner to third persons were stated by Chief Justice
MARSHALL in a general way, as follows: "The power of an
agent fs limited by the authority given him; and, if he transcends that authority, the act cannot affect his principal; he
acts no longer as an agent. The same principle applies to part·
ners. One binds the others so far only as he is the agent of the
others." "A man who shares in the profit, although his name
may not be in the firm, is responsible for all its debts." "Stipulations [restricting the powers of partners] may bind the part·
ners, but ough~ not to affect those to whom they are unknown,
and who trust to the general and well-established commercial
law." Winship tJB. Bank, 5 Pet. 529, 561, 562. And the chief
justice referred to Waugh vs. Carver, 2 H. Bl. 235, ante;
&TJ parte Hamper, 17 Ves. 403, 412; and Oow. Partn. 17.
How far sharing in the profits of a partnership shall make
one liable as a partner has been a subject of much judicial dis·
cussion, and the various definitions have been approximate
rather than exhaustive.
The rule formerly laid down and long acted on as established, was that a man who received a certain share of the
profits as profits, with a lien on the whole profits as security for
his share, was Iiabl~ as a partner for the debts of the partnership, even if it had been stipulated between him and his copartners that he should not be so liable; but that merely
receiving compensation for labor or servi~es, estimated by
a certain proportion of the profits, did not render one
liable as a partner. Story, Partn. c. 4; 3 Kent, Comm. 25, note,
32-34; E::tJ parte Hamper, above cited; Pott VB. Eyton, a c. B.
32, 40; BoBtwick vs. Champion, 11 Wend. 571, and 18 Wend. 175,
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184, 185; Burckre vs. Eckarl, 1 Denio 337, and 3 N. Y.132; Denny
vs. Cabot, 6 Mete. (Mass.) 82; Fitch vs. Harrington, 13 Gray 468,
474, 74 Allh Dec. 641; Brundred v1. Muzzy, 25 N. J. ~aw, 268,
279, 675. The test wa.s often stated to be whether the person
sought to be charged as a partner took part of the profits as n
principal, or only a.s an agent. Benjamin VB Porteus, 2 H. Bl.
590, 592; Coli. Partn. (1st Ed.) 14; Smith, Mere. Law, (1st Ed.)
4; Story, Partn. § 55; Loomis vs. Marshall, 12 Conn. 69, 78, 30
Am. Dec. 596; Burckle vs. Eckhart, 1 Denio, 337, 341; H aUet VB.
Duban, 14 La. Ann. 529.
Accordingly, this court, at December term, 1860, decided
that a person employed to sell goods under an ·agreement that
he should receive half the profits, and that they should not be
less than a certain sum, was not a partner with hi!i employer.
"Actual participation in the profits as principal," said Mr.
Justice CLIFFORD in delivering judgment, "creates a partnership as between the parties and third persons, whatever mny
be their intentions in that behalf, and notwithstanding the dormant partner was not expected to participate in the loss
beyond the amount of the profits," or "may have expressly
stipulated with his associates against all the usual incidents
to that relation. That rule, however, has no application whatever to a case of service or special agency, where the employtS
has no power as a partner in the firm and no interest in the
profits, as property, but is simply employed as a servant or
special agent, and is to receive a given sum out of the profits,
or a proportion of the same, as a compensation for his services." Berthold vtt. Goldsmith, 24 How. 536, 542, 543. See, also,
SeymourtJB. Freer, 8 Wall. 202,215, 222, 226; Beck1cith vs. Talbot,
95 U. B. 289, 293; Edtoards vs. Tracy, 62 Pa. St. 374; Burnett vs.
Snyder, 81 N.Y. 550, 555.
Mr. Justice STORY, at the beginning of his Commentaries on
Partnership, first published in 1841, said: "Every partner iR
an agent of the partnership; and his rights, powers, duties, and
obligations are in many respects governed by the same rules
and principles as those of an agent. A partner, indeed, virtually embraces the character both of a principa 1 and of an agent.
So far as he acts for himself and his own interest in the com·
mon concerns of the partnership, he may properly be deemed
a principal; and so far as he acts for his partners, he may as
properly be deemed an agent. The principal distinction
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betw(>en him and a mere agent is that he has a community of
interest with the othe-r partners in the whole property and
business and responsibilities of the partnership; whereas an
agent, as such, bas no interest in either. Pothier considers
partnership as but a species of mandate, saying contractus societatis, non seCUB ac contractus mandati." Afterwards, in dis·
cussing the reasons and limits of the rule by which one may be
charge-d as a partner by r€'8son of having received part of the
profits of the partnership, Mr. Justice STORY observed that the
rule was justified and the cases in which it bad been applied
reconciled, by considering that "a participation in the profits
will ordinarily e-stablish the existence of a partnership between
the parties in favor of tbira persons, in the absence of all other
opposing circumstances;" but that it is not "to be regarded as
anything more than mere presumptive proof thereof, and
therefore liable to be repelled and overcome by other circumltances, and not as of itself overcoming or controlling them;~'
and therefore that~ "if the participation in the profits can be
clearly shown to be in the character of agent, then the presumption of partnership is repelled."_ And again: "The true
rule, e:~: requo et bono, would seem to be that the agreement and
intention of the parties themselves should govern all the cases.
If they intended a partnership in the capital stock, or in the
profits, or in both, then that the same rule should apply in
favor of third persons, even if the agreement were unknown
to .them. And on the other hand, if no such partnership were
intended between the parties, then that there s.h ould be none
as to third persons, unless where the parties bad held themselves out as partners to the public, or their conduct operated
as a fraud or deceit upon third persons." Story, Partn. §§ 1,
38, 49.
Baron PARKE (afterwards Lord WENSLEYDALE) appears to
have taken much the same view of the subject as Mr. Justice
STORY. Both in too court of exchequer and in the bouse of
lords he was wont to treat the liability of one sought to be
charged as a dormant partner for the acts of the active partners as depending on the law of principal and agent. Beckharn
vs. Drake, (1841), 9 Mees. & ,V, 79, 98; Wilson vs. Whitehead,
(1842), 10 Mees. & W. 503, 504; Ernest vs. Nicholls, (1857), 6
H. L. Cas. 401, 417; Oo:c vs. Hickm04l, (1860), 8 H. L. Cas. 268,
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312, ante. And in Cox vs. Hickman he quoted the statements of Story and Pothier from Story, Partn. § 1, aboYe .
cited.
In that case, two merchants and copartners, becoming
embarrassed in their circumstances, assigned all their propert.r
to trustees, empowering them to carry on too business, and to
divide the net income ratably among their creditors, (all of
whom became parties to the deed), and to pay any residue
to the debtors, the majority of the creditors being authorized
to make rules for conducting the business or to put an end
to it altogether. The bouse of lords, differing from the major·
ity of the judges who delivered opinions at various stages of
the case, .held that the creditors were not liable as partners
for debts incurred by the trustees in carrying on the business
under the'-assignment. The decision was put upon the ground
that the liability of one partner for the acts of his copartner
is in truth the liability of a principal for the acts of his agent;
that a right to participate in too profits, though cogent, is
not conclusive, evid~nce that the business is carried on in
part for the person receiving them; and that the test of his ·
liability as a partner is whether be has authorized the managers of the business to carry it on in his behalf. Ooa: vs. Hickmara, 8 H. L. Cas. 268, 304, 306, 312, 313, nom. Wheatcroft vs.
.llickman, 9 C. B. (N. S.) 47, 90, 92, 98, 99.
This new form of stating the general rule did not at first
prove easier of application than the old one; for in the first·
case which arose afterwards one judge of three dissented,
(Kilshaw V8. Juke8, 3 Best & S. 847;) and in the next case the
unanimous judgment of four judges in the common bench was
reveL'Sed by four judges against two in the exchequer cham·
ber, (Bullen vs. Sharp, 18 C. B. [N. S.] 614, and L. R. 1 C. P.
86). And, as has been pointed out in later English cases, the
reference to agency as a test of partnership was unfortunate
and inconclusive, inasmuch as agency results from partner·
ship rather than partnership from agency. ·Kelly, C. B., and
Cleasby, B., in Holme vs. Hammond, L. R. 7 Exch. 218, 227, 233;
Jessel, M. R., in Pooley vs. Drit:er, 5 Ch. Div. 458, 476. Such
a test seems to give a synonym, rather than a definition;
another name for the conclusion, rather than a statement of
the premises from which the conclusion is to be drawn. To
say that a person is liable as a partner, who stands in the rela·
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tion of principal to those by whom the business is actually
carried on, adds nothing by way of precision, for the very idea
of partnership includes the relation of principal and agent.
In the case last above cited, Sir George Jessel said: "You
cannot grasp the notion of agency, properly speaking, unless
you grasp the notion of the existence of the firm as a separate
entity from the. existence of the partners,-a notion which was
well grasped by the old Roman lawyers, and which was partly
understood in the courts of equity." And in a very recent case
the court of appeals of New York, than which no court bas
more steadfastly adhered to the old form of stating the rule,
bas held that a partnership, though not strictly a legal entity
as distinct from the persons composing it, yet being commonly
so regarded by men of business, might be so treated in inter·
preting a commercial contract, Bank va. Thompson, 121 N. Y.
280, 24 N. E. Rep. 473.
In other respects, however, the rule laid down in Co~ VB.
Hickman bas been unhesitatingly accepted in England, as
explaining and modifying the earlier rule. In re English &
"Irish Society, 1 Hem. & M. 85, 106, 107; M ollwo VB. Court (Jf
Wards, L. R. 4 P. C. 419, 435; Ross va. Park]!ns, L. R. 20 Eq. 331,
335; E~ parte Tennant, 6 Ch. I>iv. 303; E:r. parte Delhasse, 7
Ch. Div. 511; Badeley vs. Rank, 38 Ch. Div. 238. See, also,
Davia vs. Patrick, 122 U. S. 138, 151, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1102;
Eastman VB. Clark, 53 N. H. 276, 16 Am. Rep. 192; Wild vs.
Davenport, 48 N. J. Law, 129, 7 Atl. Rep. 295, 57 Am. Rep. 552;
Seabury vs. Bolles, 51 N. J. Law, 103, 16 Atl. Rep. 54, and 52
N.J. Law, 413, 21 Atl. Rep. 952; Morgan. va. Farrell, 58 Conn.
413, 20 Atl. Rep. 614:.
In the pr€'8ent state of the law upon this subject, It may,
perhaps, be doubted whether any more precise general rule
can be laid down than, as indicated at the beginning of this
opinion, that those persons are partners who contribute either
property or money to carry on a joint business for their common benefit, and who own and share the profits thereof in certain proportions. If they do this, the incidents or consequences
follow that the acts of one in conducting the partnership business are the acts of all; that each is agent for the firm and for
the other partners; that each receives part of the profits as
profits, and takc>s part of the fund to which the creditors of
the partnership hnYe a right to look for the payment of their
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debts; that all are liable as partners upon contracts made by
any of them with third persons within the scope of the partnership business; and that even an expresa stipulation betwet>ll
them that one shall not be so liable, though good between
themselves, is ineffectual as against third persons. And participating in profits is presumptive, but not conclusive, evidence of partnership.
In whatever form the rule is expressed, it is universally held
that an agent or servant, whose compensation is measured by
a certain proportion of the profits of the partnership business,
Is not thereby made a partner, in any sense. So an agreement
that the lessor of a hotel shall receive a certain portion of th·~
profits thereof by way of rent does not make him a partner
with the lessee. Perrine f1B. Hankinson, 11 N. J . Law, 215;
Holmu f1B. Railroad Co., 5 Gray, 58; Beecher VB. Bush, 45 :\lich.
188, 7 N . W. Rep. 785, ante. And it is now equally well
settle<l that the receiving of part of the profits of a commercial partnership, in lieu of or in addition to interest, by way
of compensation for a loan of money, bas of itself no greater
effect. WilBon t:B. Edmonds, 130 U.S. 472, 482, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep.
668; Richtu·dson vs. Hughitt, 76 N. Y. 65, 3~ Am. Rep. 267 ;
Curry VB. Fowler, 87 N. Y. 33, 41 Am. Rep. 343; Cauidy VB. Hall,
97 N. Y. 159; Smith VB. Knight, 71 Ill. 148, 22 Am. Rep. 94;
Williams VB. Soutter, 7 Iowa 435, 446; Smelting Co. vs. Smith,
13 R. I. 27, 43 Am. Rep. 3; Mollwo VB. Courl of Wards, and
Badeley vs. Bank, above cited.
In some of the cases most relied on by the plaintiff, the person held llable as a partner furnished the whole capital on
•
which the busineBB was carried on by another, or else contributed part of the capital and took an active part in the management of the business. Beauregard VB. Case, 91 U. S. 134 ;
Hackett"'· Sttmky, 115 N. Y. 625, 627, 628, 633, 22 N. E. Rep.
745.: Pratt t:8. Langdon, 12 Allen, 544, and 97 Mass. 97, 93 Am.
Dec. 61; Rowland vs. Long, 45 Md. 439. And in M oUtoo VB. Court
of Wards, above cited, after speaking of a contract of loan and

security, in which no partnership was intended,. it was justly
observed: • "If cases should occur where any persons, under
the guise of such an arrangement, are really trading as principals, and putting forward, as ostensible tradert, others who
are really their agents, they must not hope by such devices
to escape Itability; for the law, in cases of this kind, will look
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at the body and substance of the arrangements, and fasten
responsibility on the parties according to their true and real
character." L. R. 4 P. C. 4:38. But in the case at bar no such
element is fou11.d.
Throughout the original agreement, and the renewals thereof, the sum of flO,OOO paid by Perry to the partnership, and
for which they gave him their promissory notes, is spoken of
as a loan, for which the partnership was to pay him legal interest at all events, and also pay him one tenth of the net yearly
profits of the partnership business, if those profits should
exceed the sum of flO,OOO. The manifest intention of the
parties, as apparent upon the face of the agreement, was to
create the relation of debtor and cred~tor, and not that of partners. Perry's demanding and receiving accounts and payments
year'y was in accordance with his right as a creditor. There
is nothing in the agreement itself, or in the conduct of the parties, to show that he 888umed any other relation. He never
exercised any control over the business. The legal effect of
the instrument could not be controlled by the testimony of one
of the partners to his opinion that "it was capital he bad in
the business the same as ours; we owed it to him; of course,
we owed it to him if we did not lose it."
Upon the whole evidence, a jury would not be justified in
inferring, on the part of Perry, either "actual participation in
the profits as.principal," within the rule as laid down by this
court in Berthold. VB. Gold8mith, or that he authorized the business to be carriE-d on in part for him or on his behalf, within
the rule as stated in Ooa; VB. Hickman and the later English
cases. There being no partnership, in any sense, and Perry
never having held himself out as a partner to the plaintiff or
to those under whom he claimed, the circuit court rightly
ruled that the action could not be maintained. Pleasants V8.
Fant, 22 Wall. 116; Thompson VB. Bank, 111 U. S. 529, 4 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 6S9.
Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Justice Brown, not having been a member of the court
when this case was argued, took no part in its decision.
Nor&: See Mechem's Elt!m. of Partn., §§ 66, 67, 68.

WAVERLY NATIONAL BANK VS. HA.LL.

145

WAVERLY NATIONAL BANK vs. HALL.
Supreme Oou·rt of Pennsylvania, 1892.
150 Pa. 466, 80 Am. St. Rep. 823, 24 Atl. Rep. 663.
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AssuMPSIT by the First National Bank of Waverly against
Charles L. Crandall, Stephen C. Hall, and George F. Lyou,
copartners doing business as Hall & Lyon, William L. Watrous and J. H. Floyd, all late copartners doing business as C.
M. Crandall. Defendants obtained judgment. Plaintiff
a.ppeals.
Rodney A. Mercur and Edward Overton, for appellant.
D'A. Overton and John 0. Ingham, for appellees.
J. The plaintiff sues upon notes made by C. .M.
Crandall, one of the defendants, in his own name, and seeks .
to charge the other defendants as partners of Crandall in a
business in which the proceeds of certain other notes, of which
these were renewals, were used. The evidence relied upon to
establish the aneged partnership is a contract in writing
between Crandall of the one part and the other defendants of
the ·other part, dated February 24, 1885. If this contract dot>s
not create a partnership as to creditors, it cannot be success·
· fully contended that all the evidence in the cause, takeu
together, tends to charge anybody but Crandall; and, inasmuch
as all the assignments of error are predicated upon the assumption that such partnership was created by that contract, it is
evident that, if that assumption was unfounded, the plaintifTH
could not have been injured by the rulings complained of; aml
hence, though there may have been technical error therein,
the judgment ought not to be disturbed. I~ is therefore pertinent to inquire what were the rights and liabilities of the·
parties under that contract, although the question is not
directly raised by any of the assignments of error.
The whole scope of the contract indicates that a Joan of
money to Crandall by the other parties in consideration of a
share of the profits of a business in which he was to embark
was intended, and not a contribution to the capital of a partHEYDRICK,

16
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nership of which the parties were to be the members. The
parties of the second part covenanted to furnish ,3,000 to
Crandall, and not to a firm.· They w~re to furnish it to him
from time to time, as he might require it, and its payment to
them was to be secured by a chattel mortgage upon the tools,
machinery, furniture! and fixtures of every kind and nature
belonging to or connected with the business in whi~h it was
to be used. Crandall might repay it, at his option, before the
expiration of the full term for which he had the right to
demand it; and, although it was stipulated that the money so
to be furnished should be used in the business contemplated,
the right of entire control of that business was recognized to
be in, and was expressly conceded to, Crandail. And it was
further stipulated that nothing in the writing contained should
be construed to create a .partnership between the parties
thereto except as to the profits of the business. These provi·
sions are all consistent with the relation of borrower and
lender, and some of them are inconsistent with any other rela·
tion. It is, therefore, manifest that that relation was intended
to be established; and the next question is whether, in spite of
the intention of the parties, the community of interest in the
·profits constitutea them a partnership as to creditors. If this
were a Pennsylvania contract, the question would be answered
in the negative by the act of April 6, 1870, (P. L. 56), and by
Hart t l8. Kelley, 83 Pa. St. 286. But, although it was made in
this State, it was to be executed in the state of New York.
Such cases are stated by approved text writers to be an excep·
tion to the general rule that the le.JJ loci applies in respect to
the nature, obligation, and construction of contracts. That
exception is thus stated by Judge STORY: "But where the C()n·
tract is either expressly or tacitly to be performed in any other
place, the general rule is, in conformity to the presumed intention of the parties, that the contract, as to its validity, nature,
obligation, and interpretation, is to be governed by the law of
the place of performance/' Conft. Laws, § 280. Chancellor
KE:-iT, after stating the exception in substantially the same
term~, adds that it "is more embarrassed t11an any other branch
of the subject [the lex loci] by distinctions and jarring decisions." 2 Comm. 459. But, whatever conflict of authority thera
may be in respect to the exception, all agree that matters connected with the performance of a contract are regulated by
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the law prevailing at the place of performance. Brown vs.
Railroad Oo., 83 Pa. St. 316; Scudder vs. Bank, 91 U. S. 406.
Under the present contract it is clear there could be no liability
to third persons without a performance as between the parties
to it, and therefore the question of such liability would necessarily be connected with ()r grow out of such performance, and
be determinable by the law of New York.
More than a century ago Chief Justice DEGnEY, in Gt·ace vs.
Smith, 2 W m. Bl. 998, ante, laid down the proposition
that "every man that has a share of the profits of a trade ought
also to bear his share of the loss." In a few years the pt·inciple
thus stated became recognized as a part of the law of England,
and so continued until 18GO, when it was overthrown by the
house of lords in Cox vs. Hickman, 8 H. L. Cas. 268, ante.
On this side of the Atlantic, and especially in the state of New
York, it was accepted without question, so far as I have
observed, as to the soundness of the reasons put forth in support of it, until it was exploded in England. As early as 1819,
SPE~CER, J., delivering the opinion of t!ie court in Walden vs.
Sherburne, 15 Johns. 409, said: "No principle is better established than that every person is deemed to be in partnership
if be is interested in the profits of a trade, and if the advantages
which he derives from the trade are casual and indefinite,
depending on the accidents of trade." And, although the judgment of the bouse of lords in Oo:c vs. Hickman was soon followed by many American courts, the New York court of
appeals declared as late as 1874, in Leggett vs. Hyde, 58 N. Y.
272, 17 Am. Rep. 244, that the rule remained in that state ·1s
it bad long been. But, while the judgment of the court sustained the role, the opinion of the learned judge who pronounced it betrayed dissatisfaction with it, and attempted to
depend it on no other principle· than that of stare decisis, and
the chief justice dissented from the judgment itself. The question came before the court of appeals again. in Richardson vs.
Hugltitt, 16 N.Y. 55, 32 Am. Rep. 267. In that case the defendant bad entered into a contract in writing with a firm engaged
in the business of manufacturing wagons, by the terms of
which they were to manufacture and deliver wagons to him,
and use their best effort to sell them. He was to advance $50
on each wagon, to be paid on the first day of each month, and
at the time of each advance the firm was to render him an
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account of sales of wagons during the previous month, and
pay him one quarter of the net profits thereon, with interest
on the advances. This instrument was construed to be a con·
tract for the loan of money, and not to constitute a partnership. This was followed by Ourry -a:s. FenDler, 81 N. Y. 33, 41
Am. Rep. 343, in which it appeared that certain persons having purchased vacant ground in the city of New York, and
being about to erect buildings thereon, entered into a written
contract with ·Fowler, by the terms of which he was to advance
f50,000 towards the purchase and erection of the buildings,
in consideration of which they "agreed to share the profits of
the said pnrclulse and buildings with the said Fowler;" and
he was to be allowed interest on his advances, and be secured
by bond and mQrtgage on the premises. ·This contract was
held not to create any other relation than that of borrower
and lender; the same judge who delivered the opinion of the
court in the case last cited saying: ''In Richm·dson VB. Hughitt,
76 N.Y. 55, 32 Am. Rep. 267, it was held by this court that a
person who has no inferest in the business of a firm, or in the
··capital invested, save that M is.to receive a share of the profits
as a compensation for services, or for money loaned for the
benefit of the business, is not a partner, and cannot be held
liable as such by a creditor of the firm." This language was
repeated with approval in Cassidy vs. Hall, 91 N. Y. 159. It
is said, however, in Hackett VB. Stanley, 115 N.Y. 625, 22 N. E.
Rep. 745, that these cases, and others in harmony with them,
do not overrule Leggett vs. Hyde and its predecessors. But,
while this is affinned, it is said in the same case that "excep·
tiona to the rule [that participation in profits of a business
renders the participant liable to creditors] are, however, found
in cases where a slk'lre in profits is contracted to be paid as
a measure of compensation to employ~s for ser>ices t•endered
in the business, or for the use of moneys loaned in aid of the
enterprise." It is not material to inquire how much more of
the rule is left b~v this exception than was left by Co.r. vs. Hickman-. It is enough that the present case comes within the letter and the spirit of the exception. 'l'he parties who made the
loan, and who are now sought to be held liable as partners,
had no voice or part in the prosecution of the business, either
as principals or otherwise; nor had they an irre>oca ble ri~ht
to dPmand a share of the profits, as was the case in Hackett u.
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Stanley. The· right of control, or any voice in the control,an incident of proprietorship,- was denied to them. And the
implication of partnership from community of interest in the
profits was excluded by an express stipulation, the absence of
which in Hackett vB. Stanley was thought to be worthy of notice;
and their right to demand a share of the profits was to terminate upon repayment of the money advanced ·at the end of
five years, or sooner, at the option of Crandall. In all its
material provisions the contract under consideration is not
distinguishable from that in CU1··ry VB. Fowler, or from those
provisions of the contract in Hackett VB. Stanley, which it is
there conceded would create no other relation than that of
borrower and lender.· For these reasons the defendants as to
whom issue was joined are not liable to the plaintiff, and
therefore the judgment must be affirmed.
NO'.l'E: See also caaee cited in notes to § 50, Mechem's Elem. of Partn.

SPAULDING vs. STUBBINGS.
Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1893.
86 Wis. 255, 39 Am. St. Rep. 888, 56

N~

W. Rep. 469,

On AugustS, 1888, 'Vilson H. Stubbings, who lived at Evanston, Ill., but had a store at Marenisco, Mich., entered into
a contract with one .John O'Connor, who was engaged in business at Eagle River, Wis., by which Stubbings was to advance
money to O'Connor for use in his business. O'Connor was to
give security for the mon~y, pay Stubbings 10 per cent interest
upon it, and also give him one-half of the profits. Stubbings
supplied money under the contract, and also turned in the
stock of goods at Marenisco. On April 10, 1889, the goods
and money so advanced amounted to $14.611.50, and on that day
a new contract was entered into between the parties on substantially t~e same terms as the former. O'Connor carried
on the business in his own name until his death in July, 1889,
when his son and administrator, George O'Connor, took charge
of it. Stubbings knew of and assented to this and con~inued
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to advance ~oney for the business. Plaintiff sold goods to
John O'Connor and to George O'Connor for use in the business.
George gave a note for part of these goods. The action was
upon the note and the account, and was brought against
George O'Connor.arid Stubbings, on the ground that the latter
was a partner.
Plaintiff recovered below and Stubbings appealed.
Other facts appear in the opinion.
Alban & Barnes (Gabe Bouck, of counsel), for appellant.

Levi J. BillingB (Miller & McCormick, of counsel for
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respondent.
LYoN, C. J. (after stating the facts). If defendant Stubbings
is liable in th~s action, he is so liable because he was a partner
with John O'Connor, during his lifetime, in the Eagle River
business, and aUowed the business to be continued on the same
ba.s is by the administrators of John O'Connor's estate after
his death. 'Ve have no case here for the application of the doc·
trine of estoppel against Stubbings, because he held himself
.out to plaintiff as a partner in the business. ThQ plaintiff tes·
!titled he was told by John O'Connor, just before hjs death, that
'Stubbings had an interest in the business, and that was all.
,If plaintiff was a competent witness to give his testimony
(which counsel f·o r Stubbings deny), it fails to prove that Stub·
bings held himself out to plaintiff as a partner with O'Connor
in the Eagle River business. It does not appear that plaintiff
took the trouble to inquire of Stubbings or any other person
what that interest was, if it existed, or to ascertain· whether
the business was continued on the same basis after the death
of John O'Connor; and there is no satisfactory proof that
plaintiff relied upon the fact that Stubbings was a partner
in the business when he gave credit to John O'Connor, and,
after his death, to his administrators. Hence, the first and
principal question is, were John O'Connor and Stubbings part·
ners inter 86 in the Eagle River business before and at the time
of the death of John O'Connor? Among the numerous definitions of a "partnership" to pe found in the treatises on that
subject, many of which definitions are collected in 1 Lindl.
Partn. p. 2, and in 17 Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law, 828, we think
the definition formulated by Mr. Bates in his late work ou
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that subject is as accurate and satisfactory as any we have
seen. This definition seems to be preferred by the learned
writer of the article entitled "Partnership" in such encyclo·
pedia. It is as follows: ''A partnership is the contract relation
subsisting between persons who have combined their property,
labor, and skill in an enterprise or business, as principals, for
the purpose of joint profit." 1 Bates, Partn. § 1. It is said by
Mr. Lindley that " 'partnership,' although often called a 'contract,' is in truth the result of a contract; the relations which
subsist between persons who have agreed to share the profits
of some business, rather than the agreement to share such
profits." 1 Lindl. Partn. p. 2. Hence it is not essential to thE'
existence of a partnership that it be so denominated in the contract of the parties; nor is it necessarily fatal thereto if the
parties declare in such contract that they do not intend to
become partners. The real inquiry always is, have the parties
by theh• contract combined their property, labor, or skill in an
enterprise or business, as principals, for the purpose of joint
profit? lf they have done so, they are partners in that business
or enterprise, no matter how earnestly they may protest they
are not, or how distant the forQlation of a partnership was
from their minds. The terms of their contract given, the law
steps in, and declares what their relat~ons are to · the enterprise or business and to each other.
The learned counsel for Stubbings contends that only the
agreement of April10, 1889, can be considered in determining
the question of partnership. This alone of the two agreements
above mentioned is set out and relied upon in the complaint
to establish a partnership between Stubbings and John O'Connor. While we think the same effect should be given to both
contracts, construed together, that should be given to the contract of April 10, 1889, excluding the other, we are willing to
adopt the view of counsel, and confine ourselves to giving conatruction to the latest contract. That instrument in form fixes
the amount of money loaned by Stubbings to John O'Conno1
at the sum of f14,611.50, and binds the latter to repay it iu
five years, with 10 per cent interest, payable annually. The
instrument recites that O'Connor is engaged in carrying on a
general merchandise business in Eagle River, and provides
that he shall pay Stubbings one-half of the net profits of such
businesa; that O'Connor shall keep correct account books of
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the business, which shall be open at all times to the inspection
of Stnbbings or his agent; and that during five years the stock
of goods in the business shall not be sold in bulk without the
consent of both parties thereto. It will be observed that this
agreement does not specify what O'Connor had done or should
do wit~ the $14,611.50, nor the consideration for the stipulation to give Stubbings one-half of the net profits of the business. Such share of the profits could not have been given as
additi~nal interest, because the agreement provided for paying him the highest legal rate of interest in this State, independently of the profits. Neither was it for services in the business, for Stubbings did not stipulate to perform services
therein. The conclusion is almost irresistible that it was
inserted to fix the proportionate share of Stubbings in the
business. It will also be observed that in the contract
Df April 10, Stubbings did not agree to make any further
loans or advances to O'Connor, neither does it contain
any provision that O'Connor should be responsible therefor
should any further advances be made. Stubbings made
further advances, however, for the benefit of the business, and it does not a·ppear that any time was fixed
for repayment thereof, or that he demanded any voucher
or security therefo~. It is not reasonable to believe
that he would thus have parted with his money if he was not
interested with O'Connor in the business, as a principal. More·
over, the letters of Stubbings in evidence show that the propo·
sition to start the business at Eagle River was first made by
him; that he purchased much stock for the store; that he
advised, if he did not dictate, of whom O'Connor should make
purchases, as well as prices and terms; that he arranged for
credits; and that he carefully watched and freely interfere(}
with all the details of the business, so far as he could obtain
knowledge of those details by persistent requests to the O'Connors to furnish him detailed information thereof. In short,
he exercised an influence in~ and assumed a control over, the
management of the business, (which was acquiesced in by the
O'Connors) entirely incompatible with the idea that he was
merely a creditor of O'Connor for the amount .o f his advances
and interest thereon, which can only be satisfactorily
accounted for on the theory that he was handling and directing
his own business. The foregoing considerations impel our
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minds to the conclusion that, under the contract of April 10,
Stubbings and John O'Connor combined their property, labor,
and skill in the Eagle River business as principals, and of
course they did so for their joint profit, for the contract gives
each one-half the net profits. 'fhis makes them partners in
the business, within the rule abo~e stated. The contract is
strikingly like that under consideration in Rosenfield vs. Haight,
53 Wis. 260, 40 Am. .Rep. 770, which this court held created
a partnership relation between the parties to it. The fact that
the business was conducted in the name of John O'Connor, and,
after his death, in the name of the administrator of his estate,
and the further fact that in Stubbings' letters to each of them
the business was usuaJJy referred to as "your business," ar~
not significant, for it appears that, for reasons satisfactory to
himself, Stubbings desired that his connection with the business should be kept secret. The finding that the business was
continued after the death of John O'Connor in the name of
his administrators, or one of them, with full knowledge and
permission of Stubbings, and was conducted in all respects
as before, without any notice to the contt•ary or ~djustment
of the partnership business, and that Stubbings continued to
make advances to carry it on, are fully sustained by the proof~.
It requires no argument to show that in such case the liability
of Stubbings as a partner is continued.
The findings of the court are criticised because they ignore
the note sued upon, and go upon the open account of plaintiff
alone. The note was given for a part of such account, but it
is not a payment thereof. The note was brought into court,
and the defendants are not prejudiced because the findings and
judgment rest upon the original account rather than upon the
note. A computation shows that no interest was allowed on
the account; hence the judgment is more favorable to defend·
ants than it would have been had it been upon the note. Tha
judgment of the circuit court must be affir~ed.
Nan: See also oases citeJ, Mechem's Elem. of Partn., §§ 48, 50, notes.
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MAGOVERN vs. ROBERTSON.
Court of Appeals of New York, 1889.
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116 N. Y. 61, 22 N. E. Rep. 398, l:i L. R. A. 589.

This is an action for goods sold and d~livered, brought by
John P. Magovern and others against Monroe Mattison and
others. On the report of a referee, judgment was entered dis·
missing the complaint on the merits, which judgment was
affirmed by the general term. The plaintiffs appeal. The
facts are as follows: On April 30, 18S1, the defendants entered
into the following contract: "Memoranda. of an agreement
made and entered into this 38th day of April, 1881, by and
between Evolin B. U.obt>rtson, of the village of Mayville, Chan·
tauqua county, N.Y., of the first part, and M. Mattison, W. B.
Martin, C. H. Johnson, Oren Stoddard, James Moon, W. Holt,
A. C. Packard, R. D. Bush, H. D. Stoddard, W. Northrop, Jr.,
D. H. Matthews, ,John :Northrop, A. M. Rinehart, Jackson &
Hollenbeck, W. II. White, A. W. Smith: Mark Jones, J. H.
Wood, J.
Broadhead, of the town of Busti, said county,
of the second part, witnesseth, that for and in consideration
of the covenants hereinafter expressed the said party of the
first part hereby covenants and agrees to and with the said
parties of the second part to put a stock of dry goods, gr{)ceries,
bats, caps, boots and shoes, etc., in what is known as the 'John
R. Robertson Store Building,' situated in Busti village, said
stook to be at least of the value of three thousand dollars, to
be replenished from time to time as it runs below that amount;
the said party of the first part to procure the services of John
R. Robertson to manage said store, and devote his time thereto,
to the interests of the business. The parties of the second
part agree to indorse the paper of the said party of the firJ:Jt
part to the amount of $2,000, which sum is to go into the busi·
ness, and the said parties of the second part are to ba ve an
interest at all times in the goods in said store to the amount of
their indorsement; subject, however, to no liability except such
indorsement. At the end of one year the party of the first part
is to cause an invoice of the goods on hand to be taken in the
presence, if so. required, of two of the parties of the second

,V.

'·
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part; and the net profits of said business, including all commissions recei\"ed for buying hides, butter, cheese, wool, and ·
other produce, received by said manager, and after deducting
insurance on goods, fuel, lights, additional clerk hire, freights,
and other necessary expenses of the busineBS, to be divided
as follows: Two-thirds of said net profits to belong to the party
of the first part, in consideration of her capital and management of said business through said J. R. Robertson, and the
use of said store building; and the other one-third of said net
profits arc to be paid to the said parties of the second part
pro rata, in consideration of their said indorsement and their
general interest in the business. It is further stipulated by
and between the said parties that at any time previous to th0
expiration of said year, when a majority of the parties of the
second part shall make a request in writing to that effect, the
party of the first part shall cause an invoice of the stock of
goods on hand to be taken in the presence of two of the parties
of the second part; and if it be ascertained that the business
is sustaining any considerable loss, and the said parties of the
second part so demand, the party of the first part shall turn
over sufficient amount of said goods to secure said parties of
the second part against any liability on account of said
indorsement, or relieve said parties of the second part from
said indorsement, by causing said indorsed paper to be canceled. And it is further ~greed by and between the parties
that if, at the end of one year, it be ascertained that there
bas been a profit in said business, and the party of the
first part so require, the provisions of this agreement
shall extend another year; but if the party of the
first part desires to continue said business without the aid of
said indorsement, then this contract from and after that date
becomes abrogated. Said parties to this contract are to do
what they reasonably can to make said business a success. In
witness whereof we have hereunto set our hands and seals
this 29th day of April, 1881." Pursuant to this contract, on
the 7th day of May, 1881, Evolin B. Uobertson made her promissory note for ,2,000, payable to the order of J. R. Robertson
at the First National Bank of Jamestown, which was indorsed
by all of the defendants except David H. Matthews. This note
was discounted by said bank, and the avails thereof credited to
the "Bosti Union Store." The note was twice renewed, thu
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renewals being indorsed by most of the defendants. Between
· May 7, 1881, and December 16, 1881, the business establiahed
by the contract was carried on under the name of the "Busti
Union Store," at the place and under the management as stipulated in the contract. From time to time, goods were purchased with the avails of the discounts, and upon credit. During this time, the plo.intift's, who were merchants doing business in the city of New York, sold upon credit and delivered to
the Bustl Union Store goods of the value and at the agreed
price of ,1,217.62, to recover which this action was brought
against the signers of the contract.
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WiUiam H. Henderson, for appellants.
A. 0. Pickard, for respondents.

FoLLETT, C. J . (after stating the facts.) Persons having a
proprietary interest in a business and in its profits are liable,
as partners, to creditors. Jfanufacturing Co. vs Sears, 45 N. Y.
797; Leggett vB. Hyde, 58 N. Y. 272, 278; Mason VB. Partridge, 4
Hun., 621, affirmed, 66 N. Y. 633; Burn.ett vs. Snyder, 81 N. Y.
650l555; Bank vs. Henne.ssy, 4S N.Y. 545; Bertlwldv. Goldsmith.,
24 How. 536, 641; Haas vs. Root, 16 Hun, 526, 26 Hun, 632;
Rosenfield vs. Haight, 5~ Wis. 260, 10 N. W . Rep. 378. It is
stipulated in the contract that the parties thereto should do
what they reasonably could to make the business a succesH;
that th.e defendants should have an·interest in the goods in the
store equal to the amount of their indorsement; and that at the
end of the year an inventory should be taken in the presence of
two of the defendants, the net profits ascertained, and onethird of them paid to the defendants, "in consideration of their
said indorsement and their general interest in the business."
Every one of the signers had a right to require that the assets
of the business should be applied in payment (1) of the debts of
th.e business; (2) of the sums contributed by each; (3) of the
sum due each for profits earned. An execution creditor of
Mrs. Robertson (the debt not having been contracted in the
business) could not, by a levy upon the goods, have acquired a
lien prior to the equitable lien of the defendants to have had
them applied in payment
the debts of the business, and of
the amount put into the business directly, or by way of their
indorsements. Such being the rights of the parties to the contract, they had a proprietary interest in the business and in ita

of
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profits, and are liable for the amount due the plaintiffs. The
cases holding that a person entitled to a share of the profits of
a business in payment for services rendered, or as a compensation for money advanced cannot be charged as a partner,
are not in point. The distinction between the rights and
liabilities of persons so situated, and the rights and liabilities of persons having a proprietary interest in the
assets and profits of a business, bas been clearly drawn
by the cases decided in the courts of this state. The
case at bar cannot be distinguished, in principle, from Mason
vs. Partridge, supra.

'l'he stipulation in the contract that the defendants should
not be liable beyond their indorsements limits their liability as
between them and Mrs. Robertson; but, under the findings, it
does not e.x empt the defendants f~om liability for the plain·
tiff's claim. It is quite apparent that the defendan.t s knew
that the business which they initiated was conducted under the
name of the "Busti Union Store," and not under the name and
on the credit of Mrs. Robertson. The judgment should be
reversed, and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event.
All concur, except BRADLEY and J;!AIGHT, JJ., not sitting.
Non: See also caaee cited in notes to Mechem'• Elem. of Partn., § 50.

BURNE'l'T vs. SNYDER.
Oourt of A.ppealsof New York, 1880.
81 N. Y. 550, 87 Am. Rep. 627.

This action was brought against Snyder as partner in the
firm of Strang, Platt & Co., to recover an indebtedness due
plaintiff from that firm. T.he principal question involved was
whether Snyder was liable as a partner.
Strang, Platt, Ryley, Sexton and Snyder being mutually desirous that Sexton and Snyder should be interested as partners
in a firm to be formed, to be called Strang, Platt & Co., and
thinking that it was desirable that Sexton and Snyder should
not be known as partners, agreed that articles of partnership
should be executed by Strang, Platt and Ryley in which they
alone were named as partners, Strang to have one-fifth, Platt
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two-fifths, and Ryley two-fifths, and that separate agreements
be entered into between Sexton and Platt and Snyder and
Ryley respectively, by which Sexton should have one-half of
Platt's intere:Jt and Snyder should have one-half of Ryley's
interest.
In 1864: Sexton's interest ceased and a new agreement was
entered into by Strang, Platt, Ryley and Snyder to continue
the business, Strang to have one-fourth, Platt one-fourth, and
Ryley one-half of the profits, and that Synder should have onehalf of Ryley's portion.
Ryley died in June, 18G7. Strang, Platt, Snyder and the
personal representatives of Ryley continued the business until
Dec. 31, 1869. A new firm was then formed consisting nominally of Strang and Platt, in which Snyder had an interest in
the shares of both. This firm was dissolved by the death of Platt
the following April, and a new firm under the old name was
then formed in which Snyder continued to have an interest of
the same character as before.
The plaintiff had judgment below~

William G. Wilson, for appellant.
A.aron Pennington Whitehead, for respondent.
ANDREWs, J. .The case of Burnett vs. Snyder, 76 N. Y. 344,
was an action brought to recover a debt owing by the firm of
Strang, Platt & Co., to the plaintiff, and Snyder was made a
defendant upon the allega~ion that he was a copartner with
the other defendants in that firm. In that case the plaintiff, to
sustain the averment that Snyder was a partner, relied upon a
written agreement, made December 31, 1869, between Snyder
and Peter 0. Strang and Ammon Platt, two of the members of
the firm of Strang, Platt & Co., executed concurrently with the
creation of the partnership, which recited that it was deemed
expedi~nt that Snyder should have an interest in and become a
copartner in the firm, and which contained a stipulation that
Snyder should be entitled to receive one-third of the profits
earned and received by Peter 0. Strang and Ammon Platt from
their interest in the firm of Strang, Platt & Co., and become
liable for and pay to them an amount equal to one-third of any
losses they, or either of them, might sustain by reason of their
connection as copartners, or otherwise with the firm of Strang,
Platt & Co. It was claimed on the part of the plaintiff that
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Snyder was a partner by the express terms of the agreement,
und also, that if as between himself and the other members of
the firm of Strang, Platt & Co., he was not a partner, he was
a partner to creditors by reason of a right under his agret~·
ment to a participation in the profits. The court decided
against the plaintiff upon both propositions, and held that
an agreement between one of several members of a firm and
a third per80n, that the latter should be a copartner in the
firm did not in law make him a copartner, and that an agree·
ment between one member of a firm and a third person that
the latter should be entitled to a share of the profits received
by the firm, and pay an equivalent share of his losses, was
not such a participation in the profits as to constitute the
person receiving such share a partner as to third persons, or
make him liable for the firm debts.
This action is one of a series of actions commenced by the
plaintiff against the successive firms of Strang, Platt & Co.,
which firm was first or6anized in 1863, a~d reorganized December 31, 1869, and again in May, 1870, to recover debts con·
tracted by the several firms to the plaintiff. The debt sought
to be recovered in this action was contracted by the original
firm, which remained as originally constituted unti.l the reorganization in December, 1869, except that Ryley, one of the
original partnets, died in 1867, and his interest was continued by his administrators. The case above referred to was
brought to recover the debt to the plaintiff contracted by the
firm of December, 1869.
The referee in this case found as a fact that the defendant
Snyder was a partner in the original firm of Strang, Platt &
Co. If this finding is not sustained by the evidence, it becomes
the duty of the court to reverse the judgment.
It is not claimed that the judgment can be sustained on
any theory of estoppel. Snyder did not hold himself out as a
partner. The plainti~, while the debt for. .which this action
ls brought was accruing, was a clerk in the employment of
tJtrang, Platt & Co., but he did not kn,ow, nor did he suppose
during this time that Snyder was a member of the firm, nor
was he informed that be was a partner until1874, several years
after the final dissolution of the firm. His ignorance, of course,
is immaterial, if in fact or law Snyder was a partner, but the
duty of establishing that relation, in the absence of any hold·
in&r out by Snyder that he was a partner, is upon the plaintiff

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 16:47 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112102486216
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

160

CASES ON PARTNERSHIP.

The original firm of Strang, Platt & Co. was constituted by
written articles of copartnership between Peter 0. Strang,
Ammon Platt and George Vv. Ryley. By this instrument
tht'se persons constituted the firm. Snyder was not a party
to it, and so far as the written agreement of copartnership
indicates, he was not a partner in the concern. The finding
that Snyder was a partner is based upon the fact, that con·
currently with the formation of the copartnership it was
arranged that Snyder should be jointly interested with Ryley
in his interest in the firm, that is to say, that Snyder should
be entitled to receive one-half of Ryley's profits, and should
be liable for one-half of his losses. This arrangement, so far
as appears, was not evidenced by any writing t'Xecuted by the
parti€'s. The draft of an agreement was prepared between
Ryley and Snyder, conforming to the terms of the oral arrangement, but was not produced, ·and it doe.s not appear to have
been signed. While the negotiation for fQrming the partnership was going on, Strang, Platt and Ryley expressed a desire
that Snyder should become interested in the proposed busineBs. The business contemplated was the wool brokerage and
commission business, and Snyder was a large dealer in wool
on his own account, and as purchasing agent for mills with
which he was connected. It was at first proposed to Snyder
that he should become a copartner in the firm. For prudential reasons, growing ouf.of his rela.t ions with third parties, Snyder declined the proposition to become a partner. His
refusal to become a partner had no connection with the queH·
tion of the liability which he would incur to creditors by
becoming a partner. It was then proposed that he should
take a share of Ryley's interest, and the arrangement was
'Concluded on that basis. ~'he evidence shows that the agree·
ment finally made, so far as Snyder was concerned, was au
agreement between him and Uyley;made with the knowledge
and concurrence of Strang and Platt, the other members vf
the ti.rm, and in this respect the case differs from the former
one. The business of the firm did not require the contribution
of capital and none was contributed by any of the partners.
Snyder aided the firm by purchases and consignments of wool,
but, so far as appears, took no part in the management of the
business. The question arises upon these facts, whether Sny·
der was a partner in the firm, or if not a partner as between
himself and the other persons interested, was lie such as to
creditors.
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In Grace VB. 8mit'h., 2 W. Bl. 998, and Waugh vB. Carver, 2 H.
Bl. 235, the ooctrine was declared, and was deemed to be set·
tied by these cases, that a participation in the profits of a
trade made one liable as a partner to third persons by opera·
tion of law, although he was not ostensibly a partner, and
alth.ough the partnership relation was excluded by the terms
of the agreement between him and his associates. This doc·
trine was followed in England, and was regarded as the true
test of partnership as to third persons until the case of Cox vs.
Hickman,S H. of L. Cas. 301, in which the doctrine was strongly
impugned if not wholly overthrown. It was held in that case
that partnership was a br~nch of the law of principal and
agent, and that persons who shared the profits of a business
do not incur the liabilit~P.s of partners unless the business is
carried on by them pet1!lonal1y, or by others as their real or
ostensible agents. The defendants in that case, who were
creditors of an insolvent firm carrying on business as the
Stanton Iron Works, bE'came pnrties to a deed of assignments
E-xecuted by them~ and by their debtors, whereby the latter
~onveyed their property to trustees in trust to carry on thE>
business theretofore cnrried on by the debtors in the name of
the Stanton Iron Company, with power to the trustees to enter
Jnto contracts relating to the business, and to divide the
net income among th~ creditors in ratable proportions, and
it was held that the creditors who executed the deed were
not partners in the business, and were not liable on bills
of exchange accepted by one of the trustees in the name
of the company for iron ore purchased and used by them
in the business.
But we have in this state adhered
to the general doctrine established by the earlier Eng·
lish cases, and although it proceeds upon reasons which
have not been considered entirely satisfactory, it was
applied by this court in the recent case of Leggett vs. Hyde,
58 N. Y. 272; s. c., 17 Am. Rep. 244. But the participation
in the profits of a trade which makes a person a partner ns
to third _persons is. a participation in the profits as such under
circumstances which give him a proprietary interest in the
profits before division as principal trader, E31 parte, Hamper,
17 Ves. 404; Story on P41rt., sec. 49; Pars. on Part. 74, and the
right to an account as partner, and a lien on the partnership
assets in preferE'nce to individual creditors of the partner.
Champion VB. Bostwick, 18 'Vend. 175, 3 Kent Com. 25; 1
Smith Lead. Cas. 984. It is not en•ry pnrti<'ipation in the
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profits which will make one a partner. Numerous exceptione
to the rule have heE"n established. See Vanderburgh vs. Hull, 20
Wend. 70; Burckle vs. Eckhart, S Comet. 132; Richardson t>s.
Hughitt, 76 N. Y. 55; a. o., 82 Am. Rep. 261. The contract of
aub-pa.rtnership, which Is a oontract between one ot two partDers and a third person bi whioh the latter Ia to share the
profits, or th(' profits ud Ioieea of the partner with whom the
contract is made, in the ilrm bullnea, does not constitute such
a participation in t~ profits aa will make the person con·
trarting with the partner, a partner in the firm, or liable for
the partner!1\hip debts. In EtD parte Barrow, 2 Rose 252, Lord
ELDO~ said: "I take it to have been long settled that a man
may become a pa.11:ner of A, when A and B are partners,
and yet not be a member of that partnership which existed
between A and B. In the case of Sir Charles Raymond, a
bank€'r in the city, a ~fr. Fletcher agreed with Sir Charles
nnymond that he should be interested so far as to receive a.
share of th<' profits of the business, and which share he had
a right to draw out of the firm of Raymond & Co. But it was
held that he was no partner in that partnership; had no
demand against it; had no account in it; and that he must be
satisfied with a share of the profits arising and given to Sir
Charles na~· mond." See, also, B1·ay vs. Fromont, G Madd. :>;
Killock vs. Grey, 4 Russ. 285; Frost vs. Moulton, 21 Beav. 596;
Coli. on Part., sec. 27 (6th ed).
It has been said that the English cases only show, that ns
between the members of the firm inter sese, the party contracting for the profits of one of the parties is not a partner, and
Mr. Lindley, refening to the subject, remarks, that before
the decision of the house of lords, in OotD vs. Hickman, a sub·
partner might, perhaps, have been liable to the creditors of the
principal firm, by reason of his participation in the profits.
Lindley on Part., 55. 'l'he doubt expressed by this author was
resolved in this court by our former decision.
Applying in this case, to the ostensible agreement made
between Snyder and Ryley, the test of partnership adopted
In Grace vs. Smith, as explained in the subsequent cases, Snyder did not become, by virtue of that agreement, a partner in
the firm of Strang, Platt & Co. He had no intere~t in tlw
profits of the firm as profits, but a right simply to demand
of Ryley that he should account to him for one-third of hi~
profits, accompanied with an obligation to pay one-third of
his losseA lie had no joint proprietorsl.ip with the memher~
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of the firm in the profits before division; was not entitled to
an account as partner, and had no lien on the partnership
ass~ts. Tested by the rule in Oo:r: vs. Hickman, Snyder's position is still stronger. Strang, Platt & Co. were not his agents
for carrying on the business of the firm, and he had no power
or right to interfere in its management.
It· is claimed . that whatever was the form of the arrangement, the intention was that Snyder should be interested as
a partner in the firm, and we are referred to the principlt~
that courts will look to the substance and not merely to the
form of a transaction to determine its real character. But
form may be substance. It is undisputed that Snyder refused
to become a partner in the firm. The substituted arrangement was one which the law permitted him to make without
involving him in the consequences, or subjecting him to thP
responsibilities which flow from a partnership. If the ost('usible agreement was not the real one, and the secret agr('l~
ment was that he was to be a partner, clothed with a partner's rights, he could not escape from the responsibilities of
that relation, by showing the ostensible contt·act. The law
would not countenance the evasion, or permit him, under
cover of the written agreement, to escape from liability as
a general partner. But there is no evidence to show, or from
which it can be inferred, that the ostensible agreement was not
the real one. It may very well be, that the objection which
would naturally exist on the part of the parties for whom Snyder was acting as purchasing agent, to his becoming a partner in a concern from which purchases might be made, would
apply to the arrangement actually made, but no question arises
here between Snyder and his principals. The motive which
induced Snyder, by indirection, to become interested in. tlw
busineFJs of Strang, Platt & Co., so long as the arrangement
made did not operate as a fraud upon the creditors of the firm,
is not a material circumstance.
The only point here is, whether the actual transaction made
Snyder, in law, a member of the firm or liable for its dt>bts.
We think it did not, and the judgment should be reversed and a
new trial granted.
Judgment reversed.
All concur.
NOT&: For other cases beariog upon sub-partnerships, see Mechem's
Elem. of Partn., § 30.

164:
JACOBS vs. SHOREY.
Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 1868.
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N. H. 100. 97 Am. Th!e. 586.

Action by Jacobs & Co. against Shorey and one ?tlatbes to
recover upon notes given by Shorey for goods bought of Ja~obs
who, at the time, supposed b,e was selling to Shorey alone.
It was claimed, however, that Shorey and Mathes were partners,
and that there was a fraudulent understanding between them
that the goods, when obtained, should be disposed of without
· paying for them. Mathes bad written to one TownBE'nd and
others a letter recommending Shorey to credit, and this letter
was claimed to be a part of the fraudulent design. There was
judgment below for plaintiffs.
Hatch, for plaintiff.
lVheeler, Frink & Hackett, for defendants.
NESMITH, J. To maintain this action it becomes necessary
for the plaintiffs to establish the fact that Mathes shared in
the profits of the sale of the goods from them to Shorey, or
that Mathes and Shorey were partners in that transaction,
upon the ground that where goods are obtained for the nse
of a firm by means of the fraud of one of its members, the
other partner, by receiving and participating in the use or
sale of the goods, will be held to have adopted the fraudulent
act of him who obtained them: and will be placed in the same
situation in reference to the rights of the vendors of the goods
as if be had directed ·his partner to procure the property, or
bad originally concurred with him in the transaction.
In this way pa.rtnersbips may grow out of transactions or
relations in which the word " partnership" bas not been
uttered. If there be such a joinder or union of interest and
action as the law considers as the equiyalent of partnership,
or as constituting it, it will give to the persons engng- :.-d in it
all the rights, and lay upon them all the responsibilities, anti
also give to third parties dealing with them all the remedies
which belong to a partnership: Parsons on Partnership, 9;
Hawkins vs. Appleby, 2 Sand. 421.
In general, conversations, assertions, or admissions, and
acts tending to show that parties ai'f> JHII'tners, and have that
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joint interest in the particular-business which makes- them
liable as partnel'B, will often have that effect, although such
evidence might be .quite insufficient to prove a partnership, RS
between themselves, when no third persons are interested in
the question : Pa.rsons on Part., 122.
Where there is d~ubt whether a party purchasing goods
bought them for himself alone or for the benefit of another
as partner, to prove the ·latter point evidence may be offered
of acts and declarations subsequent to the sale and delivery
of the property: Hillard on Sales, 8~.
So evidence as to the character of the goods purchased, the
ability or insolrency of the purchaser at the time, or whether
an inordinately large quantity of goods was purchased in pro·
portion to the party's apparent means of payment, or the
credit given, or whether forced sales are made at inadequate
prices, before the expiration of the credit given, or whether
there may have been any secret or fraudulent transfer of the
goods, are all open and legitimate subjects of inquiry, as bearing upon the sale, and tM probable intent of the parties there· .
to: State VB. J ohmon, 33 N. H. 457; Parsons on Part., 128.
· Upon. the question whether a purchase was fraudulently
made by a vendee in anticipation of his insolvency, evidence
tending to show that he fraudulently purchased other and
limilar goods about the same time, by means of similar false
pretenses, may be admitted, having the tendency to show the
fraudulent intent or conspiracy in the case under consideration. Acts and declarations showing a fraudulent purpose,
if connected in point of time, are admissible as throwing light
upon the general object of the party, though they do not ,-.. latt!
to the property or transaction in question: Hills vs. Hart, 1~
N. H. 605; Lee VB. Lamprey, 43 Id. 15; Blake v1. White, 13 Id.
267; Angier vs. Ash, 26 ld. 109.
In this case, the main question is, whether the acts of Shorey
were within the scope of a general design to share the profits
of the enterprise with Mathes, or whe.ther the goods were
obtained on his own credit, or for his own private use or purposes, and we think the jury might properly weigh the fact
whether the letter of credit to 'l'ownsend and others might
aot have been designed as means in obta.ining money from the
plainti1r in prosecution of their general fraudulent purposes.
The falae pretense alluded to in Lee va. Lamprey, supra, was
a letter acldreued by one of the partners to another, tendin~
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te show fraud and collusion between the parties.- Upon the
aforesaid legal principles, the facts stated in the case appear

to be suftlcient, with or without the letter, to show a fraudulent purpose in both Mathes and Shorey in procuring the goods
in question, so as to render them liable as partners: Bralley
.,,, Obcar, 10 N.H. 477; Allison t·s. Jlattlteto, 3 Johns. 235. The
letter in question may also be properly used as evidence before
fie jury as an act or deciaration of one member of a firm, an.d
properly within the scope of the partnership business, and t<>
chargP. the firm, whether honestly or dishonestly transacted
or aaid: Peirce vs. Wood, 23 N.H. 519; Webster vs. $tcan1s, 44
Id. 502. Such evidence may be received as one of a series of
acts, which, all together, indicate a fraudulent design to obtain
the goods without paying for them.
(Residue of opinion omitted.)
Plaintiffs took judgment for the amount of their first note.
NOIW See also Mechem's Elem. of Partn., § 204.

FLF;TCHER vs. PULLEN.
Court o(Appcals of Maryland, 188~.
'70 :M:d. 205, 16 Atl. Rep. 887, 14 Am. St. Rep. 833.

ApJX>al from circuit court, Dorchester county.
Argued before MILLER, RoBINSoN, IRVING, STONE, BRYAN and
McSHERRY, J.T.
8. T. Milbourne, for appellant.

Daniel M. Hen,ry, Jr., for appellee.

MILLER, J. The plaintiffs, who are nurserymen In Milford,.
Del., sued Bramble & 11'1etcber, as partners in the same bu~i
ness at Cambridge, in this state, for fruit trees sold and deli vered to them in the autumn of 1886. Bramble died before the·
trial, and Fletcher defended upon the ground that he was.not
a partner. The exceptions relate mainly to the admlssiuility
of evidence upon the question, not whether Fletcher & UrambJe were actually partners inter sese, but whether Fletche1·
bad held himself out, or had permitted himself to be held out,
as a partner, so as to become responsible to third p:uties. The
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law on this subject, well establislled by- authority, may be
stated thus: "The ground of liability of a person as partner
who is uot so in fact is tllat be bas held himself out to the
world as such, or bas permitted otllers to do so, and by reason thereof is estopped from denying that he is one as against
those who have in good faith dealt with the firm, or with him
as a member of it. But it must appear that the person dealing
with the firni believed, and had a reasonable right to believe,
that the party he seeks to hold as a partner was a member
of the firm, and that the credit was to some extent induced
by this belief. It must also appear that the holding out was
by the party sought to be charged, or by his autllority, or with
his knowledge or assent. This, where it is not the 9irect act
of the party, may be inferred from circumstances, such as
from advertisements, soop bills, signs, or cards, and from various other acts from which it is reasonable to infer that the
holding out was with his authority, knowledge, or assent; and
whether a defendant bas so held himself out, or permitted it
to be done, is in every case 8J question of fact, and not of law:"
Thomas vs. G-reen, 30 Md. 1; 1 LindI. Partn. 45; Thompson liS.
Bank, 111 U. S. 536, 537, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 689; 5 Wait, Act. &
Def. 113, 114. These general rules apply to the present case.
The evidence shows that there was, in or near Cambridge,
a fruit farm and nursery on about 15 acres of ll..,letche)js land,
which Bramble had occupied and managed from the year 1881
to 1887. The ·plaintiffs then proved that in October and
November, 1886, they received several lettel'J:J, postal cards,
telegrams, and circulars from Cambridge, signed, "Fletcher &
Bramble," representini them to be partners, and the envelopes·
In which the letters were enclosed were stamped with the same
firm name. These letters contained orders for fruit trees, and
the first of them gave a reference to a Mr. Van Horst, formerly
of .Milford, but then residing in Cambridge. The plaintiffs not
knowing the firm, nor by whom the letters were written, wrote
to Van Horst and otl.ters, inquiring aa to its credit and stand·
Jng, and in reply received information to the effect that
Fletcher was entirely responsible, but that Bramble was worth
Dothing. Upon this information, and rereiving no intimation
that Fletcher was not a · partner, they filled the orders and
delivered the trees, relying upon his credit. Each item of this
testimony was excepted to as it was offered, upon the ground
that thel!le letters, circulars, and envelopel!l were written and
gotten up by Bramble without Fletcher'~ knowledge or con~
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1ent. We think, however, they were all adiiiissible, not because
the acts and declarations of Bramble would bind Fletcher,
as of oourse they would not, unlell8 he was an actual partner,
but for the purpose of ahowing that the plaintiffs believed,
and had good reason to believe, that he was a partner, and
that th('y trusted the supposed tlrm upon the faith of his
reaponsibility. To prove thia wu an important link in the
plaintiffs' case, and evidence -tending to prove ft was, In oar·
opinion, admissible.
1.'he plaintiffs then proved that an advertisement signed.
"Fletcher & Bramble," calling attention to their nursery, otl'et•ing their trees for sale, and soliciting from the public continuance of confidence and orders, was published in two weekly
newspapers of Cambridge, where Fletcher lived, for three
months during the year 1884. In one of these papers there
was also a local notice of the advertisement. These were also
prepared, inserted, and paid for by Bramble, without Fletcber'slmowledge; but it was proved that during the time of theit·
publication he was a subscriber to both papers, and they W{·l'e
regularly sent him. There is also clear proof that be actually
knew of them while they were being published, and never
inserted in either of the papers any denial of the partnersltip.
From all this it was competent for a jury to. infer that he was
held out to the public by Bramble as a partner, with his knowledge and assent; and we are of opinion the plaintiffs were
·entitled to prove this, though they never saw the advertisements, and were not influenced by them ~n trusting the firm.
They had already proved they bad so trusted it in good fiith,
and upon good grounds, and we think they had the right to
resort to these antecedent advertisements, and to this proof,
for the purpose of showing that Fletcher bad been so held
out to the public with his knowledge and assent. It was evi
dence to go to the jury upon that subject, and, if uncou·
tradicted, would! have made him a partner, at least as to all
third parties who had trusted the firm in good faith upon that
supposition. Having knowledge of these advertisements, it
was his duty to deny the partnership, if he wished to escape
liability. But what was he to do, and bow much? We do not
l'ay he waa under a legal obligation to publish a repudiation
of the partnership in the same newspapers, or in any other,
though thfi would seem to be a very obvious and the moRt
efficient. 1uodt:l of proclaiming such denial, and the fact tbnt
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ile fail~ 10 to do wu a circumstance to go to the jury. But
we take it t~t the rule upon this 1ubject, stated by a very
eminent jurist, is reasonable and just: "I~ one is held out as
a partner, and he knows it, he is chargeable as one, unless
he does all that a reasonable and honest man should do, under
similar circumstances, to assert and manifest his refusal, and
thereby prevent innocent parties from being misled.'' Para.
Partn. *134. It follows that the court below waa right in
admitting all the evidence offered by the plaintiffs, and in
rejecting the defendant's first prayers. In regard to his second, third, and fourth prayers, all that need be said is that tht!
propositions they contain are all embraced in his fifth prayer.
which the court granted with a single modification, to whidt
we see no valid objection. .
We come now to the rulings excluding certain evident€'
offered by the defendant to show and sustain his denial an•l
repudiation of the partnership. His own testimony was to
the effect that Bramble was simply his tenant of the land for
the term of six years from 1881; that Bramble had a fruit tret•
nursery on the land, but he himself had nothing to do with it,
and never entered into a contract of partnership with Bramble, either written or verbal, in the nursery business, or any
other; that he never held himself out as such partner, and
never lent his name, or authorized the 118e of it by Bramble.
witb reference to this business, or any other, that he neve•·
knew of the letters, circulars, and envelopes written and used
by Bramble until they were produced in court at the trial; that
the advertisements and local notice were inserted without his
knowledge or consent, and he never knew anything abont
them until they appeared· in the papers; that be never put
himself to the trouble and expense of publishing in these
papers, or in any others, a contradiction of the advertisements.
but had, on all occasions, to town people and country peoph•,
when the subject was mentioned to him, and often when it
was not, denied the existence of any partnership, and repudi·
ated the advertisements as unauthorized by him. All this was
allowed to go in without objection, but it is to be observed
that he admits he knew of the advertisements which clearly
and publicly proclaimed the partnership, and never published
in any newspaper any denial of it. 'Ve have said he was under
no legal obligation to make publication, but that it was his
duty to do all that a reasonable ·and honest man should do,
under similar circumstances, to manifest his denial. '£his iA
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the important question in the case, and it was one solely for
the jury to determine. On this issue of fact be was entitled to
adduce all the evidence be oould, leaving it for the jury to
decide whether, upon the whole of it, they thought _he had done
all that a reasonabl~ and honest man ought to have done.
Under this rule, he was entitled to the benefit of any evidence
in corroboration of his own testimony which tended to prove
the publicity of his denial. Now, in addition to his own general evidence on this subject, be offered to prove, (1) by the
editor of one of the papers in which the advertisement and
notice appeared, that, when the witness called upon him to
pay for the same, he refused to do 80, repudiated all partnership with Bramble, declared he had nothing to do with Bramble's business, and would have nothing to do with his bills.
(2) By the postmaster of Cambridge, that soon after the publication of the advertisements witness delivered to Fletcher
certain man matter addressed to "Fletcher & Bramble," but
be returned lt unopened, and refused to accept the same,-telling witness be had nothing to do with Brambl~s business,
and was no partner of his. (3) That in July, 1885, he and Bram·
ble were sued as partners by the steamboat company before
a magistrate in Cambridge, on a bill for freight ; that there ·
was a crowd at the trial, and he resisted the suit, and refused
to pay the account, on the ground that he bad nothing to do
with Bramble's bl!siness; that the magistrate gave judgment
in his favor, and the case was much discussed in the com·
munfty, especially by the steamboat agent, who made great
complaint because the magistrate had decided i~ his favor.
In our opinion, these items of evidence should have be!'n
admitted. It is not for this court to pass upon their weight
or effect, no matter how slight or inadequate, as a denial of
the partnership publicly proclaimed in the newspapers, w<~
may deem them to be. This is a matter solely for the jury.
Our duty ia simply to determine the question of their admislibility as evidence, and we think the court erred in rejecting·
them. We are also of the opinion that the agreement, or
"lease," as it fa oalled, between Fletcher and Bramble, for tht•
land upon which the nursery was carried on; should have be<>n
admitted. It was part of the defendant's case, to prove that
be was not an actual partner with Bramble. This agreement
was admissible for that purpose, if he could show that by its .
true construction it merely created the relation of landlord
and tenant between them. The error in rejecting the items
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of evidence refetred to requires us to reverse the judgment,
and award a new trial. But in view of the fact that the oourt
below acting as a jury found for the plaintitf, notwithstandIng they had granted the defendant's fifth prayer, In whioh
all his own testimony in denial of the partnership waa
expressly submitted to the consideration of the judges; we
think each party should be required to pay his own costs,
both in this court and in the court below.
Judgment reversed, each party to pay his own costs in this
court and in the court below, and new trial awarded.
NOTJ:: See also Mechem's Elem. or Partn., §§ 70, 71, 72, and cases ther&
oited. Compare also with tire fol~owing case.

•

MORGAN vs. FARREL.
Supreme Ootwt of Connecticut, 1890.
158 Conn. 413, 18 Am. St. Rep. 282, 20 Atl. Rep. 614.

Action on two promissory notes. The opinion states the
facts.
0. S. Hamilton, for appellant.
J. W. Alling and W. H. Williams, for appellee.

ANDREws, C. J. On the 1st day of March, 1880, William M.
Babbott made and delivered to the firm of Morgan & Herrick,
merchants, then doing busineBS in New York, a note for the
sum of $1,004.56, expressed to be for value received, and payable in 30 days; and on the 8th day of the same month anothet•
note for the sum of $2,205.60, payable .i n 30 days at the Ansonia
. National Bank, Ansonia., Conn. These notes were signed by
Babbott in the name of "Franklin Farrel & Company," and
were delivered to Morgan & Herrick in p~yment for certain
goods sold and delivered by them to Babbott on his order ther<.>·
for. The plaintiff is now the owner of the notes, and brings
this suit to recover their amount. The complaint alleges that
at the time the notes bear date Franklin Farrel and the sai(l
iWllllam M. Babbott were partners in business under the firm
name of Franklin Farrel & Co. Farrel alone makes defense.
No service of the complaint was made on Babbott. The answer
Is a general denial. Upon the trial evidence was offered from
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which the plaintitf claimed oo have proved that Farrel and
Babbott were partners as between themselves, or at least that
they were partners as to all third persons, or that Farrel was
liable ICs a partner to Morgan & Herrick, for the reason that
he had permitted Babbott to hold out that Farrel and himself
were partners under such circumstances that he was estopped
to deny that he was a partner. Farrel denied that he was a
partner in either way. The superior court rendered judgment
for the defendant, and the plaintiff has appealed.
An exhaustive definition of partnership is not easy. So far
. as the facts in the case present the question of partnership,
it Is sufficiently accurate to say that there Is a partnership
between two or more persons whenever such a relation exist!i ·
between them that each is as to all the others, in respect to
some business, both principal and agent. If such a relation
exists, they are partners; otherwise not. They are partners in
that business in respect to which there is this relation, anu
as to any other business they are not partners. Partnership
is but a name for this reciprocal relation. Story, Partn. § 1;
Lord WENSLEYDALE in Cox vs. Hickman, 8 H. L. Cas. 311;
ante; Bullenvs. Sharp, L. R. 1 C. P. 86; Holme.vs. Hammond
L. R. 7 Exch. 230; Harvey vs. Childs, 28 Ohio St. 319; ante;
Eastman vs. Clark, 53 N. H. 276; 16 Am. Rep. 192;
ColJy. Partn. §§ 139, 412; Stillman VB. Harvey, 47 Conn. 26.
Between the parties themselves this relation of principal anti
agent cannot exist, except by their voluntary agreement.
Hazard VB. Hazard, 1 Story 371; Colly. Partn. § 2. In the present case, the finding is as explicit as language can make it that
Farrel and Babbott did not intend to become partners. It
says: "No paper was e~er signed by or between Farrel anu
Babbott alone. No conversation ever took place in which ·it
was stated in words that Farrel and Babbott were partnerA,
or were to form a partnership. No firm name was ever mentioned. No suggestion that either had used, or could use, the
name or the credit of the other. Neither ever understood,
intended, or thought that a partnership existed, or should
exist." 'And, in addition to this, there is the express declaration of Babbott to his counsel-apparently after Farrel had
written to him that he, Farrel, had stopped all work ~n thP.
machine-that he did not believe there was any partnership
between them. This part of the case is not pressed, and we
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need not punue it. A partnership as to third persons sometimes arises by operation of law even against the intention of the
parties;and this happens either because the contract which the
parties have entered into in law makes each the principal and
agent of the other, or because by a. course of dealing they have
shown that snob was the real relation between them. Such
were the cases of Parker "'· Canfield, 87 Conn. 250, 9 Am. Rep.
817; and Bank VI. Hine, 49 Conn. 236. It is laid down in Ever·
itt vs. Chapman, 6 Conn. 347, that, where the terms of the agret-·
ment and the facts are all admitted, whether or not a partner·
shjp existed is a question of law for the court to decide. The
plaintiff claims that from the facts found by the superior court
. it does appear that Farrel and Babbott were partners
quood third persons, notwithstanding their intent not to be
partners. The facts from which the partnership is claimed
to arise are mainly the exhibits!, 2, and 3; and of these exhibit
2 is the only one important All the other facts det•ive tht:it·
signitlcanct> solely from the construction that is to be put on
this exhibit.
Exhibit 2 purports to be no more than an·agreement between
the Cook Ice&: Refrigerating Company, party of the first part,
and Franklin Farrel and William M. Babbott, party of the
second part, by which the party of the first part, being the
owner of patents therefor, grants to the party of the second
part the exclusive right to manufacture and sell refrigerating
machines and apparatus for refrigerating, as described in the .
patents, throughout the United States for the full term for
which the patents were granted. And, in consideration of
that grant, the party of the second part undertakes and agrees,
with all diligence and dispatch, and without expense or charge
to the party of the first part, to ~anufacture a refrigerating
machine under the patents, and for the purpose of aiding and
benefiting the business intended in the agreement, to run the
machine for at least two months subsequent to its completion.
The party of the second part also agrees to use its best endeavon to create a public demand for the machin.es, and to man'l·
facture machines to supply any bona fi<k order therefor ; and
agrees to pay to the party of the first part an amount ~qunl
to one-halt of the gross profits accruing therefrom. There are
other provisiops in the agreement, but all having reference
to the duties and obligations of the parties thereto. Thnt ~ n c h
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a contract as this does not make the partie&:-that is, the party
of the first part and the party of the second part-partners,
is, settled by abundant authority. It only provides a way in
which the party doing the work is to be paid for its' services.
Chase vs. Bm·rett, 4 Paige 148. The only relation of Farrel and
Babbott that appears by this agreement Ia that of joint contractors to manufacture refrigerating machines for the Cook
Company. ' There is no suggestion in it that either is, or 18 to
be, the agent of the other. It does not attempt to provide in
what way Farrel and Babbott, u between themselves, are to
carry out their joint undertaking. A- community of interest
does not make a partnership. Loomis VB. Martha.U, 12 Conn.
77; 30 Am. Dec. 596; Porter VB. McOl-ure, 15 Wend. 187. Thus
tenants in common of land are not partners. Calvert .vs. Ald·
1·ich, 99 Mass. 7 4; 9.6 Am. Dec. 693. In Oliver vB. Gray, 4 Ark.
425, it was holden that two persons, joint owners of a horse,
were not partners in respect to a contract for its keeping.
French vs. Styring, 2 0. B. (N. S.) 857, was a case where two
men owned a race horse, which they entered in a race and
won a prize. It was held that they were not partners as to
that money. In Hawkint vs. Mcintyre, 45 Vt. 496, the defendant contracted to finish off a church for the sum of ,4,500.
Afterwards he agreed with the plaintiff that they should work
together in doing the job, each working himself, the work of
each to offset that of the other, and the expense of materials
and of other work to be deducted from the amount, and the
balance to be divided between them. It was held that they
were not partners. In the case above cited (Loomis vs. Mart1ulll, 12 Conn. 77), B was the owner of a satinet faetorj. A
agreed with B to furnish all the wool that should be needed at
the factory for two years, which B agreed to manufacture into
cloth, the net proceeds of the cloth, after deducting the incidental charges of sale, to be divided, so that A should have 55
per cent and B 45 per cent. It was held that there was not
a partnership as to third persons. It probably could be inferred that Farrel and Babbott were to divide between them selves whatever was left, if anything, after paying the Cook
Company. But a partnership, even as to third persons, is not
o&nstituted by the mere fact that two or more persons participate or are interested in the net proceeds of a bu~inE'ss . 1
Lindl. Partn. 24; Holme vs. Hammond, L. R. 7 Exch. 2~0; T,oom is
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vs. MarshaU, supra; Ee parle Tennant, 6 Ch. Div. 303; Bullen
vs. Sha1·p, L. R. 1 C. P . 86.

Mr. Farrel was a manufacturer of machinery, of long and
wide experience. He was at the head of a company in Ansonia, in this state, engaged in Ill.lanufacturing machinery, and
employing four or five hundred hands. Work on a refrigerating machine was begun promptly at the factory in Ansonia
under the supervision of Mr. Cook, the patentee, and with the
aid of one David Smith and of one Greene, but with no success.
"The machines broke down, and proved so faulty and imperfect
in their nature, and the businel!ls in all respects so unsatisfactory, as not to justify or warrant proceeding. Not a dollar's
return in any form was ever received from the business or
venture." In the language of the finding, it was "only failure
after failure." On September 22, 1879, Farrel wrote Babbott
that he had stopped all work on the machiiie until be could see
him. Work did stop at Ansonia at that time, and was never
resumed. About November 1, 1879, the Cook Company gave
Farrel notice to annul the contract with them, as by its terms
they bad a right to do, which notice Farrel at once communicated to Babbott. Prior to the stopping of the work on the
machines, no act had been done by Babbott or by Farrel in
which either had assumed to act for or to bind the other.
F...verything they had done in carrying out their contract with
the Cook Company had been done by them jointly. There
was no writing, and there was no course of conduct prior to
that time from which any one could be led to believe that these
three men were partners. It was subsequent to this time that
Babbott commenced and continued in New York the seri('S
of acts from which the plaintiff claims "that the ~urt erred
in not holding, ruling, and deciding that the defendant Farrel
was a partner with the said Babbott as to and against third
pm·ties, especially as to and against the plaintiff." A person
who holds himself out as a partner, or pern;tits others to do
so, is liable as such to third persons, who have given credit
to the firm upon the faith of his connection with it, or who
knew of such holding out. The liability in such cases is pred·
icated upon the doctrine o.f estoppel, and, in order to charge
a person on that ground, it is not enough to show that be was
represented by others to be a partner, or that his name
appeared in the firm; it must be shown that he knew thnt he
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was being Mid out aa a partner, and that he assented thereto,
or facts from which assent can be fairly implied. McBride V8.
IJUtUr~ Co., 22 Conn. 259; Buckingham vs. Burgess, 3 McLean,
864. It is always a question of fact whether or not there bali
been such a holding out aa to eatop a party from denying the
partnership. Wood N. Duke of Argyll, 6 Man. & G. 928; Lak~
N. Same, 6 Q. B. '77. And so the decision of the superior court
11 conclusive, unless tMre is some error in ita proceedings.
Upon an examination of this part of the case, we are satisfied
that the result to which the court came was fully required by
the facts. In May, 1879, while the parties were at work at
Ansonia endeavoling to construct a refrigerating machine,
and also were seeking to find or to create a demand for the
machines when they should be ready, one F. L. Babbott, a
brother of W. M. Babbott, ~lied on a Mr. Blackwell, of Black·
well & Co., warehousemen in Clarkson street, New York, with
reference to furnishing them with a machine, and on the 29th
day of July following, \V. M. Babbott entered into an arrangement with Blackwell & Co., as shown by exhibit 4. It was
explained to Blackwell that the machine was to be built by
Franklin Farrel, of the Farrel Foundry Company at Ansonia,
Oonn. At that time there was no machine or apparatus in
condition to be set up, and, as none was ever completed, nothing was done under that arrangement. "The first knowledge
that Mr. Farrel had that any use was being made of his name
or credit in any form was about January 1, 1880, when a three
months' note, dated October 22, 1879, signed 'Franklin Farrel
& Co.,' payable at Ansonia National Bank, was brought to his
attention a few days before it fell due by the ·cashier, who
asked him what he knew about it. Up to that time he had
never learned that there was.any claim to a partnership with
him made by Babbott. He knew nothing of Blackwell except
as above stated; never saw him until long after; was ne,·er
at Clarkson street, and had no knowledge of any business done
there. He had no knowledge of any transaction with )!organ
& Herrick, and had never heard of that firm until the notes
In suit matured, and were demanded and protested. He did
not know that Smith was in New York, and could not find or
meet Babbott there." Such is the finding. and it is added tlwt
he knew nothing of the Delamater Iron Works, or that Babbott had any dealings with it. It appears, then, that the only
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fact which the defendant knew was that some one had wrongfully used his name on that note. It d<>es not appear that at
the time he knew that Babbott was the man. Inferentially
it would seem that he did not know, for it is stated·that he
could not find Babbott in the city. But without pausing to
remark on the dearth of knowledge the defendant had of Babbott's doings, we pass to another feature in thls part of the
case.
A party setting up an estoppel by conduct is bound to the
exercise of good faith and due diligence to know the truth.
Bigelow, Estop. 480; Moore t'8. Bowman, 47 N. H. 499; Odlia
ti8. Gove, 41 N. H. 465. When Babbott began his operations
with Morgan & Herrick he showed them a copy of the contract
with the Cook Company, and also a letter from Farrel, in
which occurred the words, "1 have concluded to go on with
th.e business," accompanied with statements that he arid Farrel were partners. They were told that the goods were to be
used in the manufacture of a refrigerating machine by' Franklin Farrel & Co., at Clarkson street, New York city. They
seem not to have been satisfied with the terms of that con:
tract, nor with the statements that were made to them; f(lr
they made inqui~ies of the Delamater Iron Works, of which
Farrel knew nothing, and of the mercantile agencies of Dun,
Barlow & Co., and of Bradstreet & Co. From these agencies
they were able t<> _learn nothing as to any firm of FrankliiJ
Farrel & Co., who composed it, or as to its responsibility, or
that there was any such firm at all. If Babbott and Farrel
had been partners, by virtue of the contract with the Cool{
Company, they had been such since the 22d day of March, 187V.
The absence of the name of any such firm from these mercantile agencies was a most significant circumstance. These
agencies made known to .Morgan & Herrick all about Frankliu
Farrel and . his responsibility. These agencies could tell,
and presumably did tell, where Farrel lived, and in what
business he was engaged; that he was a man of large means,
a large manufacturer of machinery, having a large factory
and employing many bands in that kind of w·ork. From this
· information, Morgan & Herrick would know that the manufacture of a refrigerating machine would be in the exact lin<'
of work Farrel was doing at his own factory in Ansonia, Conn.
That such a man, having such facilities, was represented to
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be carrying on the manufacture of a refrigerating machine
in a warehous~ in Clarkson street, in the city of New York,
and that he was doing it on credit, would be certain to excite
inquiry in the mind of any prudent man. Why did not Mor·
gan & Herrick inquire further? Mr. Ji'arrel was a manufac·
turer in Connecticut, n~t in the city of New York. In a manu·
factoring partnership, the place where it was to be carried
on would be likely to be a controlling feature. For such work
. there must be machinery to use, and power to run it, and men
to operate it. All these Mr. Farrel had in Connecticut, and
none of them in New York. The court had judicial knowledge
that Ansonia was easily accessible from New York city by
railway; that there was frequent communication by mail, or
that the telegraph might have been used, and a reply obtained
in half an hour and at trifling expense. 1 Whart. Ev~ § 339.
When so many circum~tances called for inquiry, and with all
these means by which inquiries could have been satisfied, and
when none of them were used, we cannot hold that the plaintiff's assignors exercised· good faith or due diligence to know
the truth.
On the trial the plaintiff introduced a large number of letters and postal cards which had passed between Farrel and
Babbott, for the purpose of showing ~hat tney were partners
in the refrigerating business. The defendant claimed that
these letters, or some of them, had reference to other matters
and not to the refrigerating business, and to show this offered
other letters and postals that had passed between them. To
these the plaintiff objected; but the court admitted them solely
for the purpose named. That letters which had passed between
these men might tend to show that they were partners in any
business is very obvious, and that other letters on the same or
a kindred subject might modify or contradict the first ones is

equally obvious. The real relation between the parties oould
best be shown by the whole correspondence, not by part of it.
ThE're is no error in the judgment appealed from.
The other judges concurred.
NOTE: See aleo Meohem•a Elem. of Partn., §§ 35, 50, 70, 71, 72.
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HAHLO vs. MAYER, et al.

Supreme Court of .Missouri, 1890.
102 Mo. 98, 18 S. W. R. 804.

Appeal from St. Louis circuit court; George W. Lubke,
Judge. ·

.
Albert Arnstein, for respondent.
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Hugo Muench and Frederick A. Kline, for appellant.

BRACE, J. This is an action against Abraham B. Mayer
and Frederick Mayer, as partners under the firm name of A.
B. Mayer & Sun, on two negotiable promissory notes, -one for
$1,500, dated September 4, 1884, the other for $1,000, dated
September 6, 1884,--each payable to J. R. Wallach & Bro. six
months after date, and signed "A. B. Mayer & Son." ~bra
ham B. Mayer answered under oath, denying the execution of
the notes and the alleged partnership. Frederick answered,
admitting that he executed the notes, avers that they were
ex~cuted by him without consideration, for the accommodation
of the said J . R . Wallach & Bro., and without the knowledge
of his co-defendant, the said Abraham, and denies the alleged
partnership between him and the said Abraham. There was
a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for the amount of the
notes, interest, damages, and costs, against both defendants,
and they appeal.
The evidence tended to prove that the notes were executed
by Frederick Mayer, without any consideration, for the accom·
modation of the payees, J. R. Wallach & Co., and by them
negotiated, and that the plaintiff acquired them for value before
maturity, and that they were so executed and negotiated without the knowledge of the said Abraham. · Tho main question
in the case was, were the said defendants, at the time the notes
were executed, partners? and, if not partners in fact, did the
said Abraham so hold out the said Frederick as his partner as
that he is estopped from denying that he was a partner, in an
action upon the negotiable promissory notes executed by the
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said Frederick in said firm name, brought by the holder the~f,
who acquired the same for value before maturity ? Upon the
second proposition the court gave tlie following instructions,
(we quote only so much of them as bears upon the proposition: )
"(2) The court instructs the jury that, if they find from the
evidence that at the time the notes in controversy were executed,
and were received by plaintiff, the business of A. B. Mayer
was conducted under the name of A. B. Mayer & Son, and
that said A. B. Mayer knew such to be the fact and acquiesced
tqerein, then said A. B. Mayer is liable on the notes in suit
even though the jury finds that there was in fact n0 actual
partnership then existing between said A. B. Mayer and hit:~ son
Frederick.
·
(3) The court instructs the jury that the presumption of law
is that a party to whom a negotiable note is transferred takes
it upon the faith of the persons whose names appeax: upon it as
makers. Therefore, if the jury find from the evidence that A.
B. Mayer knew that his son, Frederick, was using the mune of
the firm of A. B. Mayer & Son in the business of said A. B.
Mayer, and said .A.. B. Mayer acquiesced therein, then plaiptiff
had a right to rely on the signature on said notes as being the
signature of A. B. Mayer and of his son, Frederick; and the
jury will find against both defendants, even though they find
that the defendant Frederick ·bad no express authority to sign
the name of ' A. B. MAYER & SoN' to the notes."
The name that appeared upon the face of the notes sued upon,
as maker, was "A. B. Mayer & Son." The plaintiff took the
note upon the faith of that firm. He has a right to look for
payment of his note to every individual who was. a member of
that firm at the time the note was executed. He bas the further
right to look for payment to every individual who, when he
acquired the notes, was holding himself out to him as a member of that firm, whether he was in fact a member of that firm
or not. If the instructions had been confined within these limitations, they would have been unobjectionable; but they go
further, and declare that the defendant Abraham B. )layer is
liable as a member of the firm of A. B. Mayer & Sou, although
in point of fact he was not a member of such concern, if, at the
time of the execution of the notes sued on, he WM holding himself out to the world as a mtmber of the firm of A. B. Mayer &
Son, whether the plaintiff knew of t:~uch holding out to the pub-
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lie or not. · While this proposition may be said to have had the
sanction of respectable authority, ( Young vs. Axtell, cited in
W.augh vs. Carver, 2 H. Bl. 242; Poillon v.~. Secor, 61 N.Y.
456; Smith vs. Hill, 45 Vt. 90; Rizer vs. James, 26 Kan. 221,)
it ha&. not been able to stand the test of critical judicial inquiry.
which has in vain sought for a principle upon which it could
stand. The great weight of modern authority is against it. .
The only conceivable ground upon which one can be charged
as a partner by one who contracts for him, and in his name, aR
a partner, without his authority, and when in fact he waa not
a partner, is upon· the ground of estoppel. The supreme court
of the United States in Thompson vs. Bank, 111 U. S. 529, 4
Sup. Ct. Rep. 689, considered this question very fully, and,
after a thorough 1·eview of the authorities, held that a person
not in fact a partner could not be made liable to third persons
on the ground of having been held ou.t as a partner, except upon
the principle of equitable estoppel, and approved the following ·
summing up of the law on this subject by Mr. JUstice Lindlsy
P,is treatise on the Law of Partnership:
"That no person can be fixed with liability . on the ground
that he has been held out as a partner unless two things concur,
viz. : First, the alleged act must have been done by him or by
his consent; and, secondly, it must have been known to the
person seeking to avail himself of it. In 'the absence of the
first of these requisites, whatever may have been done cannot
be imputed to the person sought to be made liable; and, in the
absence of the second, the person seeking to make him liable
has not in any way been misled., 1 Lindl. Partn. (2d Amer.
Ed.) 43. The court cites many authorities which on examination will be found to sustain this position, to which others might
be added if it were necessary. The doctrine thus announced
has been expressly recognized and approved in this state in the
cases of Rimel vs. Hayes, 83 Mo. 200, and in Hannah vs.
Baylor, 27 Mo. App. 302, while the earlier case of Dowzelot
vs. Rawlings, 58 Mo. 75, may be said to rest on the same principle. It is maintained by all the recent text-writers on the
subject.
In a work just published, reviewing many, and citing nearly
all, the leading English and American cases on the S!lbject, it
is said liability by holding out "proceeds solely on the ground
of estoppel," and "a person being liable as a partner, by hold-
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ing out on the ground of estoppel solely, is therefore not liable
to one who did not know of such holding out at the time of contracting. The holding out must antedate the contract; and the
plaintiff's knowledge of, and reliance on, his alleged connection,
must be proved as of that time, for otherwise the plaintiff was
not misled." 1 Bates, Partn. c. 5, § 90 et seq. The same doctrine is asserted by another author, whose valuable work has
just come to hand, (J. Pars. Partn. 1889, c. 3, § 69,) the correctness of whose position is recognized by Mr, Bigelow, in the
last edition of his work on Estoppel, (5th. Ed.) 565, note 1.
He who holds another out to be his partner, holds himself
out as a partner of such other person. There was evidence
tending to prove that at St. Louis, where the defendant A. B.
Mayer was engaged in business for some months previous to
the execution and negotiation of these notes, he had been holding out to the public that his son, Frederick, was a partner of
· his, under the firm name of A. B. Mayer & Son. The notes
were negotiated in the city of New York, where the payee,
Wallach & Co., for whose accommodation the son executed
them, was doing business, and where .the plaintiff acquired
them. There was no evidence tending to prove that the plaintiff had any knowledge of any act of the defendant Abraham
Mayer relied upon to show that he was holding out his son as a
partner. The facts of the case presented simply a holding out
to the public as a partner; and the court, as a matter of Jaw,
declared in the instructions quoted that such holding out to the
public was sufficient to render the defendant Abraham Mayer
liable, although he was not a partner of his son, and the plaintiff may not have known, or had any reason to believe, that he
had ever held out his son to be his partner. In this the court
committed error, for which the case must be reversed, and the
cause remanded for new trial.
All concur except BARCLAY, J.
NOTE.-See Mechem's Elem. of Partn.
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1n re KRUEGER et al.
U. S. Dist. Ct. 1871.
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2 Lowell 66, 5 N. B. R. 489, Fed. Cas No. 7941.

Petition against Krueger, Loud, & Bailey, alleged to be
partners in trade under the firm of Krueger, Loud, & Co., and
to have stopped payment of their commercial paper. Krueger
defended on the ground that he bad left the firm before the note
held by the petitioners was given. The firm bad carried on the
lumber business at Boston for about three years, and in September, 1870, there was a verbal agreement for a dissolution.
Krueger retired and sold out his interest to the remaining
partners on a credit of four months, with a condition that the
sale should be. void if the notes were not paid at maturity,
which they were not. He took no further part in the business,
which, however, was conducted in the old name of Krueger,
Loud & Co., with his consent, and the name remained over
their place of business. In December, 1870, notice was published, three times each, in two newspapers of Boston, that
Krueger had retired, and that Loud & Bailey would continue
the business at the same place and under the old name. The
petitioners were bankers, who had often discounted the firm
notes and other paper signed or indorsed by them; but never
by direct negotiation with the firm, or any member thereof, but
through a hrokor or other third person. This note was given,
in the name of Krueger, Loud & Co. , in February, 1871, to
Badger·& Batche]der, in exchange for their note, as had often
been done by both the old and new firm. The petitioners had
no actual notice of the dissolution, though they always took in
at their office one of the newspapers in which the notice was
printed. There was conflicting evidence upon the question,
whether Badger & Batchelder bad such notice. They sold the
note to the petitioners for value, before its maturity.

H. D. Hyde, for the petitioners.
C. P. Judd, for the defendant Krueger.
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LowELL, J. Three points are clear 1tpon the evidence before me: 1. The firm of Krueger, Loud & Co. was dissolved
by the retirement of Krueger in September, and this was published in the newspapers in December. 2. The petitioners had
no actual notice, and supposed when .they took the note that it
bound Mr Krueger. 3. ' The old firm style, which included the
name of Krueger, was retained by his former partners, with his
consent The other mRtter of fact, whether Badger & Batchelder, the payees of the note, had actual notice of the change,
was not so fully cleared up as would be desirable, and might
have been practicable, if all possible witnesses bad been exam_ined. Assuming that the petitioners had never dealt so directly
with Krueger, Loud & Co. as to be entitled to actual notice of
the dissolution of the ·partnership, still, if they took this note,
relying in part on the credit of Krueger, and he authorized his
late partners to use his name in their business, he is responsible
as a partner in respect to this note. One of t.he reported cases
decides that the mere authority to use the former partner's
name imports an obligation for all debts, even those held by a
person who knew of the arrangement: Brown v. Leonard, 2
Chitty, R. 120. Another case decides that the retired partner,
if his name is retained in the firm, is liable for injuries caused
by the negligence of a driver of a dray belonging to the new
firm: Stables v. EJey, 1 C. & P. 614. These decisions go
much beyond anything demanded by this case; but they seem
to have received the approval of the text-writers. Thus Chancellor Kent says ( 3 Com. 5th ed. 68}: "When a single partner
retires from the firm, the same notice is requisite to protect from
continued liability; and even if due notice be give11, yet, if the
retiring partner willingly suffers his name to continue in the
firm, or in the title of the firm over the door of the shop or store,
he will still be holden." And in 1 Lindley, Partnership, 45, it
is said to be wholly immaterial whether the person holding himself out as a partner does or does not share profits or losses, and
even that it is known that he does not share them; because the
permission to use his name imports a willingness to be liable for
the debts, and to look to the real pat·tners for indemnity. And
at page 330 of the Mme volume, we find: " If a partner retires and gives notice of his retirement, and he nevertheless
aJJows his name to be
as if he were still a }!<'\rtner, he will .
continue to incur liability, on the principle of holding_out explained in the earlier part of this treatise.,.
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That one who is not really a partner may be bound as such
to third persons, who have beep led by his acts or declarations
to believe him to occupy that relation, is familiar law, and
has been often recognized in Massachusetts. Story, Partnership, Sees. 64,65; Fitch v . Harrington, 13 Gray, 468; Adams
Bank 'V. Rice, 2 Allen 483, per Bigelow, C. J. In Goddard
v. Pratt, 16 Pick. 412, it was held that the members of a copartnership which had been dissolved, but permitted the firm
name to be used by an incorporated company, were liable upon
contracts made by the corporation iri the name of the firm with
persons who had no knowledge of the dissolution. That case
does not find what notice is necessary in order to exonerate the
partners; and it may be argued, with some force, that a publication in the newspapers is enough to bind all persons who had
not dealt directly with the firm before the notice was published.
This is the general rule; but we have seen that the English
books, and Chancellor Kent in his Comment~ries, make an exception of a case like the present, and hold that the retiring
partner remains liable, notwithstanding notice, if his name is
still used with his consent. It may possibly be doubted whether
an estoppel ought to apply where the creditor has actual notice
of the true state of the case; but leaving out actual notice,
which is negatived by the evidence here, I believe the true rule
to be, that one who suffers his name to be used in a firm must
answer to all who rely on that name, whether old customers or
not. Here is a note signed Krueger, Loud, & Co., with the defendant's authority. As between the parties, it means only
Loud & Bailey; but when third persons take it in good faith,
believing that it' binds the three persons who are apparently
·
bound by it, they must be bound.
It was held in Massachusetts that one not really a partner
could not be made bankrupt as such upon the petition of one of
the actual partners : Hanson v. Paige, 3 Gray, 239. But I
have no doubt that creditors may proceed in bankruptcy, as
elsewhere, against all the persons who are. held out as partners.
See Re Disideri &: Co., L. R. 11 Eq. 242; Re Rowland, L.
R. 1 Ch. 421 (1866).
In accordance with this opinion, the defendant Krueger will
be defaulted.
NOTE.-See Mechem's Elements of Partn., § 70.

v.
NATURE OF PARTNER'S INTEREST IN
PROPERTY.

BANK vs. CARROLLTON RAILROAD.
United States Supreme Court, 1810.
11 Wall. 624, 20 L Ed. 82.

Bill by the Fourth National Bank of New York against the
New Orleans and Carrollton R. R. Co.; Beauregard, Hernandez, Binder and Bonneval, to enforce the· transfer claimed to
have been made to it by one Graham, under the circumstances
stated in the opinion. Beauregard bad acquired a lease .of
the railroad, covenanting not to assign or sublet without the
consent of the directors. May and Graham signed the lease
as sureties· for Beauregard. Jmmediately after obtaining the
lease, Beauregard, May and Graham entered into copartnership for its equipment and management. About a year later
Graham assigned all his interest in the railroad and the part·
nership to complainant. Hernandez, Bender and BonnevaJ
claimed under a subsequent assignment from May, and denied
that when Graham assigned to complainant he had anything
to assign, being, as they claimed, merely a trustee for May. •
The court below dismissed the bill and the Bank appealed.
P. Phillips, for the appellant.
J. A. cE D. OampbeU, for defendants.

STno:so,.J. The effect of Graham's assignment to the oom·
platnant was, undoubtedly, to dissolve the partnership which
• See Ca• "'· .BfmlregtJf'd, pod, 440 , involving further Jitieation ~OW·
iDg out of the same tranaactionL
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had existed between Beauregard, May and himself, but it did
not make his assignee a tenant in common with the other two
partners in the property of the firm. It seems to be assumed
on behalf of the complainant, that, in succeeding to Graham's
rights, the bank acquired an ownership of the effects of the
firm jointly with Beauregard and May, and that, as Graham
had been an equal partner with them, his assignee, of course,
became the owner of one undivided third of the railroad lease
and other property of the firm. But this assumption is based
upon a misapprehension of the effect of the assignment. It
has repeatedly been determined, both in British and American
courts, that the property or effects of a partnership belong to
the firm and not to the partners, each of whom is entitled only
to a share of what may remain after payment of the partnership debts and after a settlement of the accounts between the
partners; consequently that no greater interest can be derived
from a voluntary sale of his interest by one partne~, or by a
sale of it under execution. West vs. Skip, 1 Yes. 239; Nicoll
vs. J.fum{o1·d, 4 Johns. 0~. 522; Doner vs. Stauffer, 1 Pa. 19R.
In Field vs. Taylor, 4 Ves. Jr. 396, it was said that "a party
coming into the right of partner'' (in any mode, either by pur·
chase from such partner, or ~ a personal representative or
untler an execution or commission of bankruptcy), "comes into
nothing more than an interest in the partnership, which cannot be tangible, cannot be made available, or be delivered, bnt
under an account between the partnership and the partner,
and it is an item in the account that enough must be left fo1·
the partnership debts."
When, therefore, the Bank obtained from Graham the
assignment, which is the foundation of its claim in this suit,
it obtained thereby no ownership of tbe lease made by the
Railroad Company to Beauregard, and which he agreed to
hold for the benefit of the firm, nor did it obtain any aliquot
part of it, or of any of the effects of the firm. The utmost
extent of its acquisition was an interest in the surplus, if any,
which might remain after all the debts of the firm should. be
paid, and after the liabilities of Graham to his copartners,
as such, should be discharged. It waa not in the power. of
Graham, by retiring from the firm in violation of the articlee
of oopartnerehip, either to introduce another partner Qr to
deprive the partners who remained of their right to have all
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the partnership property held for partnership purposes. Incident to the right of the Bank to share in the surplus was a
right to enforce a settlement of the partnership accounts in
order to ascertain if there was any ·surplus. It is true the
words of the assignment were very broad. It pu11Jorted to
transfer all the estate, right, title and · interest in the lease
made by the New Orleans and Carrollton Railroad Company
to Beauregard, to which the assignor might be entitled by
virtue of the articles of copartnership, and also all his right
and interest in any property and effects of the partnership, and
nil debts to him from the partnership or any member tb~reof.
Hot no matter what its language~ it is clear no more could
· pass u·n der it than the right of the assignor; and if, as we have
said, that was not a right to the specific articles of property
belonging to the firm~ the Bank obtained no such right. We
art> not now speaking of the fact that, under his contract with
the Railroad Company, Beauregard }?ad no right to transf~r
the lease t>ither to the partnership or to its members. The
case does not require us to consider that inability. It is suf.
ftcient that the complainant's right was only an equity to
share in the surplus, if any, of the firm property after settlement of the partnership accounts, and that this is a bill for
such settlemP.nt: Manifestly, then, it is incurably defective,
because neither Graham nor :.\lay are made parties defendant.
It is too plain for discussion that to such a bill all the mem·
bers of the firm are indispensable parties, for they are all
directly affected by any decree that can be made.
How utterly impossible it is to ascertain what the equity
of the complainant is, with the present state of the record~
will appear more distinctly, if the provisi<>ns of the articles
of copartnership be considered. When it was formed, Beanregard bad obtained from the New Orleans and Carro~lton
Railroad Company a lease ·of its railroad, with all of its rolling
stock and with its rorporate privileges, for the term of twenty·
five years. Though the sole lessee, and prohibited by his contract from assigning or underletting, it was, nevertheless,
a,reed between him und his copartners that the lease should
b(' for their common benefit; that .Yay and Graham should
each advance $150,000 to carry on the enterprise of running the
road, and that Beaur~gard should take charge of, manage and
direct the und~rtaking for the mutual advantage of the parties,
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at a ftxed annual salary, selecting and appointing his own
assistants. It waa agreed that the money advanced, with
eight per cent, interest, should be repaid from the annual profits of the enterprise, and that the remainder of the net profits
should be equally divided between the partners, and that all
losses should be equally borne by them. The contract evidently contemplated that the property of the ftrm and the
management of its affairs should be in the hands of Beauregard. Books were to be kept, showing not only all money
received and expended, but also all purchases made on account
of the copartnership; and monthly statements of amounts
received and expended were required to be furnished by Beau·
regard to May and Graham. It was also agreed that the part-.
nership should continue twenty·five years from the date of the
lease, which waa April 12, 1866. Now, it is quite possible
that on settlement of the accounts, Graham may be found
iadebted to .the ftrm, or to his copartners, and that the court
would be required thus to decree.
How can such a decree be made when he is no party to the
reoord? Or it might appear that May is a large debtor to the
ftrm. How can any decree be made against him? How can
any decree be made that will not prejudice one ·o r the other of
these partners? And yet, whether the Bank complainant bas
any interest or not-whether it acquired anything under
Graham's assignment-can be determined only by a ftnal and
conclusive settlement of the partnership accounts between all
the partners, two of whom are not parties to this suit.
It is argued, however, on behalf of the appellant, that even
if May and Graham were necessary parties, the bill should not
have been dismissed, but that the complainant should have
been allowed to bring in new parties by a supplemental bill.
lt is, doubtless, the general rule that a bill in chancery will
not be dismissed for want of proper parties; but the rule is
·not universally true. It rests upon the supposition that the
fault may be remedied, and the necessary parties supplied.
When this is impossible, and wheneYer a decree cannot be
made without prejudice to one not a party, the bill must be
dismissed. Nothing is to be gained by retaining it, when it is
certain that the complainant can never be entitled to a decree
in his favor. Note 5, sec. 541, Story, Eq. Pl.; Shields vs. Barrow, 17 How. 130; [58 U.S. X. V. 158]. In the present case we
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have seen that no decree for an account can be made, until
all the partners are made parties. But if both May and Graham had been made parties defendant, the circui~ court would
have had no jurisdiction of the case. It is said Graham might
have been made a coplaintiff. Perhaps he might and · had
application been made in due season for such an amendmei;tt
9C the bill, it might have been the duty of the circuit court
to grant .it. But no such application was made. The complainants chose to sta,nd upon their case as they presented it.
Possibly they never would have sought to bring in the neces·
sary parties. The defendants could not bring them in. New
parties cannot be brought into a cause by a cross-bill (Shields
t:B. Barrow, supra), and had the bill not been dismissed, it must
have been left at the option of the complainants whether the
, case should ever be brought to a ftnal decree.
Under these circumstances, there was no reason for retaining the bill.
It is insisted, however, that the court erred b dismissing
the bill, reserving only a right to sue Beauregard, May and
Graham, for a settlement of the partnership between them
prior to the 14th and 16th of May, 1867. Yet if the right
acquired by Graham's assignment was, as the authorities
show, not an ownership of the specific effects of the partnership, but only a right to share in the surplus remaining after
the settlement of the partnership accounts and the pa_yment
of all debts, as well as the just claims of the several partners,
it is clear there can be in the complaint no equity against the
Railroad Company, or again·s t Hernandez, Binder or Bonneval,
who have succeeded to May's rights (not his obligations), if
they have not to Graham's. No fraudulent confederacy is
charged in the bill. At most, according to the complainant's
own showing, they are purchasers of property that belonged
to the firm. There was, therefore, not only a want of indispensable parties, a want which cannot be supplied without
ousting the jurisdiction of the court, but a misjoinder of the
defendants, a misjoinder appa·rent upon the face of the bill.
Hence the decree of the circuit court was correct.
The decree of the circuit court is affirmed•
. NOTE: See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., § f11, et atq.
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STAATS vs. BRISTOW.
Cottrt of Appeals o'f New York, 1878.
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Staats brought this action against Bristow, who was the
assignee of Stockbridge & Marti~!, to establish the title which
plaintiff claimed in the property of that firm now in defend·
ant's possession. Plaintiff relied upon his purchase at a sheriff's sale.
Other facts appear in the opinion.
Defendant had judgment below.
C. H. Ban_nigan and W. W. Niles, for appellant.
John E. Parsons, for respondent.

FoLGER, J. The defendant had the possession of certain
personal property, to which the plaintiff claims that he was
entitled. It was, of course, incumbent upon the plaintiff to
show and establish his title. He showed that he was the purchaser at a sheriff's sale. The certificate given by the sheriff
does not say that the plaintiff bought the property itself; it
says that he bought, only, all the right, title, and interest
which Joseph Stockbridge had in it on the 30th November,
1874. The sheriff's return on the execution upon which he
sold is the same. The execution on which the sale took place
directed a sale of the property of the defendants therein
named, who were the Stockbridge above named, and his
copartner, :M:artin; but the property pointed at was what the,v
owned, or either of them owned, on a day named, to wit: ou
the 9th December, 1874; and before that day, to wit: on the.
fourth day of that month, the defendants in the execution had
assigned the property to the defendant in this action in trust
for all of their creditors.
So it is apparent that the plaintiff did not boy the property
itself, specifically; bot only the interest, right, and title which
Stockbridge had in it. Now the interest which he had in !t
was that of one of two partners; as the property was part of
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the assets of a copartnership firm of which he was a member.
The interest of a member of such a firm in the assets of it is
the share to which' he is entitled by the terms of the copartnership, in the surplus of those assets remaining after all partnership debts are fully paid. It appears in this case that the firm
was insolvent; that its debts much exceeded its assets; that
there never could arise a surplus. So the interest of Stockbridge, as an individual, in this p-roperty was nothing; and so
the plaintiff got nothing by his purchase.
The force of thel'le views is resisted by the plaintiff thus:
It is claimed, and rightly, that one partner may sell and transfer the entirety of any particular personal effects and property
of the partnership for purposes within the scope of the business, and can make sale to a creditor of the firm in payment
of a debt due, with<>ut the knowledge or consent of another
partner, though the finn be insolvent and thereby a preference
be given to the creditor vendee. Then, it is claimed that the
law may do whatever one partner can do. Let it be granted
that it may, for this occasion, though we do not ooncede it a.s
a universal principle. The law has not in this case undertaken
to do that. The attachment, under which it is claimed that the
first step was taken toward doing that, was not against this
property specifically, nor was it against the property of the
firm. It was against the property of Stockbridge. What was
the property of Stockbridge? It was what be owned in individual right, and it was his interest in the property of his partnership. What that interest was has already been shown.
So that the law did not undertake to do, nor bas it done, more
than to sell for the benefit of a firm creditor the property of
Stockbridge. We speak now of what was done by virtue of
the attachment alone. The action was against both partners,
and both were brought into court. But if both had not been
brought into court, and· judgment had been got, and execution
issued directed to be levied upon the sole _property of the one
served, and upon the joint property of both, the law would
have undertaken to do what we admit one partner can do; and
if this joint property had been levied upon before the assignment to defendant, and bad been sold to the plaintiffs in the
execution, or to one of them, and the avails paid over, the
law would have succeeded in doing just what one partner
could have done. The law must seek the end desired by the
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legal path, just as the single partner must. That path was
not by an attachment against the property of one partner ~ho,
by his personal situation, was obnoxious to that process. That
could issue, but not against joint property; only against individual property; and individual property was only the interest
in a surplus.
These vi~ws do not conflict with Van. Brunt"'· Applegate, 44
N.Y. 544, on which the appellant much relies, and we do not
express any opinion upon what was there held.
The judgment appealed from should be affirmed.
NOT&: For other oaaee, see Mechem's Elem. of Parto., §§ 99, 100.

SINDELARE vs. WALKER.
Supreme Court of lllin.Qi8, 1891.
187 ill. 48, 27 N. E. Rep. 59, 81 Am. St. Rep. MS.

The plaintiff SindeJare and one Hubka had been partners in
the dry goods business, and while so they gave a chattel mortgage on their stock to Walker. Sindelare brought this action
against Walker and Hubka (though he discontinued as to the
latter), charging that by collusion between them there had been
a fraudulent foreclosure of the mortgage by Walker and a purchase of the stock by Hubka, and that thereby he, the plaintiff,
had been wrongfully dE'prived of his interest . in the goods,
profits and good will of the business.
The court below sustained a demurrer to his declaration, and
he brought error.
Jones & Lusk, for plaintiff.

Trumbull, Willits, Robbins & Trumbull, for defendant.
WILKIN, J. (After stating the facts.) There is no averment
that the copartnership between plaintiff and Hubka has been
dissolved, or any settlement whatever had of their partnership
affairl!l. The declaration, therefore, not only fails to show any
. individual title or ownership in plaintiff to saiu property, part·
nership business, or the profits or good will thereof, which
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he says he lost, but aftlrmatively discloses a state of facts
from which it appears that he had only a community of interest therein with his partner, \ :ho consented to said transfer
and all that was done by defendant. A partner's right to partnership property is an ownership of all the assets of the firm,
subject to the ownership of every other copartner, all the partners holding all of the firm assets subject to the payment of
the partnership debts and liabilities: Parsons on Partnership,
350. lt is clear, therefore, that the individual interest of one
partner in the firm property and business can only be ascertained by a settlement of the partnership: Bopp t)S. Fox, 63
Ill. 540; Chandler t)S. Lincoln, 52 Ill. 77; Menagh t)B. Whitwell,
52 N.Y. 146; 11 Am. ~~p. 683. This rule applies to the interest
of a partner in the profits or good will of the partnership busi·
ness, a.s well as to the tangible assets of the firm. Until plaint·
ift''s actual interest in the partnership has been determined,
there can be no ascertainment of his damages: Buckma.ter
vs. Gowen, 81 Ill. 153; Sweet vs. Morrison, 103 N.Y. 235.
We are clearly of the opinion that, on the facts stated in his
declaration, plaintiff has no standing in a court of law. • •
Aftirmed.
NO'l'JI: See Meohem'e Elem. of Partn., §§ 97, 99,-.

ROBIN~ON

BANK vs. MILLER.

Supreme Court of Illinois, 1894.
1158 Dl. 2«, 46 Am. St. Rep. 888,27 L R. A. 449, 88 N. E. Rep. 1078.

This was an action by the Robinson Bank to set aside three
The defendants by cross-bill asked for a foreclosure of these mortgages. The court below set aside one
mortgage and foreclosed the others. John S. Emmons, Frauk
0. Miller and John Newton owned undivided interests in a
milling property of four acres. They afterwards, by oral
agreement, entered into partnership to operate the mill under
tht> firm name of Newton, Emmons & Miller. JohnS. Emmons
borrowed fl ,800 of the Robinson Bank on a note endorsed by
~ortgages.
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hil!l father and father-in-law, \Viley S. Emmons, and William
W~ Walter. The latter had to pay the note and John S.
Emmons gave them a mortgage on his interest in the property
to secure them. John S. Emmons b'ad also previously given a
note for fl,500 for part of the purchase price of his interest,
endorsed by his brother Willis Emmons. The latter had to
pay this note and ,John S. gave him a mortgage at the same
time that he gave the one to his father and father-in-law. Miller had also at about the same time given a mortgage upon his
interest to his brother-in-law, Lamport, to secure a note for
,5,500, given to the latter. The firm of Newton, Emmons &
Miller became indebted to the Bank for $21,585.32, and was
insolvent. The Bank desired to obtain the milling property in
part payment, and offered to allow $16,000 for it. Newton and
Miller conveyed their interests to the Bank "subject to incum- .
brances." Emmons also conveyed his interest, and all COil·
fessed judgment to the Bank. The Bank claimed precedence
over the three mortgages.
The two given by Emmons were sustained, and the one given
by Miller was defeated by the court below.
The Bank and Lamport appealed.
~Lowe,

for appellants.
Parker, Crowley & Bogard, for appellees.

Callaghan, Jones

J. ·T he Robinson Bank, one of the appellants
herein, claims that the mill property, including the four acres
of land upon which the mill was located, was partnership property belonging to the :firm of Newton, EII}mons & Miller; that
as such it was :first liable to be subjected to the payment of the
partnership creditors, including the Bank; that the mortgagees, Lamport, Walter, and Willis and "Wiley S. Emmons,
were individual creditors of Miller a.n d John S. Emmons, and
only entitled to such surplus as might arise out of the mill
property after the payment therefrom of the :firm debts.
·w hether real estate upon which a partnership transacts its
business is :firm property or the property of the individual
members of the firm is oftentimes a difficult question to determine, and one upon which the authorities are not altogether
u11.iform. The mere fact of the use of land by a :firm does not
make it partnership property. Goepper vs. Kinsinger, 39 Ohio
MAGRUDER,
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St. 429; Hatchett vs. Blanton, 72 Ala. 423. Nor is real estate
necessarily the individual property of the members of a firm
because the title is held by one member, or by the seYeral membe'rs in undivided interests. 1 Bates, Partn. § 280. Whether
real estate is partnership or individual propet•ty depends
largely upon the in'tention of the partners. That intention
may be expt•essed in the deed conveying the land, or in the
articles of partnership; but when it is not so expressed the
circumstances usually relied upon to determine the question
are the ownership of the funds paid for the land, the uses to
which it is put, and the manner in which it is entered in the
nccoun ts upon the bool~s of the firm. 1 Bates, rartn. § 280;
2 Lindl. Partn. marg. p. 649; 17 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 94:>,
and cases in note. Where real estate is bought with partnership funds for partnership purposes, and is applied to part·
nership uses, or entered and carried in the accounts of
the firm as a partnership asse.t, it is deemed to be firm
property; and in such case it makes no difference, in a
court of equity, whether the title is vested in all the partners,
as tenants in common, or in one of them~ or in a stranger.
T. Pars. Partn. (4th Ed.) § 265; 1 Bates, Partn. § 281; Johnson
vs. Clark, 18 Kan. 157; 17 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 948, and
cases cited. If the real estate is purchased with partnership
funds, the party holding the legal title will be regarded as
holding it subject to a resulting trust in favor of the firm furnishing the mom!y. In such case no agreement is necessar.v,
and the statute of frauds has no application. Parker vs.
Bowles, 57 N. H. 491; 1 Bates, Partn. § 281.
In the case at bar the land was not purchased with partnership funds. The undivided one-third interest bought by John
S. Emmons was paid for by him with his own individual
money. Miller also paid for the one undivided one-third interest, purchased by him with his individual funds. None of the
money of the firm of Newton, Emmons & Miller was contributed towards the p!Jrchase of the one-third interest held by
Newton. Indeed, the proof shows that the firm of Newton,
Emmons & Miller was formed by an oral agreement after
Emmons and Miller had bou~ht their interests. Each partner
here held the title to an undivided one-third part of the property. No entries were made upon the books of the firm showlog that the real estate was treated as firm assets. The evi·
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dence, however, does show that the property was bought for
the purpose of being used in the milling business, and that
after its purchase it was used for firm purposes, and that th~
firm gave its notes to pay for repairs, and for placing new
machinery in the mill upon the premises. Under theae circum·
stances, was the land partnership property, or the individual
property of the partners, holding as tenants in common? It
cannot be said that the land is firm property, upon the theory
of a resulting trust, because the money of the firm was not
used to buy the property. Such a trust might exist in favor of
the firm, regarding it as a person, if the partners had taken the
legal title, and the firm had advanced the purchase money.
The trust must arise at the time of the execution of the cou·
veyance, and when the title vests in the grantee. Such could
not have been the case here, under the facts stated. Van BUB·
kirk VB. Van Bmkirk, 148 lll. 9, 35 N. E. 383. In view of the
fact that the land.was bought with individual, and not partner·
ship, funds, and ·was conveyed in undivided interests to the
several partners, and in the absence of any agreement that it
should be regarded as finn property, does the conduct of the
parties in afterwards forming a partnership, and using the
property for partnership purposes, and repairing and improving the mill at the expense of the firm, make the land firm
property, in a court of equity? A negative answer to this
question is found in many of the authorities, as will be seen by
reference to the following: Ale:tandcr vs. Kimbro, 49 Miss.
529; Theriot vr. Michel, 28 La. Ann. 107; Reynolds vs. Ruckman,
35 .Mich. 80; Parker vs. Bowks, 57 N.H. 491; Thompson vs. Bowmma., 6 Wall. 316; Frink vs. Branch, 16 Conn. 260; Wheatley'I
H ef.rs VI. Calhoun, 12 Leigh 264, 37 Am. Dec. 654; Sike8 vs. Work,
834;
6 Gray, 433; Gordon vs. Gordon,, 49 Mich. 501, 13 N.
Moody "'· Rathburn, 7 Minn. 89 (Gil. 58); Paige vs. Paige, 71
Iowa, 318, 32 N. W. 360, 60 Am. Rep. 799, post, T. Pars.
Partn. (4th Ed.) § 266; Hatchett vs. Blanton, supra.
The general doctrine of all these cases is that a.purchase
of the land with partnership funds is necessary to make it
firm property. T. Parsons, in his work on Partnership (4th
Ed.), says : "Although it [real estate] be held in the joint
name of two or more persons, if there be no proof that it was
purchased with partnership funds for partnership purposes,
It will be considered as held by them as joint tenants or ten-

"r·
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ants fn common. • • • · So, if not paid for by partnership
fonds, then it is probably his property who does pay for it,
whatever use he permits to be made of it." Sections 265, 266.
In Hatchett"'· Blanton, supra, the supreme court of Alabama
says: "Steering clear of all cases of fraud, or of the use by one
partner, without the approbation of his associates, of partnership fnnds in the acquisition of real estate, the two facts must
concur to constitute real estate partnership property-acquisition with partnership funds, or on partnership credit, and
for the uses of the partnership." In Thompson. va. Botcmml,
aupra, the supreme court of the United States say: "In the
absence of proof of its purchase with partnership funds for
partnership purposes, real property standing in the names of
several persons is deemed to be held by them as joint tenants
or as tenants in common." Buchan va. Sumner, 2 Barb.
Ch. 165, 47 Am. Dec. 350. The theory of some of the
cases is that real estate bought with separate, and not
partnership, funds, cannot be conl"erted into firm property by a verbal agreement between the partners, because
no trust can be created in lands, unless by writing,
in view of the statute of frauds, except such as results by implication of law. Parker vs. Bowles, supra. There are cases which
hold that, even though the land was originally bought ~y the
several partners with their individual funds, and deeded to
them as tenants in common; yet it will be regarded in equity
as tirm property where it is improved out of partnership funds
for firm purpos-es, and actually used for such purposes,
or where the firm puts valuable and permanent improvements upon it for firm purposes, and which are essential
to the firm. In some instances the land is held to be
the property of the partners, and the improvements to be the
property of the firm. 1 Bates, Partn . §§ 281, 282. The use of
the property is not conclusive of its character as real estate
or personality, but is only evidence of the intention of the
parties. Id. § 285. When the intention of the partners to convert the land into firm property is inferred from circumstances,
the circumstances must be such as do not admit of any other
equally reasonable and satisfactory explanation. T. Pars.
Partn. § 267. And, where it is sought to show a conl"ersion of
the land into personalty by agreement of the partners, such
agreement must be clear and explicit. 17 Am. & Eng. Enc.
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Law, p. 954, and cases cited. In Alkire v1. Kahle, 123 III. 496,
17 N. E. 69a, 5 Am. St. Rep. 540, land was conveyed during the
existence of the partnership to '~Cato Abbott and Henry Rob·
inson, composing the firm of Abbott & Robinson"; and it was
held not to be partnership property, because it was not shown
to have been either purchased with partnership funds, or used
for partnership purposes; but we do not regard that case as
holding that the mere use of the land for partnership purposes
constitutes it firm property. In Mauck vs. Mauck, 54 Ill. 281~
land which had been bought and held foP firm purposes was
said to be firm property, and to partake of the character of
personalty; but in that case a part of the business of the firm
was to buy and sell real estate, and, although the land was
said to belong to the firm, it does not appear that it was not
purchased with partnership funds. In FauldB vi. Yates, 57 IlL
416, 11 Atn. Rep. 24, the land was bought for the use of the
partnership, but after the partnership was formed, and with
the money of two of the partners. In Bopp vs. Fo:», 63 Ill. 540,
land, bought by four partners with their individual funds, and
conveyed to them in their . individual names, was held to be
partnership property, because, two weeks before the purchasP.,
the four purchasers made, not a mere executory agreement to
form a partnership at a future time, but a "present, verbal
agreement Of par~nership," and then afterwards bought the
land, and began the erection of a mill for the purpose of carry·
ing on the milling business as a firm "already formed under
the verbal agreement." It was there held that the essential
question was whether the purchase money "was paid as partnership money for a partnership purpose," and we said, "'We
consider this was essentially a purchase with partnership
funds for partnership purposes."
The weight of authority seems to us to support the position
that where persons who afterwards become partners buy land
in their individual names and with their individual funds,
before the making of a partnership agreement, the land
will be regarded as the individual property of the partners, in the · absence of a clear and explicit agreement
subsequently entered into by them to make it firm property,
or in the absence of controJling circumstances which indi·
cate an intention to convert it into firm assets. We do not
think that an application of this rule to the facts of the present
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case !bows the real estate here in controversy to be ftrm property. The testimony proves affirmatively that there was no
agreement, written or verbal, to put the land into the firm as a
firm asset, and that it was treated by the parties as individual
property. John S. Emmons insured his interest separately.
When he. gave his note for $1,500, signed by his brother as
surety, in part payment of the purchase money for the land, be
promised his brother that he would give him a. mortgage on his
one-third interest when the master's certificate, issued to him
at the sale, should ripen into a deed; and the mortgage aftet·wards made was given as soon as the master's deed was obtained. Four months after the purchase, when he borrowed
$1,800 of the bank upon his note, signed by his father anti
father-in-law as sureties, he stated to the bank that he intended
to mortgage his interest to his sureties to secure them. About
this time, Newton, Emmons & Miller paid ,5,400 in cash for improving the mill; but this amount was contributed by the partners, not out of partnership funds, but by the contt·ibution of
their individual moneys, each. paying one-third. The one-third
so paid by John S. Emmons was the $1,800 borrowed on his
note. The bank itself, in procuring deeds from the partners in
September, 1884, dealt with them as owners of separate interests. Each member of a partnership has a supelior lien on the
partnership property for the payment of the firm debts. This
equitnble lien of the partners is worked out for the benefit of
the firm creditors. Hapgood vs. Oornu:·cll, 48 Ill. 65, 95 Am.
Dec. 516. Hence, partnership property must be first applied to
the payment of partnership debts; and the tt·ue interest of each
partner in such property is the balance found to be due to him
after the payment of the firm debts, and the settlement of aeoounts between the partners. Bopp vs. Fo:c, supra. In equity,
real estate stands on the same footing in this respect as pet·sonal property. Alkire vs. Kahle, supra. It results that there
can be no dower interest in real estate ow~ed by a partnership
until all the partnership debts are paid and the partnership
accounts are adjusted. Trowbridge vs. Cross, 117 Ill. 109, 7
N. E. ::l47. If the land in controversy was firm propet·ty in September, 1884, there were no dower interests a.t that time in the
wives of Newton, Emmons, and Miller; and yet their wives
were required by the bank to sign the deeds to its trustee,
Woodworth, and one of them was paid f200 for her signature.
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There It no queetlon about the bona fide character of the mort·
gages to Willis Emmons and Wiley S. Emmons and W. ".,..
Walter. They paid the judgments upon the notes of John 8.
Emmons, upon which they were sureties, and those notes were
given for borrowed money expended in the purchase and im·
provement of the mill property. We think the mortgages haYe
be-en properly sustained as resting upon an undivided one-third
interE-st in the lapd, which must be regarded, under all the circumstances of this case, as the separate property of John S.
Emmons.
But, even if the interest held by John S. Emmons was firm
property, there is nothing to show that the holders of the mortgages thereon had notice, or reasonable ground for believing,
that it was firm property. The record title was in John S.
Emmons, and all the circumstances coming to their knowledge,
as heretofore stated, were calculated to create the impression
that his real interest was that indicat~d by the record. Facts
showing a partnership in the milling and grain business were
not necessarily notice of a partnership in the land Now, it is
well settled that a bona fide purchaser or mortgage-e of firm
• property, from one of the partners holding the legal title, without notice of its partnership character, will bold it free from
partnership claims. T. Pars. Partn. (4th Ed.) §§ 277, 278; 1
Rates, Partn. § 291; Dyer vs. Ol.ark, 5 Mete. (Mase.) 562; Colly.
Partn. (Perk. Ed.) § 135. \Vhen a firm and its members are
Insolvent, and the firm has been dissolved, an equity exists in
favor of the creditors of the firm in respect of the lands purchased with partnership funds, which is superior to that of the
creditors of the individual partners; but there may be cases
where an equal or superior equity may be created in faYor of a
creditor of an individual member of the firm, as where one has
furnished to one of the members the capital upon which tht~
business was commenced. Reeves vs. Aye,·s, 38 111. 418. By
signing the note for $1,500 as surety, Willis Emmons en a bl~d
John S. Emmons ~o purchase an interest in the mill property,
and, if that interest was a partnership asset, he thereby aide(}
in procuring a part of the firm capital. In addition to what
bas been said, we think the evidence shows that the offi cct·s of
the bank, if they did not actually make an agreement to that
effect, gave ,John S. Emmons to understand that the bank
would protect the mor~gages on his interest if he and his wife
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would sign the deed to the bank. The consideration of that
deed was just the amount of the two mortgages, and four witnesses swear that one of the officers of the bank promised to
take care of the mortgages. When a person, by his words or
conduct, voluntarily causes another to believe in the existence
of a certain state of things, and induces him to act upon that
belief so as to change his previous position, the former will be
estopped to aver against the latter a diffetent state of things.
Ca81er va. Byera, 129 Ill. 657, 22 N. E. 507.
As to the mortgage made by the appellant Miller to Lamport, the lower courts have found that that mortgage was not
made in g<>od faith, and was not given to secure a bona tide
indebtedness. It is claimed that the note for f5,500, secured
thereby, was given for money loaned to Miller by his wife and
by his brother-in-law, Lamport. It is true, that the fact of the
relationship betweE-n the parties is no proof of .fraud, although
it may be a circumstance to excite suspicion. ·wightman t'd.
Ha.rt, 37 Ill. 123. But we are not satisfied from the evidence
that the money alleged to have belonged to Mrs. Miller was not
the money of Miller himself. If any funds were loaned to him
by Lamport, it is not possible to fix their exact amount separately from those alleged to have been borrowed of Mrs. Miller.
The witnesses contradict each other as to amounts, and as to
the times and places of payment. There is refusal to answer
questions, and failure to explain matters needing explanation.
We have examined all the testimony, as contained in the original record, and we cannot say that the circuit court erred in the conclusion reached by it in regard to this mortgage, or thut
the appellate court bas erred in agreeing with the circuit court.
1t ts true that the deed from Miller and Newton to the bank
contains the words, "subject to incumbrances," but we think
the reference here is to incumbrances which are made in good
faith. The facts about the mortgage were not known when
the deed was executed. There is some co~ftict in the evidence
as to whether the parties intended to refer to the Lamport
mortgage, or to certain liens claimed to exist in favor of creditors who bad furnished machinery for the mill. But even 1f
the words refer to the Lamport mortgage alone, it is not certain
from the testimony that the amount of that mortgage was a
part of the c.onsideration for the execution of the deed. The
grantee in a deed, who purchases subject to an incumbrance to
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secure indebtedness, may not be under obligations to pay such
indebtedness, if its amount is not included in, and does not
fonn a part of, the consideration of the conveyance. Drury vs.
Holden, 121 Ill. 130, 13 N. E. 547. The amount named as the
consideration in the deed was simply the agreed value of New·
ton's interest, and did not include any part of this mortgage.
The amount of the actual consideration agreed .to be paid by
the bank for the deed of Miller's inte-rest, to wit, f5,333.33 (one' .of f16,000), was paid by a credit of that amount on the
third
firm indebtedness of f21,585.23 due from Newton, Emmons &
Mille-r to the bank. The judgment of the appellate court and
the decree of the circuit court are affirmed. Affirmed.
· Non: See also Mechem's Elem. of Parto.,

bauative note in 27 L. a. A. «8.

fl 106, 107, 109; also the ex-

NATIONAL UNION BANK OF MARYLAND vs. NATIONAL MECHANICS' BANK OF BALTIMORE, et al.

Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1894.
80 Md: 871, SO A. 918, 27 L. R. A. 476, 45 Am. St. Rep. MO.

Appeal from circ}lit court of Baltimore city.
In the matter of the trust estate of G. W. 8. Hoffman and
others, late copartners trading as W. H. Hoffman·& Sons, and
of the individual members of said firm. Appeal by the National Union Bank of Maryland from an order overruling the
exceptions filed by appellant to the auditor's account, and also
its exceptions to the admissibility of certain evidence. &versed
Argued before ROBINSON, C. J., and BRYAN, McSHERRY,
FOWLER, BRISCOE, and BOYD, J. J.

Steele, Semmes & Carey, for appellant.
Barton & Wilmer, for appellees.
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BoYD, J. In October, 1893, George W. S. Hoffman, W. E.
Hoffman, and John W. Hoffman, partners trading under the
firm name of W. H. Hoffman & Sons, executed a deed of trust,
in which their wives joined, to John B. Ramsay and Simon P.
Schott, by which they conveyed all their property, ''including all
of the joint stock of the copartnership and all of the separate
estate of each of the partners, in trust for the payment of part·
nership and individual creditors according to their respective
rights and interests therein." The circuit court of Baltimore
city assumed jurisdiction of the trust, and after the sale of the
property, which will be more particularly hereinafter referred to,
an audit was made, distributing the proceeds of sales, etc. The
appellant held at the time of the assignment two notes of the firm,
each being for the sum of 85,000, and endorsed by George W .
S. Hoffman and J. W. Hoffman, individually. With each
note there were deposited bonds of the Gunpowder Valley Rail·
road Company, of the par value of 87,500, as collateral security, with the usual authority to the bank to sell at public or
private sale in case of default.
The appellant filed its claim for the amount of the notes, together with costs of protest, against the estates of the firm and
of the individual indorsers. The National Mechanics' Bank of
Baltimore excepted to the allowance by the auditor of the claim
of appellant, because it had not credited the value of the collat.
eral security held by it; and the appellant excepted to the audit
for the reason, as it alleges, that the real estate held and owned
by the three members of the firm was their individual property,
and not partnership assets. An agreement was filed, in which
certain facts are admitted, and the court below was authorized
to pass a p1·o forma order sustaining the exceptions to the claim
of the appellant, and overru1ing those filed by it. A pro forma
order was accordingly passed~ and an appeal taken to this
court.
The principal questions presented for our consideration are.
(1) Is the appellant entitled to a distributio~ on its whole claim,
without crediting the value of the securities held by it as collat·
eral? (2) Is the real estate held by the members of this firm
to be treated as partnership or individual property, so far as
the appellant is concerned ?
(Omitting the discussion of the first question.)
In considering the question as to the right of the appellant
to have the real estate treated as the individual property of the

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 16:47 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112102486216
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

206

CASES ON pARTNERSHIP.

members of the firm, and not as partnership assets, we must
bear in mind the fact that W. H. Hoffman was the original
owner of all this property, and that while it was thus owned
by him he was in partnership with his three sons,· trading under
the name of William H. Hoffman & Sons, being the style of
the firm subsequently adopted by them. If a deed of trust
similar to the one made by the sons had been made in the lifetime
of the father, by the members of the original firm, it would
hardly be contended that the real estate should be treated as
partnership property,-certainly not as against the individual
creditors of William H. Hoffman. By his last will and testament, the senior Hoffman charged an annuity upon the Gunpowder Mill property, for the purpose of keeping a burying ·
ground, etc., in proper condition, and made certain provisions
for his wife. He directed his executors to ascertain the value
of the rest of his property, and gave it-with the exception of
one-twentieth thereof, left to Peter Vondersmith, his son-in-law
-to his three sons and his daughter, Lydia A. Smyser, to be
divided between them equally, share and share alike. He
directed that ·i n the division his son John W. Hoffman should
have the property known as the "Gunpowder Mill," chargeable
with the annuity aforesaid, together with certain water rights
and 400 acres of land connected therewith, known as " Paper
Mill Hills;" also a part of the tract of the land known as
"Laurel Hills,'' 100 yards wide on each side of a stream.
He also directed that in the distribution his son George W.
S. Hoffman was to have the Marble Vale Mill property, containing 218 acres, and his son William E. Hoffman was to
have his Clipper Mill, together with a tract of land called
"Gristmill Hills," containing 257 acres; also a tract called
"Addition to Grant Mill Hills," containing 7t acres, and some
houses named by him. He provided that the property thus
given to his three sons should be taken by them in the distribution at the prices or values fixed by the appraisers, as provided for in his will, and then directed that " all the rest of my
property and estate, not hereinbefore devised or specially distributed, * * * shall be sold or disposed of by my said executors, * * * aud the proceeds of such sale or sales be so
distri.buted among my said four children as to make the share
of each, under these provisions of my will, equal the one to the
other."
Subsequently, his son-in-law and his daughter conveyed their
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respective interests to the three sons, "as individuals." It is
admitted in the agreed statement of facts that after the father
died the three sons continued to trade under the firm name of
William H. Hoffman & Sons, and opened on their firm books
an account headed "Real Estate," in which they entered all the
property so derived by them, and continued the same on their
books in that way; "that, between the said three sons, all the
said rt>al estate was always considered, in their business, as
c·o partnership property, and was treated between themselves as
such, but that the title to the same appeared in the land records
of Baltimore county and in the office of the register of wills of
Baltimore county as having been derived by them under the
will of their said father and the conveyances of said Yondersmith and Smyl!ler, as bas been hereinbefore stated, and no conveyance was made by them to the said partnership."
It must be conceded that there is nothing on the face of the
will that would indicate any intention of the testator to vest the
property in his three sons, as partners; but, on the contrary, it
is apparent that be intended them to own individually certain
pro.perties, which he directed to be given them as above stated.
The property was, at the time the partnership was formed, the
individual property of the three members. So far as the record
discloses, nothing has since been done to transfer the property
to the firm, or vest any interest in it, excepting the entries in
the books, and the fact that the real estate was considered in
the business as copartnership property, and so treated between
the members, as above stated. We are therefore met with .the
inquiry whether that is sufficient to authorize a court of equity
to treat the proceeds of sale as partnership assets, when called
upon to decide between the creditors of the firm and those of
the indhidual members. If this property had been purchased
with partnership fund~, for the use and on account of the firm,
it would be immaterial that the title stood in the name of the
individual members, as a court of equity would treat it, for all
the purposes of the partnership, as firm property; and hence it
would be liable to the partn~rship creditors, to the exclusion of
the individual creditors, until the former are satisfied. In that
case there would be an implied or constructive trust in favor of
the partners, as such, which would inure to the benefit of the
creditors of the firm. But, when it has been acquired in the
manner above stated, the question arises whether those dealing
with the members of the firm have not the right, in the absence
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of some notice or knowledge to the contrary, to assume that
the public records inform them correctly as to the ownership of
the property, notwithstanding the private understanding between the partners themselves.
Creditors have sometimes suffered great hardships by. courts
of equity declaring property standing in the name of one person
to be in trust for the benefit of others; but such decisions are
rendered to prevent injustice being done those whose money
purchased the property, and relief is only granted to them when
their claims are established by clear, direct, and explicit proof.
This court has said : "This strictness of proof is required because of the danger of rendering titles depending upon deeds
and other written documents insecure." Witts vs. Horney,
59 Md. 587. The same reasoning applies to real estate held of
record by members of a firm as tenants in common. When it
is sought to change such property from individual to partnership property, the record evidence all pointing to it being the
former, a court· of equity should not act upon doubtful proof,
particularly when the rights of strangers or third parties are to
be affected. The public records will be of but little avail, if
the private books and intentions of partners are to entirely control and determine the character of ownership of real estate.
If property is purchased with partnership funds, and conveyed
to one or more of the partners, as individuals, the entries of the
firm books would have great-possibly controlling-weight as
to whether it should be treated as partnership or individual
property; but courts should require more than private entries
and understandings between partners, to overcome the public
records, in cases such as this.
No one would suppose, from reading the will of William H.
Hoffman, that the property belonged to the partnership. Persons dealing with the individual members would be led to believe, from that will, that they owned the property individually;
and, inasmuch as it was once the separate property of the members, we are not prepared to break down all the safeguards and
protection inten<:led by our registry acts, by announcing as the
law of this State that partners can so change the character of
real estate, originally owned by them as individuals, and not in
any way derived from the partnership, as to give priority to
firm creditors over their separate creditors, simply by making
entries in their books, and treating it between themselves as
partnership property, without giving some notice, or doing s0me
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acts equivalent to notice, to their individual creditors. The
agreed statement of facts does not show that the appellant had
notice of any facts that should have put its officers on inquirF.
The statement is not as full as it might have been. It does
not even show what business the firm was engaged in. But
from the arguments, and what we gather from the record, we
assume that they were manufacturing paper. Nor is it definitely stated whether the business was conducted in one or more
paper mills, although it is shown that William H. Hoffman
died owning real estate consisting of three paper mills, farm
lands, etc. It would certainly have been much more satisfactory if the facts had been fully set out; so as to enable the court
to understand the exact character and extent of the use of the
real estate by the firm. But it is admitted that the property
was acquired under the will of vVilliam H. Hoffman, and by
the deeds of Mr. Vondersmith and Mrs. Smyser, aud that no
conveyance was made by the mern hers of the firm to the partnership. As to what uses, if any, thh~ firm, engaged in manufacturing paper, made of the farm, dwelling houses, aud othet·
property not necessarily incident to the paper mills, the record
is silent; but it is certain that, without some notice that they
were treated as partnership property, no one dealing with the
individual members of the firm would be expected to so regard
it; and the ordinary use of that kind of property, such as cultivating or renting the farms, occupying or renting the houses,
etc., would not put creditors on inquiry, or be sufficient notice
that they were treated as partnership property.
If the paper mills themselves, and such other real estate as
would properly be used in ~onnection with them, were .t reated
by the partners as firm property, and were so used as to give
notice to creditors of the individual members of the firm that
they had been put into the partnership as part of the common
stock, and were entered on the books of the firm in such way
as to comply with the statute of frauds, then the partnership
creditors might properly be given priority over the separate
creditors, to the extent of the proceeds of sales of such property.
The record does not disclose such facts as would justify us in
determining that question; but, as the decree must be reversed,
the court below can authorize testimony to be taken on that
subject. We have carefully examined the authorities cited by
the counsel for the re~:;pective parties, as well as many others,
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and have found considerable apparent conflict between some of
them. But, when the facts of them are carefully examined, it
will be found that the most of them are in accord with our conclusions, which might be summarized as follows:
(l) That as the farms, houses, and similar property were not
. purchased with partnership funds, for partnership purposes,
but were, as far as the public records show, the separate property of the !ndividual members, and were not incident to the
business of the firm, the fact tbat the partners entered them on
the firm books, and treated them as firm property, is not sufficient to change them into partnership property, and the proceeds of sales of them should be applied to the payment of the
claims of individual creditors prior to those of the partnership
creditors.
(2) That if the paper mills, and such other real estate connected therewith as would be necessary for the convenient and
proper conduct of the business, were treated by the partners as
partnership property, were put into the firm business as part of
the common stock, and were so entered in the books of the firm
. as to comply with the statute of frauds, then the partnership
creditors should have priority over the general creditors of the
individual partners, in the distribution of the proceeds of sale
of such property, provided this class of property was so used as
to give notice to the latter that it was treated as partnership
property, and was substantially involved in the business of the
firm. * • *
The decree pro forma must be reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
Decree reversed and cause remanded, with costs to the appellant.
NoTE.-See Mechem's Elem. of Part'n ~§ 106, 107. See also McKinnon
v. McKinnon F. 409, :S C. C. A. 330 12 U.S. App. 433.
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Thts was a bill in chancery filed by John A. Klein and others
against David C. Shanks, ext>cutor of the last will and testa·
ment of Joseph H. Johnston.
The substance of the bill is that in the lifetime of Johnston
there existed between him and Shepperd Brown a partnership,
the style of which was Brown & Johnston; that their principal
place of business was at Vicksburg, in the State of Mississippi,
where they had a banking house; that they had branches and
connections with other men in business at other places, among
which was New Orleans; that they dealt largely in the pur·
chase and sale of real estate, of which they had a large amount
in value on band at the outbreak of the recent civil war; that
this real estate was in different parcels and localities, and was
hon~ht and paid for by partnership money, and held as part·
n<>rship property for the general uses of the partnership business; and that early in the war, namely. in 1~63, Johnston di<>d
fn tlw State of Virginia, where he then resided, leavin~ n will
by which all his property, including his interest in the part·
nership, became vested in Shanks, who was appointed his
executor.
It seems that both Brown and Johnston were absent ft·om
.Mississippi and from New Orleans during the war-the ouc
being in Vh·ginia and the other in Georgia. Upon the cessation of hostilities, Brown returned to New Orleans, and visited
Vicksburg to look after the business of the firm of Br·own &
Johnston, and the other firms with which that was connected.
Finding that suits had been commenced by creditors of the firm
against him as surviving partner, and, in some instances,
attachments levied, he became satisfied·that unless he adopted
some mode of disposing of the partnership property and apply·
ing its proceeds to the payment of the debts in their just order,
the whole would be wasted or a few active creditors would
absorb it all. Under these circumstances, acting by advice of
<'ounsel, he executed a deed conveying all the property of the
firm of Brown & Johnston to John A. Klein, in trust for the

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 16:47 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112102486216
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

212

OASES O.N PARTNERSHIP.

creditors of that partnership, and providing that the surplus,
if any, should be for the use of tb.e partners and their heirs or
devisees. Klein accepted the trust, and pursuant thereto paic.l
debts with the lands, or with the prvceeds of the sale of them.
There is an allegation that Shanks, while acting as executor,
and about the time the deed of trust was made, had an int&rview with Brown, and, being fully infonned of the condition
of the affairs of the partnership, expressed his approval of
what Bro·wn intended to do. This is denied in the answer.
and some testimony is taken on the subject. Other questions
of bad faith on the part of Brown are raised. But in the view
which we take of the case the record establishes that Brown
acted in good faith, and did the best that could be done fot·
the creditors of the partnership and for those interested iD
its property.
It appears that after all this property had been sold to purchasers in good faith, Shanks, as executor of .Johnston's will,
instituted actions of ejectment against them. They thereupon
filed this bill to enjoin him from further prosecuting the
actions, aud compel him to convey the legal title to the real
estate which came to him by the will of his testator. A
decree was rendered in conformity with the prayer of the bill,
and Shanks appE'·aled.

lV. B. Pittman, and J. Z. George, for appellant.
E. D. Clark, for appellees.

J. (After stating the facts as above). Being sati~
fted, as already stated, of the fairness anc.l honesty of the pro·
ceedings of Brown and Klein and of the purchasers from
them, and waiving as of no consequence, in regard to the
principal point in the case, the allegation of Shank's concurence in or ratification of Brown's action, we proceed to cousider the question as to the power or authority of Brown, the
surviving partner, to bind ~hanl{s by the conveyance to Klein,
and by the sales thereunder made.
There is no doubt that in the present case all the real estate
which is the subject of this controversy is to be treated as
partnership property, bought and held for partnership purposes within the rule of equity on that subject. Nor is it denied
MILLEn,
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by the counsel who have so ably argued the case for the appellant tl1at the equity of the creditors of the partnership to haYe
their debts paid out of this property is superior to that of the
devisee, Johnston. Their contention is that this right could
only be enforced by proceedings in a court of justice, and that
no power existf'd in Brown, the surviving partner, to convey
the legal title vested in Shanks by the will of Johnston, nor
even to make a contract for the sale of the real estate which a
court will enforce against Shanks as the holder of that title.
Counsel for the appellees, while conceding that neither the
deed of Brown to Klein, nor of Klein to his vendees, conveyed
the legal title of the undivided moiety which was originally in
.Johnston, maintain that Brown, as surviving partner, had, for
the purpose of paying the debts of the partnership, power to
sell and transfer the equitable interest or right of the partnership, and of both partners, in the real estate, that the trust
deed which he mnde to Klein was effectual for that purpose,
and that by Klein's sales to the other appellees they became
invested with this equitable title and the right to compel
Shanks to convey the legal title.
One of the learned counsel for the appellant concedes that
at the present day the doctrine of the English court of chan·
eery "extends to the treating of the realty as personalty for
all purposes, and gives the personal representatives of the
deceased partner the land as personalty, to the exclusion of
the heir," and that the principle has "acquired a . firm foot·
hold in English equity jurisprudence, that partneship real
estate is in fact in all cases, and to all intents and purposes,
personalty." He maintains, however, that the principle has
not been carried so far in the courts of America; that the
extent of the doctrine is that the creditors of the partnership
and the surviving partner have a lien on the real estate of
the partnership for debts due by the firm, and for any balance
fouud due to either partner on a final settlement of the partnership tra_n sactions; and that the right of the surviving
partner, and of the creditors through him, is no more than a.
lien, which cannot be asserted by a sale, as if the property were
personal, bnt to the enforcement of which a resort to a cou'rt
of equity is necessary.
We think that the error which lies at the foundation of this
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argument is in the assumption .that the equitable rigl!t of the
surviving partner and the creditors is nothing but a lien.
It is not necessary to decide here that it is not a lien in the
strict sense of that word, for if it be a lien in any sense it is
also something more.
It is an equitable right accompanied by an equitable title. It
is an interest in the property which courts of chancery will
recognize and support. \Vhat is that right? Not only that
the court will, when necessary, see that the real estate so
situated is appropriated to the satisfaction of the partnership
debts, but that for that purpose, and to that extent, it shall be
treated as personal property of the partnership, and like other
personal property pass under the control of the surviving partner. This control enends to the right to sell it, or so much of
it as may be necessary to_pay the partnership debts, or to
satisfy the just claims of the surviving partner.
It is beyond question that such is the doctrine of the English court of chancery, as stated by counsel for appellant.
As this result was reached in that court without the aid of any
statute,. it is authority of very great weight in the inquiry as
to the true equity doctrine on the subject.
We think, also, that the preponderance of authority in the
American courts is on the same side of the question.
In the case of Dyer vs. Olark, 5 Mete. (Mass.) 562, 39 Am. Dec.
697, that eminent jurist, ChiP.f Justice SHAW, while using the
word "lien" in reference to the rights now in controversy, asks,
"What are the true equitable rights of the partners as result·
ing from their presumed intentions in such real estate? Is
not the share of each pledged to the other, and has not each
an equitable lien on the estate, requiring that it shall be held
and appropriated, first, to pay the joint debts, then to repay
the partner who advanced the capital, before it shall be
applied to the separate use of either of the partners? The
creditors have an interest indirectly in the same appropriation;
not because they have any lien, legal or equitable (2 Story, Eq.,
11253), upon the property itself; but on the equitable principle
that the real estate so held shall be deemed to constitute a
part of the fund from which their debts are to be paid before it
can be legally or bonestl:y diverted to the private ' use of the
parties. Suppose this trust is not implied, what would be the
condition of the parties?'' etc. ''But treating it as a trust, the
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rights of all the parties will be preserved." It is clea~ that in
tbe view thus announced the rigli.t of tbe creditors is something
more than an ordinary lien.
In Delmooico "''· Guilla-ume, 2 Sandf. (N. Y.) Ch. 366, where
the precise question arose which we have in the present case,
the vice-chancellor held that "Peter A. Delm<mico, as the sur·
viving partner, becam~ entitled to the Brooklyn farm, and as
between himself and tbe heir of John be had an absolute right
to dispose of it, for the payment of the debts of the firm, in the
same manner as if it had been personal estate."
In so deciding he·followed the English authorities, and cited
Fereday vs. Wightwick, 1 Russ. & M. 45; Phillips vs. Phillips, 1
Myl. & K. 649; Broom VB. Broom, 3 lb. 443; Cookson vs. Cookson,
8 Sim. 529; Townshend va. I;Jevaynes, 11 lb. 498, note.
In Andrews' Heirs vB. Brown's A.dm'r, 21 Ala. 437, the
supreme court said that, "inasmuch as the real estate is con. sidered as personal for the purpose of paying the debts of the
firm, and the surviving partner is charged with the duty '>f
paying these debts, it must of necessity follow that he has the
right in equity to dispose of the real estate for this purposP-,
fc,~ it would never do to charge him with the duty of paying
the debts and at the same time take from him the means of
doing it. Therefore, although he cannot by his deed pass the
legal title which descended to the heir of the deceased partner,
yet as the heir holds the title in trust to pay the debts and the
survivor is charged with this duty, his deed will convey the
equity to the purchaser, and through it he may call on the
heir for the legal title and compelliim to convey it."
In Dupuy va. Leat·emco,·th, 17 Cal. 262, Chief Justice FtEI.D,
in the name of the court, said: "In the view of equity it is
immaterial in whose name the legal title of the property
stands-whether in the individual name of the copartnet·,
or in the joint names of all; it is first subject to the payment
of the. partnership debts, and is then to. be distributed among
the copartners according to their respective rights. The
possessor of the legal title in such case holds the property in
trust for the purposes of the copal'tnership. Each partner bas
an equitable interest in the property until such purposes are
accomplished. Upon dissolution of the copartnership by the
death of one of its members, the surviving partner, who is
charged with the duty of paying the debts, can dispose of this
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equitable interest, and the purchaser can compel the heirs-at·
law of the deceased partner to perfect the purchase by
conveyance of the legal title."
If the case could be held to be one which should be governed
by the decisions of the courts of Mississippi, because the prin·
dple is to be regarded as a rule of property, which we neither.
admit or deny, the result would still be the same.
In one of the earliest cases on that subject in the high court
of errors and appeals of that state, Markham vs. Merritt, 8
~fiss. 437, 40 Am. Dec. 76, Chief Justice SHARKEY, in delivering
the opinion of the court, concurs in the general doctrine that
"when land is held by a firm, and is essential to the purposes
and objects of the partnership, then it is regarded as a part of
the joint stocl,, and will be regarded in equity as a chattel." A
careful examination of the Mississippi cases cited by counsel
has disclosed nothing in contravention of this doctrine, or in
denial of the authority of the surviving partner to dispose of ·
such property for the payment of the debts of the partnership.
We are of the opinion, therefore, that the purchasers from
Klein acquired the equitable title of the real estate conveyed to
him by Brown, that they bad a rfght to the aid of a court of
chancery to compel Shanks to convey the legal title to the undiof Johnston.
vided half of the land, vested in him by the
Decree affirmed.

will

KOTE-See also Mechem's Elem. of Partn., §§lOIS, 111.
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PAIGE vs. PAIGE.
Sttp1·cme Oourt of Iowa, 188"1.
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On Febl'Uary 2, 1880, Simon B. and J obn A. Paige, being In
partnership, under the firm name of S. B. & J. A. Paige, bought
certain mill property with partnership funds but took the title
in their individual names. On February 6, 1880, they united
with R. F. Paige and E. W. Dixon to form a new firm to be
known as Paige, Dixon & Co. The partnership articles pro'\"ided that one-fourth interest in the milling property should
be conveyed to each of the new partners upon their paying an
agreed sum. The new firm took possession of the property,
operated and improved it. In August, 1881, R. F. Paige died
and S. B. ·and ~T. A. Paige acquired his interest in the property,
the business being continued under the former name, until the
death of S. B. Paige. At his death, the firm and all members
thereof were insolvent. The widow of S. B. Paige claimed
dower in the milling property. The heirs of S. B. Paige, his
administrator, J. A . Paige, Dix~n, and Brown, a creditor, were
all mnde parties. The widow's claim being denied, she and the
administrator appealed.
Bills ~ Block, for appellant.
Davison&: Lane and Stewart~ White, for appellees.

RoTHROCK, J. (After stating the facts.) The parol evidence
in the case shows quite conclusively that, at the time the con·
veyance of the property was made, S. B. Paige stated that the
purchase was made by the partnership of S. B. & J. A. Paige,
and the property belonged to the partnership, and he desired
the deed to be made in the name of the partnersl1ip; but that,
under the advice of counsel, it was made in the individual
names of the members of the firm, so that, if the property
should be subsequently sold, it would not be necessary to prove
who were the proper parties to join in a conveyance.
This evidence, and all of the other parol evidence tending tG
show that the property was purchased and paid for by the part·
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nerehlp, Ia objected to by counsel for the plaintitr upon the
ground that a written conveyance of real estate cannot be
varied by parol. Jt is insisted that such evidence is incom·
petent, under the statute, which provides that "conveyances to
two or more, in their own right, create a tenancy in common.
unleu a contrary intent Is expressed." ·code, § 1939. And
the following provisions of the code are also relied u.pon: Section 1934: "Declarations or creations of trust or power, in
relation to real estate, must be executed in the.same manner
as deeds of conveyance; but this provision does not apply to
trusts resulting from the operation or construction of law."
Sections 3663 and 3664 provide that no evidence of any contract for the creation or transfer of any interest in landl'
(except leases for a term not exceeding one year) shall be competent, "unless in writing, signed by the party to be charged."
Appellant concedes that, if the property had been paid for
with partnership money, and one of the partners had takeQ the
title to the whole, there would be a resulting trust for the
benefit of the firm. Hut it is claimed that, as each received the
legal title to jnst the share he was equitably entitled to, there
can be no result~ng trust. The evidence in the case shows
quite satisfactorily that payment for the property was made,
not with the money of each individual partner, but with the
undivided money of the partnership. It seems to us it is
wholly immaterial whether the conveyance was mnde to one or
both the partners. The law recognizes the partnership as a
person distinct from the individual members of the firm, and,
this person or partnership, having paid its money for the property, tb(lre was a resulting trust in its favor, no matte r in
whose name the title was taken.
In the notes to Coles vs. Oole.s. 1 Amer. I ..ead. Cas. (Hare & '\V.J
487, it ls said: "If land is bought with partnership funds, and is
brought into the business of the firm and used for its purposes.
It will be considered as partnership stock, in whose nm11e .9oetier •
the legal title may be unless there be distinct ·evidence of an intention to hold it setJarately, such as an express agreement in the
Rrticles of copartnership, or at the time of the purchase, or the
fact that the price is chRrged to the partners respecth·ely in
their several accounts with the firm; for such arrangements
would operate as a division and distribution of so much of th~
fonds, and each woold take his. share divested of any implied
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tru81: but the mere circumstances that the conveyance waa to

them wpresaly a1 tenants in common, would not, of itself, oo
sumcient to rebut the trust."
In 2 Story, Eq. § 1207, it is said: "Where real estate Is purcllased for partnership purposes, and on partnership account,
It Is wholly immaterial, in view of a court of equity, in whose
name or names the purchaae is made and the conveyance takenwhether in the name of one partner, or of aU partners; whether
in the name of a stranger alone, or a stranger jointly with one
partner. In all these cases, let the legal title be vested in
whom it may, it is in equity deemed partnership property, not
·subject to survivorship, and the partners are deemed the
ce1tuiB que tru8t therefor."
This court has frequently held that where land is purchased
with partnership funds, and intended to be used for partnership purposes, it is to be treated as personal assets of the partnership. Evans vs. Hawley, 35 Iowa 83; Hewitt VB. Rankin, 41
Iowa 35; and other cases. In such case the trust Is not an
express one, but is implied or results from the operation or construction of the law, and is within the exception named in section 1934 of the code, and such a trust may be shown by parol
evidence. York vs. Clemens, 41 Iowa 95; Cotton "· Wood, 25
Iowa 43; Fairchild VB. Fairchild, 64 N.Y. 471.
The cases of Hale VB. Henrie, 2 Watts, 143, 27 Am. Dec. 289;
I{ramer vs. A.rthurB, 7 Pa. St. 165, and Ridg·rcay'B Appeal, 15 Pa.
St. 177, 53 Am. Dec. 586, bold that, "where partners intend
to bring real estate into the partnership, their intention must
be manifested by deed or writing placed on record, that purchasers and crediton may not be deceived. This rule Is doubtless correct, so far as the·rights of innocent purchasers, without
ootice are involved; but this court is committed to the doctrine
above announced, that a purchase of real property with partnership funds, and investing the title in a person or persons
other than the partnership, creates a resulting trust in favor of
the partnership, and the facts necessary 'to establish the trust
may be shown by paro.l.
The evidence that the property involved in this case was paid
for by the firm of S. B. & J. A. Paige is clear and satisfactory.
It consists of the declaration of S. B. Paige, made when the
deed was executed, and the recitals in the articles of partnerabip entered into within a few days after the deed was made,
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and the subsequent acts of both of the grantees in the deed in
the management and use made of the property.
2. The defendant Brown is a creditor of the firm of Paig(',
Dixon & Co., and attached the property in controversy in an
action upon his claim. His counsel submitted an argument in
the cause, the drift of which seems to be a claim. that he, as a
creditor of that firm, is entitled to a preference over the creditors of the firm of S. B. & J. A. Paige in the property in controversy. It would be improper to determine that question in
this appeal.
3. The administrator of S. B. Paige appealed, and claims
that the debts against the estate were contracted while the
title to the property was in decedent, and on the fa.ith and
credit of the same. He insists that the equities of these individual creditors should not be ignored for the benefit of the
finn creditors. But, as the property in controversy is assets
of the partnership, it is first liable to the payment of the partnership debts, and a credit<!r of one of the firm has no claim
thereon until such debts are paid. Evans vs. Hawley, 3:J
Iowa 83.
We unite in the conclusion that, as it is conceded that both
of the partnerships and all of the surviving members thereof
are insolvent, the plaintiff is not entitled to a dower interest
in the property in dispute. Affirmed.
NoTB.-Bee &lao Mechem's Elem. of Partn.,

~

105, 109.

VI.
THE FIRM NAME AND GOOD WILL.

WILLIAMS vs. FARRAND.
Supreme Oourl of Michigan, i891.
88 Mich. 478, 50 N. W. Rep. 446, 14 L. R. A. 161.

Blll by Wm. 0. Williams, Alanson Sheley, and Alanson
Sheley Brooks, against JacobS. Farrand, Richard P. Williams,
Harvey S. Clark, and JacobS. Farrand, Jr., to restrain defend·
ants from using any combination of the· names Farrand and
Williams, as a part of the firm name of defendants, and from.
in any way interfering with the complainants' use and enjoy·
ment of the business formerly belonging to "Farrand, Williams
& Oo.," of which firm complainants claim to be the successors.
The facts appear in the opinion.
·
The court below dismissed the bill, and complainants appeal.
w•lliam H. Well8 (Bowen, Dougla8 & Whiting and Ash-ley

Pond, of counsel), for appellants.
Moore & Canfield (Henrg H. Swan and F. H. Canfield, of coun-

sel), for appellees.

·

MoGRATB, J. Complainants and defendants had been for
some years engaged as wholesale druggists on Larned street
east, in the city of Detroit, as copartners, under the name and
style of Farrand, Williams & Co. There were no articles of
copartnership, and Iio term fixed for which the partnership
was to continue. Prior to the taking of the annual inventory
In January, 1890, defendant, Jacob S. Farrand, expressed to
complainant Sheley a desire to dissolve the copartnership. Mr.
Sheley declined to say anything until the annual inventory
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should be taken, and the business of the year ·settled up. On
-the 25th of January, 1890, after the completion of the inventory, defendants made a proposition in writing to "pay Messrs.
Sheley & Brooks, for their interest in the_firm of Farrand, Williams & Co., the amount of their interest being fifty thousand dollars ($50,000), the sum• of sixty thousand dollars
(f60,000), or they will take for their interest, the amount being
one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000), the sum of one hundred and twenty thousand dollars ($120,000), the same to be
paid in cash, or in notes acceptable to the parties who sell, one
week from today, Saturday, the first day of February next.
The store to be leased to the party purchasing for a term of
five years, at a rent of eight thousand dollars ($8,000) .a year,
and the warehouse to be rented to the party purchasing, at a
net rental of 6 per cent a year on the cost of their interest
therein." On the following Monday Mr. Sheley accepted
defendants' offer to sell, and on the first day of February following a bill of sale was prepared, reciting, among other
things, that defendants, in consideration of the sum of $120,000, paid to them by Alanson Sheley, party of the second part,
"have bargained and sold unto the said party of the second
part all our right, title, and interest to the within-mentioned
resources of said firm, including the good will attendant upon
the business." This bill of sale was not execu ted, objection
being made to the clause, "including the good will attendant
upon the business;" and a new instrument was prepared,
reciting that defendants, parties of the first part, "for and in
consideration of the sum of one hundred and twenty thousand
dollars, to them paid by Alanson Sheley, of the second part,
have bargained and sold, and by these presents do grant(and
convey, unto the said party of the second part, his executors.
administrators, or assigns, all our right, title, and interest in
the firm of Farrand, Williams & Company." This instrument
was executed, the insurance policies were assigned by Farrand, Williams & Co. to Williams, Sheley & Brooks, and an
agreement to assume and pay all the debts of the old firm was
executed by Williams, Sheley & Brooks, and delivered to
defendants. Defendants afterwards formed a copartnership
under the firm name of Farrand, Williams & Clark, and opened
a wholesale drug establishment at No. 32 Woodward avenue.
Complainants adopted the name and style of Williams, Sheley
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& Brooks, posted their firm name, as successor to Farrand,
Williams & Co., over their place of business; had the words
"Williams, Sheley & Brooks, Successors to" printed in red ink
over the words "Farrand, Williams & Co." wherever the latter

appeared upon letter heads, bill heads, labels, and on other
stationery; advertised themselves in the newspapers and trade
journals as Williams, Sheley & Brooks, successors to Farrand,
Williams & Co.; and sent out circulars to the trade containing
not only their firm name, }?ut the names of the individual members of the new firm. Defendants also extensively advertised
the new enterprise through the same mediums, calling special
attention to the names of the members of the new firm, their
long connection with the drug business, and the dissolution of
the old firm, and soliciting trade.
The complainants contend that the assignment by defendants of all interest in the business carried with it the good
will of the business, and, having purchased the good will of
that business, they are entitled to the exclusive use of the old
firm name; that, while defendants have the right to engage in
the same line of business, they have not the right to such a
collocation of their own names as will produce confusion,
attract custl)mers, and secure orders, letters, and goods
intended for the old firm; that defendants have no right to
simulate their labels, to solicit their customers, or entice away
their employes. "Good will" has been defined by this court
to be "the favor which the management of a business has won
from the public, and the probability that old customers will
continue their patronage." Chittenden VB. Whitbeck, 50 Mich.
401, 15 N. W. Rep. 526. Lord ELDON, in Cruttwell VB. Lye, 17
Ves. 335, defined it as simply the probability that old customers will resort to the old place.
The following propositions must be regarded as established
by the clear weight of authority:
1. Though a retinng partn~r may have assigned his interest
in the partnership business, including the good will thereof,
to his copartner, he may, in the absence of an express agreement to the contrary, engage in the same line of business in
the same locality, and in his own name.
2. He may, by newspaper advertisements, cards, and general circulars, invite the general public to trade with him, and
through the same mediums advertise his long connection with
the old business, and his retirement therefrom.
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3. He will not be allowed, howeyer, to use his own name,
or to advertise his business, in such a way as to lead the public to suppose that he is continuing the old business; hence,
will not be allowed to advertise himself as its successor.
4. The purchaser will not, in tile absence of an express agreement, be allowed to continue the business in the name of the
old firm.
5. That no man has a right to sell or advertise his own business or goods as those of another, and so mislead the public,
and injure such other person.
In Myers vs. Bteggy Co., 54 Mich. 215, 19 N. W. Rep. 961, and
20 N. W. Rep. 545, A, Band Chad been ~arrying on business
as copartners at Kalamazoo, under the name and style of "The
Kalamazoo Wagon Company." A, B and C sold to complain·
ant "all their interest in the property, money, assets, a·nd good
will," etc., in and to their business. After such sale complain·
ant's assignors formed a corporati~n under the name of "The
Kalamazoo Buggy Company;" pitched their plant in the same
locality; commenced the manufacture of the same class of
goods; issued circulars to the trade, with descriptive cuts of
the same character and appearance as those contained in complainant's circulars, and a.dvertised their place of business as
being in the same locality. In that case the name of "The
Kalamazoo Wagon Company" was an assumed name. The
only distinctive feature in the name adopted by defendants was
the use of a word of similar meaning to that for which it bad
been substituted. The defendants were not using their own
names. It was a pure case of piracy, and the facts clearly
indicated an intention to deceive the public. As was said in
Burgess vs. Burgess, 3 De Gex, M. & G. 896: "Where a person
ts selling goods under a particular name, and another person,
not having that name, is using it, it may be presumed that
he so uses it to represent the goods sold by him as the goods
of the person whose name be uses; but where the defendant
sells goods onder his own name, and it. happens that the plaintiff has the same name, it does not follow that defendant is sell·
ing his goods as the goods of the plaintiff." In Lee vs. Haley,
L. R. 5 Cb. App. 155, plaintiff bad been doing business at No.
22 Pall Mall, under the artificial name of "Guinea Coal Com·
pany." Defendant, who bad been their manager, set up a
rival business under the name of "Pall Mall Guinea Coal Com·
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pany," at 46 Pall Mall. His envelopes and business cards were
printed in such a way as to resemble the plaintiff's. In GT.enny
VB. Smith, 2 Drew & S. 476, defendant had been in plaintiff's
employ, and started in business on his own account. Over his
shop he had.his own name, Frank P. Smith, printed in large,
black letters on a white ground, but on the brass plates in the
windows of his shop be bad engraved the word "frollll," in
small letters, and the words "Thrasher & Glenny~' (the name
of plaintiff's firm) in large letters. He had an awning, also,
in front of his shop, which, when let down, would cover his
own name, and expose only the name of plaintiff's firm. The
court held that defendant was deceiving the public, and an
injunction was issued. Croft VB. Day, 7 Beav. 84; Levy vs.
Walker, 10 Cb. Div. 438; Turton VB. 'l'urton, 42 Ch. Div. 128;
Hookltam VB. Pottage, L. R. 8 Cb. App. 91; Meneely VB. Meneely,
62 N.Y. 431; Fullwood VB. FuUwood, 9 Cb. Div. 176.
6. That when an express contract bas been made to remain
out of business, or for the use by a purchaser of a fictitious
name, or a trade name, or a trade mark, the courts will enjoin
the continued violation of such agreement. In G1·ow vB. Seligman, 47 Mich. 607, 11 N. W. Rep. 404, defendant had carried
on the clothing business at Bay City, under the name and style
of "Little Jake," and sold out to complainant, and expressly
conveyed the right to use the name and style of "Little Jake,"
and agreed that he would not again engage in that business
at Bay City, and defendant was enjoined from violating his
agreement. In Shackle vs. Baker, 14 Ves. 468, defendant agreed
that he would not, for the space of 10 years, carry on or permit any other person to carry on the same business in Middlesex, London, or Westminster, and that be would use his best
endeavors to assist plaintiff, and procure customers for . him.
In Hitch cock vs. Coker, 6 A dol. & E. 438, Coker bad agreed to
enter the services of the plaintiff, and that he would not at
any · time thereafter engage in the business in which his
employer was engaged. To the same effect are Beal VB. Chase·,
31 Mich. 490; Doty VB. It!artin, 32 Mich. 462; Burckhardt fiB.
Burckhardt, 36 Ohio St. 261; Vernon vs. Hallam, 34 Ch. Div.
752; To~ vB. Gross, 127 N. Y . .480, 28 N. E. Rep. 469.
7. That an assignment of all the stock, property, and effects
of a business, or the exclusive right to manufacture a given
article, oarries with it the exclusive right to use a fictitious
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name in which such business has been carried on, and such
trade marks and trade names as have been in use in such
business. These incidents attach to the business or right of
manufacture, and pass with it. C-ourts have uniformly held
that a trade mark bas no separate existence; that there is
no property in words, as detached from the thing to which
they are applied; and that a conveyance of the thing to which
it is attached carries with it the name. Dia:on Co. vs. Ouggen·
heitn, 2 Brewst. 321; Lockwood vs. Bostwick, 2 Daly 521; Deringer vs. Plate, 29 Cal. 292. In Gage vs. Pu.blislting Co., 11 Ont.
App. 402, Gage and Beatty were copartners~ and, among other
things, were engaged in publishing "Beatty's Headline Copy
Books." Beatty sold out to Gage all his interest in the business, and engaged in the drug business. G~ge continued for
somoe years the sale of the copy books, when Beatty licensed
defendant to publish "Beatty's New and Improved Headline
Copy Books." In Hoxie vs. Chancy, 143 Mass. 592, 10 N. E.
Rep. 713, Hoxie and Chaney were copartners, engaged in the
manufacture of soaps, two brands of which were known as '
"''Hoxie's Mineral Soap" and "Hoxie's Pumice Soap." These
were simply trade names, by which the articles were known,
and the right to use them passed with the right to manufacture
the articles. In Cement Co. vs. Le Page, 147 Mass. 206, 17 N.
E. Rep. 304, Brooks and Le Page, as copartners, sold to plain·
tiff the good will of their business, and the right to use their
trade marks. They were engaged in the manufacture of glues.
Their light glues they named "Le Page's Liquid Glues." The
court held that the right to use the name by which the articles
were known to the trade passed with the right to manufacture
the articles. In Men·y vs. Hoopes, 111 N.Y. 415, 18 N. E. Rep.
714, the parties were formerly partners. Hoopes sold to Merry,
but afterwards undertook to use, certain trade mGrks, viz., the
"Lion Brand and "Ph<Pnix Brand," but the court lleld th.a:t
these trade marks passed to the assignee. In Hall vs. Barrows,
4 De Gex, J. & S. 150, ·the firm ba.d marked the chief part of
their output of iron with the initial letters of their partnership name, "B., B. & H.," surmounted by a crown, and the
court h~ld the letters and crown had become a trade mark,
and, as such, should be included as a subject of value. Brown
Trade Marks, 358; Millington vs. Fox, 3 Mylne & C. 338-352;
Myers vs. B-uggy Co., 54 Mich. 215, 19 N. W. Rep. 961, and 20
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N. W. Rep. 545; Sohier vs. Johnson, 111 Mass. 242; Shipwr-ight
O'tements, 19 Wkly Rep. 599; Rogers vs. 7'aintor, 97 Mass. 291.
8. A corporate name is regarded as in the nature of a trade
mark, even though composed of individual names, and its simu:
Iation. may be restrained. After adoption it follows the cor·
poration. Statutes providing for the organization of corpora·
tions usuaJly prohibit the adoption of the same name by twG
companies. Holmes v8. Manufacturing Oo1, 37 Conn. 278.
These propositions are· sustained by a long line of author·ities,
but in none of the cases cited does the question hinge upon a
grant of good will. Complainants insist, however, U1at a grant
of good will may be implied, and, when express or implied, it.
imposes certain restraints upon the vendors, viz.: (1) That
they cannot afterwards personally solicit customers of the olcl
firm, and (2) that they are restricted in the use that may be
made of their own names.
I. The doctrine that a retiring partner who has conveyed his
interest in an established business, whether the good will be
included or not, cannot personally solicit the customers of the
old firm, bas no support in principle. A retiring partner con·
: veys, in addition to his inteN'st in the tangible effects, simply
the advantages that an established business possesses over a
new enterprise. 'l'he old business is an assured success, the
:new an experiment. The old business is a going business, and
:produces its accustomed profits on the day after the transfer.
It is capital already invested and earning profits. The continuIng partner gets these advantages. The new business must be
built up. 'fhe capital taken out of the old concern will earn
nothing for months, and in all probability the first year's business will show loss instead of profit. For a time at least it is
capital awaiting investment, or inyested but earning notl.ting. The retiring partner takes these chances or disadvantages. He does not agree that the benefit derived from his
connection with that business shall continue. He does not
agree that the old business shall continue to have the benefit
of his name, reputation, or service; nor does he guaranty the
continuance of that patronage which may have been attracted
by his name or reputation. He does not pledge a continuance
of conditions. He takes out of the business an element that
has contributed to the success of that business. He sells only
those advantages and incidents which attach to the property
fiB.

I
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and location, rather than those which attach to the person of
the vendor. T. Pars. Partn. 409. He sells only so much of the
custom as wilJ continue in spite of his retirement and activity.
He sells probabilities, not assurances. It is urged that by the
solicitation of the customers of the old firm be is endeavoring
to impair the value of that which he has sold, but every act of
his in the direction of the establishment of the new business
tends to divert the customers of the old firm. The right to
enter into the same line of business in the same locality-next
door, if you please-to advertise his former connection with
the old business, and· to solicit generally the patronage of the
public, is conceded by the clear weight of authority. The exercise of these rights necessarily involves the diversion of cns·
tom to the new firm. Does not the right to again engage in the
same line of business include all of the incidents of that right?
Upon what principle is the line arbitrarily drawn at the per·
sonal solicitation of the customers of the old firm? The right
to engage in bm;iness in his own name attaches to the retiring
partner, and, unless expressly so agreed, there is no restraint
upon that right. In the present case, Jacob S. Farrand had
been at the head of the old house for half a century. His
name could not be subsequently used in the same line o~ busi·
ness without attracting the attention of the entire trade, nor
without affecting the probabilities of a continuance of tbe
patronage of the old house. He gave no hint that he did not
intend to again engage in business. All of the circumstance~:~
pointed in the direction of a new business. The retirement
was not of Jacob S. Farrand alone, but of his son-in-law and
Mr. Clark also. The proposition made to complainants was
not ouly to sell but to buy. In Ginesi vs. Oooper, 14 Ch. Dh·.
596, the court went so far as to insist that a retiring partner
had no right to deal with the customers of the old firm; bnt
that rule would operate as a restriction upon the public, and
the case is without support in that respect. In Labouchere vs.
Dawst:m, L. R. 13 Eq. 322, the court say that a retiring partner
who sells the good-will of a business is entitled to engage in a
similar business, may publish any advertisement be pleases in
the papers, stating that he is carrying on such a business; he
may ,publish circulars to all the world, and say that he is carrying on such a business; but he is not entitled, by private letter,
or by visit by himself or agent, to solicit the customers of the

,
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old firm. But in Pearson VB. Pearson, 27 Ch. DiT. 145, Labouchere vB. Dawson is expressly overruled. The oourt say: ''The
case of the plaintiff is founded on contract, and the question is,
what are his rights under the contract? There il5 no express
covenant not to solicit the customers of the old business, but
it is said that such a oovenant is to be implied. I have a great
objection to straining words so as to make them imply a contract as to a point upon which the parties h~ ve said nothing,
particularly when it is a point which was in their contemplation. It is said that there was a sale of good will. I think
that there was, taking good-will as defined by Lord ELDON in
Oruttwell vs. Lye, 17 Ves. 335. The purchaser has a right to the
place and a right to get in the old bills; so the purchaser gets
the good will as defined by Lord ELDON. But the term 'good
will' is not used; and when a contract is sought to be implied
we must not substitute one word for another. But suppose
the word did occur, what is the effect of the sale of 'good-will.'
It does not, per 8e, prevent the vendor from carrying on the
same class of business." Vernon vs. Hallam, 34 Ch. Div. 752~
held that a covenant by a vendor of a business, including the
good-will thereof, thllt he would not for a term of years carry
on the business of a manufacturer, either by himself or jointly
with any other person, under the name or style of J. H. or H.
Bros. (the name of the business which he had sold), is not a
convenant that the vendor would not carry on business as a
manufacturer, but against using a particular name or style in
trade, and the injunction was granted to restrain a breach of
that covenant. The court say: "Where a vendor sells his
business, and commences a similar business in the same
locality, and solicits customers of the old house to deal with
him, the court, following the decision in Pearson vs. Pearson.,
and being of the opinion that the case of Laboucllere vs. Da.1cson
had been ovel."ruled by the decision in that case, J."efused to
grant an injunction to restrain such solicitation." Leggott vs.
Barrett, 15 Ch. Div. 306, Ginesi t'S. Coope1', 14 Ch. Div. 5!16, and a
number of other ·cases cited, follow Labottchere vs. Dau;son.
The corl"ect rule is, we think, laid down in Cottrell vs. MatiU·
facturing Co., 54 Conn. 138, 6 Atl. Rep. 791. The court say:
"Cottrell did not require Babcock to agree, and the latter did
not agree, to abstain from the manufacture of printing-presses.
By purchasing the good-will merely Cottrell secured the right
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to conduct the old business at the old stand, with the probability in his favor that old customers would continue. to go
there. If be desired more, he should have secured it by positive agreement. The matter of good will was in his mind.
Presumptively he obtained all that he desired. At any rate~
the express contract is the measure of his right; and since that
conveys a good will in terms, but says no more, the court will
not upon inference deny to the vendor the possibility of successful competition by all lawful mean-s with the vendee in
the same business. No restraint upon trade may rest upon
inference. Therefore, in the absence of any express stipulation
to the contrary, Babcock might lawfully establish a similar
business at the next door, and by advertisement, circular, card,
and personal solicitation invite all the world, including the old
customers of Cottrell & Babcock, to come there and purchase
of him; being very careful always when addressing individuals
or the public, either through the eye or the ear, not to lead
any one to believe that the presses which he offered for sale
were manufactured by the plaintiffs, or that he was the successor to the business of Cottrell & Babcock, or that Cottrell
was not carrying on the business formerly conducted by tha.t
firm. That he may do this by advertisements and· general circulars oourts are substantial~y agreed, we think. But some
have drawn the line here and barred personal solicitation.
They permit the vendor of a good will to establish a like
business at the next door, and by the potential instrumentalities of the newspapers and general circulars ask old customers to buy at the new place, and withhold from him only
the instrumentality of highest power, viz., personal solicitation. To deny him the use of the newspapers and general circulars is to make successful business impossible; and
therefore is to impose an absolute restraint upon the right
to trade. This the courts could not do, except upon express
a~reement. But possibly the old customers might not see
these; and in some cases, the courts have undertaken to preserve this possibility for the advantage of the vendor, and
found a legal pri.nciple upon it. Other courts have been of
the opinion that no legal principle can be made to rest upon
. this distinction; that to deny the vendor personal nccess to old
customers eYen would put him at such disadvantage in competition as to endanger his success; that they ought not
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upon inference to bar him from trade, either total1y or par·
tially; and that all restraint of that nature must come from
his positive agreement. And such, we :think, is the present
tendency of the law."
Good will may be said to be those intangible advantages
or incidents which are impersonal, so far as the grantor is
concerned, and att.ach to the thing conveyed. Where it con·
sists of the advantages of location, it follows an assignment
of the lease of that location. Again, it may not depend
at all upon location, as in the c>.ase of a newspaper, and it
would follow an assignment of all interest in the plant, prop·
erty, effects, and business. A partnership name may become
impersonal, after the death of the partners, and it is then
treated like a fictitious or corporate name. A surname may
become impersonal when it is attached to an article of manu·
facture, and becomes the name by which such article is known
in the market, and the right to use the name may in conse-quence follow a grant of the right to manufacture that article,
or a sale of the business of manufacturing such article;
and where the right to manufacture is exclusive, the right to
the use of the name as applied to that article becomes likewise
exclusive. It appears, however, that in the first bill of sale
which was prepared the words, "including the good-will
attendant upon said business," were inserted, but were
objected to, stricken out, and a new bill of sale prepared,
omitting any reference to good will. But it is said that this
clause was objected to because, in the opinion of the objector,
it might preclude him from engaging in the same business,
whereas, under the law, be would have such a right had the
clause remained. The only use, however, which complain·
ants now propose to make of the clause, treated as a
part of the instrument, is to restrict that right to engage in
business by taking away one of its incidents. Adopting the
language used in Churton VB. Douglas, Johns. Eng. Ch. 174, with
reference to the right of plaintiff to continue the use of the old
firm name, "I think the defendant is fully entitled to the benefit
of the observation that it was proposed to him to insert such a
provision, and that he refused it. I think, therefore, that this
case goes a step higher than 'the authorities, and the defendant
fa entitled to put his case in the highest possible form with
r<•gard to his right" to engage in the same line of business
I
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II. The next question relates to the use by defendants of the
firm name of Farrand, Williams & Clark. It is clear that
complainants have no right to oontinue their business under
the old firm name. The role that upon a dissolution of a firm
neither partner has the right to use the firm name, as well as
the other rule that a retiring partner has no right to use the old
firm name, are both subject to the exception that a person bas
the right to use his own name unless he has expressly covenanted otherwise. In case A B should sell out his business
to C D, in the absence of a grant to C D of the right to use
the name of A B, or an agreement to the contrary, is there
any doubt but that A B would have the right to engage in the
same line of business in his own name? In that case, such a
probability would naturally suggest itself to C D, and, if he
desired to get the advantage of A B's abstinence from busi- .
ness, he would insist upon an agreement to that effect. In the
present case, Mr. Farrand's name bad ·been at the head of the
firm name for nearly half a century and the name of anothel' of
the retiring members corresponded with the only other surname used in the old firm name. It must have been evident to
complainants that in any event the name of the new firm would
be similar to that of the old firm. If complainants desired any
protection against such a use of the names of the retiring mem·
hers, they should have inserted a provision to that effect in the
bill of sale. The right to continue the use of a firm name, as
well as a restriction upon the use by a retiring partner of his
own name, are proper subjects of bargain, sale, and agreement.
Here neither have been purchased. Complainants have purchased the business of the ·old firm. They have the right to
ad>ertise themselves as succeeding to and continuing that
business. The exercise of such a right does not contlict with
any right reserved by defendants. Complainants, by such a.
holding out, commit no fraud, misrepresentation, or deception.
They publish the truth only. Defend~ts have the right to use
their own names, or any collocation of their own names. They
have not adopted the old firm name, although it would have
been appropriate. They have adopted no fictitious name.
There is no deception in the use of the name adopted by them.
The business of the old firm is a separate and distinct business.
Defendants have no right to advertise their business as a continuation of the old firm business. They are subject to the
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rut~ already laid down, that no man has the right to sell or
advertise his own goods or business as that of another, and so
mislead the public and injure such other person. In Lathrop
vs. Lathrop, 47 How. Pr. 532, after dissolution J. Lathrop
formed a copartnership with one Tisdale, and adopted th<>
name of J. Lathrop & Co., which was the style of the olii
firm. Held that, in the absence of any covenant witl1 his late
partner, he might legally do so. In Reeves vs. Denicke, 12 Abb.
Pr. (N. S.) .92, the court say: "In this case, the firm name was
not sold or transferred to defendants as constituting a part of
the partnership property; nor did the sale, in terms or by necessary Implication, include the good will; and it is therefore
unnecessary to determine whether the partnership name was
a part of such good will. There was no restraint upon a retirIng partner holding him from engaging in a. similiar business,
and he violated no obligation ·by forming a. new firm under his
own name, and transacting a business in all respects like that
he had released to them. It is quite clear that defendants
acquired no right to continue the use of the partnership nam(~
of the old firm. If the good reputation of that· firm waa
intended to pass and become a part of defendant's new firm, it
should have been provided for in the conveyance. That it was
not intended it should pass is evident from the omission to
include it." Seed Co. vs. Dorr, 70 Iowa 481, 30 N. W. Rep. 866;
Bassett va. Percival, 5 Allen 345; Ma.chine Co. vs. McGowan, 22
Ohio St. 370. In Turton vs. Turton, 42 Ch. Div. 128, although
there were no contract relations between the parties, the court
say: ''No man can have the right to represent his goods as the
goods of another; the.refore, if a man uses his own name, that
is no prima facie case, but if he, besides using his own name,
does other things which show that he is intending to represent,
and is in point of fact making his goods represent, the goods of
another, then he is to be prohibited; but not otherwise." In
Hookham vs. Pottage, L. R. 8 Ch. App. 91, plaintiff and defendant had been copartners as Hookham & Pottage. Plaintiff
succeeded to the business, and defendant afterwards set up
a shop only a few doors away, and printed over the door the
words, "Pottage, from Hookham & Pottage." The court
held that "defendant bad a right to state that be was fonuerly
manager, and afterwards a partner, in the firm of Hookham &
Pottage, and that he had a right to avail himself by the state-
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ment of that fact of the reputation which he had so acquired,
but that he had no right to make that statement, or to avail
himself of that reputation, in such a way as was calculated to
represent to the world that the business which ~ was carry~
ing on was the business of Hookham & Pottage, or that Hookham had any interest in it." In Meneely VB. Meneely, 62 N. Y.
431, the court say: "If defendants were using the name with
the intention of holding themselves out as the successors of
Andrew Meenely, and as the proprietors of the old established
foundry which was being conducted by plaintiffs, and thus
enticing away cnstomers, and if with that intention they used
the n~me in a such a way as to make it appear that of the
plaintiff's firm, or resorted to any artifice to induce the belief
that defendants' establishment was the same as that of pla.inti1Is, and, pel"haps if without any fraudulent intent, they had
done acts calculated to mislead the public as to the identity of
the establishment, and produce injury beyond that which
resulted from similarity in name, then the court would enjojn
them, not from the use of the name, but from using it in such a
way 8.8 would deceive the public. • • • Every man has the
absolute right to use his own name in his own business, even
thoug~ he may thereby interfere with or injure the busin~ss
of another, bearing the same name, provided he does not resort
to any artifice ot• contrivance for the purpose of producing the
impression that the establishments are identical, or do anything calculated to mislead." In Fullwood VB. Fullwood, 9 Ch.
Div. 176, R. J. Fullwood carried on business as manufacturer
of annatto at 24 Somerset place, Roxton, from 1785 to 1832.
Plaintiff and three brothers, one of whom was the defendant,
succeeded to the business, but ultimately the right to carry on
the business vested in the plaintiff. Defendants, -Mathew
Fullwood, and another brother formed a copartnership in the
name of E. Fullwood & Co., and issued and distributed in various ways cards containing the following: "Established over
85 years. E. Fullwood & Co. (late of Somerset place, Roxton).
Original Manufacturers of Liquid and Cake Annatto." Thev
also placed around the bottles containing the annatto a wrap-"'
per -resembling that which plaintiff used. The court say:
"Defendants are entitled to carry on their business under the
finn name which they have adopted, if they are so minded, provided they do not. represent themselYes to be carrying on the
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business which has descended to plaintiff." In Bininger vs.
Clark, 60 Barb. 113, the defendant wrongfully advertised him·
eelf as aucceseor to the old firm, and made such a use of his own
name as to indicate a fraudulent intent. Hegeman vs. Hegcmcm, 8 Daly 1; Levy vs. Walker, 10 Oh. Div. 436. In Churton t1ll.
DouglM, Johns. Eng. Ch. 174, 5 Jur. {N. S.) 887, plaintiff and
defendant had carried on the business as stuff manufacturers
at Bradford, in a building owned by defendant, and known as
"Hall Ings," under the name and style of John Douglas & Co.
Defendant sold out to plaintiff all his share, right, and title in
the business, including the good wlll, and executed to plaintltf
a seven-years lease of the premises occupied by the firm.
\Vithin a soort period defendant set up in the same line of
business, next door to plaintiff, in a part of the same building,
known as "Hall logs," adopting the old firm name of John
Douglas & Co. The court held that defendant, by the use of
the old tlrm name, and the surroundings, would be
obtaining the custom of the old firm, by inducing the belief
that his was a continuation of the old establishment. The
court say: "The authorities, I think, are conclusive upon
this point that the mere expression of parting with or selling
the good wlll, does not imply a contract on the part of the person parting with that good will not to set up again in a
similar business; but I use the expression 'similar' to avoid
including the case of the vendor seeking to caiTy on the identi·.
cal business. He does not contract that he will not carry on
an exactly similar business, with all the advantnge which h•~
might acquire from his industry and labor, and from the regard
people may bave fot·l.tim, and that in a place next door, if you
like, to the very place where the former business was carried
on. It is settled that it is the fault of those who wish any protection against such a class that they do not take care to insert
the provision to that effect in the deed."
The same principle obtains with reference to trade marks.
One may have a right in his own name as a trade mark, but be
cannot have such a right as against another person of the sa me
name, unless the defendant use a form of stamp or label so like
that used by the plaintiff as to represent that the defendant's
goods are of the plaintiff's manufacture. Sykes vs. Sykes, 3
Barn. & C. 541; Hollotoay vs. Holloway, 13 Beav. 209; Rogers
.vs. Taintor, 97 Mass. 291; Gilman vs. H·unnewell, 122 Mass. 139;
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Goodyear'& India Rubber Glove Manttf'g Oo. vs. Goodyear Rubber
Oo., 128 U. S. 598, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 166. The tests applied by

all the authorities in this class .of cases are: Is a corporate
or trade or fictitious name simulated? Is the name assumed
or adopted false in fact? Is it used in connection with locality
or other representations, so as to convey the impression that
the ,business is a continuation of the old business? Defendants are not responsible for the blunders made by clerks, postal
clerks, mail carriers, telephone employes, or newspaper reporters. In Meneely VB. Meneely, the court say: "'\Yhere the only
confusion created is that which results from the similarity
of names, the court will not interfere." In Turton vs. Turton
it is said that "defendants are not responsible for the blunders
made by the busineSB communityin not distinguishing between
John Turton & Sons and Thomas Turton & Sons." See, also,
RichardsO"n & Boynton Oo. vs. Richardson & Mot·gan Oo., 8 N. Y.
Supp. 52; Goodyear'& Indw Rubber Glove Manufg Oo. vs. Goodgear IJ.ubber Oo., 128 U.S. 598, 9 Sup. Ct. 166.
Any collocation of the names of Farrand and Williams
would create some confusion. Defendant Clark had been connected with the old business foo- thirty years, and Williams,
the son-in-law of Mr. Farrand, for twenty-one years. Defendants are using their own names only. They went into business on Woodward avenue, several blocks from the old stand.
In every letter-head, bill-head, card, or advertisement in which
their firm name appears they give the individual names of the
members of the firm, the new place of business, and in no case
have they represented that they are successors to the old firm.
The bill-beads used by the old firm had a cut of the old stand
on the left-hand upper corner, about three inches square.
'l;hose of the new firm contain no cut, and less than half of the
amount of matter. It would be exceedingly difficult to prepare two bill-heads more unlike. The letter-heads of the old
firm contained two cuts,-one of the old stand, at the left
hand, and one of the Peninsular White ·Lead & Color Works,
on the right. The dissimilarity is marked. The envelopes
used by the old firm contain eight printed lines on the upper
left-band corner, occupying an inch and three-quarters of
space. Those used by the new firm contain five lines, occupying about three-quarters of an inch in space. There has been
no attempt at lmitati~n in words or type. On March 15th
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they announced, through circulars distributed generally, that
they had engaged in business at 32 and 34 Woodward avenue;
that they expected to have their new store ready for occupancy in a few days; and that the work of getting a new stock
of goods would be pushed as fast as possible. On April 7th
they issued another circular, announcing that they were now
prepared to fill orders, and hoping that the friendly acquaintance of many years would be continued. An advertisement
is produced, wherein defendants say: "Though it may seem
paradoxical, it is nevertheless true, that the wholesale drughouse of Farrand, Williams & Clark is both the oldest and the
newest representative of this important commercial industry
in Detroit." But in the same advertisement they announce
the dissolution of the old firm, their retirement from said firm,
and the formation and business location of the new firm. It
is difficult to imagine how such an advertisement would mislead the public. It contains no false colors. Both parties
advertiaed e:rtensively in the city and State papers and in the
trade journals; complainants giving the names of their individual members, and their ' new firm name, and advertising
themselves as the successors to Farrand, Williams & Co.; and
·. defendants giving the names of their individual members, and
1
,the name and business location of the new firm. Complain.ants sent out circulars to the trade generally, informing it of
'the dissolution of the old firm, the fact that they were the successors, and giving their firm name; and defendants sent out
circulars announcing their withdrawal and the formation of
a new firm. There is no doubt but that the dissolution of this
firm, the fact that complainants had bought out the interests
of defendants, the name adopted by complainants, the formation of the new firm, the names of its members, and the defendants' firm name, have been most extensively advertised by both
parties, not only in the city, but throughout the State and
Union. Nearly fifty letter have been received by the old firm,
since the dissolution, addressed to Farrand & Williams; Farrand & Williams Paint Co.; Farrand & Williams Drug Co.;
Farrand, Sheley & Brooks; Farrand, Williams & Sheley; Farrand, Williams, Sheley & Co.; Farrand, Williams & Brooks;
Farrand & Co.; Williams, Farrand & Co.; Farrand, Sheley &
Broo"ks; Williams & Farrand; Williams, Farrand & Co.; and
Williams & Co. It cannot be said that any act of defendan.ts
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fa responsible for these blunders. Confusion is inseparable
from t~e dissolution of an old firm and the composition of two
firms from its membership, especially when the name of but one
of those who remained has appeared in the firm n.ame, and the
new firm is composed of one whose name for nearly half a cen·
tury bas stood at the head of the firm namP., and the surname
of another retiring member is the same as the only other name
used in the old firm name. It appears that at the outset
defendant Clark, by mistake opened two or three letters
addressed "Farrand, Williams & Co.," but in every other
Instance defendants refused to receive mail directed to Farrand, Williams & Co., unless directed to defendants' street and
number; that in a single instance Clark inadvertently signed
a letter "Farrand, Williams & Co.;" that tw~ checks were sent
to defendants in payment for goods bought from them, which
were payable to the order of Farrand, Williams & Co., and Mr.
Farrand indorsed them Farrand, Williams & Co., and guaranteed the indorsement; that in four instances merchandise or
articles not marked, but intended for defendants, were delivered to complainants, and afterwards taken away; that in two
Instances complainants were notified by freight agents that
freight awaited delivery; that in both the goods were manifested to Farrand, Williams & Co., but marked, and were afterwards delivered, to Farrand, Williams & Clark, for whom they
were intended; that complainants were notified that a sample
box of glassware ·h ad been shipp.ed to them, but they bad not
received it; that defendants received a sample box of glassware from the same bouse, which was billed to Farrand, Williams & Clark, and the latter were notified of the shipment by
the assignors; that simila.r boxes of samples had been sent to
other drug-houses at Detroit; that in one or two instances
merchandise had been delivered to defendan.t s which was
intended for complainants; that in a single instance a customer
at Port Huron, who knew of the dissolution, intending to call
up the old house by telephone, asked for Farrand & WilJiams,
was given Farrand, Williams & Clark, an~ told that it was
Farrand, Williams & Clark, asked the price of oil, and ordered
one ba-rrel; that 112 letters, telegrams, receipts, or bills were
received by complainants directed to Farrand, Williams & Co.,
which were intended for defendants; that of these thirty-five
were directed on the inside to Farrand, Williams & Clark; that
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all of the letters so received were from business houses from
which defendants were buying goods, and none were from
customers of either bouse. These proofs do not tend to show
any appropriation by defendants of the old firm name, or any
attempt to secure the correspondence addressed to the old
firm, or that the customers have been deceived or misled, or
that defendants have practiced any fraud, concealment, or
deception.
Complaint is made in the bill that defendants have enticed
away certain of complainants' salesmen, but this charge is
not made out by the proofs. It is also charged that defendants have simulated certain trade marks and labels used by
the old firm, but no instance of piracy has been established.
Complainants have, under the authorities cited, an. undoubted
right to protection in the proprietary rights acquired b,y the
old firm, and in the use of such trade marks as were in use by
the old firm, and defendants have no right to so imitate the
labels in use by the old firm as to convey the belief that the
goods labeled are from the old house. The use, however, of
the words, "Sold by Farrand, Williams & Co.," or "Prepared
by Farrand, Williams & Co.," upon label, will not be pr()tected as a trade mark or trade·name, and the right to use that
name in that connection did n.ot pass under the bill of sale.
The decree of the court below must be affirmed as of February
27, 1891, and the bill di~missed, with costs to defendants.
MoRsE and GRANT, JJ., concurred with McGRATH, J.
LoNG, J., did not sit.
Ca.a.MPJ,IN, C. J. d.is8ented.

a

NOTE.-For other cases, see Mechem's Elem. of Pa:tn., §§ 86, 87, 88,
89.

Compare a.lso with the two cases following,

.

SNYDER MANUFACTURING CO. vs. SNYDER•

Supreme

Cot~rt of Ohio, 1896.

54 Ohio St. 86, 48 N. E. Rep. 325, 31 L. R. A. 657.

The action below was brought by Andrew 0. Snyder and
William A. Snyder, against the Snyder Manufacturing Com·
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pany, to enjoin the use by the defendant of the name "Snyder
Manufacturing Company," and especially the use of the word
"Snyder" in that name. The plaintiffs, who are now, and for
several years past have been, engaged in business as manufac·
turers of certain kinds of goods at the city of Piqua, in this
state, for many years before carried on the same kind of a business at Ashtabula, also in this state, and by their skill and
attention to business established a valuable reputation in their
business, which was carried on under the name of Snyder &
Son. Then, on the 7th day of September, 1887, they and two
other persons formed a copartnership with W. H. Bradley, who
was the owner of a manufactory at Ashtabula, employed in
the manufacture of goods similar to those made by the plaintiffs, for the purpose of combining the business of the parties,
and thereafter continuing the same as one concern. By the
terms of the partnership agreement, Bradley was to, and did,
contribute one-half of the capital, and, in addition thereto,
furnish the use of his manufactory without charge, and expend
at least ,3,000 in putting the same in repair, as an offset to
which the plaintiffs were to, and did, put in the good will of
their business, and they and their two associates were to, and
did, contribute the other half of the capital, and devote their
time n.nd skill to the manufacture of goods and the general
management of the business of the partnership; Bradley not
being required to give any time or attention thereto. This
copartnership, which carried on its business under the firm .
name of Snyder Manufacturing Company, continued for a
period of three years, acquiring under that name an extensive
and profitable business, and a good reputation; and at its
termination, the parties being unable to effe~t a satisfactory
settlement, the plaintiffs, to obtain a settlement of its affairs,
commenced an action, in which a receiver was appointed at
their instance, who took possession of the partnership effectA,
and afterwards, under an order of the court so directing him,
sold the same, with the good will of the firm, at public sale.
The order of sale contained an express provision that the purchaser should have the right to carry on the business as the
successor of the firm, and was so made ~ithout objection
from any of the partners, all of whom were parties to the
action. The plaintiffs and Bradley were competing bidders
at the sale, when the latter, bidding more than his com16
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petitors for the assets and good will of the firm, and being the
highest bidder therefor, became the purchaser. The sale was
duly confirmed by the court, and the property transferred to
Bradley, who shortly thereafter, with other persons, organized
a corporation under the laws of this state, with the name of the
"Snyder Manufacturing Company," for the purpose of continuing the busine88 at the manufactory which bad been operated by the firm; and the partnership effects and good will
that Bradley 'b ad purchased were transferred, with the manu·
factoring plant, to the corporation, which has since, in its
corporate name, been doing business of like character to that
formerly done by the copartnership, and claiming to be its
successor. That manner of conducting its busineBS by the
corporation was enjoined by the judgment which it is sought
here to have reversed; and whether there 'should be a reversal
or not, it is conceded, depends on the effect of Bradley's pur·
chase of the aBSets, including the good-will of the partnership~
and their transfer by him to the defendant corporation. Did
the defendant in that way acquire the right to carry on a business in the name adopted by it, like that which had been donE:
by the previously existing partnership, and as its su~essor?
Burke & IngersoZls and A . A. Thayer, for plaintiff in error.
Theodore Hall and Dickey, Carr &

Goff, for defendants in

error.
WILLIAMs, J. (after stating
the facts.) Without attempting
,
an accurate or exhaustive definition of the good will of a busi·
ness, it may be said that it practically consists of that favor- ·
able disposition or inclination of persons to extend their
patronage to the business on account of the reputation it has
established; and, as the business is always associated with
tht- name under which it is conducted, the name becomes a.
part, and often an important part, of its good will . . The good
will of a copartnership is rt-garded in law as property, consti·
tut ing a part of its assets, and having a salable value in connection with its tangible property, sometimes exceeding all
its other assets, ber.ause of the advantages afforded a pur·
chaser of retaining an established custom, and enlarging
it. As a general rule, when it become necessary to sell the
partnership effects, the good will should be valued and sold
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with, and as a part of, them, and ordinarily it passes by n
sale of them, though not expressly mentioned. It is well settled that, when a partner sells his interest in the business to a
copartner, without a reservation or exception of the good will,
the purchaser is entitled, not only to continue the business in
the name of the :firm, and as its successor, but be may prevent
the selling partner or other person from carrying on business
in that way; and no good reason is apparent why the same
result should not attend a purchase of the entire assets and
good will of the firm, by one of the partners, at a sale thereof,
made under an .order of court, in a proceeding to which the
partners were parties, especially if the sale be so made at their.
instance and for their benefit. Indeed, the authorities appear
to go further, and maiu.tain that, upon the dissolution of a
copartnership, there being no agreement between its members
to the contrary, the court, having the parties before it, may
order the good will to be sold or disposed of as may be deemed
most advantageous t.o the partners; and that the purchaser at
such sale, though a stranger t.o the firm, may lawfully continue
the use of the firm name in carrying on the business therealter.
And that seems but the logical result of the rnle that the rights
menti.oned belong to a partner who becomes a purchaser at
such sale; for, in order to insure a fair sale, all bidders should
stand upon an equality, which would not be so if the right~
acquired at the sale were to be varied or made to depend upon
the relation which the purchaser bad sustained to the partnership, or other individual circumstance. The salable value of
the good will is whatever it is worth in the market when open
to untrammeled competition; and when brought to that test
for the benefit of the partners~ it is not for them to assert that
the purchaser obtained less than they authorized to be sold or
induced him to believe be was buying.
It is contended that Bradley did not become the owner of
the good will of the late firm of winch he was a member, by
his purchase at the receiver's sale, because (1) the good will of
the plaintiffs was put into the firm as an offset to the use of
Bradley's manufactory, and only for the period agreed upon for
the duration of the partnership, and therefore, at the expitation of that period, the plaintiffs were reinvested with their
good will, as was Bradley with the possession of his property;
(2) the order of the court under which the sale was made
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Mfre88ly excludes any right on the part of the purchuer to
aake uee ef the Arm name; and (3) the good will ceased upon
tile termiu.tiora of the partnership, and consequently could
uret be sold.
•
1. With reospect to th·e first of these propositions, it may be
ebeened that what the order of the court directed to be sold,
aad what the receiver, under its authority, in fact sold, was,
n9t the ~ood will or property of the plaintiffs, but those belong·
ing to the ftrm. The plaintiffs' business and its good will, as
they existed at the formation of the partnership, were absorbed
aBd merged into those of the firm, and went to make up its
a.Bsete, and, in so far as they did so, became the property of the
firm, subject to sale under the order with its other effects, aBd
witk them vested in the purchaser. Conceding, oowever, that
the plainti•, at the expiration of the partnership into which
they had eM:et"eG with Bradley, were restored to the good will
which belonged to their business when the partnership was
formed, and were entitled ·to resume that business under the
name they had formerly used, it is not perceived bow that
could operate to vest in them any part of the good will of the
firm, or prevent its vesting in Bradley under the receiver's
sale.
2. The order under which the sale was made, directs the
receiver to sell all of the property of the firm "as a whole,
including the good will," and provides that "the purchaser
shall have the right to carry on the business as successor te
the Snyder Manufacturing Company," but states that "the
court does not pass upon or make any order whatever as to
what name said purchaser would have the right to use in car·
rying on said business." The last clause of the order is relied
upon as excluding any right, on the part of the purchaser
ander it, to employ the name of the firm in any busint>as he
might choose to carry on after the purchase, and as further
excluding any authority to do such business as the successor
of the ftr;m. But it is obvious the clause bas not that operation.
Instead of being an adjudication abridging the rights of the
purchaser with regard to the use of the firm name, its desigll
was to leaTe the determination of those rights, in any contro·
Tersy that might thereafter arise concerning them, unaffected
by the order. And, as a partner who purchases the property
and good will of the copartnership becomes entitled to the use
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of the firm name, in the absence of a stipulation forbidding it,
an express provision in the sale, or the order of the court
un6ler which it was made, that the purchaser should have that
rig:ht, was unnecessary.
3. The proposition mainly urged in support of the judgment
below is ·that the good will of a copartnership can exist only
so long as it is a going concern, and,_ceasing upon the termination of the partnership, is not thereafter a subject of sale.
It may be that, when a firm is dissolved, its effects distribut~,
or &Old in parcels to purc~ers not wishing to .embark in a
similar business, and its affairs are wound up, its good will is
dissipated and lost; but that results from the acts of the part~rs themselves in making suc-h a disposition of the assets as
renders the good will unavailable aa a salable article, for it is
not a distinctive article of property, which may be sold separate from the tangible effects of the partnership, and in that
sense it may be said to cease when the partnership is 80 wound
up. That, in substance, is the scope and purport of the rule
declared in the cases cited in the brief of the defendant in
error. In neither of the cases was the question here presented
involved. But the doctrine m.aintained, both in England and
this country, where the copartnership is wound up in the manner indicated, is that the good will remains the undivided
property of the members of the firm, either or any of whom
may therea1ter lawfully use the firm name if they desire t~
continue in business, although the name of the partner so
using it dOes not appear in that of the firm. Banks. vs. Gibson,
34 Beav. 566; Bradbury vs. Dickens, 27 Beav. 53; Oaswell vs.
Hazard, 121 N.Y. 484,24 N. E. Rep. 707; Doughet·ty vs. Van NoR·
tmnd, Hoff. Ch. 58. The proposition contended for, if sus·
tained, would practically destroy the value of the good will
as an asset of the partnership, and entajl upon its members,
in many instances, serious loss. As partnerships rest upon
the-agreement of the parties, express or implied, a dissolution
occurs, and a new partnership is forined, whenever a partner
retires or a new one is admitted; and if, when that occurs, the
good will of the dissolved firm should cease, and could neither·
be acquired by the new finn nor transferred by any sale made
by the members of the old one,though expressly included ia
the sale of its effects, its value as an asset of the firm woulfl
disappear. Yet, it is commonly lm()wn that the good will coastitutes an importamt, and sometimes a controlling, part of the
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consideration for the purchase, and it has long been the settled
law, that, in cases of the kind mentioned, the purchaser obtains
the
. good will, including the right to the use of the firm name
in the continued prosecution of the business. In so holding,
the courts give effect to the intention of the parties as dis·
closed by the transaction. Where the partners themselves
make a sale of the firm effects, including the good will, the
intention and understanding is manifest that the purchaser
shall acquire and enjoy every advantage and benefit which the
tlrm had, so far as the parties are capable of transferring the
same; and, when a sale is made under an ·order of court, . in
a proceeding to which the partners are parties, that intention
is not less plainly inferable. The object to be accomplished
in making the sale, in either mode, of the good will, with the
other partnership effects, is to enhance the value of the assets
by inducing persons to bid more for them than they otherwise
would, under the belief that the purchaser will obtain all the
benefits of the good will; and, when the sale is made and consu.mmnted on that basis, it would be neither just nor equitable
to permit the vendors to deprive the purchaser of anything
they undertook to sell, and for which they have been paid.
The good will being thus sold as a thing of value, and paid
for by the purchaser as such, to deny him the benefit of it
would operate as a fraud, which the law will not sanction.
\Ve are not reluctant, therefore, in holding that, upon the
dissolution of a trading copartnership, its assets, including
the good will of the business, may be sold as a whole, either
by the partners directly, .or through a receiver, under an order
made by a court in a case to which they .are parties; and that
a purchaser thereof under either method of sale is entitled to
continue the business as the successor of the firm, and make
use of the firm name for that purpose; and, further, that, where
the purchaser transfers the property so acquired by hiqt to .
a corporation of which he is a member, organized to succeed
to the business, it may carry on the business, in the same manner, under a corporate name including the name which had
been used by the firm. Iron Works Oo. ti8. Payne, 50 Ohio St.
115, a3 N. E. Rep. 88, 19 L. R. A. 82. It if is desired to limit the
right of the purchaser or his vendee in the use of the firm
name, or exclude such right altogE>ther, it should be done by
stipulation in the contract when the sale is made by the part·
ners, or by a provision to that effect .in the order, when the
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sale is made through the court. In the case of Horton M a.nufactu1·ing Co. vs. Horton Manufacturing Co., 18 Fed. Rep. 816,
cited. by counsel for the defendant in error, a copartnership,
without any consideration, obtained the consent of a person
not a member to use his name in, and as part of, the firm name.
That consent, the court held, amounted to a mere license,
revoca.ble at pleasure, and the partnership so obtaining it
could not, without the consent of such person, "transfer the
right to another company or corporation to make a like use
of the name." BUJt that case cannot be regarded as an authority against the claim made by the plaintiff in error in this
case; for, where the partners themselves make a sale of their
firm's good will, which carries with it the right to use the firm
name, or authorize such sale to be made,· it cannot be said
that the use of the name, either by the purchaiSer, or those succeeding to the business, is without their consent. As said by
the court in the case just cited, on page 819.; "If one bas made
of his own name a trade m.ark, and then transfers to another
his business, in which his name bas been so used, the right
to continue such use of the name will doubtless follow the
business as often as it may be transferred."
Upon the facts admitted by the pleadings, the judgment of
the circuit court must be reversed, and judgment rendered for
the plaiQ.tiff in error.
'
Judgment accordingly.
NOTE.-See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., ~ 86, 67, 88, 89.
Compare also with preceding and following casea.

TREGO vs. HUNT.

English House of Lorqs, 1895.
[1896) A. C. 7.

For some years prior to 1876 'Vil1iam Henry Trego, the husband of the appellant, Anna Trego, had carried on busint:>ss
as a varnish and japan manufuctur·er at Bow and in London~
under the name of Tabor, Trego & Co. In 1876 he took the
respondent into partnership, but upon the terms that the good
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will ()f the business ah()uld be and remain the sole property
ot William Henry Trego. The partnership continued until
his death, in 1888. In· February, 1889,- a partnership agreement was made between the a.p pellants and the respondent
that they should carry on the business under the old style of
Tabor, Trego & Co., for a term of seven years, computed from
January 1, 1889. The agreement provided that the good will
should nevertheless be and remain the sole property of Anna
Trego. In December, 1894:, the appellants found that the
respondent had employed a clerk of the firm, out of office
hours, to copy for him the names, addresses, and businesses
of all the firm's customers. The respondent admitted that his
.object in having the list made was to acquire information
which would enable him, when the partnership expired, to canvass these persons, and to endeavor to obtajn their custom for
himself. The appellants accordingly brought this action, and
moved for an injunction to restrain the respondent from mak·
ing any copy of or extract from the pa.rtnership books for any
purpose other than the purpose of the partnership business.
STIRLING, J. made no order, and this decision was affirmed
by the court of appeal. (Lord HALSBURY, LINDLEY and A. L.
SMITH, L. J.J.) [1895] 1 Cb., 462.

Hastings, Q. C., and Cozens-Hardy, Q. C. (Leigh Clare, with
them), for the appellants.
Sir R. E. ·Webster, Q. 0., and Buckley, Q. 0. (George Henderwith them.)

•on

Lord HERSCHELL. My Lords, a very important question
which has given rise to much difference of judicial opinion
presents itself for decision in the present case. [His lordahip stated the facts set forth above, and continued:]
STIRLING, J., in the course of his judgment said: "It has
been admitted in the argument, and for the purposes of it, that
the defendant intends, in the event of the partnershlp coming
to an end at the beginning of next year, to use this list for
the purpose of soliciting the customers of the present firm.
Be proposes then to engage in a business of a similar nature
to that carried on by the firm, and th(! question whlch I have
to decide is whelher he is entitled to make such a use of
the list."
It seems clear, therefore, that the point in contest before
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the learned judge who heard this motion was whether the
respondent was entitled to make use of the list of the customers of the firm which he had obtained in order to canvass them
when he started business on his own account. I mention this
because it may have been open to contention on behalf of the
respondent that he was at all events entitled, whilst he
remained a partner, to make copies of the partnership booke,
and that it was premature to come to the court to restrain the
use of these oopies even if he were not entitled when he ceased
to be a partner to canvass the customers of the firm.; but in
view of the fact that the respondent threatened to use the list
for the purpose of canvassing the persons named therein, and
having regard to the course taken before the learned judie,
I thin¥ it would have been open to him to grant an injunction,
though not in the terms prayed for, if the canvassing of those
customers would be a wrongful act on the part of the
respondent.
STIRLING, J ., and the court of appeals had, I think, no alter·
native but to refuse to grant any injunction. They were bound
by the decision of the court of appeal in the case of Pearson vs.
Pearson, 27 Ch. D. 145, that, even though the good will belongs
to one of the partners, it is lawful for the other, on the termination of the partnership, to canvass the customers of the
firm. Consistently with that decision, I think it would have
been impossible to bold that the appellants were entitled to
an injunction. That case is, however, open to review by your
lordships, and the real question in the present case is whether
it was well decided.
The question wbetber a person who had sold the good will
of his business was entitled afterwards to canvass the customers of that business came first before the courts for decision in the case of Labouchere vs. Dawson, L. R.13 Eq. 322. Lord
Ro:mLLY, M. R., answered in the negative. He was of opinion
that the principles of equity must pr.evaiJ, and that persons
are not at liberty t o depreciate the thing which they have sold.
He considered that the defendant was not _entitled personally,
or by letter, or by his agent or traveler, to go to anyone who
was a customer of the firm and to solicit him not to oontinue
business with the old firm but to transfer it to him; that this
was not a fair and reasonable thing to do after be had sold the
good will. He accordingly granted an injunction to restrain
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the defendant, his partners, servants, or agents froiDI applying
to any person who was a customer of the old firm prior to the
date of the sale, privately, by letter, personally or by a traveler, aaking such customers to continue to deal with the
defendant or not to deal with the plaintiffs.
In the case of Ginesi vs. Cooper, 14 Ch. D. 596, Sir George
JESIEL, M. R., followed the decision in Labouche-re vs. Dawson,
L. R. 13 Eq. 322, and expressed in very strong terms his concurrence with it. He .:ranted an injunction restraining the
defendants, their clerks, senrants, agents, workmen, or othera,
from soliciting or in any way endeavoring to obtain the custom of or orders for goods similar in character to those dealt
in by the old firm from such of the customers as were customers of the old firm, or from attempting to take away any portion of the business bought by the plaintiff. This was all that
the plaintiff in that case asked for; but the learned judie went
further, and expressed a strong -opinion that a man whc> sold
the good will of his business must not only refrain from soliciting the old customers to deal with him, but must not deal with
them. It was not, he said, necessary to decide it on that
occasion; but he stated it because he thought what the meaning of selling the good will of a trade or business is should be
thoroughly understood.
In the case of Leggott t'B. Ban·ett, 15 Ch. D. 306, which came
before the same learned judge shortly afterwards, he acted
upon the same view, and extended the injunction to restrain
the defendant from dealing with the customers of the old firm.
From this judgment there was an appeal; but the appellant
confined his appeal to that part of the order which restrained
him from dealing with the customers of the old firm. He made
no objection to the injunction so far as it restrained him from
canvassing those customers. The court of appeal dissolved
that part of the injunction of which the appellant complained.
They thought they could not on any just principle prevent the
defendant from supplying a man with goods if he applied for
them; that there was no implied obligation upon him, either
legal or moral, to shut his door against a customer who came
to him of his own free will; that a sale of good will did not
involve an implied contract not to dt=>..a.l with any customers
of the old business the good will of which was sold. The case
is chiefly important for present purposes, in so far as it dis-
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eloses the view taken by the learned judges, who, on that
occasion, constituted the court of ap~eal, on the point now
onder consideration.
In the case of Pearson t;S. Pearson, 27 Ch. D. 145 to which
I shall have occasion to refer immediately, CoTToN, L. J., stated
that the decision in Laoouchere vs. Da·w8on, L. R. 13 Eq. 322,
was doubted in Leggott vs Barrett, 15 Ch. D. 306, by JAMES, L.
J., and himself. Thi.s is no doubt correct so far as CoTTON, L. J .,
is concerned; but I am unable to find any clear indication that
this was the view of JAMES, L. J . It is quite true that in an
early part of his judgment he said: "I do not like going much
into the case, because what I should say might perhaps be
considered to mean that the injunction wbioh is submitted
to is too wide." But in a later part of the judgment he says:
"At first it did n()t appear to me that we might, from the
equitable view of the case, say that the defendant shall be prevented from dealing with any customer or customers whom
he bad solicited; but it appeared to me that that was too vague
_ and too wide." He pointed out that a man might give the
order afterward~ without any reference to previous solicitation. Further on, when discussing the effect of the agree- .
ment, and showing that there was no implied obligation not
to deal with the customer, he says: "It means that you are
not to solicit customers." The impression produced upon my
mind by the whole of the judgment is that the learned judge
had not arrived at the conclusion that Labouch.ere vs. Dawson,
L. B. 13 Eq. 322 was wrong. BRETT, L. J., expressed a decided
approval.of that decision. He was of opinion that, on the sale
of a good will for a valuable consideration, there was an
implied contract that the vendor would not solicit former customers, who were really the people who formed the good will.
The next case in which the matter was brought under the
consideration of the court of appeal was that of Walker vs.
Mottram, 19 Ch. D. 355. In that case the good will of the business carried on by a bankrupt bad been "sold by his trustees in
bankruptcy. It was sought afterwards to restrain the bankrupt from soliciting the customers of that business. ·Sir
GEORGE JESSEL, M. R., refused to grant an injunction on the
ground that the doctrine laid down in Labouchere vs. Dawson,
L. R., 13 Eq. 322, did not apply to the case of a bankrupt whose
business bad been sold by his trustees. This judgment was
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affirmed by the oonrt of appeal. or the lord juattces who then
constituted the court, BAGGALL.AY, L. J., expreBSed a strong
doubt as to the correctness of the decision in Labouclr.6re "'·
Daw80fl., L. R., 13 Eq. 322. He said that it appeared to him, as
at present advised, that it went far beyond what any of the previous decisions would bave sanctioned. Luas and LINDLEY,
L. JJ., tbe other members of the court, said that the rule laid
down in Labouchere vsUJawson, L. R., 13 Eq. 322, had, it was
believed, been recognized and acted upon in practice, and,
whatever else might be &aid of it, the rule was in accordance
with the general opinion of what was fair and right, and was
easily applied.
in the case of Pearson vs. Pearson, 27 Ch. D. 145, the question
came again before the court of appeal. The facts were there
less favorable to the plaintiff than in the case of Laboucher•
vs. Dawson, and BAGGALLAY and LINDLEY, L. JJ., both consid·
ered that, even if Labouchere vB. Dawson was rightly decided,
the case then before them was not governed by it. BAGGAL·
LAY and CoTToN, L. JJ., however, distinctly rested their judg·
menta on the ground that the decision in Labouchere vB. Dawson
was wrong and ought to be overruled. LINDLEY, L. J., on the
other hand, was of opinion that it was rightly decided. The
reason of BAGGALLAY, L. J., for dissenting from La.bouchere vs.
Dawson, so far as it is disclosed by the report of his judgment,
appears to be that it went beyond a number of decisions of a
higher court, and, as he thought, without sufficient reason.
Even assuming that the decision in Labouchere vB. Dawson
went beyond previous decisions, this does not seem to me to
ntford any indication that it was wrong, unless it can be shown
that it was in conflict with the principles involved in those
earlier decisions. CoTTON, L. J., examined the earlier decisions and arrived at the conclusion that Lord ELDON was
against the notion that the vendor of the good will of a business was, in the absence of express contract, to be restrained
from carrying on a similar business in the way in which he
might lawfully carry it on if there 'h ad been no sale of the good
will. The learned lord justice pointed out that Lord RoMILLY
rested his decision in Laboucllere vs. Dawson on the principle
that a man could not derogate from his grant. "But," he said,
"it is admitted that a person who has sold the good will of his
business may set up a similar business next door and say that
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he is the person· who carried on the old busine88; yet such
proceedings manifestly tend to prevent the old customer from
going to the old place. I cannot see where to draw the line. If
he may, by his acts, invite the old customers to deal with him
and not with the purchaser, why may be not apply to them and
ask them to do so? I think it wouid be wrong to put such a
meaning on 'good will' as would give a right to such an injunc·
tion as bas been granted in the present case."
I propose now to examine the older authorities. I may state
at once, however, that I can find nothing iri them inconsistent
with t4e decision in Labouchere vs. Dawson. It no doubt went
beyond them, inasmuch.as it dealt with a question not deter·
mined by them; but this seems to me to be no demerit, nor to
afford any indication that it was wrong. The earliest case
which bas any bearing upon the point is that of CruttwelZ vs.
Lye, 17 Ves. 335, 3!6, before Lord ELDON. The business of a
bankrupt, who was a carrier between Bristol 'lnd London, had
been sold by his assignees in bankruptcy. He afterwards commenced carrying on the trade of a carrier betw~n Brililtol,
Bath and London; but though the termini were the same the
route employed was different. He addressed direct solicita·
tion to the public for the carriage of their goods, stating that
be had been reinstated in hfs business; and there was further,
in the opinion of the lord chancellor, so much probability of
direct solicitation to the customers of the old concern, in some
few instances that the fact might fairly be assumed. Under
these circumstan~s the purchaser of the bankrupt's business
applied for an injunction. The case was therefore the same
as Walker 'VB. Mottram, 19 Oh. D. 355, where Sir GEoRGE JES·
BEL-than whom no one has more strongly insisted upon the
propriety of the decisioo in Laboucltere vs. Dawson-was of
opinion that no injunction slrould be granted. The bankrupt
was no party to the contract of sale; there could therefore b~
no implied contract on his part to be derived from it. It is
most material also to observe what was the nature of the
injunction then in question. It was whether the bankrupt
was to be restrained from carrying on the trade which he waa
pursuing of carrying goods between Bristol, !;lath and London.
The lord chancellor held that he could not be so restrai•ed;
and I think it must now be taken as settled that the sale <tf the
good will of a business, even when the vendor himaelf ie a
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party to the contract, does not impose upon him any obligation to refrain from carrying on a trade af the same nature as
before. But Lord ELDON certainly did not decide that such a
vendor was entitled to solicit the customers of the old firm.
He was not asked for an injunction to restrain the defendant
from so doing. It was sufficient for the decision of that case
that, in the opin.ion of the iord chancellor, there was no principle arising out of the provisions of the bankruptcy law upon
which the court could hold that the bankrupt ought not to
engage in the same trade and by the same road as before;
though I think that, so far, the opinion of the lord chancellor
would have been the same if the sale of the business bad been
effected by the bankrupt himself and not by his assignees.
The importance of the case consists in the definition which
Lord ELDON gave of the good will there sold. He said: ''The
good will which has been the subject of sale is nothing more
than the probability that the old customers will resort to the
old place. Fraud would form a different consideration; but if
that effect was prevented by no other means than th08e which
belong to the fair course of improving a trade in which it was
lawful to engage, I should, by interposing carry the effect of
injunction to a much greater length than any decision has
authorized or imagina-tion ever suggested." These observations were much relied on by CoTTO~, L. J., in Pearson vs. Pearson, 27 Ch. D. 145. If the language of Lord ELDO~ is to be
taken as a definition of good will of general application, I think
it is far too narrow, and I am not satisfied that it was intended
by Lord· ELDON as an exhaustive definition.
" 'Good will,' I apprehend," said \Voon, V. C., in Ohurtou tiS.
Douglas, Job. 174, 188, "must mean every advantage--eYery
positive advantage, if I may so express it, as contrasted with
the negative advantage of the late partner not carrying on the
business himself-that has been acquired by the old firm in
carrying on its business, whether connected with the premises
in which the business was previously carried on, or with the
name of the late firm, or with any other matter carrying with
it the benefit of the business." The learned vice chancellor
pointed out in this connection that it would be absurd to say
that when a large wholesale business is oonducted the public
are mindful whether it is carried on in Fleet street or in the
Strand.
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The questi.on, wbat is meant by "good will," is, no doubt, a
critical one. Sir GEoa(a: JESSEL, discussing in Gincsi vs.
Cooper, U Ch. D. 596, the language of WooD, V. C., which I
have just quoted, said: "Attracting customers to the business
is a matter connected with the carrying of it on. It is the
formation of that .connection which has made the value of the
thing that the late firm sold, and they really had nothing el~
to sell in the shape of good will." He pointed out that, in the
case before him, the connection had been formed by years of
work. The members of tbe firm knew where to sell the stone,
and he asked: "Is it to be supposed that they di'd not sell
.that personal connection when they sold the trade or business
and the good will thereof?"
The present master of the rolls took much the same view as
to what constitutes the good will of a business. I cannot
myself doubt that they were right. It is the connection thus
formed together with the circumstances, whether of habit or
otherwise, which tend to make it permanent, that constitutes
the good will of a business. It is this which constitutes the
difference between a business just started, which has no good
will attached to it, and one which has acquired a good will.
The former trader has to seek out his customers from among
the community as best he can. The latter has a custom ready
made. He knows what members of the community are pur·
chasers of the articles in which he deals, and are not attached
by custom to any other establishment. 'Vhat obligations then
does the sale of the good will of a business impose upon the
vendor? I do not think they would necessarily be the same
under all circumstances.
In Cook vs. Ooll-ingridge, Collyer on Partnership, 2d Ed. 215,
27 Beav. 456, Lord Chancellor ELDON had to determine what
orders were to be given where a partnership had expired by
eftluxion of time, and where the good will had to be valued.
He declared that there existed no obligation upon the part·
ners to restrain them from carrying on· the same trade, or any
of them wanting to do so; that a claim to have an estimated
value put upon any subject that could be considered as
described by the term "good will" could not be supported upon
the same grounds or princ~ples as those upon which a value
was received from a partner buying the share of the partner
going out of the business and retiring from the trade alte·
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gether. He thought that all that could be valued was the
chance of the customers adhering to the old establishment,
notwithstanding that the previous partners or any of them
carried on a simdlar business elsewhere.
In Johnson vs. Helleley, 2 D. J. & S. 446, a bill was filed by
the surviving partner to wind up the business of the partnership. The usual decree was made. The chief clerk certified
that it was most beneficial that the business should be sold
as a going concern. The master of the rolls ordered it to be
stated in the advertisement and particulars that the surviving
partner would be at liberty to continue carl"ying on the busi·
ness of a wine merchant in the same town and place. This
judgment was affirmed by the Lord Justices. In Hallvs. Ba1·:
rows, 4 D. J. & S. 150, Lord Chance11or WESTBURY said: "I
think the direction to value the good will should be accompanied by a declaration defining what is meant by it, at least
negatively; that is to say, a declaration that the good will is
not to be valued upon the principle that the surviving partner, if he were not the purchaser, will be restrained from setting up the same ·description of business." In cases of thi::~
description, where a partnership has been dissolved by effluxion of time or .death, the good will is regarded as a part of the
assets, and subject therefore to realization on winding up the
partnership; but it would obviously be absurd that because n
partnership becomes thus dissolved those who formerly constituted the firm, or the survivors thereof, where the dissolution has been due to death, should thereafter be restrained
from carrying on what trade they pleased. Whatever restrietion the sale of the good will may im1pose, it is clear that in
this class of cases it could not extend to prevent the former
partners carrying on a similar trade to that in which they
were previously engaged. It is noteworthy that in Johnson vs.
Helleley, 2 D. J. & S. 446, it was thought necessary to warn
intending purchasers that, though the good will was being
sold, one of the persons who had previously carried on th~
business might continue to trade in the same town; and Lord
WESTBURY thought it necessary to give the same warning to
the person who was to value the good will in Hall vs. Ba'rrows,
4 D. J. & S. 150.
These circumstances appear to me to afford an indication
that the courts recognized that their view of what was meant
by "good will" and the effect of a sale of it differed from the
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popular conception. Where the good will of a business is not
sold under circumstances such as I have been discussing, but
the sale is the voluntary act of the vendors, I am by no means
satisfied that a different effect might not have been given to .
the sale and the obligations which it imposed. It might have
been held tba.t the vendor ~as not entitled to derogate from
his grant by seeking in any manner to withdraw from the pur·
chaser the customers of the old business, as he would do by
l!letting up a business in such a place or under such cii"cumstances that it would immediately compete for the old custom..
ers. It is now, however, too late to make any such distinetion.
I think 'it must be treated as settled that whenever the good
will of a business is sold the vendor does not, by reason only
of that sale, come under a restriction not to ca.r ry on a competing business. This is really the strong point in the position of those who maintain that Labouchere vs. Datoson, L. R.
13 Eq. 322, was wrongly decided. CoTTON, L. J ., says: "It is
admitted that a person who has sold the good will of his business may set up a similar business next door and say that he
is the person who carried ~n the old business. Yet such proceedings manifestly tend to prevent the old cti.s tomers fi"om
going to the old place. I cannot see where to draw the line.
If he Illily, by his acts, invite the old customers to deal with
him and not with the purchaser, why may be not apply to
them and ask them to do so?" I quite feel the force of this
argument, but it does not strike me as conclusive. It is often
impossible to draw the line and yet possibly to be perfectly
certain-that particular acts are on one side of it or the othei".
It does not seem to me to follow that because a man may, by
his acts, invite all men to deal with him, and so, amongst the
rest of mankind, invite the former customers of the firm, be
may use the knowledge which he has acquired of what persons were customers of the old firm in order, by an appeal
to them, to seek to weaken their habit of dealing where they
have dealt before, or whatever else binds them to the old business, and so to secure their custom for himself. This seems
to me to be a direct and intentional dealing with the good
will and endeavor to destroy it. If a person who bas previously been a partner in a firm sets up in a business on his
own account and appeals generally for custom, he only does
that which any member of the public may do, and which those
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carrying on the same trade are already doing. It is true that
those who were former customers of the firm to which he
belonged may of their own accord transfer their custom to
hh~; but this incidental advantage is unavoidable, and does
not result from any act of his. Be only conducts his busi·
D.ees in precisely the same way as he would if he had never
been a member of the firm to which he previously belonged.
But when he specifically and directly a.ppeals to those who
were customers of the previous firm be seeks to take advan·
t~e of the connection previously formed by his old firm, and
of the knowledie of that connection which he has previously
acquired, to take that which constitutes the good will away
from the persons to whom. it has been sold and to restore
it to hiB1!8elf. It is said, indeed, that he may not represent
himself as a successor of the old firm, or as carrying on a
continuation of their business, but this in many cases appears
to me of little importance, and of small practical adV'antage,
if canvassing the customers of the old firm were allowed without restraint. I do not think that in cases where an injunction wu granted in the terms employed in Labouchere vs. Daw•on, L. R. 13 Eq. 322, there would be any real difficulty in
drawing the line and determining whether there bad been a
breach of it or not. In several cases such injunctions were
granted, and there is nothing to show that any practical difficulty arose in enforcing them. It is not material to consider
w hetber, on the sale of a good will, the obligation on the part
of the vendor t~ refrain from canvassing the customers is to
he regarded as based upon the principle that be is not entitled
to depreciate that which be bas sold, or as arising from an
implied contract to abstain from any act intended to deprive
the purchaser of that which bas been sold to him and to
restore it to the vendor. I am satisfied that the obligation ,
exist~, and ought to be enforced by a court of equity. I have
so far dealt with the case as if the good will had been sold,
but I think the rights and obligations must be precisely the
same for present purposes when, on the creation of a partnership, it has been agreed that the good will shall belong
exclusively to one of the partners.
For thco~Se reasons I think the judgment must be reversed
and that an injunction should be granted in the form adopted
in Labouchere vs. Dawson, L. R. 13 Eq. 322, with the modifica·
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tion rendered necessary by the circumstance that here the
partnership has not yet expired.
Under the very peculiar circumstances I think that no costs
should be given here or in the court of appeal.
Lords MACNAGBTEN, DAVEY and ASHDOURNE, concurred.
Order of the court of appeal reversed, with a declaration
that the appellants are entitled to an injunction restraining
the respondent, his partners, servants, or agents, from applying privately, by letter, personally, or by a traveler, to any
person who was, prior to the dissolution of the partner-ship,
a customer of the firm of Tabor, Trego & Co., asking such customer to contin_ue after- the dissolution to deal with him, the
respondent, or not to deal with the appellants; the respondent to repay to the appellants the costs in the court of appeal
paid by them to him.
Cause remitted to the chancery division.

VII.
RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF PARTNERS TOWARD
EACH OTHER.

LATTA vs.

KILB~URN.

United StateJJ Supreme Court,

189~.

160 U. 8. 524, 87 L. Ed. 1169.

Bill in equity by Kilbourn and Olmstead against Latta for an
account of profits made by the latter in transactions which
the former claimed were partnership transactions and the
benefit of which therefore enured to the firm, of which all
three had been memben! but which was now dissolved. Latta
and Kilbourn had been partners as "real estate brokers and
auctioneers" under the firm name of Kilbourn & Latta. Afterwards Olmstead was taken into the firm, the name remaining
the same. During the continuance of the firm, Latta entered
into real estate speculations with one Dr. ·Stearns, which
resulted in large profits, and it was to secure a share in these
that this action was chiefty instituted. The court below
decreed that Latta should account to his former partners for
these profits, and Latta appealed. It was claimed by com·
plafnants that, when Olmstead was taken into the firm, a pew
arrangement was made to the effect that if either member
heard of a piece of property for sale and saw an opportunity
for speculation, or was going into any speculation, it should be
communicated to the :firm, so that the other partners also
might have an opportunity of going into the speculation.
Other facts appear in the opinion.
W. D. Davidge, for appeJJant.
Enoch Tolten and W. F. Mattingly, for appellees.

•
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JA.cKSoN, J. (After stating the facts &.nd disposing of ot~er
matters.) The oourt below based its opiniQn upon two grounds:
First, that the scope of the copartnership business and agreement, as alleged in the third paragraph of the bill, was established, and that the appellant could not engage in purchases
of real estate on his own account or in connection with others
except by the consent of his copartners, without violating the
duty and obligation which he owed to his firm; and, secondly,
that, even if the ·copartnership did not include the business of
buying and selling real estate on partnership account, still the
appellant oould not employ the knowledge and information
acquired in the course of the partnership business in respect
to the real estate market, in making purchases or transactions
for his own benefit
The general principles on which the court proceeded admit
of no question, it being settled that one partner cannot,
directly or indirectly, use partnership assets for his own benefit; that he cannot, in conducting the business of a partnership, take any profit clandestinely for himself; that he cannot
carry on the business of the partnership for his private advantage; that he cannot carry on another business in competition
or rivalry with that of the firm, thereby depriving it of the
benefit of his time, skill, and fidelity without being accountable to his copartners for any profit that may accrue to him
therefrom; that he cannot be permitted to secure for himself
that which it is his' duty to obtain, if at all, for the firm of
which he is a member; nor can he avail himself of knowledge
or information, which may be properly regarded as the property of the partnership, in the sense that it is available or
useful to the firm for any purpose within the scope of the
partnership business.
It therefore becomes necessary, in testin·g the liability of the
appellant to account for the profits realized from the transactions with Stearns, to consider and ascertain what was the
scope of the partnership agreemeut in reference to the purchase and sale of real estate. This is the underlying and
essential fact on which rests the proper d-etermination of the
question whether the appellant, in engaging in the joint enterprise with Stearns, violated any duty or obligation which he
owed to the firm of Kilbourn & Latta. In other words, the
question on this branch of the case depends entirely upon this:

•
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Were or were not those transaetions within the scope of the
ftrm business, in respect to which Latta owed a duty to his
ftrm, or in respect to which be could properly be said to be
the agent of the firm?
·
In his answer, which was called for under oath, Latta posi·
tively and in direct terms denied the allegation of the bill that
it was ever agreed that the firm should carry on the busi·
ness of buying and selling real estate, and that at no time waR
such transaction within the scope of the partnership business.
Under the well-settled rules of equity pleading and practice,
his answer must be overcome by the testimony of at least two
witnesses, or of one witness with corroborating circumstancee.
The proofs jn the present case not only fail to break down
his denial on this point, but on the contrary affirmatively estab·
lish that neither under the first nor the second firm of Kil·
bourn & Latta did the partnership agreement extend to the
business of buying and selling real estate either for invest·
ment or for speculation on firm account. The appellee Kilbourn, when pressed upon tbe question, evaded a reply thereto,
and Olmstead, in his sworn testimony, failed to support the
aJlegation of the bill as made on that particular subject. On
the other band, the testimony of the appellant fully supported
the denial of his answer, and be is corroborated by all the
facts and circumstances in the case, such as the character of
the business as advertised and as actually conducted. The
well-known characteristics Qf "real estate and note brokers,"
Indicating as the words imply, those engaged in negotiating
the sale and purchase of real property for the account of
others, afford a presumptive limitation upon the scope of the
business, such as the appellant asserted and testified to in
this case. His sworn answer and testimony on this point has
not been overcome by the vague and equivocal testimony of
the appellees. The court below was in error in finding as a
matter of fact that the partnership extended to the buying
and selling of real estate for the account of the firm. There is,
therefore, no right on the part of the complainants to· relief
in this cause, based upon the consideration that the scope and
character of the partnership business embra~ the purchase
and sale of real estate, either for the firm alone, or jointly with
others.
The further allegation of the bi11, "that all profits resulting from operations in real estate by any member of the firm
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of Kilbourn & Latta during the existence of said partnership
should belong to said firm and be entered upon the books of
the firm and be paid into the partnership account, and that no
member of said firm should engage in too business of buying and selling real estate in the said district on his own
account, or with any other person or persons, except in cases
where the proposed transaction had OOei1 explained to the said
firm, and the firm bad declined to take any part therein," was
also positively denied by the answer of the .appellant under
oath. There is no testimony in the cause to overoome that
denial. On the contrary, the evidence establishes that there
was no such restriction or limitation imposed upon the indi"idual members. So that the complainants were entitled to
no relief on that ground.
But aside from the foregoing questions of fact, bow standR
the case on the assumption that there was a new stipulat ion
or agreement when Olmstead was taken into the firm (u
claimed by Kilbourn and Olmstead, and as set out above) that
knowledge and information obtained by any member of the
firm as to bargains in real estate should be first common icated to the firm, with the view of giving the firm, or the members thereof, the first opportunity of purchasing, before any
individual member thereof could aot upon such knowledge or
information for his own benefit? Can the agreement to furnish information as to bargains in real estate and give copartners the option of taking benefit of such bar:;rains, be considered as so enlarging the scope of the partners;dp business as
to include therein the purchase and sale of real estate on
joint account? It would be a perversion of language and a
confusion of ideas to treat such a stipulati<m, if it were clearly
established, as creating a partnership in future options to buy
what did not already, by the terms of the copartnership, come
within the scope and character of the partnership business.
That alleged stipulation, instead of enlarging the partnership
business, was manifestly a restriction and .limitation upon the
power and authority of the copartners to bind the firm, or the
members thereof, in any real estate transaction, until each
member had expressly consented or agreed to join in the particular purchase, specially submitted for consideration.
By the well-settled law of partnership each member of the
firm is both a principal and an agent to represent and bind
the firm and his associate partners in dealings and transactions
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within the scope of the copartnel'Ship. No express authority
is necessary to confer this agency or fiduciary relation in
respect to the business of the firm. If the buying and selling
of real estate was a part of the business of Kilbourn & Latta,
the alleged stipulation about giving an option to the firm and
the members thereof t,o accept special bargains would have
been an idle arrangement. But under the alleged stipulation
each and every purchase of real estate was a special and individual transaction or enterprise, requiring the special assent
and agreement of each partner thereto, before it became a subject of partnership, or was brought within the scope of th~
partnership business. Under the operation of ~he agreement,
a partner who purchased real estate, either on joint or partnership account, did so not under or by virtue of the partnership
articles, or under authority derived from the partnership busi·
ness and his implied agency to represent the firm therein, but
solely and exclusively from the special assent or agreement of
his associates to engage in that particular purchase. So that
each parcel of real estate to be acquired, as well as the agreement to purchase the same, was first made the subject ot a
special arrangement. It is difficult to understand how, under
such circumstances and conditions, a copartnership could properly be said to include or extend to the business of purchasing
and selling real estate.
The special subject of each purchase, as admitted by Kilbourn,-like the purchase of bonds and other securities,-did
not and could not come within the operation of the copartnership, or ~come a part of the partnership .agreement, until each
particular piece of property had been selected and agreed upon.
It is undoubtedly true that, under this alleged agreement, if a
partner had submitted to the firm or his associates the
question of buying a particular parcel of land, and they had
agreed to make that purchase, he would thereafter have occu·
pied an agency or fiduciary relation in respect to that particular piece of property. But the question here is whether his
failure to give the firm, or his copartners, the opportunity of
making an election to buy certain real estate, and his making
the purchase thereof for his own account, or jointly with
another, is such a violation of his fiduciary relations to the
firm and his associates in respect to copartnership business as
to entitle the latter to call him to account for profits realized
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in such transactions. In other words, will the violation of his
undertaking to give to the firm, or his associates, the ()pportunity or option to engage in any particular transactio11, not
within the scope of the firm's business, entitle the C()partners
to convert him int() a constructive trustee in respect to the
profits realized therefrom?
That the members ()f the firm, prior to 1871, or alter th·a t
date; by special agreement, made purchases ()f particular parcels of real estate on speculation or f()r investment, did not
make such speculative transactions a part of the partnership
business so as to invest either partner with the implied authority to engage therein on acc()unt of the firm. The name ()f the
firm was never, in fact, used in such special ventures, which
no partner had authority to enter into except, and until, the
consent of the others bad been speciftoolly obtained eo to doeach instance of buying on firm or joint account being the subject of a separate, special, and diatinct agreement.
It may be said of any and every partnership, irrespective of
its regular business, that by C()nsent ()fall the members, other
matters beyond the scope of the partnership may become the
subject of investment or speculation on joint aocount, but suck
special tmnsactions cannot properly be said to come within
the scope of the partnership. The very fact that the express
consent of each partner was required in order to engage in such
s~cial ventures goes clearly to show that the transactions
were not within the scope of the partnership, for, if they were,
special consent could not be required as a condition precedent
for engaging therein.
Matters within the scope of the partnership are regulated
and controlled by a majority of the partners, but by the alleged
stipulation under consideration a single member of the firm
could control the firm's action in respect to purchases of real
estate. This is inconsistent with the idea that the business
of t1he firm extend~ to such purchases.
Again, the alleged agreement does not ·provide how such
future acquisitions as might be specialJy selected or agreed
upon for speculation or for investment were to be paid for,
or in what proportion the several partne~ should be interested therein. Neither does it distinctly appear from the allegations of the bill, nor from the testimony of the a.~pellees,
whether, in acting upon information given, the spedal pur-
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chasee were to be made for the account of the partnership or
for the a.ccount of the several members of the firm. The methods of keeping the accounts of such transactions in the name
of the individual members rather th11n in the name of the firm,
would indicate that such purchases were for the benefit of the
separate partners rather than for the firm.
· The~ is no allegation in the bill, nor any direct statement
in the testimony of the appellees, that if the information had
lK'lell given as to the Stearns' transactioDB, either the firm or
themselves would have exercised the option of engaging
therein upon the conditions of allowing Stearns to determine
"when, at what price, and on what t€'rms any portion of the
real estate might be sold." Neither is it alleged in the bill,
nor shown by the proofs, that the appellant in any way neglected the partnership business, nor that the firm and his
copartners sustained any damage whatever from the transaction. On the contrary, it is shown that from ·the purchases
and sales of the property bought 9n joint account with Stearns
the firm derived its regular commissions.
This alleged new stipulation amounts, if it has any legal
force and operation, simply to an agreement for a future partnership, or the joint acquisition of such special. properties as
might by mutual and unanimous consent be considered as holding out a prospect of profitable speculation; and at most could
only be regarded as an agreement for a future partnership in
respect to such properties as might be specially selected for
speculation. It is well settled in such case that no partnership
takes place until the cont~mplated event actually occurs. It
stands upon the same principle as an option to beoome a partner, which creates no partnership until the option is actually
exercised.
If the stipulation in question could be construed into an
agreement that no partner should engage in the buying and
selling of real estate on his own account, would that entitle
the other members of the firm to share in the profits that
Latta made in real estate speculation without having first
secured the consent of his copartners to his engaging therein?
No such proposition can be sustained.
In Murrell vs. Murrell, 3a La. Ann. 1233, it was held that a
partner who, in violation of the act of partnership, enters
into another firm, does not thereby give the right to his origi-
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aal copartner to claim a share in the protlts of the new fir.m.
The violation of the agreement may give rise t~ an action for
damage.B, but inasmuch as the original oopa.rtner oould not
be held, without his consent, for the debts of the new firm,
he cannot claim to be made a partner therein.
In Dean"'· McDowell, 8 Ch. D. 345, one of the stipulations
in the articles of copartnership was that "said C. A. McDowell
should diligently and faithfully employ himself in and about
the business of the partnership, and carry on and conduct the
same to the greatest advantage of the partnership," and by
· another article it was stipulated that neither partner should
"either alone or with another person, either directly or indiredly, engage in any trade or business except upon the account
and for the benefit of the partnership." The business of the
firm was to deal as merchants and brokers in selling the produce of salt works on commission, and during its existence
McDowell clandestinely purchased a share in a. firm of salt
manufacturers. A bill was filed by the other partner for an
account of the profits realized in the new business, and it was
held by the master of the rolls that the bill could not be sustained. On appeal this judgment was affirmed. Lord Justice
JAM:ms, after stating the general principles of partnership
law, said: "The business which the defendant has entered
into was that of manufacturing salt, which was to be the subject-matter of the trade of the first firm. It in that he bad
in any way deprived the firm of any profits they otherwise
would have made-if by his joining in the partnership for the
manufacture he had diverted the goods from the firm in which
he was a partner to some other firm, I can see that that would
be a breach of his duty; but it is not pretended or alleged
that any alteration took place in the business of the firm by
reason of his having become a shareholder in the other business. It is not pretended that there was any alteration in the
commission or anything else. Everything remained exactly
as it was, so that it cannot be suggested that there was a
farthing's worth of actual damage done to the original firm
by reason of his having become a shareholder in the works
which produced the thing in which the firm traded. Under
these circumstances it seems to me that we cannot say his
profits from the new business was a benefit arising out of his
partnership with the plaintiffs. It was not a benefit derived
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from hie connection with the partnership, or a benefit in
respect of whiCh he was in a fiduciary relation to the partner·
ship. His relations to the partnership in this respect was
the same aa an ordinary covenantor to a covenantee in respect
of any other covenant which is broken. It was a covenant
by a partner with a copartner, a covenant that ·h e would
oot do something which might result in damage. But
it was not a covenant, in my view, which was in any way connected with the fiduciary relations between the parties. That
being so, it seems to me that the master of the rolla was
right in saying that you cannot extend the cases with regard
te a share in the profits to a case in which, as between the
parties, there really was nothing but a breach of covenant,
which in truth dtd not result, and could not have resulted, in
the slightest loss to the partnership, unless it could hav~ been
shown that it led to the covenantor neglecting 'the busine88
of the partnership, ani! devoting himself to other business,
and diverting his time and attention from the business to
which it was his duty to attend." These views, which were
concurred in by the other members ·of the court, are directly
in point in the present case, which, in principle, cannot be
distinguished from the case there under consideration.
We are clearly of the opinion that the alleged new stipulation that each copartner should furnish to the firm, or to the
members thereof, information as to ba.rgajns in real estate:
and give it or them the option to engage in the acquisition
thereof before acting upon such information for his own benefit, neither enlarged the scope of the partnership so as to make
it include the purchases and sales of real estate, nor precluded
any member of the firm from making purchases on his own
account or jointly with others; and that the act of the appellant in purchasing property with Stearns was not such a violation of his duty and obligation to the firm of Kilbourn &
Latta, or to the members thereof, as to entitle the appellees
to share in the profits which he realized therefrom.
In respect to the second ground, on which the court below
rested its judgment, that the appelfant could not take advantage of the skill, knowledge, and information as to the rea)
estate market acquired in the course of his connection with
the partnership of Kilbourn. & Latta so as to gain any profit
individually therefrom, but was bound to share with his
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copartners all the beneficial results which could be derived
from his knowledge or info·rmation on that subject, we need
:aot do more than to say that this proposition is whoJJy unsupported either by the authorities or by any legal principle appli·
cable to partnership law.
It is well settled that a partner may traffic outside of the
acope of the firm's business for his own benefit and advantage,
and without going into the authorities it is sufficient to cite the
thoroughly considered case C1f Aas vs. Benha-m, 2 Ch. D. (1891)
244, 255, in which it was sought to make one partner accountable for profits realized from another business, on the ground
that he availed himself of information obtained by him in the
course of his partnership business, or by reason of his con·
nection with the firm, to secure individual advantage in the
new enterprise. It was there laid down by Lord Justice LIND·
LEY that if a member of a partnership firm avails himself of
information obtained by 'him in the course of the transactions
of the partnership busineS&, or by reason of his connection with the firm, for any purpose within the scope of the
partnership business, or for any purpose which would compete
with the partnership business, he is liable to account to the firm
for any benefit he may have obtained from the use of such information; but if he uses the information for purposes which are
wholly without the scope of the partnership business ana not
competing with it, the firm is not entitled to an account of such
benefits.

It was further laid down In that case, in explanation of
what was said by Lord Justice CoTToN in Dean vs. McDotcell,
ubi supra, that "it is not the source of the information, but
the use to which it is applied, which is important in such
matters. To hold that a partner can never derive any personal benefits from information which he obtains as a partner would be manifestly absurd;" and it was said by Lord
Justice BowEN that the character of information acquired
from the partnership toonsaction, or from connection with the
firm, which the partner might not use for his private advantage, is such information as belongs oo the partnership in the
sense of property which is valuable to the partnership, and in
which it has a vested ri~ht .
Tested by these principles, lt cannot be properly said that
IAltta used any information which was partnership prope~y
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so as to render him chargeable with the profits made therefrom. His knowledge of the. real estate m.e.rket, or in respect
to profitable investments therein, was not used in competition
with the business of the firm, nor in any manner so as to come
within the scope of the firm's business.
The points already considered being sufficient to dispose
of the case, we do not deem it necessary to go into the other
question discussed as to whether a parol partnership, in
respect to purchasing and selling real estate, or an agreement
between copartners to give each other the option of engaging
in such purc-hases, would come within the operation of the
statute of frauds.
We are clearly of opinion, upon the whole case, that the
decree should be
Reversed, and ·the catUle remanded to the court below with direotttml to di81ni88 'lhe bill at the cost of

lh~

appellees.

NOT&.-See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., §§ 112, 118.

INSLEY vs. SHIRE.
Supreme Court of Kamas, 1895.

M Kan. 793, 39 Pac. Rep. 713, 45 Am. St. Rep. 308.

Insley and Shire were equal partners in carrying on banking
and other business at Leavenworth, Kansas. In 1882, Shire
died, leaving a will, under which Ann M. Shire (his widow),
J . W. Gaw (his brother-in-law), and Levi Wilson, were
appointed executors and were authorized to continue the business of the firm.. This was done, and no steps were taken to
ascertain Shire's interest nor did Insley assume the position
or rights of a sll!rviving partner. Insley and Shire's executors
C()ntinued to carry on the business, Gaw taking the active
management on the part of the executors, until 1887, when
the firm was found to be insolvent. It appeared also that one
Milligan, who had been employed by Gaw to serve in the Bank,
bad fraudulently appropriated a large part of the assets. Mrs.
Shire bNmght this acti()n against Insley, Gaw, Milligan and
ot}lers, to recover damages for what was alleged to be their
•
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negligent mismanagement of the busineae lle8ulting ia inaol·
vency and the loss of the assets.
The court below found that Insley and Gaw had been
guilty of such negligent mismanagement, and rendered judgment against them, from which this appeal was taken.
W. 0. Hook and D. M. Valentine, for appellant.
I!J. Hagan, Hayden & Hayden, T. A. Hurd,_ and L. B. & S. E.
Wheat, for appellees.

JoHNSTON, J. (After disposing of the question of Gaw's liability aa an executor, and of Insley's liability as a coexecutor.)
There is the further contention that the plaintiff could not
maintain an action against Insley for the purpose of obtainfog an accounting of the partnership business. This contention is based upon the idea that all of the executors represent
the Shire interetJt in the partnership, and, as the estate is joint
and entire, the executors are to be considered in law as one
person, and all of them m-ust join as plaintiffs. This is the
correct rule, and all three of the representatives of the estate
should have joined in bringing the action for an accounting
with Insley. 7 Amer. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 360, and cases
cited; 11 Amer. & Eng. Ency of Law, 1033. No proper objection, however, was made on account of the nonjoinder of Gaw
and Wilson, and, as they were made defendants in the action
in their representative capacity, and remained in the court
throughout the proceeding, while the accounting was being
made,· the failure to name them as plaintiffs cannot be
regarded u a fatal objection. Treating the proceedings, then,
as one in which all of the representatives of the estate had
joined in asking an accounting of the partnership business,
the question remains as to the liability of Insley. Insley and
Shire, as we have seen, were equal partners. When Shire
died Insley did not give a oond and take possession of the
partnership property as surviving partner, as he might have
done under the statute1 • The death of Shire operated to dissolve the partnership, but it appears that by a mutual arrangement, and in accordance with the provisions of the will, the
business was continued by the executors upon the same terms
as it was during the lifetime of Daniel Shire. This arrangement had the effect of creating a new partnership, composed of
the executors on ooe side and Insley on the other.
• See Shattuck w. Chandler, ante.
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Some attempt Is made to hold Insley to the liability of a
surviving partner under the law, but, from the testimony, it is
clear that he waa not so regarded or treated by any of the
parties. He did not assume title and control as surviving
partner. No bond was given by him; no inventory of the part·
nership estate was made; and he did not take the managem·e nt of the partnership estate as surviving partner. On the
contrary, all the parties united in the control and possession
of the property; the executors, representing the Shire interest,
and Insley, representing his own, they joined together in carrying on the business until it was discontinued. They were
partners to all intents and purposes, and all alike equally
owed the dtrtles O'f partners to each other. There was no
agreement for a division of labor between the executors on one
side and Insley upon flhe other. Insley wa.s not employed
to represent the executors or to attend ro the business
of the partnership for the estate. It is true that he
devoted most of his time and attention to the partnershjp
business, but, from 1885, Gaw was employed on behalf of the
estate to attend to the Shire interest in the partnership, and
he received an annual salary of fl,OOO as compensation for his
services. There is a finding by the referee that be undertook
to represent the Shire interest in the partnership, and was
continuously so engaged down to the close of the bank.
The claim that Insley was general manager for the firm,
and liable as such, is not sustained by the record. While be
was active in the management of the affairs of the firm, he
was not appointed nor employed as manager, nor did be bold
any official position which made him the representative of the
estate in the firm business. There was no ngreement that he
should receive compensation as manager or agent for the firm,
nod none was allowed or paid. It is true that, when the controversy arose between the parties, a rredit was entered and
a claim for extra services made, but, as there was no such
agreement, it was not allowed and it appears to have been
abandoned. So far as 1be partnership accounting is concerned
Insley is to be treated as a one-half owner and the Shire estate
as the owner of the other half interest. The three executors
are to be regarded as one person, and together they sustain
the same relation to lneh.'y that Shire did in his lifetime;
Insley owed them, as partners, no higher duty or any greater
diligence than be would have owed to Shire under similar circumstances If he had been alive. It was the duty of the
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partners to devote their time and best endeavon to carry on
the business, and prom~te the prosperity of the partnership.
In the absence of any special agreement between them as to
the division of labor, each should give time and attention to
· the conduct of business without compensation, and without
regard to the relative value of the services of the several
parties: Parsons on Partnership, 3d Ed. 244; 17 Amer: &
Eng. Ency. of Law 105ft Scrupulous good faith and reasonable diligence is required from each to the other, and all losses
caused by culpable neglect of duty or bad faith on the part of
a partner are chargeable against him in favor of the firm.
''A fair degree of care only, however, is required. An honest
mistake of judgment, or a tfivial departure from the partnership agreemE'nt in cases of emergency, will not impose the
borden of the losses of the firm on the deviating partner."
17 Amer. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 1219.
A partner of equal responsibility, and who himself is indifferent to his own interest or guilty of negligence, is hardly in
a position to claim and recover for the entire losses resulting
from the negligence of both. In this case fhe duty of
carefully selecting employes and supervising the businestJ
of the pa.rtnersbip rested equally upon Insley and the
representatives Qf the estate; and yet we find that the
entire loss resulting from the fraud and defalcation of
employes was placed upon a single partner. The principal
losses resulted from the action of Milligan in abstracting and purloining ~poney from the bank. Gaw, who _
was giving special attention to the interests of the Shire
estate, procured the employment of MiJligan, who was a relati"e, and there is testimony that Milligan was employed and
placed on the working force of tlre bank as a representative of
the Shire estate. It was as much the duty of those representing
the esta.t e to exercise a watchful care over the conduct of Milligan and tbe M:her employes as it was of Insley. The accounts
which he fraudulently manipulated and tbe books which he
falsified were under the eyes and supervision of the partners.
Why, then, should Insley account for all these losses? If
Shire bad been alive, and had selected Milligan as an
em'Jlloye, and be bad been guilty of frauds similar to those
charged against him, and if there had been no other division
of labor or responsibility between Insley and Shire than did
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exist while they were partners, how could Shire have elaimed
that Insley should bear all the losses resulting from the frauds
and peculations of Milligan?
It appears that the methods by which Milligan abstracted
and purloined the money of the ftrm were so ingenious as to
almost baftle the skill of expert accountants, and several weeks
were consumed before they were able to uncover the fraud
and determine by whom the money was taken. Insley was
not a bookkeeper nor an expert accountant, and no reasqn is
seen why he should be held to. a higher degree of care with
respect to the books than those representing the other interests. Where t~ partners share alike in the oontorol and labor
of business one of them cannot sit passh·ely by, indifferent to
the interests of the firm, and after neglecting to use reasonable diligence himself, bold the other responsible to the firm,
for a like indifference or negligence. It does not appear that
Insley bad any special skill as a banker, and as a partner
he cannot be held for the lack of skill in that respect. His
partners had a right to expect reasonable care and diligence
from him in assisting to carry on the business, but they knew
what his capabilities were when th~y entered into business
with him, and therefore have no right to complain of a lack of
ability or skill. The charge of bad faith and of conspiracy
with Gaw was not sustained because there was an express
ftnding that Insley did not participate in any fraudulent transaction of the employ~s or in any of ·the fruits thereof, and,
more than that, that he had no knowledge of the same. lt
is clear that the accounting was made upon an incorrect
theory. The liability of Insley was extended beyond what
was warranted by the evidence or the Jaw, and hence the
judgment cannot be sustained.
Reversed.
NOTB.-8ee Mechem's Elem. of Partn., i 114.

-~

-·-
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MURPHY vs CRAFTS.

Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1858.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 16:47 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112102486216
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
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~19,

71 Am. Dec.

~19.

Plaintiff and defendant were commercial partners, transact·
ing a general commission business under the name and style
of Murphy & Crafts, in the city of New Orleans. Their con·
tract of partnership was in writing, and the third article
thereof was in these words: "\Ve will not indorse any note,
draft, or give our signatures separately or collectively, except
for our legitimate business purposes." Crafts, in violation
of this article, accepted in the partnership name, for the accommodation of his brother-in-Jaw, John C. Robertson, of the city
of Boston, bills of exchange to the amount of $12,500. Robertson failed in business, and the ftrm of Murphy & Crafts lost,
by these acceptances, the sum of $5,592.90. The action was •
by Murphy against Crafts to recover indemtnity for this loss.
Judgment below for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
Singleton & Clack, for plaintiff.

Ooze & Breau:.c, for defendant.
LAND, J. (After stating the facts.) Tbe principal question
in this case is, whether Crafts is liable to his partner for the
loss. (Omitting references to the code). Judge STORY, in his
Commentaries on the Law of Partnership, says: "One of the
most obvious duties and obligations of all the partners is
strictly to conform themselves to all the stipulations contained in the partnership articles, and also to keep within the
' bounds and limitations of the rights, powers, authorities, and
acts belonging and appropriate to the due. discharge of the
partnership trade or business. Of course every known deviation from and every excess in the exercise of such rights,
powers, authorities and acts, which ·produce any loss or. injury
to the partnership, are to that extent to be borne by the partner who causes or occa!lions the loss or injury, and he is bound
to indemnify the other partners therefor. The same doctrine
is recognized by Pothier as existing in the French law; and it
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seems, indeed, 10 clearly the result of naturp.l justice as to
require no particular exposition." Sec. 173.
Aecording to these rules, the defendant is clearly bound to
indemnify the plaintiff for the Joss resulting from his .breach
of the third article of their contraet of partnership, unless the
same was superseded 'Or waived in the course of their busi·
ness, with the assent of the plaintiff. And this is the defense
made by the defendant to the action; but we concur with the
district judge that the evidence is insufficient to show that
the partners came to a new arrangement, in the course of their
ltusi.ness, and thereby superseded article tbird of their con·
tract, or that the plaintiff ratified the acceptances in favor
of Robertson. • • •
A16rmed.
NoTa.-See Heohem'a Elem.

ot Partn., f llll.

WEBB vs. FORDYCE.

Supreme Oourt of Iowa, 1880.
M Iowa 11.

The partles to this action had been partners, and, having
dissolved and not being able to adjust their accounts, each
had brought an action against the other. The case was tried
before a referee, who found that defendant had drawn out
of the partnership funds the sum of ,11,187.74, and that he
had accounted for ,8,404.72, leaving a balance due from him
of ,2,78.~.02. As to this, defendant testified that aU of the
money he had drawn out had been properly applied to part·
nership uses, but he was unable to make any statement of
his disbursements, having no account whatever of many of
his transactions.
Judgment was rendered against him, and be appealed.

L. Eoom, for appellant.
Onm & Flick, and Whitfin & Brown, for appenee.

ROTunoox, J. (After stating the facts.) The sole question
presented by appenant in this appeal is whether the defend·
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ant should- be held liable for such of the partnership funds
as caJD~ into his hands,. and for whic'h he oould render no
account and as to which he could but testify generally that he
did not convert the same to his own use.
It is contended that the question presented is the same as
that determined in Da-venport VB. Schutt, 46 Iowa, 510. nut
we think the cases are quite different. In that case Davenport delivered to Schutt promissory notes, for the purpose of
effecting loans by discounting the notes. Schutt, as the agent
of Davenport, sold the notes and paid the proceeds to-Davenport. It was held that there was no more obligation upon
one party to keep books of account than the other-, and: that
Schutt was not liable merely because he could not show an
itemized statement of the tr.ansactions between the parties,
and that being a credible person; and having testified po!Ji·
tively that he had paid and disposed of all sums realized by'
him from plaintiff's notes as directed by the plaintiff, this, in
the absence of some account or showing by Davenport that
the proceeds of the notes were not accounted for, was· a · sufftcient defense. In that case no confidence nor. trust as to
the disposition of the proceeds of the · notes was reposed in
Schutt. He was to pay to Davenport, who could well have
kept a correct account of all the notes deposited and payments made.
Here the relation of the parties is quite different. Each
checked out the funds of the pat·tnership at will, upon his
own check, and it was the duty of each to account to the firm
for what he drew out. If the defendant drew checks and
obtained the money thereon its expenditure was a matter
peculiarly within his own knowledge. The plaintiff was
entitled to some showing more than a general statement that
the proceeds of the checks were used for partnership purposes.
"All partners having any charge of the business of the firm
are bound to keep constantly, regular, intelligible and accurate
accounts of all .the business, and to give all the partners at
all times access to them- and to the means of verifying them."
Parsons on Partnership, p. 527.
Affirmed.
NOTB.-See Mecbem·s Elem of Partn., § 118.
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YORKS vs. TOZER.
'Supreme Court

of

Minnesota,

189~.

59 Minn. 78, 60 N. W. Rep. s.6, 28 L. R. A. 88.

Plaintiff and defendant were partners in respect to one parcel of land, the title to which was taken in defendant's name.
Defendant negotiated a sale of the land, without the plaintiff's
bowledge, but, on obtaining an absh-act, the title appeared
defective in la-cking one conveyance. The title was, however,
perfect, and the fault was in the abstract. Plaintiff could
haTe informed defendant of this error, but, without consulting
plaintitf, defendant paid f526, to procure a conveyance to supply the supposed deficiency. ·The action was by plaintiff for
an accounting for the proceeds of the sale, and the defendant
sought to be allowed the f526 so paid.
Disallowed and defendant appeals.
Clapp & McCartney, for appell-ant.

Henry N. Setzer, for appellee.
CANTY, J. (After stating the fach.) The court [below]
finds that defendant acted in good faith in the sale of the land,
and in expending said sum of f526 in attempting to cure the
suppoaed deft>ct in his title, but holds that he ·cannot compel
plaintiff to stand oue-half or any part of such expense. 'Ye
are of the same opinion. If defendant did not act in bad faith,
be was, ~say the least, grossly negligent. It does not appear
that plaintiff was not accessible and could not be comrnuniea.ted with in a reasonable time. This land was the only partnership property, and its purchase and sale wa.s the only partnership business. It w.as not ao act in the uErual course of
the partnership business, but one which went to the very foundation of the partnership. It is found by the court that the
plaintiff, and not thf' defendant, conducted the negotiations
for the purchase of this land, and procured the conveyance to
defendant; and he should be presumed to have had some
knowledge of the state of the title. No rooson is given by
defendant why all negotiations for the sale of the land and
the purchase of this supposed title by him were kept secret
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from plaintiff. In every important exigency the partner about
t~ act should consult the other partner, at least, if there are
no circumstances which excuse him from so doing.
Affirmed.
NOTB.-8ee Mechem's Elem. of P&rtn.,

~

11'7.

LINDSEY vs. STRANAHAN.
Supreme Oourl of Pennsylvania, 1889.
129 Pa. St. 685, 18 Atl. Rep. 524.

Action for accounting of partnership transactions. It
appeared that J. A. Stranahan had carried on business alone
unti11876, when J. K. Lindsey bought a half interest in it and
the two united as partners under the firm name of J. K. Lindsey & Co. Af.ter the foMn3Jtion o.f the firm Stra.nathan left the
entire management and control of the business to Lindsey.
On the settlement, Lindsey claimed compensation for thus
managing the business. The matter was referred to masterR
in chancery to state an account, and they reported, among
ather things, as follows: "No express agreement or contract
was made by said partners that either of them was to receive
compensation for services rendered by either of them in the
business of the partnership; but as Lindsey took credit for
his services from time to time on the books of the firm, and
such books were open to the inspection of Stranahan, he must
be presumed to have known the fact and t{) have assented
thereto; and, as· it is not to be presumed that the said Lindsey
would render his services in managing the affairs of said partnership for nothing, we, therefore, find as a fact, that there
was an implied contract that Lindsey ~hould receive such
compensation for his services as they were reasonably worth."
They therefore credited him with "salary, $3,700."
The court below disallowed this claim, and Lindsey
appealed.
8. and 8. B. Griffith, for the appellant.

J. A. Stranahan, for appellee.
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PEa: Cuauw. There ia bot a single question in thia case:
Ia J. K. Lindsey, the plaintiff, entitled to compensation for his
services as a pat-tner? It ia eonceded that there was no
express contract that he should be paid for such services, and
there is no principle better settled than that the law will not
imply a contract in such cases. The reason is that the partner is bot attending to his own affairs. This rule is im~xor
able; as much so aa that betwet>n parent and child. Were it
otherwise, we might have a contest between the partners upon
the settlement of every partnership account, as to the value
of their respective services. It is true this principle may work
hardship in particular cases; almost every general rule does,
bot that is a weak argument against the soundness of the
rule. When the copartnership agreement contemplates that
one partner shall manage the business, or do more than his
share of the work, it is e~sy to provide for his compensation
in the agreement itself; and if no &uch stipulation is then
made, as before said, the la·w will not imply one. Even where
a liquidating or surviving pnrtner settles up the business, it
has been repeatedly held that he is not entitled to compensation for doing so, although, in such case, he performs all the
serTice; Beatty vs. Wray, 19 Pa. 516, 57 Am. Dec. 677; Brown
v8. JfcFarland, 41 Pa. 129, 80 Am. Dec. 598; Gyger's Appeal,
62 Pa. 73, 1 Am. Rep. 382; Brown'a Appeal, 89 Pa. 139.
Judgment aftlrmed.
NOTB.-See also Mechem's Elem. of P.artn., §t 119, 120, for other cases to
the same effect. The same general :::-ule ordinarily governs the allowance
of interest to one partner upo11 money ad vanceJ by him for partner11hip
purpoeea. See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., § 121.

McFADDEN vs. LEEKA.
Supreme Omtrt of Ohio, 1891.
48 Ohio St. 513, 28 N. E. Rep. 874.

McFadden, Leeka, and a large number of others organized
an unincorporated association known as The Union Pork
House Oompany, under a constitution and by-laws agreed
upon. The affairs of the association were iu charge of a board
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of directors provided for by the by-laws, and elected from the
mrmbers. One of the purposes of the organization was the
erection of a packing bouse. By-law VIII provided that the
directors should not incur indebtedness beyond the available
capital of the company. In erecting the packing house, the
contributions from the members proved insufficient, and the
directors borrowed large sums on their personal responsibility.
They then procured a mortgage upon the property to secure
them against this indebtedness, foreclosed the mortgage,
bought in the property, and, after applying the proceeds upon
this indebtedness, brought this action against all the stockholders to recover a large balance remaining unsatisfied.
Leeka was one of these directors and McFadden one of the
stockholders so stlled.
Judgment below against M·cFadden and others, and they
brought error.
Alphonso Harl, for plaintiffs in error.
Steel & Hough, and Urio Sloane, for defendant in error.
DICK~fAN, J.
(After holding that the association was a
partnership and that the rights and liabilities of the member'S
were to be determined as partners). When the directors,
finding they were able to collect only eight thousand and
five hundred dollars ()f the st()ck, proceeded to contract an
indebtedness largely in excess of the available capital of the
company, and in disregard of a plain provision of an
unchanged by-law, their action, as between the partners, was
binding only upon tboge who eitller assented beforehand to
the creation of the indebtedness or ratified it after it was
incurred. In general, the act of one or more partners in contravention of the p:11·tnership articles in a substantial point,
<:annot, as among the members of the firm, bind the nonassenting partners.
One of the most obvious duties and ob~igations of all partners is, strictly to. conform themselves to all the stipulations
contained in the partnership articles. In respect to the extent
of the partnership as stated in the articles, courts of equity
construe the articles strictly, and do not permit the business
to be extended by any of the partners without the consent of
all of them.- Story, Part., sees. 173, 193. ln 1he management
of the interior concerns of the partnership among themselves,
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tbe weight of authority is in favor of the power of a majority
of the firm, acting in good faith, to bind the minority in the
ordinary transactions of the partnership, and when all have
been conaulted. 3 Kent's Com., 45. But unless special provisions in the articles of association be made to the contrary,
this right of the majority does not extend to the right to set
aside, or materially change any of the articles of the partnership. In eftecting such a change, or in substantially violating
any of the articles, it is essential that all should unite; otherwise, it is not ooligatory upon them. Colly. Part., 3d Am.
Ed., 182. In no case can the majority bind the minority inter
seae to anything expressly stipulated against .in the contract,
or which is oot fairly within the scope of the partnership
business, and that cannot be considered within its scope which
in any respect is subversive of the fundamental agreement.
Abbott vs. Johnson, 32 N. H. 9; 1 Wood's Colly. Part. sec. 155,
p. 285, N.
In Davies vs. Hawkin.s, 3 Maule and Sel. 488, a company was
formed for brewing ale, and by deed they confided the conduct
of the business _to two persons, who were to be trustees of the
company. General quarterly meetings of the company were
to be held. It was reso-lved by the King's Bench, that one person only could not be appointed at a general quarterly meet·
ing in place of the two originally appointed under the deed,
unless such alteration was made with the consent of all the
subscribers. Lord Eu.ENBonovoa said, that "a change had
been made in the constitution of this company, which could not
be made without the consent of the whole body of the subacribers. It was such a substituted alteration in its constitution as required the consent of all."
The right of contribution and indemnity between partners
grows, in a large measure, out of the agency of the partner
seeking reimbursement. Each member, as an agent of the
firm, is entitled to be indemnified by the firm, against liabilities
bona fide incurred by him while pursuing the authority conferred upon him by the agreement entered into between himself and his copartners; but he has no right to claim con·
tribution from the other members of the firm, for liabilities
incurred in disregard of the authority thus reposed in him. It
devolves upon agents and trustees who seek indemnity front
their principals and cest'Uis que trustent, to show that they have
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Dot acted contrary to their instructions, for on principle they

wm not be entitled to any indemnit]' or reimbursement for
losses and expenses incurred w.hile BO acting. And this rule
has been applied to directors of companies. In The Worcester
Corn Exchange Company's Case, 3 De Gex, Mac. & .G. 180, a
company was organized for the purpose of building a corn
exebange. The deed of settlement of the company limited the
amount of each :shareholder's subscription, and authorized the
directors to create new shares, and to raise the money by borrowing, under certain restrictions. The capital of the com·
pany being expended, and more money being required~ the
directors advanced money themselves, and expended it in payment of debts of the company. They also, but in excess of
their powers, borrowed money of a bank which bad notice
of the company's deed. It was held that the directors were
not entitled to charge the shareholders, either in respect of
the advances, or in respect of the bank debt, beyond the
amount of the capital which each shareholder bad agreed to
subscribe. And this decision is pronounced to be, "strictly
in conformity with the sensible rule that agents are not
entitled to any indemnity from their principals in respect of
unauthorized expenditures." 1 Wood's Colly. Part., 495.
But we are reminded that the constitution and by-laws of
The Union Pork House Company provide, by article XI of
the one and article IX of the other, that either the constitution or by-laws "may be altered or amended at any regular
meeting by a two-thirds vote of all stockholders represented
at said meeting." And it is urged in argument, that notwithstanding article VIII of the by-laws restraining the action
of the direetors bas never been altered or amended, yet, the
shareholders, at certain extra but not regular meetings, by a
vote sufficient to alter or amend that section, virtually
assented to and ratified the acts of the directors in creating
an indebtedness beyond the available capital of the company,
by authorizing them to borrow money and directing a mort,age on the company's property to indemnify them against
loss. But the object of a change in the by-laws is not to be
attained by an indirect, irregular, and unauthorized method,
calculated to mislead the shareholders. The shareholders had
the right to rely upon the inviolability of the constitution
and by-laws, unless changed in the manner prescribed. Until
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the by-laws to restrict the directors in the expenditure of
money should be changed in the mode provided, to wit: by
a two-thirds vote of all the stock represented at a regular meet·
ing, of which due notice had been given, and held on the first
Thursday of March or September, the directors ~uld be confined within the bounds of the available capital of the company, and in transgressing those bounds, would, we think, be
entitled to no contribution or reimbursement from non-assenting shareholders or partners who had paid their subscriptions.
If it is proposed to make an alteration in the partnership articles by an agreement w·hich shall be binding on all parties,
notiee of the proposed change and of the time and place at
which it is to be taken ·into consideration ought to be given
to all partners. Oonst v8. Harris, 1 T. & R. 496. For, even
if the change is one which it is competent for a majority· to
malre against the assent of the minority, all are entitled to be
beard upon the subject; and unless all have an opportunity
of opposing the change, those who object to it will not· be
bound by the others. 2 Lind. Part., 2d Am. Ed., 410.
Recurring, however, to the court's findings of fact in reference to the extra meeting of December 1, 1875, when a resolution was adopted authorizing the directors to finish the
building and borrow money to pay off the indebtedness; and
the extra meeting of September 26, 1876, when the matter of
paying off the indebtedness, and completing the building was
considered; and the extra meeting of December 23, 1876, when
the trustee was authorized to execute and deliver a mortgage
to secure the directors from loss on account of their individual
liability on the indebtedness, it doe~ not appear how many
shares of stock were represented at any one of tbose meetings,
or whether any resolution was adopted·by a two-thirds vote,
or whether any notice was ever given to any shareholder,
informing him that an alteration or amendment of any of
the by-laws would be taken into consideration.
Furthermore, where a member of a firm materially violates
the articles of copartnership, and claims contribution and ind<'mnity from his copartners for the losses and expenses to
which be has thereby been subjected, it will be incumbent
upon him to show assent or ratification of his acts by his
copartners before be can recover of them. In the findings of
fact it is not disclosed that the plaintiffs in error, or any of
them, ever expressly assented to the creation or payment of
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any of the indebtedness contracted by the directors. Indeed,
the court evidently did not regard sucll assent necessary to
bind the other shareholders. For, the court found, that a
stockholder who was never present at any meeting when the
indebtedness was made known or talked of, who never
attended any meeting after he heard of the indebtedness, and
who expressed his dissatisfaction at the creation of the debt;
that a stockholder who never attended any of the meetings,
never heard of the indebtedness until the commencement of
the original action, and never expressly assented to it; and
that a. stockholder who attended a meeting whe:a the indebtedness was made known, but voted against paying it, and never
expressly assented to it, should each, nevertheless, be holden
to e<>ntribute toward the reimbursement of the directors.
The fact that the shareholders received notice of the meetings and failed to attend, seems to have· been deemed adequate to bind them. But, the directors having disregarded
an important article of t'he by·laws, essential to the safety
and protection of the company, and thereby created an
indebtedness beyond the company's available capital, a shareholder who did not see fit, u~n notice, to attend a meeting
called by those directors to consider their own neglect of duty.
sh<mld not therefore be concluded by the action of those stock·
holders present who ratified the unautoorized acts of the
directors.
In our view the conclusions of law, and the decree of the
circuit court are not altogether sustained by the facts as
found by the court; and those of the plaintiffs in error who
did not, in any other manner than by failure to attend the
meetings of the stockholders when notified, assent expressly
or by necessary implica.ti011, to the creation or payment of
any of the indebtedness incurred by the directors, should not
be required to contribute toward the payment of such indebtness, after paying the amount due upon their respective subsc·riptions. ~Ve think, therefore, that a judgment should be
rendered for the plaintiffs in error upon the facts found, in
conformity with the foregoing opinion of the court.
Judgment accordingly.
NOTK: See Kechem'a Elem. of Partn., g§ 125, 111.

vm.
ACTIONS BETWEEN PARTNERS.
1. AT LA.w.

WYOOFF vs. PURNELL.
Bupreme Court of Iowa, 1860.
10 Ia. 832.

In February, 1857, plaintift and defendant formed a copartnership in tlle grocery and provision business in the city of
'Y~1 Keokuk, each of said partners agreeing to furnish his share of
~ ~ _,.rthe capital stock and share equaJly in the profits of their firm
( ., JV
~ business. The oo~rtnership thus_formed was djssolve_d in
~~
/ December, 1857. The stock in trade was sold and placed to
'·< ' the credit of plaintiff on the partnership account. The plain/
tiff in his petition avers that the defendant failed to furnish his
-:...:
share of the capital for the said firm; that he drew out of the
;-· ~~ , aaid firm more than his just share of the profits, and that upon
ll. ) ... . / )
a settlement and account stated between plaintiff and defend. ._ <t , ..
a·nt there WaS auefrOiil-defeDdallt to plamb~sum Of f1,109,
·...
for which sum the plaintiff sues. Defendant demurred to
plaintiff'& petition, which demurrer was sustained by the court
ud judgment entered thereon, from which plaintiff appeals.
Noble~

Strong, for appellant.

.Banmn, Miller

~

Enster, for appellees.

J. The defendant demurred to the petition of
plaintiff, and assigned as cause of demurrer, that the petition
showed that it waa a controversy for the settlement of partnerBAJ,DWIN,
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ship matters, and its subject-matter was one of exclt1sive
chancery oognizance; also that an action at common law
would not lie· for the matters and things set up in the petition.
It is contended by counsel for appellee that one partner
cannot sue another at law for an unsettled account, and that
chancery has exclusive jurisdiction of unsettled matters
between partners. Upon this point there is no controversy.
But it also claimed by appellant that the principle is fully
and clearly settle-d that one partner can maintain an action at
law against his copartner upon an amount found to be due him
upon settlement and acoount stated. We think the current of
authorities show this to be the proper and settlE-d rule. WhiJ~
in some courts it ~as been held that upon a settlement of partnership accounts, an express promise to pay is essential to support an action, yet in most of the statE's it has bE-en held that
where there has been a settlement and balance ascertained, the
law itself will imply a promise to pay: Collyer on Partnership, §§ 278, 279, 280, and note; Story Eq. Jur., I 644 and note.
Whether this is a suit at law to recover upon a promise by
dE-fendant, either express or implied to pay a balance ascertained to be due upon settlement, or a proceeding to reoover an
amount unliquidated betw.een partners, must be determined
by the language of the petition. It is averred in the petition
that the partnership ha~ been dissolved; that the property of
the ftrm had been disposed of, and upon a settlement and
account stated, there was due from the defendant to plaintiff
the amount claimed in the petition.
We think that the plaintiff shows by his petition, under a
fair and natural construction, a cause of action properly maintainable in a court of law. That while the petition is defective
in not setting forth fully the character of the settlement of the
partnership business, yet it shows also that the partnership
was E'nded; that the account between the plaintiff and defendant, as partners, was no longer a matter of controversy; that
the amount sued for had been agreed a.s due to plaintiff;
which, if established by evidence, the plaintiff had a right to
recover.
Judgment reversed.
NOTB.-See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., § ls;. ·2.As stated by BALDWIN, J., there are some dates In which It Is said that
there must be an e;z:preu promise to pay. Thus, see Cou~1e 111. p, ince, 1
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Mill, (S. Oar.} 416, 12 Am. Dec. 649; Murray 111. Bogert, 14 Johns. (N. Y.)
818, 7 Am. Dec. 466; OhadMy w. Harrison, 11 Ill. 1111: Burn.t 113. Nottingham, 60 DL 861; NirM w. Bigelo'IJ1, « N. H. 876. But the general rule is
that the promise may be implied. Wyco:ff 113. PurMll, tupra; Holyoke w.
Mayo, 50 Me. 885; Spear 111. Newell, 18 Vt. 288, post; Pope vs. Ra1~·
dolph, 18 Ala. 14: Wray w. Milat~. G Meu va. l+ells, 21,
In Haeaaohueetta, a Btill more liberal rule prenils. Se<l William. "'·
Hen.haw, 11 Pick. 79, 22 Am. Dec. 866; 12 Pick. 878, 28 Am. Dec. 614.
In Hicbi£an, see Wheeler '"· Arnold, 80 Mich. 806.

BULLARD vs. KINNEY.
- Supreme Oourl of California., 1858.
10 Cal.

-eo.

This wu an a'Otion of assumpsit, brought by the plaintiff on
an account a&Signed to him by Sotzen and Goodnow, for goo!Js,
wares, and merchandise sold to the defendants. The defend·
ants composed a joint stock association, known as the "Columbus Quartz Mining Company." While Sotzen and Goodnow,
merchants and partners, were shareholders in the company,
they sold to the company goode, wares and merchandise to a
large amount. They afterwards, and during the existence Gf
the company, sold their stock to one White, and assigned their
account against the company to the plaintiff.
There was nothing in the constitution of the company whi<f1
regulated the remedies of the shareholders, as between themselves. Nor was there any final settl~ment of the partnership
accounts, or any balance struck, or promise on the part of the
shareholders to pay this account. The plaintiff commenced
his suit by attachment against the property of defendants.
The defendants had judgment in the court below, and the
plaintiff appealed.
Sanderson and Hewes, far appellant.

D. K. Newell, for respondent.
BuRNETT, J.

The only question arising in the case is, whether
the plaintiff .can sue in this form?
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There was nothing in the constitution of this company which
regulated the remedies of the shareholders, as between themselves, and, therefore, the general law of partnership must
prevail (Coli. on Partn., Sec. 1115). There having been no
final settlement ()f the partnership aJCCOunts, and no balance
struck, and no express promise on the part of the individual
members to pay their ascertained portion of this amount to
Sotzen and Goodnow, they could not maintain assumpsit. As
they could not sue, it is difficult to see how their assignee could
do so. To permit a partner, who .has a claim against the firm,
and who caD..D()t, therefore, sue the firm at law, to avoid this
disability by assignment of the debt, would defeat all the
substantial reasons upon which this rule is predicated, This
rule rests upon three grounds:
1. The technical ground, that a man cannot, at the same \
time, in the same suit, be both a plaintiff and a defendant.
2. Because it would be useless for one partner to reoover that
which, upon taking a general account, be might be compelled
to refund; and thus a multiplicity of suits be permitted, where
one would answer.
3. The contrary rule would defeat the equitable right of the
other partners to set-off their advances against those ()f plain- \
.tiff, and would force them to first pay the amount, and then
rely upon the individual responsibility of the partner for a
return of his proportion.
The first ground, being merely technical, may be considered
as not so material under 6Ur system of pleading; but the other
. two grounds are substantial in their character. • • •
Affirmed.

I

NoTE.-See Mechem a Elem. of Partn., t 130, and cases there cited.

CASES ON

.P ARTENBSHlP.

· MANGNELB vs. SHAEN, et al.
App. Div. of Sup. Ct. of New York 1897.
21 App. Div. 007.

The facts appear in the opinion.
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G. E. Waldo for plaintiff.
Charles Edward Souther for defendants.
RUMSEY,

J. :

It appears from the complaint that for some time before the
't( h l s t of January, 1889, Henry B. Shaen; Frederick B. St~wart
'x-.Y
and Frederiok M. McWilliams, the defendants in this action,
~...
were copartners doing business.in the city of New York under
~~ -,;--, ~/the firm name of H. B. Shaen & Co ; that the same Harry B.
t
Shaen a.nd Frederick B. Stewart, with one Nathan Phipps,
r, ¥v' were between the 1st of January, 1889, and the 1st of October,
~\
1889, a copartnership under the same name, that the last.~..,-..?',- l named firm at the request of the defendants and in liquidation
~· ~ ·?
of the business and debts of the old firm paid.for their use the
,_-~;:f,.r
~·sum of thirty thousand and odd dollars, which the defendants
~
.
'-. •· ~- promised to repay to the new firm.
r.i '· ,;;. A'
About the 16th of October, 1889, the finn composed of Shaen,
:. :"~;'·;"'--stewart and Phipps made a general assignment to the plaintiff,
\ . ~>. -~~ : ; "
•'
who took by vil'tue thereof the claim against the ·old firm, and
this action is brought upon that claim. The defendant Me. , ,
WiUiams alone interposed a defense. The case came on for
·. , "' ·:. "-...:t
trial at the Trial Term. The complaint was dismissed upon
J
~ · ~c
the pleading for the reason that no cause of action was stated
· , t. .'
therein, because the plaintiff sued as assignee of three individ...
uals who composed a partnership and the defendants are the
-v'
same three, with one exception, the court at Trial Term holding
that where the same person was a member of two firms, one of
those firms could not sue the other firm for the recovery of a
debt which the plaintiff firm owed to the defendant firm. The
sole ground of dismissal was that this action could not have

•ttrj.

~
>, , )
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been maintained by the creditor firm or its assignee against the
debtor firm, for the reason that so~e of the members of each
firm were the same persons. In this contention the defendant
and the learned trial court were entirely mistaken as is well'
settled by authority in this State.
In Cole vs. Reynolds, (18 N. Y. 74) the same question was
presented, where the action was brought upon the original balance due from one firm to the other, although certain of the
members of each firm were the same persons. It was held by
the Supreme Conrt that the action could not be maintained;
but the judgment of this court was reversed by the Court of
Appeals, the court holding that, u~the rule establi~;hed bx
the Code, the action coulrl be maintained and it was erroneo tochsm ss the complaint. The same ques ton w s presented to
the General Term in the first department in the case of Schnaier
vs. Schm.idt (13 N. Y. Supp. 725 )where the action was tried as
.an action at law without any objection, as was the case here.
The plaintiff firm had a judgment against the defendant, and
upon appeal the judgment was affirmed, the court holding that
there was a cause of action and that the action could be maintained.
These two cases sufficiently show that it was erroneous to
dismiss the complaint in this action.
The decision of the judge at Trial Term, therefore, in any
aspect of the case, was erroneous, and the exceptions should be
sustained and the motion for a new trial granted, with cost.~ to
the plaintiff to abide the event of the action.
VAN BRUNT, P. J., BARRETT, WIX..LIAMS and PATTERSON,
J J., concurred.
Exceptions sustained, new trial ordered, costs to plaintiff to
abide event.
NOTE.-8ee Mechem's Elements of Partn., § 147.
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COLE, et al. vs. REYNOLDS, et al.

Court of Appeals of ....Vew York, 1858,
18 N. Y. 74

D. D. Cole, Holmes and W. J. Cole were partners under
the firm name of Cole & Holmes. W. J. Cole was a part'- ner with others in a firm of Cole, ,Stevens & Co.
The
., c. · ~~ latter firm was indebted to the former for a large sum on ac11
{
/count stated.
c- ~- D. D. Cole and Holmes bring an action thereon and W. J.
,;Cole declining to become a party plaintiff was made defendant
.v
as provided by the Code.
I
Defendants insisted that this action at law could not be maintained but that there must be an accounting.
From a judgment for defendanttJ plaintiffs appealed.
)
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James Gibson for appellants.
Potter and Tanner for respondents.
HARRIS, J. By the Code, the distinction oetween actions at
law and suits in equity is abolished. The course of proceeding in both cJasses of cases is now the same. Whether the action depend upon legal principles or equitable, it is still a civil
action, to be commenced and prosecuted without reference to
this distinction.
But while this is so in reference to the form and course of
proceeding in the action, the principles by which the rights of
the parties are to be determined, remain unchanged. The Code
has given no new cause of action. In some cases parties are
allowed to maintain an action who could not have maintained
it before, but in no case can such an action be maintained
where no action at all could have been maintained before upon
the same state of facts. If under the former system a given
state of facts would have entitled a party to a decree in equity

•
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in his favor, the same state of facts now, in an action prosecuted in the manner prescribed by the Code, will entitle him to
a judgment to the same effect. If the facts are such as that, at
the common law, the party would have been entitled to judgment, he will, by proceeding as the Code requires, obtain the
same judgment. The question therefore is, whether, in the
case now under consideration, the facts, as' they are assumed
to be, would, before the adoption of the Code, have sustained
an action at law or a suit in equity.
The defendants' firm are indebted to the plaintiffs' firm upon
an account Atated and settled between them. This fact, stand·
ivg alone, would have entitled the plaintiffs to maintain an
action at law. But there is another fact in the case, which
upon a technical rule peculiar to the common law, would have
defeated such an action. One of the individuals composing the
plaintiffs' firm is also a member of the defendants' firm. A
man cannot sue himself; and~' at common law, all the members of a firm must unite in bringing an action, it follows that
in such a case no action at law could be sustained.
But in equity this technicality does not stand in the way of
justice. It is enough, there, that the proper parties are before
the court.' They may be plaintiffs or defendants, according to
circumstances, but, being before the court, it will proceed to
pronounce such judgment as the facts of the case require.
This latter rule is obviously the dictate of common sense. So
far as I know, it prevails everywhere else except at the
common law.
Indeed, equity, like the law of Scotland and the systems of
continental Europe, goes farther, and treats the copartnership
as a distinct existence, having its own distinct rights and
interrsts. "In all such cases," says Story, "courts of equity
look behind the form of the transactions to their substance, and
treat the different firms, for the purposes of substantial justice,
exactly as if they were composed of strangers, or were in fact
corporate companies." ( 1 Story's Eq. J ur. , § G80; Story on
Partnership, § 235.)
There is no difficulty, therefore, growing out of the fact that
one of the parties is a member of both firms, in sustaining this
action. How, then, can it be defeated? The fact that, upon
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a settlement between the two firms, it was agreed that the
balance now claimed by the plaintiffs was due from the defendants' firm to the plaintiffs' firm is scarC'.ely denied in the
answer, and, upon the trial, the plaintiffs offered to prove it.
The indebtedness, therefore, for the purposes of this decision,
must be assumed. The amount claimed must be regarded as
ex aequo et bono, due from the defendants' firm to the plaintiffs' firm. Its payment would constitute a final adjustment of
all the transactions between the two firms. Why then should
not the plaintiffs be allowed to recover it?
In the view taken by the court below, it was nee
ry to
have an accounting in order to determine the ri ts of the
parties. But it is to be remembered that, as between the two
firms, an accoupting has already been had. What other accounting did the court below contemplate? Shall it be between
the several members of the plaintiffs' firm or the several members of the defendants' firm? In short, what must the plaintiffs
do, more than they have done, to entitle themselves to recover
the acknowledged indebtedness of the defendants to their firm?
Had it been set up as a ground of defense that, as between
the plaintiffs' firm and the partner who iR made a defendant,
the state of accounts was such that it would be inequitable to
require this debt to be paid, such a defense might have rendered an account necessary in order to determine the equitable
rights of the parties. Even then, I suppose, the better doctrine would be to let the debtor firm pay its debt, and the creditor firm, after receiving their debt, adjust their individual
equities among themselves. This would seem to be more in accordance with the common sense of the commercial world, and
the rule of ·equity which treats a copartnership firm, for the
purposes of a trial, as an artificial body, a quasi corporation.
Upon the whole, I am of opinion that the case stated by
the plaintiffs, and which, upon the trial, they offered to prove,
was sufficient, prima facie, to entitle them to recover. If, upon
another trial, the defendants shall be able to present a state of
facts which renders it necessary that an account should be taken
between the different members of either firm, to enable the
court to determine whether the amount claimed is equitably due
from the defendants to the plaintiffs' firm, it will be entirely
competent for the court tQ direct that such an accounting be

)0
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bad. But no such defense would be admissible under the
present state of the pleadings
The judgment should be reversed . and a new trial ordered,
with costs to abide the event.
PRATT, J., dissented; SELDEN, J., expressed no opinion, all
the other judges concurring.
J udgrnen t reversed and new trial ordered.
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CARPENTER vs. GREENOP.
Supreme Oourt of Michigan, 1889.
'74 Mioh. 664, 42 N.. W. Rep. 276, 16 Am. St. Rep. 662.

Action by Charles D. Carpenter against John Greenop and
Lavery upon a promissory note.
Judgment was' given for defendants, and plaintiff appeals.
Glidden. & Batea, for appellant.
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M. Brown and F-rank Dumon, for respondents.

CAMPBELL, J. PJain~ifi purchased in good faith, but after
maturity, a note of John Greenop & Co., payable to the order of
Robert A. Lavery, and indorsed by Lavery. Lavery was a mem:-~
ber of the firm of John Greenop & Co., and made the note, with
Greenop's consent, for money lent by Lavery to the firm. The
.
note was dated January 21, 1883, payable in six months. It
\ was transferred to plaintiff in 1884 while the firm was stiJl in
j~ business, and about a year before it ceased doing business.
.X. There was no evidence of the state of accounts, or that Lavery
'f
~.-' was in any way a debtor to the firm when the transfer was
,"\ . J" ...::.....
made, or that there were any equities existing against him
· '-. , ~ which did not exist when the note was m.ad.e. The court below
•. < )l' l(. held that plaintiff could not recover. The reason assigned
"< '! ' , , '·'.>../
was thstt the note could not be transferred after maturity, so
'as to enable the indorsee to sue upon it, if suit could not have
·,. Y ,..J' been brought by the assignor, and that Lavery could have
t- (
"""
brought no suit on it. The decision also seems to have been
/vi!' J
based partially on the idea that a partner can have no deal" .J ~
ings with his firm. which are not subject to the final account·
. ',J ' ' ing, and that the equities of such an accounting attach to such
: ( ·-·'"
claims as he may hold against the firm.
y
,.
I do not think this doctrine is tenable. It certainly has not
c,
been directed in this court. The only case that is seriously
claimed as bearing in that direction is Davis vs. Merrill, 51
Mich. 480, 16 N. W. Rep. 864. That case has no resembiance
to this. One member of the firm, named Eastwood, received
from the firm in October, 1874, a note due in one month after

\. ,, ~

\. ·: .h

z;

\

\

1

.
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date. In 1875 the firm was dissolved, and the affairs were put
into the bands of George W. Merrill, one of the partners, to
wind up. Merrill's credit in the firm accounts was larger than
Eastwood's, and E-astwood bad been credited on the books
with the amount of the note, which bad never been presented
or demanded during the period after dissolution. In May, 1881,
Eastwood, who had Jost the note by accidental tire in January
of the same year, assigned to the plaintiff in general terms
whatever claims be had against the firm, with no reference to
the note as such. It is plain enough that there could have
been no recovery in such a case. Even had the note been
described, the statute does not authorize the assignee of a
negotiable note, who is not an indorsee, to sue in his own
name on it. But, furthermore, there was no attempt to transfer the note as such. The assignment was one which trans·
ferred nothing but Eastwood's claims generally against the
company, and must therefore be subject to the partnership
settlement. There was no firm in existence for nearly six
years before the assignment. In the present case the note
was transferred by regular indorsement a considerable time
before the firm went out of business. It was due already as·
an independent claim against the · firm for money lent, and
not for money invested in the business. It was not by its
terms, or by the nature of the transaction, to be postponed
until the future dissolution of the concern, and there is no
accounting in advance of dissolution, unless \>Y agreement.
While there is a difficulty in a suit at law in the name of
a party against himself, yet, if this is the only difficulty, it
goes only to the form of the remedy, and not to its exrstence.
There never was any legal or equitable reason why a partner
should not have specific dea.lings with his firm as well as any
other person; and unless those dealings, from their nature, are
intended to go into the general accounting, and wait for their
adjustment till dissolution, they give a right to have a remedy
according to their exigency, and can be .dealt with like any
other claims. The only reason why they must, under the old
practice, be prosecuted at equity instead of at law, arose frqm
the necessity at law of having plaintiffs capable of suing the
defendants. In such a case the failure of a remedy at law
justified a resort to equity. But equity could grant relief in
such cases, and under our present rules there can be no dif·
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1lculty at law. Where partners have seen ftt to deal with each
other without reference to the ftnal accounting, the transaction is not subject to the necessity· or delay of such an
accounting.
This note was by its terms negotiable. It is elementary doctrine that negotiability does not cease when paper matures.
It is only subject to such equities as exist against the paper
at the date when it is negotiated. And the equities which
affect the indorsee are only such as attach directly to the note
itself, and do not include collateral matters. This is very old
doctrine, and is laid down without qualification. Lord TEN·
TERDEN and his associates, speaking through Mr. Justice BAY·
LEY in Bun-ough "· MoBB, 10 Barn. & C. 558, refer to the subject in this way: "This was an action on a promissory note,
made by the defendant, payable to one Fearn, and by him
indor!JE'd t<! the plaintiff after it became due. For the defendant it was insisted that he had a right to set off against the
plaintiff's claim a debt due to him from Fearn, who held the
note at the time when it became due. On the other hand, it
was contended that this right of set-off, which rested on the
statute of set-off, did not apply. The impression on my mind
was that the defendant was entitled to the set-off, but, on discussion of the matter with my Lord TENTERDEN and my
learned brothers, I agree with them in thinking that the
indorsee of _a n overdue bill or note is liable to such equities
only as attach on the bill or note itself, and not to claims
arising out of collateral matters. The consequence is that the
rule for reducing the damages in this case must be discharged."
See Chit. Bills, 244-246; Story, Bills, § 220; Leat,itt V8. Putnam, 3 N. Y. 49,, 53 Am. Dec. 322; Ba:eter v8. Little, 6 Mete.
7, 39 Am. Dec. 707; and cases in note to page 275 of Bigelow's
Leading Cases; 3 Kent Comm. 91, and notes.
It was not shown, and cannot be claimed on this record,
that there was any unfairness or want of consideration, or
payment, or any other matter bearing on the note in this cMe,
when it was transferred, and in such case it can make no dif·
ference when it was transferred. It continued to be a valid
~ote, and capable of transfer by indorsement. That a partner
himself may have a remedy of some kind, where the transaction is such as to be separated from the general. partnership accounting, does not seem to be questioned. Mr. Collyer
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refers to several illustrations, in boo~ 2, c. 3, Partn. (2d Ed.)
Judge STORY, in his work on Partnership, § 222 et seq., indicates
very clearly the light of a partner to relief in the case of contracts as a creditor or otherwise with his firm; and the fact
which is referred to in all the books, that an accounting can
only be had at the close of the business, indicates as clearly
as anything can that either a partner can make no separate
contract with his firm at all, or else there must be some means
of enforcing it. A contract which cannot be enforced is nugatory. Partnerships are often made for long terms- of years.
Members bec<>me managers on salaries which are payable at
regular intervals, and they frequently furnish articles for
which they are entitled to pay. No one doubts their right to
pay themselves out of moneys in their charge; but all do not
have this opportunity, and to hold that a person must, if his
copartners will not advance him what is due, wait the whole
term of business for payment, is not reasonable or maintainable. A very thorough discussion of the various questions is
found in the early case of Smith vs. Lusher, 5 Cow. 688, where
the judges of the supreme court, and the chancellor and other
members of the court for the correction of errors dealt with
the subject in a very exhaustive way, with entire unanimity.
The cases of Ntmins vs. Tmr-nsend, 6 Conn. 5, and Gray vs. Bank,
3 Mass. 364, 3 Am. Dec. 156, are also somewhat pertinent. I
have found no authority which sanctions the doctrine that
plaintiff was precluded by the fact that the note was past due
from taking the title by indorsement, and none that allows a
note to be affected by collateral equities. When this note was
indorsed there could be no accounting, because the firm continued its ordinary business. The debt was for a. loan, and
not for investments in the capital. It was distinct from the
mutual relations among the partners, and stood as a separate
contract. I think there was nothing to bar recovery, and that
the judgment to the contrary should be reversed.
CHAMPLIN, LONG, and MORSE, JJ., concurred.
SHERWOOD, C. J., dissented.
NOTE.-See also Mechem's Elem. of Partn., §§ 180, 131, and oases there
referred to.
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BEEDE vs. FRASER.
. Supreme Court of Vermont, 1894.
~

.

86 Vt. 11,, 28 Atl. Rep. 880, « Am. St. Rep. 824.

">

'r<--\ f~ The court below found the following facts: Prior to October 15, 1891, the plaintiff and one George were copartners,
, ·~ ~
· ·' ... >- '> ~
under the firm name of George & Beede, . in the business of
~·, J< r. ""
quarrying and selling granite at Barre, and the defendants, as
~ .:< · it\"('~ copartners under the firm name of P. B. Fraser & Co., were
'\o. ,.1 ·~..J engaged in manufacturing granite into monuments, etc. The
~ \.. }>'
former partnership was dissolved about September 1, 1891.
~~-Prior ~o tl,tat tim:, it had sol_d and delivered to the defendants a
, ~
~.. JC. quantity of gramte, for which the defendants owed George &
\...)( ~/~~ Beede; and the debt, by the contract of dissolution, became the
r 7
property of Beede. The defendants were so notified before
x "'
this suit was brought, and thereupon promised to pay the
rl" plaintit! the amount of said debt, and afterwards did pay him
.,- , ~, · './ .f'f50, leaving a balance due of $4.62. October 15, 1891, the
.__x; -.../' i f plaintiti and defendants entered into copartnership under the
\ ·/
,.
firm name of Beede & Co.; and that firm carried on the busi·
r(" /
ness of quarrying and selling granite, and prior to December
"~
4, 1891, sold the deft:'ndants gt-anite to the amount of $90,
...,.
which was due from the defendants to Beede & Co. on that
date, when the firm of Beede & Co. was diss~lved. The firm of
Fraser & Co., composed of Fraser and Smith, owed the $90 to
the . other firm, which was composed of Beede, Fraser, anti
Smith. The plaintiff was not a member of the defendant
firm. The court found that as a part of this contract of dissolution the plaintiff became the owner of all debts due to Beede
& Co., aJ!d that concurrently with the making of the contract
the defendants promised the plaintiff to pay him the demand of
f90, but it certifies that these facts were found solely from
Paper A, which is as follows: "This is to certify that the
r.opartnership heretofore existing by and between F. A. Beede,
P. B. Fraser, and G.
Smith, all of Barre, in the county of
'Vashington, and state of Vermont, under the firm name and
style of Beede & Company, Is hereby dissolved by mutuaJ
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agreement. And it is further agreed by and between said
Beede, Fraser, and Smith that the said F. A. Beede is to, and
hereby agrees to assume and pay all of the debts of the said
ftrm, and to have and collect all of the debts due and owing
said ftrm. Witness our hands and seals, and dated at said
Barre this fourth day of December, 1891. F. A. Beede [L. S.],
P. B. Fraser [L. S.], G. W. Smith [L. S.]."
There was a judgment for the plaintiff and defendants
appealed.
Marlin c£ Sla.ck, for plaintiff.
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J. W. Gordon and E. lV. Bisbee, for defendants.
TYLER, J .' Before the dissolution the defendants owned the
demand jointly with the plaintiff, and Beede & Co. could not
have maintained an action upon it against the defendants,
because Fraser and Smith would have been both plaintiffs and
defendants, and "no one can be interested as a party on both
sides of the record." \Vhere two companies are composed in
part of the same individuals, no action at law can be maintained by one against the other. G1·een vs. Ohapman, 21 Vt.
236, citing Maintoaring vs. Newman, 2 Bos. & P. 120, and Bosanquet vs. lVray, 6 Taunt. 597; Dicey, Parties, rule 22. It is a general rule that all the partners must join as plaintiffs jn an
action at law to enforce a partnership claim, whether the
action is brought before or after the dissolution of the partnel'·
ship. Therefore, two partners cannot maintain a suit against
a third to recover for goods charged to him on the partnership
books, although by the contract of dissolution the two were to
have all the debts d.ue the ftrm, there being no promise by him
to pay the other partners. Judd vs. lVilson, 6 Vt. 185. One
par-tner cannot recover of another an unliquidated and unsettled balance of a partnership business. Spear vs. Newell, 1~
Yt. 288. But when, on the dissolution, one retained a portion
of the partnership assets sufficient to pay.a particular partnership debt, and agreed with his copartner to pay it, and the
copartner was afterwards obliged to pay it, it was held that he
.could recover in assumpsit the amount so paid. Hicks V8.
Cottrill, 25 Vt. 80. As a rule, assumpsit will not lie by one
partner against his copartner, in respect to any matter connected with the partnership transactions, or which would
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involve the consideration of their partnership dealing. Yet
one may sustain an action against his copartner on an express
contract or covenant to do, or omit any particular act not
illvolving any question as to the general accounts. And when
the parties by an express agreement separate a distinct matter
from the partnership dealing, and one expressly agrees to pay
the other a specified sum for that matter, assumpsit will lie on
the agreement, though the matter arose from the partnership
dealing. Oollamer vs. Foster, 26 Vt. 754. "It is quite clear,'' says
T. Parsons on Partnership (section 190), "that certain particular and distinct transactions may be separated from the affairs
or business of the partnership, by the agreement of the partners.
Then, those persons who are concerned in this separated matter are not as partners to each other, although in all other
business relations they remain partners." Where partners
agree to divide a partnership debt, and the debtor assents to it,
and promises one of the partners to pay him his moiP.ty, such
partner may maintain an action for his moiety against the
debtor. 1 Lindl. Partn. 265, citing Blair"'· Snover, 10 N. J.
Law, 153. After a dissolution, and a balance has been struck
and agreed upon by the partners, one may maintain assumpsit
against the other to recover his balance upon an implied
promise. Spear vs. Newell, 13 Vt. 2U2, post, Wan·en vs.
Wheeloolc, 21 Vt. 323; Gibson '!;8. Moore, 6 N. H. 547; Wilby vs.
Phinney, 15 .Mass. 121; Wheeler vs. Wheeler, 111 Mass. 247.
Assumpsit lies where, after dissolution and settlement, one
partner received more than was his due. Bond vs. H ay1, 12
Mass. 34; Olark vs. Dibble, 16 \Vend. 601.
(Omitting a discussion in which the court held that general
aBSumpsit was a proper action.)
Affirmed.

•
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lliLL ' VS. PALMER.

HILL vs. PALMER.
Supreme Court of Wi8con.rin,

188~.

156 Wis. 123, 13 N. W. Rep. 20, 43 Am. Rep. 708.

Hill and Briggs sued Palmer alleging that in September, 1877,~
it was agreed that these three should enter into a partnership for
the purpose of lumbering on the lands of Cline; that the contract
with Cline was to be made in Palmer's name alone but for the
benefit of the proposed firm; that Palmer made the contract with
~ /.,
Cline, but then refused to recognize any interest in plaintiffs and~~~··"~'.'
excluded them from participation, whereby they lost the profits -v_
which would. have accrued to them. Palmer demurred and de..r-'"
murrer sustamed.
.
/ . -t):
1J1trnp, Hetzel & Qmnon and Patchen & Weed, for appellant.
Charles W. Felker, for respondent.
~

.Y'

·Y ·/

X

LYoN, J. Counsel agree that the learned circuit judge sus-

}P ~ ' ..,K-

tained the demurrer to the complaint on the ground that
~( ~
the facts therein stated show that the parties were partners~
~
in the contract with Cline, and in the execution thereof, and
~
that the only remedy of the plaintilfs is by an action in equity~~
.
for an accounting and settlement of the partnership affairs.y;·~
.
The question to be determined is, does the complaint state '·
v- ,
facts wh;c:h constitute a cause of action at law for the recov- '\::r / , \ ery of damages, or must the plaintiffs resort to an equitable~ /
action for relief? It is a fairly debatable question whether it - _\J ,
~
appears from the complaint that the agreement between the*'~ ()"""" 1
parties in respect to the copartnership was anything more~~ \._,_~ ')
than an executory agreement to enter into a partnership in the ~"-.....
future, which was never executed. The agreement alleged is~
~ , '\not in terms that the parties thereby formed a copartnership,
....rF ~ · ·
0
but that "it was agreed that the said parties should enter into o-· 0. .~ ·~~
a copartnership" for the purposes therein specified. The breach~ -~ .• :. · '· • ~
of such agreement alleged in the complaint is that the defend- ·,~-· ~ant "refused to comply with the conditions thereof by refusing~ '..._.._..:
to enter into or carry out said partnership." But, however this ~
may be, ·it seems clear that if any copartnership ever existed
between these parties it commenced when the agreement
between Cline and the defendant was executed. Giving to the
complaint the most favorable construction for the defendant
of which it will admit, we think that the agreement therein
alleged is, in substance and effect, that if the defendant should
succeed in making a contract with Cline which should be satis-

""V

>-
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factory to the plainti1fs, to cut, log and run Cline's timber,
then the parties should become partners in that enterprise on
the terms and conditions stipulated between them.
In that view of the case there may ha;e been a time when a
copartnership actually existed between the parties, but it was
immediately terminated by the wrongful act of the defendant
(so far as he could terminate it) and no business was transacted-nothing whatever was done by the parties as partners.
The defendant excluded the plaintiffs from all participation
whatever in his contract with Cline as soon as it was made,
and 'they had no part in the performance thereof. By such
wrongful act the defendant refused to launch the partnership
business, and thus rendered the copartnership inoperati;e for
the purposes for which it was formed. There is no doubt whatever that an action at law may be maintained by a party to an
executory contract to form a future copartnership to recover
damages for a wrongful refusal by the other party to execute
such agreement. It is also well settled that the wrongful
refusal by a party to a contract of copartnership to permit the
ftrm to oommenoe business, or as it is sometimes termed, to
launch the partnership business, is ground for an action at law
by the injured partner to recover damages of the partner whose
wrongful act has defeated the purpose for which the copartnership was formed. The cases which so hold, both in England
and this country, are very numerous. Indeed, the authorities
seem ro be quite uniform in so holding. The following are a
few of the cases referred to: Venning vB. Leckie, 13 East 7;
Gale VB. Leckie, 2 Stark. 107; Manning vs. Wadsworth, 4 Md. 59;
Glover VB. Tuck, 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 153; .{3a.gley vs. Smith, 10 N.
Y. 489, post; Terrill vs. Richards, 1 Nott. & McC. (S. Car.)
20; Ellison vs. Chapman, 7 Blackf. (Ind.) 224; Williams vs. Henshaw, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 79; 22 Am. Dec. 366; Adams vB. Totten,
39 Penn. St. 447; l'ance VB. Blair, 18 Ohio 532, 51 Am. Dec. 467;
1 Story Eq. Jur. Sec. 665; Collyer on Part. Sec. 245; 2 Lindle~· ·
on Part. (4th Ed.), 1025, and cases cited in notes. The subject
is much discussed in some of the above cases and many other
cases asserting the same doctrine are cited in the opinions as
well as in the above text-books.
The test seems to be that if the damages resulting from a )
breach of a covenant or stipulation in the partnership agreement by one partner belong exclusively to the other partner,
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and can be assessed without taking an account of the pnrtnPr- ~
Rhip busine~s, coYenant or assumpsit may be maintained by
the injured pm·tner against the otht·t· for such damages. Here ·
no partnership business was transacted; lwnce no account
could be taken, and the damnges claimed belong to the plaintiffs. This principle was applied in Sprout t·s. Crou;Tc_lj, 30 \Vis.
187. Should it be conceded that by the alleged ngreement of
September, 18ii, the. parties became partners. this action can
still be mnintained under many of the cases cited above. This
court has frequently held that one partner bas no claim against
his copartner individually (that is to say, be cannot maintain
an action at law against such copartner), on account of partnership transactions, although a final settlement of the affairs of
the firm would show a balance in his favor. Tolfonl vs. Talford, 44 "Wis. 547, and cases cited .. nut it has not held that if
one partner, immediately after the contract of copartnership
is made and before anything has been done under it, wrongfully repudiates the contract and pr~vents the firm from ever
doing any business under it, the injured paL1'J· cannot maintain an action at law against his copartner and recover the
damage which he has suffered thereby.
In 'l'olfonl t·s. 'l'olford, supra, and also in Lotcer vs. Denton, 9
Wis. 2G8, an accounting was necessary in order to det<>rmine
the dnmages or compensation to which the plaintiff was
entitled. Thc~e were actions at law. The same is true of
Wood -z;s. Beall!, !!:J Wis. 254, whkh was a suit in equity.
It follows from the fon'going views that the complaint
states a valid cau~e of action at law.
Judgment reversed.
On-ro~, J., dissented.
NoTE-See Mechem's
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Appeal from a judgment of the New York superior court
for damages for breach of articles of copartnership. The'\ :. ,·
agt·eement was in writing and under seal, and provided for a~.,,. . _.
~
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continuance of the firm for a term of four years and one month
from December 1, 1846. Before two years had quite expired,
two of the partners, while the third was traveling in the west
on business of the firm, published a notice of dissolution of
the old firm, and of the formation of a new one in their own
names to continue the business. They took possession of the
stock, and commenced business, according to their announcement. This suit was brought by the ousted partner for damages for this wrongful dissolution; and resulted in a Yerdict
and judgment for plaintiff, ·subject to exceptions taken by
defendant, which raised the questions discussed iD the following opinion.
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Daniel Lord, for the appellants, who had dissolved the firm..

John Slosson, for the respondent, the ousted partner.
JoH~SoN,

J. The principal points presented by the exceptions in tllis case are: 1,. Whether an action can be main·
tained for a breach of a 'covenant to continue a partnership
for a fixed period, unless sooner dissolved in accordance with
the terms of the covenant; 2, ·whether actual damages can
in such case be recovered; 3, 'Vhether expected profits can
be regarded as ground for damages in such a case, and 4,
whether the amount of profits made prior to the dissolution
could be considered by the jury as bearing, in any degree, upon
the amount of damages to which the plaintiff was entitled.
Another objection was presented on the argument, that the
covenants of the defendants being several, no judgment for
joint damages could be given. This objection, not having been
presented at the trial, so far as the bill of exceptions informs ~
us, cannot be considered here.
There do not seem to be any special rules of law applicable
to covenants contained in partnership articles and not to other
co,·enants; and we may therefore say, without discussion, that
an action will lie for a breach of covenant, no matter in what
instrument the covenant be found. · ·we may further affirm
ti1at no rule of law declares that the breach of a covenant contained in partnership articles shall be compensated only by
nominal damages. The measure of damages must depend on
the nature of the obligation, and the extent of the injury in
this as in all other cases of broken covenants.
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No question was made at the trial as to the sufficiency of
the proof that a breach of the obligation to contiuue the pat·tnership bad taken place, except ouly so far as a questiou of_
that sort is raised by the objection of the defendants' counsel,
that by the constitution of the partnership the pat·tnct·s have a
power of revocation wheneYer they lose confidence in each
other. It is not quite clear whether this objection points to
the particular frame of this p:utnership, or is supposed to be
founrlPd upon the g(•neral rules applicable.to that relation. If
it relate to the pro,·isions of the partnership agreement in
this case, then it is cleat· that the articles contain uo elause
which war1·ants the defendants' proposi tion. If, on the other
hand, the general law of partnership is referred to, while it
must be conceded thatt some difference of opinion s<>ems to
exist as to the power of either partner in a partnership for
a fixed term, contrtH'Y to his agreement, to put .an end to the
continuance of the firm at his own mere will, it can be safely
affinned tha.t, conceding this power to exist in the broadest
form, it has never been pt·etended that a partner who should,
in contravention of his a~reement , put an end to the partnership would not be held responsible for the injury thus
committed.
" 'e are left, then, to the only substantial question which this
case presents: \Ylu>ther the Joss of those profits which the
plaintiff would have made during the stipulated term of the
partnership is a proper subject of compensation, and whether
the evidence of past pt·ofits, during the period next preceding
the dissolution, can be considered as bearing upon the question
of prospective profi ts. The form of the exc<~pt ions taken concede
that the judge counnitt~·<l no ei'l'Ot', unless in taking the pt·otits
into consideration at ·an; that if he was conect in this he bas
annexed to his instructions all the proper qualifications to
prevent an exn·~s in· and enoJH.·ous <.'Stima te of the amount of
comp{'nsation for JH'ospective profits.
The object of comin<•t·cial partn e n~hip is pt•ofit. 'l'his is the
moti>e upon whic·h llH'n c•nter in to the relntion. The only
legitimate ben E'ficiaJ conseqtu•nce of continuing a partner~hip
is the making of profits. The most direct and le~itimate
injurious con!'equence whieh can follow upon an tmauthorbwd
dissolution of a partnerl5hip is the loss of profits. Fnl<>ss that
loss can be made up to the injured party. it is idle to say that
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any obligation is imposed by a contract to continue a partnership for a fixed period. The loss of profits is one of the common grounds, and the amount of the profits lost one of the
common measures. of the damages to be given upon a breach of
contract. I neer only refer to Masterton t:s. Mayor, etc. of
B1·ookZyn, 7 Hill, 61 [ 42 Am. Dec. 38]. So, too, in Wilson vs.
Martin, 1 Denjo ~02; Hcck8her vs. McC1·ea, 24 " 'end. 304; airtl
Shannon vs. Comstock, 21 ld. 457 [34 Am. Dec. 262], what the
pat1:y would.have made, in other words, his prospective profit,
from the performance of th.e contract was held to be the true
measure of damages. I refer also to two English cases on the
question, although the English courts do not seem so carefully
to have considered the rules by which, as matter of law,
damages are to be measured as the courts of this country.
Gale vs. Leckie, 2 Stark. 107, was at nisi prius before Lord
ELLENBOROUGH. The defendant agreed, as author, to furnish
a manuscript work to plain-tiffs, to be published at their
expense, and the profits to be equally divided. The defendant
failed to fulfill, and this action was brought for damagel-1.
Lord ELLENBOROUGH told the jury the plaintiffs were entitled to
their expenses of paper and printing, and added, "the sum of
ninety pounds has been stated by the witnesses as the amount
of profit which would probably have been derived from the first
edition; and it is doubtful whether it would have reached a ·second;" after suggesting that there might have been a loss
instead of profit, which would have been wholly the plaintiffs'
loss under the contract, he submitted tbe matter to the jury,
who found for the plaintiffs fifty pounds more than the expenses, etc., for loss of profit. The case does not appear to have
been moved afterwards.
McNeil vs. Reid, 9 Bing. 68, was an action upon a contract,
by the defendant, to take the plaintiff into a firm of which the
defendant was a member. It appeared, upon the trial, iliat
the plaintiff had been offered, upon certain terms, the com
mand of an East India ship for a double voyage; that the value
of such voyage to the captain was not less than one thousand
pounds; that the plaintiff had been induced by the defendant
to give up this voyage to enter into the promised partnership.
The jury found five hundred pounds for the plaintiff: It was
obj~ted, among other things, that the jury were wrongfully
instructed as to the damages. On this point TI:"DAL, C. J.,
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says: "I told the jury that they might see that the plaintiff
considered the engagement equal to an Indian voyage, because
be would not otherwise have relinquished it, and the defendant could not have estimated it at less, because be made his
offer as a friend of the plaintiff." It was the value ot the
engagement as partner, therefore, which the jury were t9 estimate; and BosANQUET, J., says: "The damages were estimated
according to what the jury thought was the value of the cou- ·
tract. Tlie value of the East India voyage bas not been recovered as special damage, but has been taken as an ingredient
for estimating the value which each party set on the proposed
contract of partnership." In each of these cases the prospective profits of a joint undertaking unperformed was made the
subject of compensation in damages· in an action at law.
The next question relates to the admission of the evidence
of the amount of past profits, to be considered by the jury as
bearing upon the future profits. It will be observed that the
objection does not at all relate to the mode of proof, but only
to the competency of the fa.ct. It seems to me quite obvious
that, outside of a court of justice, no man would undertake
to .form an opinion as to the prospective profits of a business
wi thout in the first place informing himself as to its past
profits, if that fact were accessible. As it is a fact in its nature
entirely capable of accurate ascertainment and proof, I can see
no more reason why it should be excluded from the consid·
et·ation of a tribunal called upon to determine conjecturally
the amount of prospective profits than proof of the nature of
the business, or any other circumstance connected with its
transaction. It is very true that there is great difficulty in
ma.king an accurate estimate of future profits, even wi th the
aid of knowing the amount of the ·past profits. This difficulty
is inherent in the nature of the inquiry. We shall not lessen
it by shutting our eyes to the light which the pt•eyious transadions of the partnership throw upon it. Nor are we the more
inclined to refuse to make the inquiry by reason of its .difficulty, when we remember ~hat it is the misconduct of the
defendants which has rendered it necessary.
Another question arises upon the defendant's third request
to charge, viz.: "That supposing Baglt>y to be accountable
through want of diligence, that should be taken into view in
diminution of the damages.~' An issue had been formed upon
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the pleadings, and tried, whether Bagley bad fraudulently
abstracted a quantity of gold from the firm, and the judge had
instructed the jury that lf they found this issue for the defendants, then they were justified in dissolving the partnership,
and the plaintiff could not recover damages. No issue bad
been made as to negligence on Bagley's part, nor did the evidence tend to the proof of such negligence; and on these
grounds, as well as because the request was not in such a
shape, even conceding it to have been well founded upon the
evidence, as to require the judge to comply with it, we think
the exception not well taken. A request must be in such form
lhat the judge may properly charge in the terms of the request
as made, without qualification, or his refusal will not be ground
of error. If made, as requested here, the effect would have
been to submit to the jury to find whether Bagley was accountable through want of diligence, without any instructions as
to what sort of diligence he was bound to exhibit, or what
sort of losses or other mishaps be was thus to be made-accountable for. In this refusal there was no error.
It may be proper to notice briefly the proposition that the
plaintiff's claim for profits must be limited to the period
between the dissolution and his subsequent entry into business. This is obviously unfounded. The only question which
could be made as to this part of the case is, whether the
defendants, in mitigation of damages, could show that . the
plaintiff-either was or might have been as profitably employed
in business on JHs own account as he would have been had·
the firm business been continued. The plainti-ff might, perhaps, have disputed the competency of such evidence. But
surely the defendants can not be heard to say that the plain·
tiff was bound to remain idle at their expense, or lo::Je his
claim upon them altogether from the moment when he engaged
in business.
Judgment affirmed.
NOTE.-See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., § 18'7.
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SPEAR vs. NEWELL.
Supreme Oourt ,of Vermont, 181,1.
18 Vt. 288.

Bill In equity, for accounting and settlement of a partnership.
Spear, Carlton and Newell entered into partnership for the
manufacture and sale of paper. Spear nnd Carlton owned one·
half interest and Newell the other half. Spea.r and Carlton
were to manage the business, sell the product, and collect the
l't'ceipts, and the profits or losses were to be divided accord·
ing to their interests. The business resulted in a large loss,
and Spear and Carlton brought an action of account against
Newell in 'the United States Circuit Court, to recover half of
the loss, but that court held that, as the defendant bad never
llt!Ceived any of the partnership effects, no action of account
could be sustained against him, and that the only remedy w!ls
by bill in equity. They then filed the bill, but the court below
dismissed the bill. Complainants appeal.
0. Linsley and E . .4.. Ormsbee, for complainants.

R. Pierpoint and E. N. Briggs, for defendant.
CoLLAMER, J. Thel!!e parties were copartners, the orators
being jointly interested in one-half of the partnership, and the
defendant in the other. The orators were the active partners, the recipients of all the property. and avails of the concern; but, it being an unprofitable and losing concern, there is
a balance due the orators from the defendant, and to ascertain
this balance, which has not been done, and to close the concern
and recover this balance, this bill is filed.
The articles of copartnership were not under seal, and therefore no action of covenant can be maintained. That an action
of assumpsit cannot be maintained at law by one partner
'
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against another to recover an unliquidated and unsettled balance of a copartnership business, has been too fully and frequently decided to be considet·ed open to discussion. Gow on
Partnership, 98; Collyer on Partnet·ship, 143, 144. If, after a
dissolution, a balance is struck and agreed upon by the parties,
assumpsit may be maintained to recover it, on an implied
promise to pay. I Holt's R. 368. Different rules have been
adopted in different states whether there must be an express
promise to pay the balance; yet, all concur that it is only when
the nnnl balance has been adju~ted that assumpsit can be maintained. Collyer on I>artn., 153, note 45. [See a lso Wycoff vs.
Purnell, ante, and note.] To t~is rule, Massachusetts
stands alone an exception. There, in the absence of a chancery
jurisdiction~ the· court of law has gone further than other
court of mere common law jurisdiction; probably influenced
by the pressure of a necessity which does not here exiE~t.
It has been fully settled in an action of account between
these parties that these orators, who wet·e the active partners
and received the whole property and avails of the copartnership, cannot maintain, at law, an action of acccmnt against the
defendant to r~cover the balance of losses. It follows that the
orators are u;UllOut remedy at lato, and are therefore compelled
to resort to chancery to adjust the balance of the concern, and
to recover of the defendant his proportion of the loss when so
ascertained. The mere stat(>ment of the case shows the necessity of the bill, and shows too that it is not a mere bill for an
account which could be sustained at law. It is true that, in
matters of account, generally, cbnncery has concurrent jurisdiction with the courts of law; and where the defendant is
pursued in chancery for an account in any capacity in which be
could be pur·sued at la.w, a. bitl will not.be sustained where an
action would not be. But in this case the bill is not addressed
to the concurrent, but to the peculiar and exclusive, jurisdiction of the court of chancery, in a case where the orators have
a just claim but are without a remedy at law. It is not a bill
calling on the defendant to account, lie has received nothing,
and of course had no account to render. It is a bill to settle
and adjust a mutual account between the parties of a copartnership transaction, which the defendant u:ill not settle and
which the law camwt.
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(Omitting the consideration of a plea of the statute of limitations.)·
Decree of the court of chancery reversed, plea disallowed,
and the cause ordered to pass to the court of chancery to take
an account, settle and adjust the same, and .ascertain the bal·
ance, ana decree the same to the party to whom it shall be
found due. ·
NOTE.-S~e Mechem's Elem. of Partn., §§ 158, 154.
Compare with following cases.

PIRTLE vs. PENN.
Court of Appeals of Ke-ntucky, 1835.
8 Dana 247, 28 Am. Dec. 70.

Henry Pirtle filed a bill in chancery against Shadrack Penn,
alleging that they were partners in the publication of "Pirtle's
Digest;" that Pirtle, as author, was to furnish the manuscript,
and Penn, as mechanic, was to execute the printing and binding, and each to be entitled to half of the proceeds to be der·ived
fr·om the sale of the books; that Penn was not bound to commence the printing unless he should be satisfied that the public
patronage would be satisfactory and sufficient; that the state
subscribed for five hundred copies, and individuals for two
bund'red and fifty copi~s, and that a1terwards Penn had
printed two thousand copies and bound about half of them,
but that after dividing equally the gross sum paid by the
state for five hundred copies, he had refused to permit Pirtle
to have any control over the books, or any participation in
the sale of them-allt>ging, for the first time, that be was
entitled only to one-half of the net profits, after deducting
the cost of printing and · binding, which had not yet been
wholly reimbursed; and lastly, that Penn was insolvent, and,
therefore, praying for an account of sales which had been
made, and for an injunction restraining further sales, and for
the appointment of a receiver.
Penn in his answer to the bill and amended bill, a-dmitted the
partnership as alleged, with only one material qualification,
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and that is, that his personal supervision and the interest on
his capital expended in the publication were, by the agreement,
to be a set-off against Pirtle's skill and labor in prepnring the
manuscript, and that the net profits only were to be divided,
after reimbursing the amount expe'nded in the printing and
binding, and in the purchase of materials; denied that he was
insolvent, and after exhibiting a general account, insisted that
Pirtle bad received about as much as be bad himself· received.
The circuit court having, on final hearing, dismissed the bill,
this appeal is prosecuted to reverse the decree.

Otittenden and Piftle, for appellant.
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Morehead & Brown, for appellee.
RoBER'l'SON, Ch. J . (After stating the facts as above.) As
there was no prayer for a dissolution of the pat·tnership,
interim management, by a receiver or otherwise, under the control or direction of the court, was not authorized by the established rules and usages of courts of equity. Gow on Part., 120,
139; Cary, 32.
And it bas been said, that without a prayer for dissolution,
a court of equity will not entertain. a bill for an account,
beeause such bills might be annual, or of indefinite recurrence.
But both principle and authority tend to the condu&ion,
that a bill for an account between copartners may be maintained without a prayer for a dissolution of the partnership, 1f
there be any good reason for compelling an account and settlement. Cary, 34; Gow, 120, 136.
A court of equity may, moreover, compel a specific execution of a partnership contract, and may sometimes enjoin a
partner from persisting in improper conduct, jeopardizing the
rights or derogating from the power or authority of his copartner, and when the latter, if be can be protected and s<.>cured
by injunction, does not desire a dissolution, but prefet·s a continuation of the partn<>rsbip, according to the spirit and end of
the association.
In this case, though there is no prayer for dissolution, yet,
. as Peon has been selling the books and does not deny that he
refuses to permit Pirtle to control or participate in the sale of
the residue, we think the circuit court had power to decree, and
ought to have decreed some relief, if the allegations of the bill
as to the terms of the partnership be true.
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As there was no written mem(}rial, nor any evidence ali-unde,
of ~he contract of partnership, its terms must be settled as a
deduction of· law from what the parties have agreed in their
pleadings.
· The parties agree, that one was to furnish the manuscript,
and the other to print and bind it; but they disagree as to their
proportion of interest in the gross proceeds.
Upon these facts alone~ the law decides that what each contributed was his share of the joint capital, that their respective
contributions were, l;>y themselves, deemed equivalents, and
that therefore each of them is entitled to an equal interest in
the books, and in their gross vendible value. Gow, 9~10; 3
Kent's Co~., 28-9; Hom>t·e vs. Col·mesnil, 1 J. J. Mar. 506. The
general conclusion of law, in the absence of any fact to the contrary, is that "the losses are to be equally borne and the profits
equally divided.". Kent's Com., supra.
But as profits are only what remains of the avails of the concern after defraying incidental expenses and reimbursing the
capital, the counsel for Penn insists, that the rule of law
applied to the facts of this case will entitle Pirtle to only onehalf of "the net profits," after deducting a just compensation
for materials, printing and binding, and that, consequentl:r,
Penn's understanding of the express agreement, and the legal
interpretation of the character of the partnership are the same.
This argument would be sound if the fact which it presupposes
were admitted; but the assumed fact, to wit: That Penn's ca.pital exceeded tl1at of Pirtle, to the extent of the value of the
materials, printing and binding, bas no existence in proof or in
11resumption of law. If one partner contributes a thousand dollars·and another contributes five hundred, nothing else appearing, equity would fix a corresponding ratio of interest, and of
loss and gain between them.
But the productions of genius or of knowledge are scarcely
appreciable, the value of writing a book must necessarily be
uncertain, before publication. But that Pirtle's manuscript
and copyright were of some value, and of considerable value
too, and were so considered by both parties, cannot be doubted.
The precise amount of the actual value was not only unknown,
but unascertainable when the contract was made. Perhaps it
exceeded the amount of all the cost of printing and binding;
~nd it is far from being improbable that it did. But it is sum-
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cient only to observe, that.the law cannot decide that the contribution~ of each partner were not of equal value, or were not
estimated by themselves as equivalents. And therefore, in
estimating profits, nothing is to be deducted in favor of the one
or the other party for capital or excess· of contribution to the
joint stock.
This deduction of law is fortified, rather than weakened, by
t>xtraneous facts. From the pleadings, it must be taken as
admitted, that by the contract of partnership, Penn was under
no obligation ever to commence the publication, unless the
patronage to be obtained should, in his judgment, be sufficient
to insure his indemnity. The state afterwards subscribed for
five hundred copies, which, added to two hundred and fifty
copies subscribed for by individuals would, at eight dollars a
copy, bring the gross sum of six thousand dollars. nut it seems
that the amount actually subscribed was six thousand three
hundred and eighty dollars; the half of which, to wit: three
thousand one hundred and ninety dollars, was, according to
any hypothesis, assured to Penn before he began the printing,
or was under any obligation to begin it; and which sum was,
according to the proof, at least equal to the actual cost of printing and binding two thousand copies, including the cost of
materials.
Then, according to these facts~ Penn, if he were entitled to
only one-half of the books or of their value, was sure of being
reimbursed, and of then having left for his remaining interest
in the books, after supplying the subscribers, six hundred and
twenty-five copies, which, at eight dolla1·s a set, would be worth
five thousand dollars, which, or whatever that number of copies
would sell for, would be clear profit.
'rhus, supposing the contract to be as Pirtle avers it was,
and as the law presumes it to have been, it appears tllat Penn
incurred no hazard, and had a sure prospect of profit to a large
amount, and that the whole risk and loss were Pirtle's.
It is intrinsically improbable. thet·efore, that Pirtle ever
agreed that Penn should be entitled to more than one-half of
the gross proceeds of the publication. But it is enough tllat
there is no proof that Penn contributed more than Pirtle did
to the joint stock, or that he was to have more than an equal
joint interest; and, therefore, according to the proper deductions from the pleadings, the law will give him no more.
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From this view of the case, it would seem that, under the
circumstances of this case, Pirtle is entitled to a decree for
an account, and for securing to him his equal control over the
books, and correspondent participation in the sale or dispo·
sition of them, by a partial injunction, or otherwise, so as to
effect that end most s~urely and appropriately. And conse~
quently the absolute dismission of the bill was improvident.

• • •

Wherefore, it is decreed and ordered that the decree of the
circuit court be reversed, and the cause remanded.
NOTE.-See Mechem's Elem. of Partn.,

§~

152, 108.

See alao Howell 11. Harvey, post.

SHANNON ·vs. WRIGHT.

Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1883.
60 Md. 520.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Baltimore City.
The appellee together with the appellants, were copartners in
the business of manufacturing and dealing in metals in the
City of Baltimore, under the firm name of Shannon, Wright &
Co. A bill was filed by the appellee against the appellants,
asking for an injunction and the appointment of a receiver,
The case is further stated in the opinion of the Court.
The cause was argued before MILLER, STONE, ALVEY.
lRYING and RITCHIE, JJ.

William M. Busey and Samuel Snowden for the appellants.
Sebastian Brown for the appellee.
RITCHIE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal from an order of the Circuit Court of Baltimore City appointing a receiver and granting an injunction;
with leave to the defendants after filing answers to the bill and
upon giving five days' notice to the complainant, to move for the
rescinding of the order and the dissolution of the injunction.
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The answers have been filed; but under the construction
given to the 21st Sec. of Art. 5 of the Code of Pub.
Gen. Laws, this Court is confined on the appeal provided by
the statute to the case made by the bill, and does not examine
the answer. The averments of the bill, whatever may be the
real state of the facts, must be taken as tn1e. Haight &
r~peatedly
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O'Connell vs. Burr, 19 Md. 130.
Our duty therefore is simply to determine whether the case
stated by the complainant was one which justified the passage
of the order appealed from.
Without pausing to dwell upon those averments of the complainant which impute fraudulent misrepresentations to the defendants as to tae value of the firm's assets and its business, by
which he was induced to enter into a partnership with them,
which has disproportionately engulfed his means and exposed
him to great loss, we find in the specific allegations of clause
ten of the bill ample ground for the equitable interposition he
has invoked. That clause is as follows:
"And now your orator charges, that debts are due by, and
suits are pending against, the firm, and that the defendants
having the money of the firm in their possession, refuse to apply-it toward the payment of said debts, that they refuse to
give any money to your orator; that they refuse to permit your
orator's counsel to examine th~ books of the firm; that they refuse to allow a competu.nt book-keeper, selected by your orator,
to examine the books of the firm; that in order to anticipate
debts owing to the firm, and thus get the firm's money in their
pockets, they have drawn drafts in the name of the firm upon
their customers, and procured the same to be discounted by
their lawyer and others at exorbitant rates of interest; that
without the knowledge or consent of your orator they ha,·e
given ·notes of the firm in settlement of debts not owing by the
firm, one of said de6ts being for clothing ·purchased by D. R.
Shannon and John T. Shannon, individually; that without the
knowledge or consent of your ·orator the said D. R. and John
T. Shannon have offset their own debts by sales of merchandise of the firm of Shannon, Wright & Co.; that they have no
tangible pr~pert.y outside of their interest in said firm; that they
represent themselves to be three stubborn brothers, and express
their intention of litigating the matters in controversy by
means -of the firm's mouey until they have ruined your orator;
that the said D. R. Shannon and John T. Shannon refuse to
return the money which has been advanced to pay their debts;
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that defendant.s.declare themselves to be unwilling to continue
said partnership, even if your orator was willing, and yet they utterly refuse to dissolve the partnership; that they threaten to
make contracts in the name of the firm, knowing they cannot
be carried out, which contracts, if made, will render your orator liable in damages; that judgments will shortly be entered
against the firm, and your orator damaged, unless the money
in the hands of the defendants be applied to the payment of the·
notes sued on, as above stated; and your orator charges that
unless immediate relief be given by way of an injunction and
receiver, which he is advised is the proper remedy, he wilf be
reduced from a reasonable competence to poverty."
There is evidently here set out such a case of alleged fraud
and imminent danger to the complainant's interest in the partnership property as justifies a receiver and an injunction; prOceedings which do not determine the rights of the parties, but
simply protect the property from injury or destruction until
those rights can be further inquired into or adjudicated. The
order appealed from must be affirmed.
Order affirmed and cause remanded.
NOTE.-See Mechem's Elements of Partn., §§ 152, 155.

NEW vs. WRIGHT.
Supreme Court of Mississippi, 1810.

«

Miss. 202.

New filed a bill in equity against Wright, alleging that New
owned a tract of cypress timber, a mill site and part of the
machinery and material for the construction of a saw-mill;
that he entered into partnership with Wright .who was to
supply the necessary matel'ials and machinery to complete
' the mill, and was to superintend the construction and management; that the timber was to be sawed .into lumber, and the
proceeds divided equally after reimbursing each party for a
stipulated portion of his outlay on the mill; that New was
to supply the timber and 'Vright was to pay all the expenses
of sawing and selling. The bill further charged that Wright
refused to account, allt>ging that the proceeds did not equal
the outlay by about $7,000, etc.; that Wright had ceased to
use complainant's timber and was procuring it elsewhere; that
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Wright was so largely indebted to complainant that the latter
could not be paid unless out of the proceeds of the timber
and lumber which Wright had about the mill; and the bill
prayed an injunction to prevent Wright from removing or selling the lumber or timber, that a receiver be appointed. the
partnership dissolved and an accounting had. A preliminary
injunction was issued, but the court subsequently dissolved
it and denied the application for a receiver. New thereupon
appealed.
Geo. L .. Potter, for appP.llant.
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No appearance for appellee.
PEYTON, C. J. (After stating the fa.cts.) The propriety
of the action of the court in dissolving the injunction is
Impeached by the appellant, and presents the first question for our consideration. The bill of complaint charges
that neither party contemplated any use of the s&id
mill than to saw the cypress timber on the complainant's said
tract of land, on which the mill was erected, and for the sawing of no other timber. .and that the said defendant, in disregard of the terms of tht: partnership, and without the consent
of the complainant, has ceased to procure cypress timber from
the said tract of land of the complainant, for the· use of the
saw-mill thereon. and has been for some time heretofore, and
now is, procuring other cypress from other persons to saw,
and is sawing the same into lumber on said mill, and thereby
defeating one of the objects the complainant had in view in
entering into the partnership, and...that object was to turn his
own cypress tirwhE>r into productive capital. And this allegation is, to son,:! P.xtent, corroborated by the evidence of
the appelJee, who testified that his wife bought saw logs and
timber. This was using the mill in a manner unauthorized
by the terms of the contract of partnership, and would justify
an injunction, and together with the loss of seven thousand
dollars in running the mill for· more than three years, would
perhaps authorize a dissolution of the partnership. The
injunction, therefore, could not have been properly dissolved
for the want of equity on the face of the bill. • • •
The remaining question for our decision is, did the court err
tn overruling the motion for the appointment of a receiver?
"It must be admitted," said the master of the rolls, in .11adg-

m--·~rs;::=.,
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with vs. Wimble, G Beavan, 495, "that when an application is
made for a receiver in partnership cases, the court is always
placed in a position of very great difficulty. On the one band,
.if it grants the motion, the effect of it is to put an end to the
partnership, which one of the parties claims a right to have
continued; and on the other hand, if it refuses the motion, it
leaves the defendant at liberty to go on with the partnership,
at the risk and probably at the great loss and prejudice of the
dissenting party. Between these difficulties, it is not very
easy to select the course which is best to be taken, but the
court is under the necessity of adopting some mode of proceeding to protect, according to the best view it can take of the matter, the interests of both parties."
In order to justify the dissolution of a partnership, on the
ground of misconduct, abuse, or ill-faith of one of the parties,
it is not sufficient to show that there is a temptation t~ such
misconduct, abuse, or ill-faith, but there must be an unequivocal demonstration, by overt acts ·or gross departures from duty,
that the danger is imminent, or the injury already accomplished: Story on Partnership, 464, § 288. Where a concern
af any character or kind, covering a partnership, is broken up
by controversial suits, and•it is apparent that there can be IH>
agreement between the parties in interest ·for its continuance,
a receiver will be appointed: Williams vs. Wil8on, 4 Sandf.
(N. Y.) Chan. 379; Edwards on Receivers, 330. And a di8Solution of a partnership may be granted and a receiver
appointed on account of the gross misconduct of one or more
of the parties: 1 Story's Eq. 635, § 672 a. To authorize the
appointment of a receiver there must be some breach of the
duty of a partner, or of the contract of partnership: Harding
fJB. Glover, 18 V es. 281.
It was the duty of the appellee to take the timber used in the
mill, from the tract of land on which it was erected, belonging
to the appellant; and the getting timber ~lsewhere, as alleged
in the bill of complaint, was a breach of that duty ~nd of the
contract of partnership. And if the mill sawed six thousand
feet of lumber per day, and the running of the mill from the
fall of 1865 to the commencement of this suit in the spring of
1869, brings the parties in debt seven thousand dollars, as
stated by the appellee in his testimony, it would seem to be a
business which neither party should deaH-e to ·continue.
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Upon the whole, we are of opinion that the case made by the
bill authorizes the appointment of a receiver, and that, therefore, the court erred in overruling the application therefor.
For the reasons herein stated, the decrees of the court in disaolving the injunction and overruling the motion for the
appointment of a receiver, will be reversed, and the cause
remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this
opinion, with leave to the appellee to answer the bill within
aixty days from this date.
NOTB.-See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., § 152, 155.
For other caees of di.aaolution in courts of equity, see Gerard w. Gateau,

pod.

BUCK vs. SMITH.
Supreme Cou.rt of Michigan, 187.f.
J9 Mich. 166, 18 Am. Rep. 84.

Bill in equity by Buck against S\nith for specific performa~ce of the agreement referred to below and more specifically
set out in the opinion, and for an accounting and injunction.
The bill recited that G. W. Swan, J. R. McArthur, W.
McArthur and J. F. McDonald had been partners in the lumbering business, under the name of McArthur & Co., and had
large and V'aluable property; that Smith agreed with complainant Buck that Smith would buy the interest of Swan and
J. R. McArthur, in the firm's real and personal property; convey one-half of this interest to Buck to be paid for as rapidly
as he could do so out of the profits or otherwise; and that
Bur.k, Smith, W. McArthur and McDonald should then go into
partnership to manage and work the lumber property formerly
so t,(~longing to McArthur & Co.; that Buck should have the
management of the business, give it his personal attention and
go to reside near the property; that Smith bought the interest
rdt>rred to, but went into partnership with the others, excluding complainant, and thereby deprived him of valuable gains
and property.
The court below dismissed his bill and Buck appealed.

BucK vs. SMITH.
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M. Buck, in person, and D. W. Perkins, for complainant.

0. I. Walker, for defendant.
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C. J.

(After stating the facts.) We consider it
very clear that the case which the complainant makes by his
bill is not suitable for the jurisdiction invoked. The power
vested in courts of equity to compel the specific performance
of contracts, instead of leaving parties in all cases to obtain
common-law redress through actions for damages, is a very
useful one when. legitimately exercised. It must, however, be
borne in mind that the jurisdiction has many necessary limits
and qualifications, and that it does not necessarily attach or
operate with imperative force wherever a contract relation
exists which the complainant has respected and the defendant
has not. In each case the court must consider whether, in
view of all the facts and those doctrines which are interwoven
with t~e very texture of equity jurisprudence, and in view of
the specific peculiarities presented, and the settled principles
and maxims of the court, it is right and proper to entertain
the case and administer relief. MoMurtie 1'8. Bennette, Har.
(Mich.) Oh. 124; Smith vs. Lawrence, 15 Mich. 499; Ohambers vs.
Livermore 15 Mich. 381; Millard vs. Tayloe, 8·Wall. (U. S.) 557.
Among the primary considerations is the question whether
the substantial sense and design of both parties can be worked
out by the decree of the court, since the real equity of the
proceeding, the spirit of the particular jurisdiction, means
performance on both sides and not a compulsory surrender by
one party to another without a present substantial and practical equivalent,-an equivalent susceptible of enforcement and
execution by the court.
Now, what is the real essence of the case made by this bill?
What is the arrangement the court is asked to carry out? It is
an agreement, according to the representation of C{)mplainant,
between himself and the defendant, by which the latter agreed
to convey an undivided interest in real an-d personal property
held by defendant in common with third persons, and that the
complainant should, for an indefinite time, become a partner
with the defendant and such third persons in operating the
property; that the defendant should advance from time to
time the complainant's quota of the funds necessary for the
business and the improvement of the property; that the comGRAVES,
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plainant should have the right to manage and direct the business and the improvements; and that he would employ his
time, skill; judgment and experience in the direction and supervision of the property and business, and that the purc~ase
price of his proprietary share, and the amount advanced for
his benefit in carrying on the business, should be paid by his
skill and services in the concern, and the gains obtained in
the enterprise.
Waiving all objection founded on .the circumstance that the
bill does not aBBert that McDonald and McArthur became in
any manner engaged with complainant to- admit him to a partnership, or to clothe him with any right or power to manage
their interests, we first encounter the rule, which is pretty well
recognized, that the court will not enter upon so vain an undertaking as to compel a party to go into a partnership where the
agreement is silent as to its duration, flnd where, therefore, it
may be dissolved at the will of either as soon as formed.
But, secondly, we confront the inevitable and very formidable objection that the agreement by its very nature is practically not enforceable on both sides. It is extremely plain
that the court cannot assume to enforce the performance of
daiJy prospective duties, or superYise or direct in advance
the course or conduct of one who is to cont.rol and manage
in the interest of a finn in which he is to stand as a member,
and where, too, the stipulated arrangement as plainly set forth
contemplates that his personal skill and judgment shall be
applied and govern according to the shifting needs of property
and business. No court is competent to execute such an
ar1angement. The complai~ant's portion of the executory
scheme, then, which relates to his introduction to the position
of partner and manager, to his rights and duties in that position, nnd to the agreed method for working out the compensation to be made by him for the benefit he seeks, cannot be
specifically enforced. Looking at the case made by the bill,
the court is powerless to execute the equivalent the complainant is bound to render. If a conveyance to the complainant
should be ordered, he would get at once the essence of what
he claims, whilst the defendant would fail in getting, through
a decree, any substantial consideration whatever.
As the court possesses no means by which to work out performance on the part of complainant, be would become at once
invested with the benefit for which he prosecutes, whilst the
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defendant would be left standing upon a nak-ed right to exact
the consideration through the future performance of duties
incapable of being- specifically decreed. The doctrine of the
court will not sanction such one-sided relief; Blackett vs.
Bates, L. R. 1 Ch. App. 117; Stocker VB. Brockelbank, 3 MeN.
& G. 250, 5 Eng. L. & Eq. 67; Johnson VB. Shrewsbury & B. R.
W. Co., 3 DeGex. M. & G. 914, 19 Eng. L. & Eq. 584; Picke-ring
VB. Bishop, 2 Y. & Col. Ch. 249; Kemble vs. Kean, 6 Sim. 333;
Kimberley vs. Jennings, 6 Sim. 340; Baldu:in tiS. Society, 9 Sim.
394; Gervais vs. Edwards, 2 Dr. & W. 80; Bozon vs. Farlow, 1
Mer. 459; Flight vs. Bolland, 4 Russ. 298.
It is, then, very apparent, that, apart from other difficulties,
the case presented by the bill is wanting in mutuality, and is
not so constituted as to warrant the court in giving the relief
d~manded. As a consequence, the decree below dismissing
the bill must be affirmed, with costs, but to preclude all question as to the etfect o.f it, it may be so varied as expressly to
be without prejudice to any proceeding·s at law the complainant may think proper to take.

•

NOTE:-In MorriB 'VB. Peckham, til Conn. 128, it is said, " It is a rule in
equity that the court will not decree a specific performance where it has
no power to enforce the decree. Hence partnership articles will not be enforced, especially where no time is fixed for its continuance, as either party
may dissolve it at pleasure. And even where a time is fixed it is difficult
to see bow the decree can be enforced. Take this case as an illustration;
is the court to keep its hand on the parties for seventeen years and compel
them to carry on this business?" In Pollock's Dig. of Partn, 6, it is said:
•· The remedy of specific performance is generally not applicable to an
&«reement to enter into partnership, for ' it is impossible to make persons,
who will not concur, carry on a business jointly for their own common
advantaee.'"
See also England tiB. Curling, 8 Beav. 129; Scott vs. Rayment, 7 Eq. 112.
See also Mechem's Elements of Partnerllutp, §§ 81, 149-151, and notes.
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SOMERBY vs. BUNTIN.

Supreme Court of J.lfassachusetts, 1875.
118 Mass. 279; 19 Am. Rep. 459.
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Bill in equity filed January 9, 1872, by John P. Somerby and
J eremiab Prescott, alleging substantially the following facts:
The defendant, in the years 1865 and 1866, invented a ·new
and useful improvement in seats for railroad passenger cars,
and being desirous to obtain letters patent therefor, or otherwise to so use or dispose of his invention as to realize money
therefrom, applied to the plaintiffs for assistance in both of
these respects, and offered the plaintiffs each one-third part of
the property in the invention, and of all moneys and emoluments which should result therefrom, as compensation for
affording him the solicited assistance. The plaintiffs accepted
the said offer of the defendant; and an oral agreement was
made between the parties that the invention, by which all
letters patent which should be granted therefor, should be the
joint property of the plaintiffs and the defendant, each to be
the owner of one-third part thereof, and that each and all of
the parties should use his best efforts to make said invention
available and remunerative for the common benefit of all the
parties. In pursuance of this agreement, application was
made in the name of Buntin for letters patent of the United
States, and the expenses of making and prosecuting the application were paid by Somerby, and sales of the right to use the
invention were made primarily through the agency of Prescott,
from which sales divers sum~ of money were received, which
were divided between Buntin and the plaintiffs in the propor·
tion of one-third part to each, in punmance to the agreement.
The invention was rapidly advancing in public favor, chiefly
through the labor, expenditures and exertions of the plaintiffs,
and the sales of rights to use the same were increasing in a
similar ratio, so that the proceeds of the sales bad become large
and were steadily augmenting, and would have yielded to the
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plaintiffs a large income for their time, labor and expenditures
in the premises, but that the defendant early in the year 1867,
while the aforesaid application to the United States for letters
patent was pending, and without the knowledge or consent of
the plaintiffs or either of them, made application to the United
States for letters patent in his name and in another form, for
the said invention, on which application letters patent were
granted to him, on or about April 2, 1867, for a "design for
end frame of a car seat," which was the invention of the defendant that had become the property of the defendant and the
plaintiffs. Upon the receipt of the said letters patent by the
defendant, he refused to assigq any part thereof to the plaintiffs, anrl denied that they had any right therein or in the. invention, or in the proceeds thereof, and proceeded to make
large sales of rights to use the invention under the letters
patent, and bas received therefrom divers large sums of money
f?r which he refuses to render any account to the plaintiffs, or
to make any division thereof with them, and pretends that all
said sums of money belong to him, and that the plaintiffs, or
either of them, have no property or right therein.
The prayer of the bill was that the defendant might be
restrained from making any sale or assignment of the said
letters patent, or of the invention, to any person or persons
other than the plaintiffs without their consent; that he be compelled to assign and transfer to each of the plaintiffs one-third
part of said letters patent and invention; for an account of all
sums of money and of all other considerations received by him
for sales under said letters patent or for licenses to use the invention; and the payment to each of the plaintiffs of such sums
of money and other considerations as should be found to be due
to them respectively; and for general relief.
The defendant demurred to the bill upon the grounds which
appear in the opinion. The case was heard by Gray, C. J.,
upon the biU and demurrer, and reserved, at the request of the
parties, for the consideration and determination of the full
court.

T. L. Livermore for defendant.
J. P. Healy for plaintiff.
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GRAY, C. J. The causes assigned in the demurrer are, let,
that the contract sought to be inforced is not in writing; 2d
that it is against the course and practice and not. within the
jurisdiction, of this court to entertain suits for the specific performance of oral contracts; 3d, that the plaintiffs have not
stated such a case as entitles them to any discovery or relief in
equity.
1. In support of the first cauee assigned, the defendant relies
on the section of the statute of frauds relating to the sale of
goods, wares or merchandise; Gen. State., cb .. l05, sec. 5; and
also on the clause of the same statute relating to agreements
not to be performed within one year from the making thereof.
Sec. 1, cl. 5.
It was held by the court of Chancery in England, before the
American Revolution, that shares in a corporation were goods,
wares and merchandise within the statute of frauds. Mussel
vs. Cooke, Pre. Ch. 533; Crullvs. Dodson, Sel. Cas. inCh. 41.
And it bas been held by this court that such shares, and even
·promissory notes, fall within the statute. Tisdale vs. Harris,
20 Pick. 9; Baldwin vs. Williams, 3 Mete. 365. But the
modern decisions in England are the other way, and the decisions in other sta~ are at variance. Browne on Stat. of Frauds,
sees. 296, 298; 1 Chit. on Cont. (11th Am. ed.) 541, note. The
words of the statute have never yet been extended by any court
beyond securit~es which are subjects of common sale and barter,
and which have a visible and palpable form. To include in
them an incorporeal right of franchise, granted by the government, securing to the inventor and his assigns the exclusive
right to make; use and vend the article patented; or share in
that right., which has no separate or distinct existence at law
until created by the instrument of assignment, would be unreasonably to extend the meaning and effect of words which
have already been carried quite far enough. · See Chanter vs.
Dickinson, 6 Scott N. R. 182; s. c. 5 Man. & Gr. 253.
But it is not necessary in this case to go so far as to say that
a sale of letters patent for an invention is not within the statute
of frauds. Before letters patent are obtained, the invention
exists only in right, and neither that right nor any evidence of
it bas any outward form which is capable of being transferred
or delivered in .<~pecie, or which, upon any construction, how-
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ever liberal, can be considered as goods, wares or merchandise.
So far as regarded the letters patent when obtained, the contract between the parties in this case was not a contract of sale,
but a contract of partnership, which would be equally valid
whether written or oral. Story on Part., sec. 86; 1 Lindley on
Part. (3d ed.) 89. According to the contract alleged, the defendant was to contribute to the proposed partnership his inchoate right in the invention; the plaintiffs were to contribute
the money necessary to make that invention available in the
form of a patent; and both were to contribute their services to
make it remunerative. The patent, when obtained, was therefore not the result of the efforts, the service or the money of
one partner, but the joint contribution of all, and was in equity
partnership property, in whosesoever name letters patent were.
taken out. 3 Kent's Com. (12th ed.) 24-26; Green vs. .Beesley,
2 Scott 164; s. c. 2 Bing. N. C. 108; Sim.tt vs. Willing, 8 S. &
R. 103; Musier vs. Tr·umpbour, 5 Wend. 274; Duryea vs.
lVhitcomb, 31 Vt. 395; Dyer vs. Clark, 5 Mete. 56~; Fall River
Whaling Co. vs. Borden, 10 Cm:Jh. 458; Bulfinch vs. Winchenbac:h, 3 Allen 161.
We are therefore of opinion that the contract set up in the
bill was not an agreement for the sale of goods, wares or merchandise, within the statute of frauds.
The agreement to obtain letters patent might ·be performed
within a year, and it does not appear by this bill that all the
efforts required of either party, to make the invention available
anC. remunerative for the common benefit, might not also be
exerted ·within that time. As it does not appear that the contract could not l>e performed within a year, it does not fall
within the statute of frauds. Blake vs. Cole, 22 Pick. 97;
Doyle vs. Dixon, 97 Mass. 208; Brown on Stat. of Frauds,
sees. 272-282. It may be doubted whether the case of Packet
Co. vs. Sickles, 5 Wall. 580, cited by the defendant, in which
an oral contract to pay, for a right to use an invention on a
certain steamboat, so much a year during the term of a patent
having twelve years yet to run, "if the said boat should last so
long," was held to be within the statute, can be reconciled with
the general current of authority in this Commonwealth and
elsewhere; but it is quite unlike this case, in which it does not
appear that the parties contemplated that the time for the performance of their contract should exceed a year.
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2. It is now well settled that the jurisdiction of courts of
equity to decree specific performance is not confined to contracts
for the sale of land, but may be exercised, upon sufficient cause
shown, over agreements for the transfer of interests in personal
property or patent rights. 1 Story's Eq. Jur. ch. 18; Clark vs.
Flint, 22 Pick. 231, 239; Leach vs. Fobes, 11 Gray 506, 510;
Todd vs. Taft, 7 Allen 371; Binney vs. Annan, 107 Mass. 94:;
Corbin vs. Tracy, 34 Conn. 325. Even oral contracts will be
specifically enforced, when the case is not within the statute of
frauds, and no complete and adequate remedy can be had by an
action at law. Colt vs. Nettervill, 2 P. Wms. 303; Clifford
vs. Turrell, 1 Yo. & Col. Ch. 138; Duncrujt vs. Albrecht, 12
Sim. 190; Union Ins. Co. vs. Commercial Ins. Co., 2 Curtis
524; s. c. 19 How. 318; Glass vs. Hulbert, 102 Mass. 24, 33.
Under the Revised Statutes, indeed, the equity jurisdiction
of this court to decree specific performance was confined to
written contracts. Rev. Stats., ch. 74, sec. 8; ch. 81, sec. 8.
But by the Stat_. of 1857, ch. 214, the legislature conferred upon
this court "full equity jurisdiction, according to the usage and
practice of courts of chancery, in all cases where there is not a
full, adequate and complete remedy at law." The re-enactment of this statute in the Gen. Stats., ch. 113, sec. 2, is not to
be limited in effect by reason of its being accompanied by a reenactment of -the more restricted provisions of the Revised .
Statutes and of the successive statutes by which our equity jurisdiction had been from time to time extended.
The oral agreement of the parties, alleged in the bill, that the
invention and all letters patent which should be granted therefor
should be their joint property, in proP<>rtions specified, stands
upon the same ground as if it had been in writing. Such an
agreement, though made before the issue of a patent, is valid,
and capable of being enforced in equity by compelling an assignment, an account and such other relief as the circumstances of
the case may require. Herbert vs. Adams, 4 Mason 15; lYesmith vs. Calvert, 1 Wood b. & Min. 34; Clum vs. Brewer, 2
Curtis 50G; Binney vs. Annan, 107 Mass. 94. Although a
court of equity will not ordinarily decree specific performance
of an agreement to form a partnership which may be immediately dissolved by either party, it will secure to a partner the
interests in property to which by. the partnership agreement he
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is entitled. Buxton vs. Lister, 3 Atk. 383; Story on Part.,
sec. 189; 1 Story's Eq. Jur., sec. 666.
The bill sufficiently alleges that the plaintiffs performed the
agreement on their part, and that the profits received before
the issue of the patent were duly divided between the parties.
It is not alleged, and is not to be presumed, that the plaintiffs
have received any profits, for which they are bound to accoun.t,
since the defendant procured the patent to be issued in his own
name alone.
For these reasons, none of the causes of demurrer assigned
afford any ground for refusing to entertain jurisdiction of the
bill. The objection of laches was not taken in the demurrer
filed, nor assigned ore tenus at the hearing before a single justice. It is therefore not open to the defendant.
Demurrer overruled.
NoTE.-See Mechem's Elements of Pa.rtn., § 151.

IX.
POWERS OF PARTNERS.

SWEET vs. "WOOD.
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Supreme Court of Rlux'U Island, 1893.
18 R. I. 886, 28 Atl. Bep 885.

Assumpsit for the use of a horse let to hire. Plaintiff had
judgment below. The opinion states the facts.
W. B. Tanner and E. L. Gannon, for plaintiff.
S. 8. Stone and E. F. Lovejoy, for defendanta.
C. J. The defendants petition for a new trial
on the ground of erroneous ruling, and also because the verdict
is against the evidence. The testimony shows that the
defendants, as copartners, were engaged in keeping a general
store in Burrillville, and that they had occasion to use horses
in carrying on their business. The plaintH! testifies that
},rank W. Wood, one of the defendants, came to him and stated
that they (the defendants) were in need of a horse and would
like to get his to use for a few days; that he consented to such
use; and that said ·wood thereupon took the horse away. This,
however, was denied by '"''ood, who testified that he asked the
plaintiff for the use of the horse for one 'Vaiden in his laundry
business, and that, with the plaintiff's permission, be took the
horse to Walden's stable; that 'Vaiden continued to use the
horse for several months, to the plaintiff's knowledge; that the
plaintiff, at different times, took the horse from 'W alden's
stable and returned him there when be had done using him.
The defendants requested the court to instruct the jury that,
if they found that the hiring of the horse was not necessary
for the carrying on of the partnership business in the ordinary
MATTESON,
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way, the firm was not pt·ima facie liable for the hiring by one
partner alone. The request was refused, and the defendants
excepted.
We think the req nest was properly refused. As the use of
horses was necessary for carrying on the partnership business
in the ordinary way, the hiring of a horse for that purpose was
cle-arly within the scope of the partnership business. The rule
is too well established to admit of question that the acts, admissions, and declarations of a partner during the existence of the
partnership, while.engaged in the transaction of its business,
or relating to matters within its scope, are evidence against·
the firm. 17 Amer. & Eng. Enc. r. .aw, 1077, and cases cited in
note 2. It was wholly immaterial whether, as a matter of fact,
the hiring of a horse was or was not necessary for carrying on
the business of the firm in the ordinary way; for being within
the scope of the ·partnership business, and therefore within the
authority of one partner to bind the firm, the firm would be
bound by the declaration of the partner that the firm needed
the horse for the transaction of its business, whatever the fact
might be.
The defendants also requested the court to instruct the jury
that one partner could not, without authority from the other
members of the firm, bind the firm on an implied contract, not
in any way connected with its business, or for its benefit. The
court gave the instruction, with the qualification tha.t, if the ·
partner declared when he hired the horse that it was for the
benefit of the partnership, it would be responsible. To this
qualification the defendants excepted. We think the instruction requested, in view of the testimony, was erroneous, and
that the qualification of it was correct. The request was
erroneous, in that it assumed, contrary to the evidence, that
the hiring by one partner was unauthorized by the other. It
was not unauthorized by the other, because, as we have seen,
it was within the scope of the partnersh,ip business, and one
partner is the agent of his copartner in all matters within the
scope of the partnership business. As such agent, his declara·
tions are sufficient to bind his copartner, whether in accordan<'.e
with the fact or not.
The verdi~t is supported by the testimony of the plaintiff.
Though this testimony is denied by that of the defendant,
Frank W. Wood, and though there are circumstances which
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may or may not, according to the view taken of them, tend to
oorroborate the testimony of the latter, it is the province of
the jury to judge of the credibility of the testimony, and to
determine its weight. Unless it is clear that they have made
a mistake, or have been swayed by passion, partiality, corruption, prejudice, or sympathy, so that their verdict is strongly
aaainst the evidence, the intervention of the court is unwarranted. Defendants' petition for a new trial is denied and dismissed.
NOTB: See Mechem'• Elem. of Partn., §§ 1G2, 181, 191.

BARNARD vs. PLANK ROAD CO.
Supreme Oourl of Michigan, 1859.
6 Mich. 27f.

'!'his was an action brought by the plank road company to
recover upon a subscription made to its stock by Coe in the
aame of Ooe & Barnard. Barnard alone defended. One Johneon testified that a plank road was very necessary to enable
lumbering operations to be carried on in the vicinity in which
defendant's lands were situated. Judgment for plaintiif, and
Barnard brings error.
MitcheU & McAlpine, for Barnard, were stopped by the court.

Conger & Harri8, for the company.
MARTIN, 0. J. Barnard & Coe are admitted to have been
"partners in the lumbering business, owning lands in St. Clair
county as such partners, and manufacturing lumber therefrom." While such partners, Coe subscribed the name of the
firm to the articles of association of the plank road company,
but without Barnard's knowledge or consent. This subscription, it is claimed, made Barnard a stockholder in the company.
No rule is better settled than that one partner cannot bind
his copartner by any contract not within the immediate scope
of the partnership, unless with such copartner's knowledge and
consent. Each partner is an agent for all the members of the
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firm, In the transaction of all business of such firm; but as to
matters foreign to such business, he is regarded as a
stranger. The genertil business of the firm being that of manufacturing lumber, and the ownership of land as incident
thereto, the subscription to stock in a corporation, or to articles
of association for the creation of one, was not an incident of
such partnership. · Incidental benefits would not authorize one
partner to bind his fellow, and no authority so to bind him is
shown.
And the knowledge and assent required to bind ~be copartner must be established by evidence affirmatively showing it,
or from which it may be clearly inferred. This is sought to be
established from the fact that assessments were made, and
their payment demanded of the firm, which were unresponded
to; and it is urged that it was Barnard's duty, upon such
demands, to repudiate any interest in the company, and that
his sil~nce should be construed into a recognition of his relation as a stockholder. Now, a demand either through the
mail, or personal, is sufficient to bind a stockholder, but not to
create one. If the person of whom the demand is made be not
one, it is not his duty to disclaim the character of stockholder;
it is enough that he does not respond to such demand. The
simple admission that demand was duly made of the firm, is
not one of a personal demand of Barnard, nor is it of anything
more than a fact-its effect being a question of Jaw: There is
no evidence, nor any admission, in the case, that knowledge
of the demand ever came to Barnard; and certainly none that
be ever, by any word or act, recognized any connection with
the company.
The liability of Barnard is also sought to be established from
the testimony of Johnson. This testimony is objected to, as
inadmissible under the case as presented, and for general
incompetency.
We do not regard the stipulation as the making of a case,
but only as an admission of·facts for the'purpose of obviating
the necessity of producing witnesses to prove them. Any
other facts necessary for either party to show oould still be
proven.
The testimony was competent as tending to show the intel'est of the partnership in the road, but falls far short of being
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sufficient to establish, or of tending to ftx, any liability upon
Barnard.
The judgment must be reversed, and a .new trial granted.
The other justices concurred.
NOTE: See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., §

16~.

BANNER TOBACCO.CO. vs. JENISON.
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Supreme Court of Michigan, 1882.
48 Mich. 459, 12 N. W. Rep. 6M.

On June 26, 1875, the defendants, Luman and Lucius Jeni·
son, were in business as partners in the milling business at
,Jenisonville under the name of L. & L. Jenison.· One B. F.
Emery, who wa,s in business at Whitehall, owed them about
$1,000. He was also heavily indebted to others and presumably insolvent. Under these circumstances, and of his own
motion, he put on record a chattel mortgage on his stock to
defendants and then telegraphed them to come to 'Whitehall.
Luman Jenison, who had personal charge of the milling busi·
ness, went. While at Whitehall an arrangement was made
between him and Mr. Emery under which the apparent ownership of the stock of goods was placed i:Q the firm of L. & L.
Jenison, and their name pl~ced ,upon the store as is usual to
indicate proprietorship. Mr. Emery was then to go on and sell
the stock in the usual course of business as their agent, keeping it up by new purchases as should be found needful. Luman
JenisOn in his testimony says· that no purchases were to be
made on credit, and all authority to use the credit of the firm
was expressly withheld. Emery denies this, but admits he
was cautioned not to get the store in debt. He bought, however, from time to time on credit, and among other purchases
made of the plaintiff the purchase of cigars, the bill which is
the subject of this suit. Luman Jenison at the time of the
arrangement opened a bank account for Emery in the naine of
L. & L. Jenison with a banker at Whitehall, and Emery pro-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 16:48 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112102486216
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

BANNER ToBAcco Co.

vs.

JENISON.

337

cured letter and bill heads in the same firm name which were
used by him.
The business continued under this arrangement until the
fall of 1879; Emery and Luman Jenison evidently understanding that, though Emery was ostensibly agent, he was realJy as
· between the parties themselves only mortgagor, with permission to sell the mortgaged goods to pay the debt. He did not,
however, during all this time reduce the debt, but on the other
hand received flour from defendants .for which he paid only a
part. Meantime he took the benefit of the bankrupt law, and
received his disc'ltarge. On September 11, 1879, Luman Jenison
went to Whitehall and with the concurrence of Emery sold
out the stock to one Banks, realizing therefor less than the
sum due his firm. Subsequently the account of the plaintiff
was presented to him for settlement, and he refused to recognize any liability upon it. It was then put in suit. Plaintiff
had judgment and defendants appealed.

T_aggart, Stone & Earle, for plaintiff.
J. 0. Fitzgera.ld, for defendants.

Coor.EY, J. (After stating the facts.) If the plaintiff's case
is weak in any point it is in the evidence to connect Lucius
Jenison with the arrangement whereby Emery was made agent
for carrying on the business at Whitehall. The circuit judge
correctly instructed the jury that if the action of I~uman Jenison was taken, and the business subseque-ntly carried on in the
name of L. & L. Jenison without the knowledge of Lucius at
the time or his subsequent ratification, there could be no recovery in this action; but that if Lucius authorized it, or knew
how the business was being conducted and did not dissent, then
both were bound to the extent of the agency Luman undertook
to create. He also instructed them that merely leaving Emery
in possession with instructions to sell t~e goods, would not
give him authority to purchase goods on credit. This instruction was as favorable as defendants could ask, and we find no
requests refused which we think the defendants entitled to.
It is conceded that the authority of Luman Jenison as a partner in the mill did not empower him m engage the firm in
another and independent business without the consent of his
associate. It was a very important fact, however, that the
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debt for which Luman Jenison assumed to take security in the
peculiar manner above described was a partnership debt. Be
undoubtedly bad authority to take goods in payment, and to
create an agency f()r the purp<lse of selling off the goods so
taken; and if in his opinion keeping up the stock for a time
was the best means of enabling the goods to be sold to advan·
tage, very slight circumstances of knowledge or assent on the
part of his copartner ()Ugbt to be sufficient to ·make the firm
responsible for the acts of the agent in keeping up the stock
in the usual way. Secret instructions to the agent upder such
circumstances cannot avail. It would be a reproach to the law
if it could suffer a principal to escape responsibility for those
acts of the agent which, acC()rding to the usual course of the
business in which be was engaged, the pu_blic bad a right to
understand were authorized. There was abundant evidence
in the case to charge Luman Jenison, and we think there was
also enough from which the jury might infer that Lucius Jeni·.
son could not have ·been ignorant of the business carried on so
long in the name of his firm.
It was urged on the part of the defense that ae the defend·
ants had a known place of business which they personally man·
aged, and which was altogether different from that carried on
at Whitehall, the plaintiff was guilty of negligence in making
sale to Emery without first communicating with defendants
and learning from them directly what was the extent 9f
Emery's agency. We think, on the other hand, that the negli·
gence, if any, was all on the other side. The arrangement
under which L. & L. Jenison became apparent owners, while
as to Emery they were mortgagees only, and under which
Emery for se'\"eral years was enabled to carry on business
though a bankrupt, was more than questionable in its nature,
and if it landed the parties in trouble it was what they ought
to have anticipated. The plaintiff sold its goods in. the usual
course of trade, and with no reason to doubt that Emery bad
the authority he professed to have, and which one of the
defendants at least, according to the evidence which the jury
believed, had done what he could to confer.
(Omitting a question of practice.)
Affirmed.
•
NoTE:- See Mechem'• Elem. of Partn., §§ 183, 1M.
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BOARDMAN vs. ADAMS.

8-uprem.e Court of Iowa, 1851.
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15 Iowa 224.

The plaintitrs, Boardman & Gray, were manufacturers of
pianos at Albany, N. Y. Adams & Hackley were partners in
the printing business and published the· "Tribune" newspaper
at Dubuque, Iowa. On June 19, 1854, Adams wrote to plaintift's, saying "your offer to us of an agency, we accept," and
urging plaintiffs to send sample pianos. Hackley also wrote
the same day, recommending Adams as a competent man, and
saying: "I think you would promote your interest by shipping us, at once, a small but select assortment of your instruments." Plaintiffs replied on June 23 declining to send any as
samples, but offered to sell them the pianos on certain terms
and said they had. forwarded two on those terms. On September 29 Hackley wrote, "We have just effected a sale of your
two pianos at six months. We have a prospect of selling two
or three more, if we had them. A. W. Hackley." On the
receipt of this letter plaintiff shipped two more pianos on the
terms mentioned in their previous letter. Hackley received
these pianos and put them in the hands of a oommission merchant for sale. When sold the proceeds were paid to Hackley.
Adams bad nothing to do with this last tra-!lsnction, and, in
fact, the partnership between Adams and Hackley had been
dissolved about August 25. Not receiving pay for any of the
pianos plaintiffs brought this action against Adams & Hackley
to recover the price of the four. Verdict for plaintiffs, and
Adams appeals.
Smith, McKinlay & Poor, for appellant.

No appearance for plaintiffs.
J. The court charged the jury that the plnintiffs
must recover for pianos sold and delivered, or they oould not
recover at all; that if the pianos were sold to Hackley nlone,
and not to the firm, the plaintiffs could not recover in this
action; that there must be satisfactory proof, either that the
STOCKTON,
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buying and selling of the pianos was within the scope of the
partnership business of defendants, or that they jointly
ordered the pianos from plaintiffs, before they can recover;
that plaintiffs having sued for pianos sold and delivered, cannot recover on proof that the pianos were sent to defendants
to be sold on commission, or on any other proof falling short
of proof of sale and delivery; and that the jury must examine
the testimony with reference to each of the defendants separately. It is first assigned for error, that the district court
refused to charge the jury that it was necessary for plaintiffs
to show that ~dams had knowledge of the whole of the transactions, and consented thereto (or what was equivalent
thereto), before he could be made liable. It is assumed that
the refusal of the court to charge the jury as requested was in
effect saying to them that one member of a partnership th·m,
without the consent of the other partner, can bind the firm in
matters which are without the scope of the partnership business.
The law is well settled, as claimed by defendants' counsel,
that one partner cannot bind the flrm by any contract made
in the name of the firm, unless it be in a matter within the
scope of the partnership dealings or falling within the ordinary
business and transactions of the firm: Western Stage Co. vs.
Walker, 2 Iowa 512, 65 Am. Dec. 789; Story on Partnership,
§ 322. Looking at all the instructions given in this case, and
at the testimony contained in the record, we cannot say that
the court undertook to lay down a different rule, or that there
was error in refusing the instructions asked. The respective
letters of Adams & Hackley to plaintiffs of June 19, 1854,
though signed in their individual names, were evidently written in the name and upon the business of the firm. Adams
says: "Your advertisement of pianos is in our paper, and your
offer to us of an agency we accept." Attached to this is the
letter of Hackley in which be says: "I think you would promote your own interests by shipping to us a small but select
assortment of your instruments." The jury were told that
"they must be satisfied that the business of buying and selling
pianos was within the scope of the partnership business, or
that defendants jointly and as copartners specially ordered
the pianos before a joint liability was incurred." By this
instruction the question of fact was left for the determination
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of the jury whether the dealing in pianos had been made a part
of the business of the firm. And from the evidence we think
they were authorized to infer that the def(>ndants concurred in
accepting, in the name of the firm, the agency offered them by
plaintiffs, and had agreed to add to their regular partnership
business that of dealing in pianos.
. It is to be observed that defendants in their letters to plain·
tiffs make no stipulation as to the terms on which the pianos
are to be sent to them. Nothing is said of their being sent to
be sold on commission. They accept the agency, and advise
plaintiffs to send on their pianos to them. In reply the plaintiffs inform them that they do not consign pianos to be sold
on . commission-they decline all such applications. They
have, however, shipped to defendants two pianos on these
terms; that they are to be at the risk of the defendants when
delivered at Albany on the railroad or canal, and all sales are
to be at defendants' risk; that the pianos are sold to them at
the usual rates; but they agree to wait with defendants for
payment until the pianos are sold by them, charging them
interest on account after four months; nnd that if the defendants choose to purchase the pianos "out and out'' twenty per
cent. will be deducted from the invoice price at six months'
credit-if for cash a discount of five per cent. additional will be
made. Upon these terms the first two pianos were shipped to
defendants. Upon notice to them of the terms of the plaintiffs, if not acceptable to them, they should have notified plaintiffs pf their dissent and their refusal to receive the pianos.
Instead of this Hackley, one of the defendants, writes to plaintiffs from the "Tribune" office, September 29: "We 'have just
et\'ected a sale of your two pianos at six months." Having
mnde ·the dealing in pianos a part of their partnership business, and notified plain tiffs thereof, this letter, though written
and signed by Hackley alone, binds the firm. There is no
expresse·d dissent to the terms on which"ttie pianos were sold
to them, and no unwillingness manifested·to continue the business and agency on the same terms. On the contrary, they
inform the plaintiffs that they "have a prospect of selling two
or three more if they had them." In accordance with this
suggestion the remainder of the pianos charged are shipped
to defendants.
l\' here a partnership firm, embarked in a particular busin:ess
to which their engagements are confined, and to which alone
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their partnership c<>ntracts extend, by mutual ag.reement,
enlarge the sphere of their operations, and include another
branch of business, the power of each partner to bind the firm
by his contracts Is co-extensive with the whole business of the
partnership; and the acts of each member are as binding on
the firm in the new branch of business in which they are
engaged as they are in the former regular and ordinary busi·
ness. If Adams & Hackley agree to add the business of dealing in pianos to their regular business of printing and publish·
ing newspapers, the acts of each member of the firm are binding on the other in everything connected with the buying and
selling of pianos, and neither can object that the other partner
makes contracts or incurs liabilities in the name of the firm,
which, by virtue of the relation existing between them, shall
bind them both. It was not necessary, therefore; in our view
of the law and the facts, that the plaintiffs should prove that
Adams had knowledge of all the transacti<>ns which passed
between his copartner and the plaintiffs, and that he consented
thereto. He is presumed to consent to all the acts of his partner within the scope of the business of the. firm.
The second assignment of error is upon the refusal of the
oourt to charge the jury "that if the letter of Boardman & Gray
d<>es not accept the offer and terms stated by Adams, it is nee·
essary to bring home to Adams a knowledge of the contents
<>f the letter <>f Boardman & Gray." The refusal to give this
instruction was not erroneous. No offer of terms was made by
Adams in his letter to plaintiffs. He informs them that the
offer to their firm of an agency for the sale of their pianos is
accepted by defendants, and advises plaintiffs that they had
better have one of their pianos in Dubuque. Having ac<:epted
the agency proposed, and agreed to make the dealing in pianos
a part of their business as a partnership, Adams, as one of the
partners, is equally and jointly with Hackley liable for all
pianos sold and delivered to the partnership firm. Even if
Adams never saw or knew anything of the letter of plaintiffs,
he is bound by the acts of his copartner.
·
Judgment affirmed.
NOTE:-See Mechem's Elem.
p. 260.

or Partn., §

167; Latta va.. Kilbourn, ante,

•
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PORTER vs. CURRY.

Supreme Court of Illinois, 1869.
50 Dl. 319, 99 Am. Dec. 520.
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Assumpsit by Porter against Curry and Maj<>rs, as partners,
for the balance of the price of a mare, claimed to have bee~
8Qld by the plaintiff to the defendants. Curry alone was
served. The defendant had a verdict and judgment, and the
plaintiff appealed.
Ski·nner and Marsh, for the appellant.

Warren and Wheat, for the appellee.

LA WRE:-l'CE, J. Curry and Majors were partners tn the manufacture of wagons, and in August, 1867, s<>ld a wagon to P<>r·
ter, the appellant, for $110, for wbicb he gave his note. Soon
afterwards llorter, by an arrangement with Majors, sold the
latter a mare for $200, and received therefor his own note and
one executed by Majors for $90. Porter swears, however, that
Majors claimed t<> be purchasing the horse for the use of the
firm, and on the credit of the firm, and that he himself supposed that be was taking the firm note, instead of the individual note of· Maj<>rs, and not being able to read did not discover his error until Majors absconded and be showed his note
to a neighbor. Majors absconded to Missouri a few days after
the purchase, taking with him the mare. Curry pursued
Majors, obtained possession of the mare, and sold her. Porter
brought this suit against the firm to recover the $90, and it
is resisted on the ground that the mare was not required in the
business, and therefore Majors had no power to buy her on the
firm credit.
It is clear, however, even if the purcha.se of a horse was not
within the scope and usage of such a partnership as existed
between Curry and Majors, yet if the mare was in fact pur'
chased on the firm credit,
and if Curry afterwards claimed her
from Majors as firm property, and obtained possession of her
on that ground, be thereby ratified the act of Majors in buying
her on the partnership credit. He cannot be permitted at the
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same moment to claim the benefit of the purch~se and deny
its obligations. This view of the law was embodied in the
sixth and seventh instructions asked by plaintiff, and they
should have been given. For the same reason, the first instruction given for the defendant should have been refused. It puts
the case to the jury wholly on the question of an original power ·
by Majors to buy on the firm credit, and makes the case turn
entirely upon that, leaving the question of ratification altogether out of view.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
Judgment reversed.
Non:-Bee Mechem's Elem. of Partn., §§ 176, 190.

PEASE vs. COLE.
Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1885.
158 Conn. 68,22 Atl. Rep. 681, 515 Am. Rep. 68.

Action by Ernest M. Pease against Charles H. Cole and
Daniel McCarthy on a note executed by McCarthy in the firm
name of defendants to J. B. McCarthy, father of Daniel
McCarthy, and by him indorsed to plaintiff.
Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant Cole appeals.
G. G. Sill and H. S. ,Sanford, for appellant.
L. E. StantOfl and S. F. Jones, for appellee.

LooMIS, J. The question involved in this case Is whether
one member of a copartnership formed for the purpose of con·
ducting a ·theater in Hartford could, under the circumstances
mentioned in the finding, bind the other member by executing
a negotiable promissory note in the name of the firm for
money borrowed. The finding, in terms, excludes all express
authot'ity of the other partner, and even all knowledge of
the matter on his part. So that any conclusion that the note
is the- note of the firm, rather than of the member executing it~
must necessarily rest on an authority to be implied. But here,
again, the facts found so circumscribe the range of inquiry as
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to exclude all the ordinary sources of such'authority. The circumstances from which an authority may be implied are
identical with those involved in a question of ordinary agency,
for each partner is regarded as the accredited agent of the rest.
In many cases the decisive fact is found in the customai·y
course of dealing; but not so here, for it is found that the note
in quE>stion was the only note ever given in the name of the
ftrm. The copartnership first commenced business in August,
1883, and on the 24th of the same month the note in suit was
given. There was therefore very-little time for a course of conduct or usage of any sort to grow up, giving any apparent
authority. The finding traces the money borowed only into
the bands of McCarthy, the partner who signed the firm name,
and no fact appears showing directly or presumptively, that
the act was nE.>cessary for any of the purposes of the partnership. The only remaining 80Urce from which an authority may
be derived by implication must be sought in the nature and
scope of the partnership and in the nature of the act; and here,
if we examine the legal principles that are applicable, it will
be found, not only that all such implication is wanti~g, but
that the presumption is directly against the authority assumed.
The weight of authority in the United States, and the uniform
tenor of the authorities in England, will be found .to establish a controlling distinction in respect to im~plied authority
between commercial or trading and non-trading partnerships.
Story, Partn. (6th Ed.) § 102a; 1 Lindl. Partn. (4th Ed., by
Ewell), top p. 266, and note 1, and cases there cited; 1 Colly.
Partn. 648, 658; Mete. Cont. 121, and cases cited in the notes.
In a commercial partnership each acting partner js its general agent, with implied authority to act for the firm in all matters within the scope of its business; and the presumption of
law is that all commercial paper which bears the signature of
the firm, executed by one of the partners, is the paper of the
partnership, for the reason that the giving of such notes would
be within the usual course of mercantile transactions. But
when we pass to non-trading partnerships the doctrine of general agency does not apply, and there is no presumption of
authority to support the act of one partner. Hence, in order
to subject the firm upon a bill or note executed by one partner
in its name, a course of conduct, or usage, or ot~er facts sutll~ient to warrant the conclusion that the acting partner had
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been invested by his copartners with the requisite authority,
must appear, or that the firm bas ratified the act by receiving
the benefit of it. That·tbe partnership in question belongs to
the non-trading class seems so obvious as to need no discussion.
The brief in behalf of the defendant Cole cites many cases, and
giv~s a long list of pursuits and professions which those cases
establish as CJf the non-trading class, and, although the conduct
of a theater is not there mentioned, yet the analogies manifestly include it. To show the existence of the distinction
contended for, and its application, we select from a multitude,
of authorities the following in addition to those previously
referred to:
In Judge ~8. llmBtcell, 13 Bush, 67, 26· Am. Rep. 185, the
defendants were partners under an agreement to engage in
mining business upon lands then lease(J. or which might be
thereafter acquired. One of the members of the firm purchased, without the others' consent, and took conveyances <?f,
mining land in the name of the firm, and gave the bills of the
ftrm therefor. In an action by the payee of the bills against
the firm, a defense was made by the other partners that the
purchase was without their consent or ratification, and in the
plea they renounced all claim to the lands purchased. The
court held that the firm was not liable on the bills, saying that
the power of one partner to bind his copartners rests alone on
the usa~e of merchants, and does not amount to a rule of law
in any other than commercial partnerships. In non-commet·cial
partn~rships, one who seeks to hold the firm bound upon a contract made by a single member must be able to show, either
express authority, or that such is the customary usage of the
particular branch of business in which the firm is engaged, or
such facts as will warrant the conclusion that the partnet· hau
been invested by his copartners with the requisite authority.
In Hedley vs. Brait~bridge, 3 Q. B. 316, the defendants were
attorneys in partnership, and one of the partners gave n note
in the name of the firm to the plaintiffs for the balance of
advancements made to one partner who was acting in behalf
of the firm. The advances were to be laid out on mortgage by
the firm. Lord DENMAN, C. J., in giving the opinion, said:
"No doubt a debt was due from the firm; but it does not follow
that one partner bad authority to give a promissory note for
that debt. Partners In trade have authority, as reg-:11·ds

::
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third persons, to bind the tlrm by bills of exchange, for it is
.the usual course of mercantile transactions so to do; and this
authority is by the custom and law of merchants, which is
part of the general law of the land. But the same reason does
not apply to other partnerships. There is no custom or usage
that attorneys should be parties to negotiable instruments, nor
is it necessary for the purposes of their business. • • •
Upon the whole, we think t~at the implied authority fs
confined to partners in trade."
In Dickinson vs: Valpy, 10 Barn. & C. 128, the plaintiff was an
indorsee for value of a bill of exchange drawn and acceptea in
the name of a mining partnership by order of its regular direct·
ora. It was held incumbent on the plaintiffs to prove that the
directors had authority to bind the company, and that it was
necessary, for the purpose of carrying on the .business of the
company, or usual for other similar mining companies, to draw
or accept bills of exchange. Opinions were given by Lord
TENTERDEN, C. J., and Judges BAYLEY, LITTLEDALE, and
PARKE, and the same distinction was made as in the other cases
between trading and non-trading part.nerships. See, also,
Greenslade vs. Dower, 7 Barn. & C. 635.
In Levy vs. Pyne, tried before Baron ALDERSON, 1 Car. & M.
4:53, it was held that, "if a hill of exchange or promissoi"y note
be drawn, accepted, or indorsed by one of two persons who are
partners in a business which is not a trade (e. g., as attorneys),
in the name of the tlrm, • • • the plaintiff must give
evidence of the authority of the othei" partner to draw, accept,
or indorse in the name of the fil"m; but in the case of a Com·
mercial tlrm, this is not neeessary, as there is a general
authority." See, also, Rickards vs. Bennett, 1 Barn. & C. 223;
Ga1·Zand vs. J a.comb, L. R. 8 Exch. 218.
Ju Smith vs. Sloa1~, 37 'Vis. 285, 19 Am. Rep. 757, the court, by
LYoN, J ., after an able and exhaustive review of the authorities, adopted the following proposition as fully sustained:
"We gather from all the authorities that the distinction
between a trading and a non-trading partnership, in respect to
the power of a partner to bind his copartner by negotiable
instruments, is not limited to a mere presumption of such
authority in one case, and the absence of such presumption in
the other, as the learned counsel for the plaintiff argued; but
we thinlc, and must so hold, that one partner in a non-trading
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partnership cannot bind his copartner by bill or note, drawn,
accepted, or indorsed by him in the name of the ftrm, not even
for a debt which the ftrm owes, unless he have express
authority therefor from his copartner, or unless the giving of
such instrument is necessary to the carrying on of the firm's
business, or is usual in similar partnerships; and the burden is
upon the holder of the note, who. sues upon it, to prove such
authority, nec~ssity, or usa~e."
In "Clery vB. Ginrich, 57 Ill. 531, the partnership was for farm·
ing purposes, and the note in suit was given by one in the name
of tlu.• firm for money borrowed. It was held ~o be a non·trading
fir-111; and the snme principles were adopted as in the cases
previously cited. In R·m~t vs. Olla:pin, 6 Laos. 139, it was held,
MILLER, P. J., giving the opinion, that the rule which authorizes
one member of a copartnership to bind the firm is only aPJ)li·
cable to business of a trading nature, and has no application
to partnerships for agricultural purposes, or others of a l'imi·
Jar character. See, also, Kimbro vs. Ba.llitt, 2~ How. 25G;
Orat'fB va. Kellenberger, 51 Ind. 66; Bank vs. Snyder, 10 Mo.
App. ~11.
In Chalmers' Digest of the Law of Bills of Exchange! Prom·
it-~ory Notes, and Cheques (2d Ed. pp. GS, 69), the following
propositions are laid down as well-settled rules : "Art. 77. A
partner in a trading firm has prim.a facie authority to bind the
firm by drawing, indorsing, or accepting bills in the firm name
for partnership purposes; and, if the bill get into the bands of
a bolder for value withont.notice, the presumption of authority
becomes a.bsolute, and it is immaterial whether it were given
for partnership purposes or not. Art. 78. A partner in a non·
trading partnership bas pt·im.a facie no authority to render his
copartners liable by signing bills in the partnership name.
The holder must show authority, actual or ostensible."
l\fany more authorities equally pertinent might be cited, but
these will suffice to show that the distinction relied upon is
strongly supported both in England and in the United States.
While we feel constrained to adopt the distinction between the
two classes of partnE-rship so far as the presumption of authoritv
. or the want of it is concerned, we do not deem it necessarv
for the purposes of this case, or even quite reasonable, to carry
its application so far as to deny ab~olutely, as some of the
cases do, the right to recover on a note gh·en by a non-trading
~
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flrm for money borrowed for the firm and appropriated to its
use, or on a note given in payment of its debts. Some authorities ignore the test of liability referred to, but adopt anotbe1·,
which is equivalent in result. Chancellor Kent, in his chapter
on partnerships in the third volume of his Commentaries (7th
Ed. p. 44), omits the use of the terms "trading" and "non-trading," and makes the distinction between partnerships, in
respect to the power of one partner to bind the firm, depend on
the single test of the usual scope of the business, in connection
"''ith the subject-matter of the contract. 'l'his rule was adopted
in Orostlwait t·s. RosB, 1 Humph. 23, 34 Am. Dec. 613, where it
was held that one partner in the practice of medicine oould.
not bind the finn by drawing a bill or note on which to raise
money, because it was not within the scope of the partnership
business. Though under a different name, the real distinction
here taken is between partners in trade and partners in an
occupation. Afterwards the same court, in the case of Pooley
t'8. Whitmo1·e, 10 Heisk. 629, 27 Am. Rep. 783, in a most able and'
elaborate opinion, held that the liability of a partnership §nn
of the non-trading class to a bona fide boldPr of negotiable
paper without notice, upon a · note endorsed in its name by a
member for bis own benefit, would depend upon the nature of
the business, the usage of trade, and the course of dealing of
the particular firm. It was also held that, where the nature
of the partnership is such that it may or may not be proper
to deal in negotiable instruments (as in that case, whic'h was
a publishing company), it was error in the circuit judge te
charge, without qualification, that the firm was liable if tb.e
holder received the note before maturity, in the due course of
trade, and without notice. " rethink the same principle, under
the circumstances of the case at bar, made it error in the
court below to hold the firm liable.- This court hitherto has
had no occasion to give prominence to the distinction under
discussion. The nature of the partnership business has, bowever, been made a ground fora presumption and a test of liability. In Walcott 1i8. Canfield, 3 Conn. 194, the defendants were
partners in running a line of stages from Hartford te Albany
and back. One of the partners by an advertisement promised
to transport passengers and lea'fe them at Albany in a specified time, upon which agreement the suit was based. The
advertisement, being the act of one partner, was held not even
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admissible in evidence against the firm, without previously
establishing the authority of that one to bind the others.
Hos:mcR, C. J., in delivering the opinion, on page 198, said:
"A copartnership formed to transport passengers and their
baggage in a stage does not authorize one of the partners to bind the firm by an agreement that he will convey a
person a certain distance within a specified time. Unless be
bad special authority, he could only obligate himself by a
contract not within .the scope of the connection, and not his
partners, who have never expressly or impliedly assented."
The subject-matter of the contract was diffet·ent from the case
at bar, but it seems even more closely connected with the scope
of the business than the giving of the note in suit.
Many authorities lay down the unqualified proposition, as if
it was applicable to all partnerships, that if one partner raises
money on a negotiable bill or note signed or indorsed in the
name of the firm, and which comes into the hands of a bona ft4e
purchaser, the partnership is bound, although it was in fact
for the individual use of the acting partner. The doctrine is
so stated in substance by this oourt in Imurance Co. vs. Bennett,
5 Conn. 574, 13 Am. Dec. 109. The case shows that the partnership was a commercial one. We do not say, however, that
public convenience does not demand the same rule in the case
of non-commercial partnerships,' where the holder was not
advised·of the nature of the partnership and its oourse of dealing, or of other circumstances to put him on inquiry, and where
the circumstances would justify the belief that he was dealing
with the partnership. We may well leave this for future consideration, for, upon the facts found, we think the plaintit'f's

right was impaired by reason of what he knew in connection
with the circumstances. We do not forget that the oourt
below, in terms, found that the plaintiff purchased the note
in good faith without notice of any defect. This, of course,
means simply that there was no actual bad faith and no actual
notice, and, as matter of fact, it is final; but at the same time
the oourt found special facts as h> the plaintiff's knowledge
arid action which we must also consider, and, if we find constructive notice or constructive fraud, the law must prev~H.
The plaintiff, as holder, must stand affected by the nature
of the partnership, of which be was fully advised. He purchased the note in the face of the presumption that it was
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unauthorized. To show the general nature of the facts which
courts have held to be constructive notice, we cite a few
cases. In Livingston VB. Roosevell, 4 Johns. 278, 4 Am. Dec.
273, A and B formed a copartnership under the style of A &
Co., in the business of sugar refining, and so adve-rtised in
the newspapers. B afterwards, without the knowledge of A,
bought a quantity of brandy, for which be gave a note indorsed
by him with the name of the firm. The plaintiff, who was an
indorsee of the note, took the newspaper in which the firm's
business was advertised. KENT, C. J., after commenting on
certain facts tending to show that the plaintiff knew that the
purchase of the brandy was not a partner~hip concern, proceeded to lay down these principles: "But if the plaintiff did
not in fact know that the purchase was made by C. I. Roosevelt on his own account, and acted under the mistaken impression that it was a partnership purchase, still the firm were not
bound by the indorsement, because the facts disclosed
amounted to constructive notice or ootice in law. • • •.
When a person deals with one of the partners in a matter not
within the seope of the partnership, the intendment of the
law will be that he deals with him on his private account, notwithstanding the partner may give the partnership name,
unless there be circumstances to destroythart: presumption. 'If~'
says Lord ELDON (Ez parte Bonbonns, 8 Ves. 544), 'under the
circumstances the person taking the paper can be considered
as being advertised that it was not intended to be a partnership proceeding, the partnership is not bound.' Public notice
of the object of a copartnership, the declared and habitual business carried on, the store, the counting-house, the sign, etc.,
are the usual and regular indicia by which the nature and
extent of a partnership are to be ascertained. When the business of a partnership is thus defined and publicly declared,
and the company do not depart from that particular business,
nor appear to the world in any other light than the one
thus exhibited, one of the partners· cannot make a valid
partnersltip engagement on any other than a partnership
account. • • •
When the public have the usual
means of knowledge given them, and no means have been
suffered by the ·partnership to mislead them, every m~
is presumed to know the extent of the partnership with
whose members be de-als." In 1 Collyer on Partnership (page
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650) it Is said that "a note given by one partner In the partnership name, within the scope of the partnership, is binding upon
the firm, but the payee is bound to know whether it is within
tbe scope of his apparent authority, and, if it is in excess
thereof, the firm is not responsible." In Cocke vs. Bank, 3 Ala.
175, the note in suit was signed in the partnership name of J.
F. & W. Cocke, who were partners in keeping a tavern. It was
executed by J. F. Cocke, and payable to Lea & Langdon for
their accommodation, without the JmQwledge of the other partner. Woodson Cocke. No actual knowledge of the ciL·cumstances was shown on the part of the bank, which sued as
indorsee; but it was assumed to have been the duty of the bank
to make inquiry. GoLDTHWAITE, J., in delivering the opinion,
said (page 180): "The law presumes that the bank, if it
inquired at all intQ the partnership of the defendants, must
have received information that they were not partners in a
mercantile trade, but only in the business of tavern-keeping.
This ascertained, it took the note at its peril, and must have
relied on the faith of the indorsers." It was held that ·wood- .
son Cocke, the partner who had no knowledge of the transaction, was not liable.
In the case at bar the plaintiff had full and actual knowledge
of the nature of the partnership, and the Jaw attributed to him
knowledge, also, that one partner could not bind the other by
bill or·note without authority, and knowing, as he did, that the
note had been written and signed by .McCarthy, who was irreBponsible, and that, if he purchased it, it would be upon the
credit of Cole alone. and having also actual knowledge of a
course of dealing which avoided McCarthy and pointed to
Cole alone as the financial represeDJtative of the firm, tt
seems to us the plaintiff took the note at his peril. It
was very strange for the plaintiff to inquire of the one who had
used the firm name if it was the note of the firm, and omit
entirely, when be had ample and easy opportunity, to inquire
of the other partner, on whose sole credit be depended; but the
court has found that the failure to inquire of Cole was not
owing to a belief that the inquiry would result in finding the
note hivalid, and this we must accept as true. Ordinarily such
a finding would save the rights of a bolder in good faith of
negotiable paper, but the great difficulty in the present case is
that the note was purchased with constructive notice that it
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was not within the apparent scope of the partnership business,
and prima faeie was not the note of the firm; and· the actual
course of business, so far as it was known to the plaintiff,
tended to increase rather than allay the suspicion of a want of
authority.
But the. plaintiff contends that the judgment in his favor
cannot be disturbed because the burden of proof was on the
defendant. On this general subject of the burden of proof,
most of the authorities cited in another connection to show the
distinction between the two classes of partnerships, and many
others that we might cite, assert most positively that in the
ease of non-commercial partnerships the burden is on the
bolder of the note.. But we concede that many cases can be
found which in terms would seem to place the burden on the
defendant. In some of these cases the partnerships were in
fact commercial, as in the case of Faler vB. Jordan, 44 Miss. 283.
In Doty vB. Bates, 11 Johns. 544, PLATT, J., giving the opinion,
said: "The partnership being admitted, the presumption of
law is that a note made by one partner in the name of the ftrm
was given in the regular oourse of partnership dealings until
the contrary.is shown on the part of the defendants." The case
is so brief in the report that we cannot see clearly what was
involved in the admission of the partnership which furnished
the basis for the presumption. It incidentally appears in the
description of the ftrm that its business was tanning, currying,
and shoe making. This, dQubtless, involved the buying of
bides, bark, and materials for tanning, and the sale of le.atber
and shoes. The basis of the presumption was doubtless the
apparent scope of the business. In Holma vs. Porter, 39 Me.
157, the bead note omits an important qualification. The
proposition laid down by the court is that, "when the contract ·
is made in the name of the ftrm, it will prima facie bind the
ftrm unless it is ultra the business of the ftrm." The head
note omits the last clause. The case of Carrier vs. Cameron
31 Mich. 373, 18 Am. Rep. 192, was relied upon by the'
plaintiff to show that the · burden was on the de-fendant.
In terms it so holds, but a brief analysts will show that it. is nQt
inconsistent with our position in this case, and will suggest a
mode of reconciling many apparently conflicting cases. There
was nothing at all in the case to show the nature of the partnership, and the plaintiff's knowledge of it. GnAvEs, C. J., in
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giving the opinion, stated the question as follows: "Was the
plaintiff below required, in order to make out a·prima facie
case, to show at the outset that Carrier had express authority
to make notes generally, or else to show either that the copart·
nership was one of the class in respect to which such authority
is presumed, or that its course of business had been such as to
imply authority, or that the signing by Carrier had been approved or ratified?" The question was answered in the negative, upon the authority of Littell vs. Fish, 11 Mich. 525. It is to
be noticed that the question was simply as to the burden of
proof after the fact of partnership was admitted, and before
the nature or class of the partnership appea.red. That being the
position of the case, the court well remarked that "it was not
needful f-or the plaintiff, by any positive averment or positive
pr~of, to negative a defense which, in virtue of a general presumption, would be intended not to exist. He could not be required to go into particular proof on such a point until some
proof should appear in contravention of the presumption." In
this statement of the law we fully concur, but it is not applicable to the facts in the case at bar, because the controlling fact
in the proposition is wanting.. Proof in contravention of the
ptoesumption, which at the outset was in favor of the plaintiff,
had appeared, and had resulted in the finding of the opposing
facts; and it is significant that all the facts which the above
question impliedly concedes to be sufficient to overcome the
presumption referred to are distinctly found, namely, that there
was ~o express authority to make notes generally or to give
this note; that the partnership was of the non-trading class, in
respect to which no authority can be implied; that there was
no course of business that could imply authority; and that the
giving of this note bad never been ratified or approved by Cole.
\Vhatever presumption, therefore, ·there might have been in
favor of the plaintiff at the outset had been fully overcome,
and, if there exists any further fact from which an authority
might be implied, the plaintiff must show it, or lose his case.
It is manifest that in the Michigan case, as, indeed, in all the
cases treating of the burden of proof in suits on notes alleged
to have been executed by partnerships, an illegitimate use haB
been made of the term "burden of proof." Properly, it is applied only to a party affirming some fact essential to the support of his case. Thus used, it never shifts from side to side
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during the trial. Loosely used, as in the cases referred to, it is
confounded with the weight of evidence, a very different thing,
which often shifts from one side to the other as facts and presumptions appear and are overcome; and, in this indiscriminate use of the term "burden of proof," much of the apparent
conflict in the cases bas its origin. For, after all, the test of
the burden of proof is very simple, and so is the question of the
weight of evidence, and there is no contrariety in the principle
adopted by the authorities. In the light of principle, we
think it may be demonstrated that the position of the plaintiff
is untenable. A partnership has been sued on a note executed
in its name. Upon the trial the note is produced by the plain·
tiff, and the first question is, was it the note of the firm? The
plaintiff takes the aftirmative of this issue, because, if no evidence is offered on either side~ he must fail. He has then the
b.urden of proof, and it remains on him, and does not pass at all
to the defendant. But suppose now it is shown or admitted
that the partner8hip alleged exists, and that one of the finn
executed and delivered the note in its name. By virtue of the
general presumption that authority was given by the partnership, the plaintiff is entitled to recover, if nothing further appears, because the weight of evidence is on his side. But suppose the defendants take their turn, and prove the identical
facts here found, that there was no authority, general or
special, given; no ratification of the act; no course of dealing
to imply authority; and, furthermore, that the partnership was
of a class from which no authority can be implied. Is the
plaintiff now entitled to a verdict? Bas be proved that the
note was the note of the firm? Surely not. What, then, is left on
which to rest his case? The preponderance of evidence is not
with him. The burden upon him to show that it was a partneratbip note bas not now been met. But it is said that there is a
realm of inquiry not touched by either party; that is, that it was
not shown whether or not the partnership had the benefit of the
consideration of the note. If such a fact appeared, we concede,
for the purposes of this case, that it would tend to show that
the note was the note of the firm. But if any authority could
not be implied as the case stood before, can it now be implied?
The case stands precisely as before. There can be no change
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in the ·wAight of evidence, 'because nothing bas been added; and
the clatm of the plaintiff would seem to be reduced t6 the

absurdity that be is to have the same benefit from an unproved
fact as from one proved. There was error in the judgme:at
eomplained of, and, as against the defendant Cole, it is reversed, and a new trial ordered. The other judges concurred,
except Ga.ANGE11, J., who dissented.
NOTE:-For other cases upon the power of one partner to bind the firm
'by negotiable instruments, see Mecht>m's Elem. of Partn., § 174.
For the die tinction between trading and non-trading firms, eee Id.

i

161.

DOWLING vs. EXCHANGE BANK OF BOSTON.
United States Supreme Court, 1892.
145

u. s.

512.

The court stat~ the case as follows:
Edward P. Ferry, of Grand Haven, Michigan, and George
E. Dowling and Frank H. White, of Montague, in the same
State, entered, February 1, 1873, into written articles of copartnership, "for the purpose of carrying on the business of
sawing lumber, pickets and laths at the said village of Montague,
in the steam saw mill lately there erected," the name of the
firm being F. H. White & Co., and the partnership to continue
for the full term of five years, unless sooner dissolved by agreement. Of the the capital of the firm Ferry contributed one-half,
and Dowling and White one-fourth each.
By the written terms of the partnership, no part of the capital
was to be diverted or used by either partner, otherwise than in
the business; the profits and losses were to be shared according
to their respective intere8ts; Ferry and Dowling were to have
the care and charge of securing the sawing for the mill, the supervision of the financial part of the business and of the firm's books
to be divided between them, as they might agree without charge
for their services; and White was to have full management of
the work of sawing, of hiring and discharging of men and fixing
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their wages, keeping double entry books, which should be open
at any time for the inspection of the partners, and receiving for
his services one thousand dollars, to be paid by the firm. It
was further provided that the books of the firm should be closed
as of January 31, in each year, the profits then to be ascertained
and passed to the credit of the respective partners, a.n d applied
in a. specified way.
At the date of the several transactions out of which this litigation arose there was a firm, Ferry & Bro., at Grand Haven,
Michigan, engaged in business as manufacturers of and dealers
in lumber and shingles. It was composed of Thomas W. Ferry
and Edward P. Ferry.
The present action involved the question of the liability of
F. H. White & . Co. upon three promissory notes, bearing date,
r~spectively, Montague, Michigan, October 17, 1882, N ovember 27, 1882, and January 15, 1883, and for the respective sums
of $5,288.75, $5,100.73 and $5,391.90, and payable, each, four
months after date, to the order of Ferry & Bro., "at the
National Exchange Bank, Bo~ton, Mass., value received."
Each note was endorsed by Thomas W. Ferry, in the name of
Ferry & Bro., and was sold by him, acting in the name of his
firm, to that bank. Neither White nor Dowling- whose firm
continued in business under the above articles of partnership
until May 31, 1883-had any knowledge of the existence of
these notes until after their rAspective maturities, nor until
shortly befo~e the commencement of this action. Neither
authorized the not.es to be given. They were gotten up by
Thomas W. Ferry, with the aid of Edward P. Ferry and one
Thompson, the bookkeeper of Ferry & Bro., the latter acting
under the direction of Thomas W. Ferry. The proceeds were
used for the benefit of Thomas W. Ferry, or of his firm. The
firm name of F. H. White & Co. to each note was signed by
Edward P. Ferry, who did not communicate to White and
Dowling that he had done so.
Separate actions having been brought by the bank upon the
notes, they were, by consent, consolidated. Before the order of ·
consolidation was made Dow ling filed in each action his affidavit, stating that "on the 17th day of October, 1882, he was, and
still is, a member of the copartnership firm of F. H. White &
Co., of Montague, Michigan; that said firm was at said time,
and still is, composed of Edwnrd P. Ferry, Frank H. White
and this deponent as co-partners;" that ''he never executed the
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promissory note a copy of which was served upon him with the
plaintiff's declaration;" that "the signature thereto is not in the
handwriting of this deponent; and that said promissory note
was not executed by any person ha•ing. authority to bind this
deponent or to hind the said defendants, Edward P. Ferry,
Frank H. White and this deponent jointly upon said promissory note."
A verdict was returned in favor of the plaintiff for $17,791.45,
the court saying to the jury: "Regretting very much that
these defendants White and Dowling, who alone make defense
here, are in such a situation that they must suffer from the
wrongdoing of their associate, the court is unable to relieve
them without violating principles of Jaw which are essential to
the security of mercantile business, and violating also the rights
of parties innocent of the wrong. As there is, in the opinion of
the court, no question of fact about which there is any conflict
in the evidence, the court holds that, giving effect to the testimony, the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict, and you are instructed
to find accordingly against all the defendants." The opinion
which preceded this charge is reported in 30 Fed. Rep. 412.
Judgment having been rendered upon the verdict, a severance
was duly had between the defendants, so as to authorize a writ
of error in the name of Dowling alone.

Mr. Michael Brown (with whom was Mr. J. 0. Fitzgerald
on the brief) for plaintiff in error.
Mr. Mark Norris (with whom was ftfr. Lyman D. Norris
on the brief) for defendant in error.
MR. JusTICE HARLAN, after stating the case, delivered the
opinion of the court.
It is not disputed that the execution by Edward P. Ferry,
in the uame of F. H. White & Co., of the notes in suit was
without express authority of his partners, and that neither of
the notes was given or used in the business of that firm. The
primary question therefore is, whether, for the protection of the
plaintiff a bona fide purchaser for value, it will be conclusively
implied, as matter of law, from the nature or course of the
firm's business, that Edward P. Ferry bad authority from · his
partners to make those notes or either of them.
Mr. Justice Clifford, speaking for the court in Kimbro vs.
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Bullitt, 22 How. 256, 268, said that "wherever the business,
according to the usual mode of conducting it, imports, in its '
nature, the necessity of buying and selling, the firm is then
properly regarded as a trading partnership, and is invested
with all the powers and subject to all the obJigations incident
to that relation," citing, among other cases, Winship 'llS. Bank
of United States, 5 Pet. 529, 561. :M:r. Justice Story said
that the doctrine that each partner may bind the firm by bills
of exchange, promissory notes and other negotiable instruments
is generally limited to partnerships in trade and commerce, and
does not apply to .o ther partnerships unless it is the coryunon
custom or usage of such business to bind the firm by negotiable
instruments, or it is necessary for the due transaction thereof.
Story on Partnership, sec. 102, a.
In Irwin vs. Williar, 110 U. S. 499, 505, :M:r. Justice
Matthews, speaking for the court, said : "The liability of one
partner for acts and contracts done and made by his copartners, without his actual knowledge or assent is a question of
agency. If the authority is denied by the actual agreement
between the partners, with notice to the party who claims
under it, there is no partnership obligation. If the contract of
partnership is silent, or the party with whom the dealing has
taken place has no notice of its limitations, the authority for
each transaction may be implied from the nature of the business according to the ordinary and usual course in which it is
c~rried on by those ~ngaged in it in the locality which is its
seat, or as reasonably necessary or fit for its successful prosecution. If it cannot be found in that, it may still be inferred
from the actual though exceptional course and conduct of the
business of the partnership itself, as personally carried on with
the knowledge, actual or presumed, of the partners sought to
be charged." Again: "What the nature of that business in
each case is, what is necessary and proper to its successful
prosecution, what i~ involved in the usual and ordinary course
of its management by those engaged . in it, at the place and
time where it is carried on, are all questions of fa<:t to be
decided by the jury, from a consideration of all the circumstances which, singly or in combination, affect its character or
determine its peculiarities, and from them all, giving to each
its due weight, it is its province to ascertain and say whether
the transaction in question is one which those dealing with the
firm had reason to believe was authorized by all its members.
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The difficulty and duty of drawing the i:qference suitable to
each case from all its circumstances cannot be avoided or supplied by affixing or ascribing to the business some general
name, and deducing from that, as a matter of law, the rights
of the public and the duties of the partners."
'
It is very clear that the articles of agreement between Ferry,
White and Dowling did not create a partnership, each member
of which bad, under the settled rules of commercial law, and as
between the firm and those dealing with it, authority to give
negotiable paper in its name. The firm was of the class denominai.,d in many adjudged cases as non-trading or non-commercial firms, the members of which could not be held, as matter
of law, and by reason of the nature of the partnership business,
to have authority to execute negotiable instruments in the name
of the firm.
We quite agree with the learned judge who presided at the
trial that the liability of a partnership upon negotiable instruments executed by one partner in the name of the firm' exists
not only where the firm is a trading or commercial partnership,
but "where the actual course of business pursued adopts the
practice of issuing the mercantile paper of the firm to accommodate its necessities or convenience whenever the occasions
occur." But the difficulty in this case is that the jury were
not permitted to determine, from a consideration of all the circumstances of the case, what, in view of the admitted nature of
the business of F . H. White & Co., was necessary and pt'oper
to·its successful operation, what was im·oh·ed in the usual and
ordinary course of its management by those engaged in it, or
what should be inferred from the actual course and conduct of
the partnership, so far as it was known, or ought reasonably to
have been known, to the parties sought to be charged with liability on the notes in suit. We do not deem it necessary to
make a detailed statement of the numerous facts disclosed by
the evidence, or to suggest what inference might be drawn from
them. It is sufficient to say that the issue as to whether the
defendants were estopped to dispute the authority of Edward
P. Ferry to make the notes in suit, in the name of F. H. ':Vhite
& Co., was one peculiarly for the jury, under all the facts indicating the nature, necessities, and course of business of the firm,
and un<ler proper instructions from the court as to the legal
principles by which they should be guided in determining the
ease.
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We think the court erred in holding, as matter of law, that
the jury were not at liberty, under any view of the facts, to find
for the defendants. It seems to us that a verdict in their favor
would not have been so palpably against the evidence as to
have made it the duty of the court to set it aside and grant a
new trial.
The judgment is reversed as to the defendant Dowling, who
alone prosecutes this writ of error, with directions to grant him
a new trial.
NoTE.-See Mechem's Elements of Partn., § 174.

MORGAN vs. RICHARDSON.
Supreme Court of Missouri, 185!.
16 Mo. 409, 57 Am. Dec. 285.

This was a proceeding to set aside a judgment entered
against A. & J. M. Richardson, partners, upon a promissory
n<Yte executed in the name of the firm. The judgment was
entered upon a confefi!sion made by J. M. Richardson alone,
after the dissolution •f the partnership. The execution was
levied upon the property of A. Richardson. The court below
set aside the judgment against A. Richardson and qua8hed the
exeeution. Plaintiff appeals.
Leonard, for the appellants.
Hayden, contra.

ScoTT, J. The facts in this case stand admitted by the
demurrer to the petition, and we are at a loss to conceive the
ground upon which the proceeding can be sustained against
A. Richardson. The case of Green vs. Beals, 2 Caines (N. Y.)
254, is a11 authority to show that the judgment confessed by
J. M. Richardson was void as to A. Richardson. The cases of
Motteua: vs. St. Aubin, 2 W. Blackst. 1133, and Denton vs. Noyes,
6 Johns (N.Y.) 298, 5 Am. Dec, 237, are not applicable to the
circumstances of this case. It cannot be maintained that a
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partner, either bef.ore or after the dissolution of the copartner·
ship, has authority to confess a judgment for his copartner.
The authorities are abundant to show that one partner cannot
tonfess a judgment which will bind his copartner: Crane vB.
French, 1 Wend. (N. Y.) 311; :McBride 'liB. Hagan, Id. 327. We
caB see no difference in principle between setting aside the
judgment and restraining an execution upon it, as either mode
of action is based upon the nullity of the proceeding, which
is not permitted to be used as a foundation for any future
action against the party for whom it bas been unwarrantedly
entered. It does not appear that the judgm-ent against J. M.
:Richardson has been vacated, nor will we interfere with it.
Affirmed.
Nou.-8ee Mechem's Elem. or Partn., • 179.

FOX vs. NORTON.
Supreme Cow·t of Michigan, 1861.
9 Mich. 207.

Norton and others sued Charles R. Fox, Thomas D. Gilbert
and Francis B. Gilbert on a bond. The bond, which was
received in evidence against defendants' objection, described
the obligors as Charles R. Fox and Gilbert & Co. It was conditioned that said Fox and Gilbert & Co. should pay, etc.; and
was signed thus:
CHARLES R. Fox (Seal].
GILBERT & Co.
[Sealj.
Judgment for plaintiff and defendants bring error.
Withey & Gray, for plaintiffs in error.
J. T. Holmes, for defendants in error.

CHRISTIANCY, J. (After stating the facts.) The Individual
names of the Gilberts do not appear upon the bond. It was,
however, proved that Thomas D. Gilbert and Francis B. Gilbert were, at the date of the bond, partners composing the firm
of Gilbert & Co., and that the said Thomas D. Gilbert executed
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the bond in the name of the firm. But no evidence was given
or offered showing or tending to show that the bond was executed by the single partner in the presence of the other part·
ner, nor that the other partner bad previously assented to its
execution, nor that be subsequently recognized or ratified it
as the act or obligation of the firm.
We understand the general rule of law to be well settled
t}lat (with the exception of the release of a debt, which stands
upon peculiar ground) one partner cannot execute a specialty
binding as such upon the finn, without express authority for
that purpose under seal. The English decisions recognize but
a single exception to this rule, and that is when the single partner executes the tnsh·ument in the presence and with assent
of the other member or members of the firm. But, by the gen·
eral current of American authorities, the instrument may alSG
be sustained against the firm by proof of prior parol assent, or
subsequent parol ratification by the other member. We are
aware of no case which got:-s further. See the authorities collected in Story on Cont. §§ 218, 220; Story on Partn. § 117,
et seq.; Conyer on Partn. (Perkins Ed.) §§ 462 to 467.
The bond in this case was not admissible under the general
rule, and no evidence was given tending to bring it within any
of the recognized exceptions to the rule. It was therefore
improperly admitted. The bond not being in evidence, and all
the other questions raised in the case being dependent upon the
bond, such dependent questions have no bearing upon the case
before us, and we do not deem it necessary to notice them here.
Reversed.
NOTE: See Mechem's Elem. of Partn.,

~

180.

SHATTUCK vs. CHANDLER.

Supreme Court of Ka.nsas, 1889.
4:0 Kan. 516, 20 Pac. Rep. 225, 10 Am. St. Rep. 227.

Chandler, as assignee of the firm of Pierpont & Tuttle, sued
Shattuck and Bowers, upon the notes referred to in the opinion.
Plaintiff bad judgment below and defendants bring error.
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Don OaJ'los & Son, for the plaintiffs in error.
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A. G. & W. H. McBride, for the defendants in error.

CLoosToN, C. This was an action upon a large number of
promissory notes made payable to Pierpont & Tnttle, and
guaranteed by the firm of Shattuck & Bowers in these words:
"For value received, I hereby guarantee the payment of this
note according to the terms thereof, waiving demand, notice,
and protest. Shattuck & Bowers." The evidence shows that
Pierpont & Tuttle were a manufacturing firm, located at Bush·
nell, Illinois, and that Shattuck & Bowers resided in Phillips
county, Kansas, and were engaged in the sale of agricultural
implements. Certain agricultural implements furnished by
Pierpont & Tuttle were sold by Shattuck & Bowers, and the
notes sued on were taken in payment therefor, said notes being
. made payable to Pierpont & Tuttle, and before delivery to
them were guaranteed as above stated. In answer to the petition, the defendant alleged, among other defenses, that the
plaintiff was not the assignee of Pierpont & Tuttle, and that
he had no right or authority to bring the action; and also
alleged that Pierpont & Tuttle had failed to collect the notes
when the same were due and payable; that the makers of the
notes were solvent at that time, and afterward became insolvent and non-residents of Kansas.
The plaintiff offered in evidence the notes sued on, and the
deed of assignment made in Illinois by Tuttle in the firm name
of Pierpont & Tuttle; also a deed of assignment by Tuttle as
the surviving partner of Pierpont & Tuttle. Said last deed of
assignment,·in addition to a general assignment of all the property of the firm of Pierpont & Tuttle, ratified the first deed of
assignment, and all the doings and proceedings had thereunder by the plaintiff as such assignee. Both of these assignments were objected to, and the objection overruled, and were
admitted in evidence. The first deed was objected to upon the
ground that one of several partners has no authority, without the consent of the other partners, to make a general assignment of the partnership property. The plaintiff contends that
the deed of assignment is prima facie good, and it devolved
upon the defendant to show that Pierpont did not consent to
the assignment, and that unless it was at least shown that he
objected to the assignment, the assignment must be held good.
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In this we do not agree with the plaintiff. Where an assign·
mentis made by one partner, his right to make that assign·
ment depends upon the consent of his copartner; and to give
him authority tQ make it, he must, in addition, sho~ that his
partner consented thereto, or show such a state of facts from
which the court could presume assent, or show that the partner was absent from ibe country, and that therefore his assent
could not be procured, or SQme other state of facts that would
show to the court that the partner making the assignment
had authority, either by reason of the articles of partnership,
or by the fact ef his being managing age11.t of the partner·
ship, or some such fact fr()m which the court oould say that
the assignment was authQrized by the partners'hip. Ne such
proof was made in this case, and we think, in the absence of
such proof, the assignment offered in evidence was absolutely
void. See Burrill on Assignments, 5th Ed., Sees. ii-88; Loeb vs.
Pierpont, 58 Iowa, 469; 43 Am. Rep. 122; Lcnoemtein vs.
Flaurand, 82 N.Y. 494; Haggerty vs. Granger, 15 How. Pr. 243;
Dunklin vs. Kimball, 50 Ala. 251; Sloan vs. Moore, 37 Pa. St.
217; Graves vs. Hall, 32 Tex. 665; Story on Partnerships, Sec.
101; Parsons on Partnerships, 166. Tais doctrine is now
almost universally acknowledged to be the rule.
The second assignment offered in evidence presents a more
difficult question. In many of the states the doctrine i~ held
that a surviving partner cannot make a general assignment,
and in these states, the theory upoB which the decisions were
rendered is, that, at the death of one partner, the surviving
partner becomes trustee of the partnership estate, and that he
baa no·power to transfer the trust so-created to ~..IlQther trustee. This seems to be the doctrine held in New York: Nelson
vs. Sutherland, 43 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 327; Loeschigk vs. Hatfield, 51
N. Y. 660; Cushman vs. Addison, 52 Id. 628; also Tiemann vs.
Molliter, 71 Mo. 512; Vosper t;B. Kramer, 31 N. J. Eq. 420.
On the other hand, it has been beld by some of the sta.tes that
the surviving partner may make a genera.! assignment of a
partnership; and to this effect are numerous decisions, among
which is Emerson t~s. Senter, 118 U.S. 3, in whi~h case the court
held that the surviving partner could make a general assignment. The court said: "The right to do sa grows out of -his
duty, from his relations to the property, to administer the
affairs of the firm so as to close up its business without unrea-
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sonable delay." This seems to be the settled doctrine of the
supreme court of the United States, and should be followed
unless there is some statute making a diffe1·ent rule. This
assignment was made under the l~ws of Illinois, and should be
, interpreted thereunder; but in this case no statute of Illinois
was offered disclosing what provisions had been made in that
state by statute for the winding up of »artnership business;
and in the absence of any showing of this kind, we must presume that the statute of Illinois is like that of Kansas. This
brings up the question, is there any statute in Kansas that
conflicts with the rule laid down by the supreme court of the
United States in the last case cited? Article 2, chnpter 37, of
the compiled laws of 1885, provides for the winding up and
settlement of partnership estates. This p'rovides for the
appraisement of partnership property, and that the ·property
shall remain in the possession of the surviving partner, and if
he sees flt to continue its· management, and the disposing of
the partnership assets and the payment of the partnership
debts, he may do BO upon condition that he give a bond for
faithful performance of the. duties imposed, and the power is
given the probate court to cite him, after the giving of such
bond, to an accounting, and to adjudicate upon such accounts,
as in the case of an ordinary administratoc, and for an action
upon the bond in case of his failure to faithfully administer
the partnership estate; and upon his refusal to give the bond
and take charge of the partnership property, it becomes the
duty of the administrator of the deceased partner's estate to
assume the management of the same and to settle it up. By
this statute ample provisions are made for the closing up of a
partnership estate, either by the surviving partner, or by the
administrator of the deceased partner's estate. We think
t1lat the legislature by this provision intended to provide a
trustee to close up the partnership upon the death of a member
of the firm, and that the ·statute creat-es a trust in the surviving partner which he has no power to transfer to another
except as it is transfEC>rred by his refusal to administer upon the
partnership estate, in which event it is transferred by operation
of law to the administrator of the deceased partner's estate.
It was said in Carr vs. Catlin, 13 Kan. 393, in speaking of this
class of administrators: "He is neither more nor less than ~
special trustee as to this property and this class of debts."

LOWMAN VS. SHEETS.
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The rule Is, that. where a form of procedure la provided by
statute, and the manner of doing a particular act or thing is
pointed out, it precludes the doing of it in any other manner
or form. If the surviving partner under our statutes may
transfer his trust to an assignee, then the assignee would close
up the entire partnership business in the oourt having juris·
diction of the assignment and estate thereunder, and would
be entirely free from the jurisdiction of the probate court, and
the statute above cited would be without any force or effect.
Did the. legislature intend that this statute might be regarded,
or not, at the pleasure of the surviving partner? We think
not. This means of winding up a partnership business bas
been prescribed by the legislature, and in the absence of any
proof of the statutes of Illinois to the contrary, we must presume that this is the manner of closing up partnership estates
in that state.. We therefore think the court erred in permitting
the second assignment to be given in evidence, as it gave the
plaintiff no authority or right to. commence the action. • • •
Judgment of the court below reversed and a new trial
ordered.
NOTB: For other cases upon the power to make asaignmenta for creditors,
eee Meohem'a Elem. of Partn., § 172.

LO\VMAN vs. SHEETS.
Supreme Courl of Indiana, 1890.
124 Ind. 417, 1M N. E. Rep. lml, "'L. R. A. "'M.

Templeton and Sheets made a contract for the establishment
of a stock farm and acquired a herd of brood mares for that pur.
pose. Without the knowledge or conseJ}t of Sheets, Templeton
undertook to sell the entire herd to the plaintiff. Sheets ref~sed to surrender them and :Loman brought replevin. Verdict
for defendant and plaintiff appeals.
Wallace, Baird c£ Ohase, for appellant.
B. P. Hammond, M. H. Walker, D. Fra8er, I. H. Pharu and W.
B. A.mtin, for appellee

~
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CoFFEY, J. (After stating the facts and disposing of other
questions.) It is contended by the appellant thrut Templeton
and appellee were partners, and that, as such, either partner
had the right to sell the property owned by the firm and confer
a good title,and that by his purchase from Templeton he a~
quired the title to the whole of the property in controversy and
has a right to its possessioo. We do not deem it necessary to
decide whether the contract between the parties was one ()f
partnership or not, as the appellant had no power to sell the
entire property, whether it was held as partnership property.or
otherwise. The partnership, if one existed, was n@t one in
which the parties contemplated a sale of the property here ia.volved, but it was one in which this property was to be kept for
the purpose of carrying on a particular business. In such case
neither party had the power to sell the entire property: Bates,
Partn. § 401; Hewitt VB. Sturdevant, 4 B. Mon. (Ky.) 453; Oa.yton
vB. Hardy, 27 Mo. 536"; Mussey VB. Holt, 24 N.H. 248; Hudson vB.
McKenrie, 1 E. D. Smith, (N Y.)358. Mr. Bates, in his valuable
work on partnerships, in treating the subject in the section
above cited, says: ''But I have no doubt but that the power of
sale must be confined to those things held for sale, and that the
soope of the business does not include the sale of_the property
held for the purpose of business and to make a profit Gut of itJ
and that this only is the true rule." • • •
Aftirmed.
NOTB.-Bee also Mechem's Elem. of J>artn., § 186, and cues there cited;
. .Arnold "'· Brown, 24 Pick. 99, 85 Am. Dec. 296.

CLARKE vs. WALLACE.

·"

Supreme Court of North Dakota, 1891.

t N. D&k. 404, 48 N. W. Rep. 889,26 Am. St. Rep. 63e.

Action by Clarke against Wallace, Winslow, Allen and the
administrators of Sheets and Bickford. Judgment for plaintiff, ·and the defendants, Winslow, Allen et aZ., appeal. The
findings of the court show that in 1883 the defendants 'Winslow and Allen, together with John A. J. Sheets and Samuel
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M. Bickford, the two latter riow deceased, and their administrators, being defendants herein, were copartners engaged in
the banking, real estate, and l<>an business at Jamestown, Dak.
T., under the firm name of "North Dakota Bank." Allen was
the managing member of the firm. The firm had aoout f1,300
on deposit in the First National Bank of Jamestown. The
defendant Robert E. Wallace was president of the latter bank.
This bank was in failing circumstances. Wa.11ace needed
,5,000 to help him out of the embarrassments connected with
the failure of the bank, and he proposed t<> Allen that, if the
North Dakota Bank would aid him in obtaining a loan of that
amount, be would secure the deposit of that firm in the said
First National Bank. Allen, in his individual name, opened
a corresp<>ndence with the plaintiff, Clarke, who was a nonresiden,t, which resulted in obtaining a loan from Clarke, to
Wallace for the required amount, the note to be guaranteed
by the North Dakota Bank. Accordingly Wallace executed
the note, and Allen guaranteed it in the noame of the North
Dakota Bank, and the m<>ney was paid over t<> Wallace.
Plaintiff, Clarke, loaned the money largely on the credit of
the North Dakota Bank. Wallace secured the deposit of the
North Dakota Bank in the First National Bank by delivering collaterals to Allen, and the amount of the deposit was
subsequently reaJized out of the collaterals. _\lien had no
express authority from the other members of the firm to
guaranty the note of Wallace, nor did the other members of
the ftrm have any knowledge of such gua.r anty, or ever in any
manner ratify the same, nor did they, prior to the bringing
of this action, have any knowledge that the deposit in the
First National Bank was paid from the proceeds of collaterals
delivered by Wallace to Allen.

Nickeus ~Baldwin, for appellants.
Edgar W. Camp, for respondent.

J. (After stating the facts.) This action, so
far as_. these appellants are concerned, is brought on the guaranty heretofore mentioned, the defense being lack of authority
on the part of Allen to thus bind the firm. The contract of
guaranty was entered into contemporaneously with the execution of the note, and plaintiff parted with his money largely
BARTHOLOMEW,
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upon the strength of the guaranty, and the consideration there.
for was ample. Baylies, Sur. 54, 55; 9 Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law,
69, and cases cited. The benefit received by the tl.rm in obtain·
ing security on its deposit in the First National Bank becomes
material only so far as it bears upon the question of the authority of Allen to bind the firm. It is not usual for persons in
bu.siness to make themselves answerable for the conduct of
other people; and it is settled law that the party who takes a
promissory note bearing the indorsement of a firm, eithe·r as
guarantors or sureties, takes it burdened with the presumption
that the firm name was not signed in the usual course of partnership business, and no recovery <'.an be had by simply show·
ing the indorsement. The bolder is required to show special
authority to make the indorsement on the part of the partner
by whom the firm name was signed, or an auth_ority tb be im·
plied from the common course of business of the firm or previous course of dealing between the parties, or that the
indorsement was subsequently ado.pted and acted upon
by the firm. Sweetser vs. F1·ench, 2 Cush. 309, 48 Am. Dec. 666;
Schermerhorn vs. ScheNnerhorn., 1 Wend. 119; Bank vs.
Bowen, 7 Wend. 158; Foot va. Sabin, 19 Johns. 154, 10 Am. Dec.
208; Bank vs. McDonald, 127 Mass. 82; Moynahan vs. H ana ford,
42 Mich. 329, 3 N. W. Rep. 944. In this case there was no pre·
vious course of dealing between the parties from which authority on the part of Allen to guarantee in the firm name could be
implied; there was no express authority, and no subsequent
ratification on the part of the firm, or any member thereof.
But it is claimed that the indorsement was made for the pur·
pose of preserving the firm assets or collecting a firm debt, and
that the implied powers of a partner cover such a case. We
think, however, that plaintiff seeks to push the rule further
than any decided case wa.r rants. The case of Andrews vs. Ocmgg,r, 102 U.S. (Co. Op. Ed.) bottom page 90, is cited to support
the contention. It does not go so far. In that case one member of a firm, without the consent of his copartners, indorsed in
the firm name certain notes issued by a corporation. It ap·
peared, however, that the firm owned a majority of the stock of
the corporation, and the larger part of the benefits arising from
the notes accrued at once to the firm. The bueiness of the
· corporation might almost be regarded as a branch of the busi-

•
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ness of the firm. But the correctness of the decision in that
\!ase seems to be questioned in Bates on Partnership (volume
1, § 321), and it no doubt goes as far as any court bas gone in
that direction. In Lindley on Partnership, 341 (bottom paging), it is said: "The latter cases, however, decide that, unless
it can be shown that the g~ving of guaranties is necessary for
carrying on the business of the firm in the ordinary way, one of
the members will be held to have no implied authority to bind
the firm by them." Nor do we think that one partne1• has any
implied power to bind his firm in the use of unusual and extraordinary means for collecting a debt. In this case the guaranty was not ne~ssary to carry on the firm business in the or·
dinary way. It does not appear but that the deposit of the firm
would have been paid in full without the guaranty; but further
than that we are not willing to bold that one member of a firm,
in order to secure a debt, has implied authority to bind a firm
for a distinct and separate liability to a third person; and, par·
ticularly must that be true where, as in this case, the liability
incurred is several times greater than the debt sought to be
secured. It can be readily seen that any different rule would
be extremely hazardous. As fully sustaining our views, see
Moore vs. Stevens, 60 Miss. 809; Macklin vs. Kerr, 28 U. C. C. P.
· 90. Plaintiff failed to egtablisb any liability upon the guaranty in suit as against these appellants, and the judgment of
the lower c~rt as to them must be reversed, and a new trial
ordered. Aif concur.
NOTB.-See Mechem's Elem. of Partnei'I!hip,

I 188.

I /

.

\ ~\

\

JOHNSTON vs. DUTTON.
Sttpreme Court of Al.abama, 1855.
27 Ala. 245.

·I

Action bJt Dutton's administrator again-st Johnston & Co.
The latter firm was composed of Johnston, Fogg and Vanderslice. The notes were drawn and signed, in the firm name, by
Fogg. They were dated Dec. 17, 1852, and Jan. 8, 1853. John·
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ston denied liability on the ground that prior to the giving of
the notes he had given personal notice to Dutton and had also
published a notice in the newspaper that he, Johnston, would
not be bound by or for any future contracts made by Fogg
without Johnston's oonsent. Other facts appear in the opinion. Judgment for plaintiff and defendant appeal.
P. Hamilton and F. S. Blount, for appellants.

R. H. Sm·ith, contra.
GOLDTHWAITE, J. The evidence in this case tended to show
that the appellants and one Vanderslice carried on ·in copartnership a steam saw-mill, which, by the articles of oopartnership, was to continue at least five years; that the note sued on
was given with ·the concurrence of two of the partners, Fogg
and Vanderslice, for supplies necessary for the hands engaged
in carrying on the mill, which had been ordered by one of them.
Upon these facts alone, there can be no doubt that the firm
would be bound. The furnishing of supplies to those engaged
in the immediate direction of the business was essential to the
oonducting of it, and within the scope of the purpose for which
the individuals bad associated; and the authority of either of
the partners to purchase such supplies, and give the note of
fhe firm, cannot be q ueertioned.
The principal ground of objection) however, is, that the evidence proved that, before the goods were furnirtlied and the
note given, the appellant, Johnston, gave notioo to the public
that he would not be responsible for any future debt oon·
tracted on account of the copartnership, and that this notice
was brought home to the party with whom the debt was contracted; and it is insisted that its effec~ was to revoke the
authority of the other partners, so far as be was concerned, to
bind the firm from tbat time.
It is to be observed, that in the present case the contract was
ooncurred in by two members of the firm; and the question,
therefore, is, as to the right of the majority to bind the other
partners, against their dissent, as to matters appertaining to the
common business, and in the absence of any stipulation conferring that power in the articles of copartnership. This question is a new one in this court, and indeed we have found no
case in which it has been expressly decided. Both in England
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and the United States, there are cases which assert the general
proposition, that a partner may protect himself against the con·
sequt!'Dces of a future contract, by giving ooti'Oe Otf his dissent
to the party with whom it is about to be made. Gallway vs. Mat·
thew, 10 East 264; Willis vs. Dyson,.J.. Stark. 164; l'ice vs. Flem·
ing, 1 Y. & Jerv, 227, 230; Leavitt v.t. Peck, S Conn. 125, post
Feigley vs. Sponeberger, 5 W. & S. GG4; .Monroe vs. Connor, 15 Me. 178, 32 Am. Dec. 148. And where the firm consists
of but two persons and there is nothing in the articles to pre·
vent each from having an equal voice in the direction and con·
trol of the common business, the correctness of the proposition
cannot be questioned. In such case, the duty ()f each partner
would require him not to enter into any contract from which
the other in good faith dissented; and if he did, it would be a
violation of the obligations which were imposed by the nature
of the partnership. It would not, in fact, be the contract of
the firm; and the party with whom it was made, having notice,
could not enforce it as such. So, if the firm was composed of
more than two persons, and one of them dissented, the party
with whom the contract is made acts at his peril, and cannot
hold the dissenting partner liable, unless his liability results
from the articles or from the nature of the partnership contract. All the cases can be sustained on this principle; and
it is.in strict analogy with the civil law, which holds where the
stipulations of the partnership expressly intrust the direction
and control of the business to one of the partners, that the dissent of the other would not avail, if the contract was made in
good faith, (Pothier, Ttaite du Com. de ,'Joe., No. 71, 90); and
such also, we think, is the rule of the common law. Const vs.
Harris, Turn & Russ. 496; Story on Partn. Sec. 121. WePe it
othe1·wise it would be denying to parties the right to make
their own contracts. If our views as to the governing force
of express stipulati()ns are correct, the effect of such terms
or conditions as result by clear implication from the articles,
or arise out of the nature ()f the partnership, must be the
same. It is as if they had been expressly provided.
Now, whenever a partnership is f<>rmed by more than two
persons, we think that in the absence of any express provision
to the contrary, there is always an implied understanding that
the acts of the majority are to prevail over those of the minority, as to all matters within the scope of the common busi-
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ness; and such we understand to be the doctrine asserted by
Lord ELDON in Oonst vs. Harris, supra, and such was the
opinion of Judge Story: Story on Part., sec. 123; 3 Kent's
Com. (5 ed.) 4:5. The rule a.s 'thus laid down, is certainly more
reasonable and just, than to allow the minority to stop the
operations of the concern, against the views of the majority.
We do not say that it would be a bona fide transaction, so as
to bind the firm, if the majority ch~se wantonly to act without
information to or consultation with the milwrity (Story on
Part. sec. 123); but when, as in the present case, the one partner
has given notice, and expreased his dissent in advance, there
could be no reason or propriety in requiring him to be con·
suited by the other two.
We do not consider the cases to which we have been referred,
holding that one partner has the right at pleasure to dissolve
a partnership, although the articles provide that it is to con·
tinue for a specified term (Marquand vs. New York Ins. Oo., 17
J~hns. 525; Skinner VI. Dayton, 19 Id. 513, 10 Am. Dec. 286), as
having any bearing Oil the case under consideration. Conced·
ing they are law-whtch is doubtful (Story on Part. sec. 275, n.
8, and cases there cited)-the decision rests solely upon the
ground, that the limitation on the right of dissolution is incom·
patible with the nature of the copartnership contract; and this
principle does not militate against the position we have
asserted. The dissent, in the present case, cannot be regarded
as a dissolution; for, if effectual, it wouM not necessarily pro·
duce that result, although it might operate to change the mode
ot conducting the business. In other words, it might be cat·
ried on without contracting debts.
Our conclusion is, that the act, being concurred in by two
of the partners, was, under the circumstances, the act of the
firm; and that the charge, asaerting tLe proposition that the
dissent of one partner against the other two would necessarily
exonerate him, was properly refused.
Judgment affirmed.
NOTE: See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., §§ 168, 189.
Compare with caaee following.

,
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LEAVITT vs. PECK.
8up1·eme Com·t of Connecticut, 1819.
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8 Conn. 125, 8 Am. Dec. 157.

Action, against Gad Peck and Egbert D. Peck, as copartners
under the firm name of Egbert D. Peck, to recover upo~ a
promissory note made by Egbert to Gad, and by him endorsed
to plaintiff. There was evidence that Gad was a dormant
partner with Egbert, but Gad denied this and also proved that
when plaintiff applied to him to sign the note with Egbert he
bad refused to do so, but agreed to indorse it and did indorse
it, and that plaintiff accepted it. Verdict for defendant and
plaintiff appealed.
N. Smith and T1oining, for appellant.
Staples and Denison, contra.

HosMER, C. J. It is a well established pl'inciple that the
contract of a partner is obligatory on his copartner, by virtue
of an implied authority which may be rebutted by a refusal to
be bound by his acts. By legal consequence, the partner
whose authority is thus declined cannot bind the copartnership in favor of those who have knowledge of this fact: Galway -vs. Jlattltelo, 1 Campb. 403; S. C. 10 East 264; Willis
D.'JBOn, 1 Stark. 164. Nothing can be more reasonable than
that a person may protect himself in this manner against the
fraud and misconduct of his associate. The principle under
consideration is not founded at all on any supposed waiver by
the creditor; but solely and exclusively on the declaration of
the person declining to be bound.. The implied authority of
his partner be bas annihilated; and the contract in the name
of the firm is of no validity beyond the personal obligation it
infers on the individual making it.
w·hether a person in any given case bas rebutted the implied
authority of his partner to bind him, is a question of fact. On
this head I am inclined to think the charge to the jury was
incorrect. They were directed, if Gad Peck was a donnant
partner. with Egbert, and refused to give a joint note with

vs.
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him, to render a verdict for the defendant. The charge
involved this principle, that a refusal by Gad Peck to put his
name to the note in suit was necessarily a revocation of
Egbert's implied authority. This ascribed a consequence to
the act of Gad Peck which the premises did not warrant. It
is very possible that he might decline affixing his signature
to the note, and not refuse to be bound by his acts as a partner.
I am aware that th~re is a difficulty attendi.n g the prohibition
of .Egbert's authority without dissolving the partnership, but
I do n-ot consider it as insuperable. If it should appear that
Gad Peck did n-ot merely decline to execute a joint note with
Egbert, but refused to be b-ound by his acts, at all events,
and this was clearly understood by the plaintiff, I should con·
sider him as within the principle of the cited cases.
The ignorance of the plaintiffs relative to the existence of
the copartnership could be of no avail. It is true, they did
not kn-ow that Gad Peck was partner with Egbert; and of con·
sequence, they could not foresee the manner in which his
refusal to become bound as joint promisor would operate. But
they would know, and this alone was necessary, that if Egbert
were a partner, his authority was disclaimed. The oppo.gite
principle involves this proposition: that the plaintiff must have
knowledge of the precise consequences to which the refusal
would extend. Sufficient is it, if they know the fact, that in
every conceivable shape, Gad Peck refused to be bound by the
note of Egbert.
·
New trial to be granted.
NOT&; See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., § 163.
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WIPPERMAN vs. STACY.
Supl'eme Court of Wisconsin, 1891.

~

....

80 Wis. 845, 50 N. W. Rep. 886.

Action for the price of goods sold by 'Vipperman to Green
and Stacy. Recovery below and Stacy appeals.
The defendants, F. F. Green and \V. H. Stacy, on the 26th
day of October, 1888, entered into an agreement whereby
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defendant Green was to· put in his time and labor, and the
said Stacy was to furnish. $20,000 in money or credits, to carry
on the business of retail merchandise at the village of Keshena,
in this state, and they were to share the profits of said business
equally. The said Green was to have the purchasing of all
goods that were used in said store, but of parties named by
said Stacy. Sta~y resided at Clintonville, a considerable distance from Keshena, and Green resided at Keshena with his
family. Plaintiff had been in the habit of selling goods to
the concern at Keshena on the order of Green, and by the consent of Stacy, up to the 3d day of December, 1888. On that
day Stacy served upon the plaintiff the following notice:
"Clintonville, Wisconsin, Dec. 3d, 1888. Dear Sir: Don't
let F. F. Green have anything to be charged to me unless by
.an order [upon order] from Clintonville, given by me. [Signed.]
W. H. Stacy." About that time Stacy publiRhed in a Clintonville paper the following notice: "Notice is hereby given that
I, W. H. Stacy, do forbid all and every one from selling F. F.
Green, in my name, anything of any kind or nature, for I will
not pay for the same, nor bold myself resgonsible. [Signed.]
,V, H. Stacy." Of the goods sued for, part were sold and
delivered and went into the Keshena store before, and part
after, the service of the above notice; and they were used or
sold and accounted for in said store; and Stacy knew that at
least some of them were so sold and delivered and used or
sold in said store after the service of said notice, and without
any objection from him. Stacy was often at the store, and
knew what business was done, and all the bills for the same
were present in the store, open to his observation and inspection.
Benjamin M. GoldlJerg (Charles Bat'ber, of counsel), for
appellant.
E. J . Goodrick, for respondents.

ORTON, J. (After stating the facts.) The referee found, in
both cases, that the defendant Stacy, by his acts and conduct,
previous and subsequently to said notice, in receiving the
plaintiff's goods without hindrance or objection, and selling
the same, and applying the proceeds to the use and benefit of
the said copartnership, ratified and approved or consented to
the doings and acts of his copartner, F. F. Green, in said
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matter. This finding appears to have been fully warranted by
the evidence. These are the substantial and material facts,
and, as a question of fact, we cannot disturb the finding of the
referee. The learned counsel of the appellant contends that
the firm is not liable for any goods sold to it by the order of.
Green after the service of that notice. There was no provision
in the agreement of copartnership for any such notice co those
who are selling goods to the concern, not to sell on Green's
order. There is a clause, "that said goods shall be purchased
of parties named by said W. H. Stacy." That can haYe force
only as between Stacy and Green. Stacy may name to Green
the parties from whom he shall purchase goods for the concern.
From the fact that the plaintiff had been selling goods to the
tirm for a long time by the consent and acquiescence of Stacy,
the presumption would be that he was one of the parties named
by Stacy. There is no evidence that Stacy had ever notified
Green that he should not continue to purchase goods of the
plaintiff. It follows that Green had the right to continue to
purchase of the plaintiff. If Green had such right, then the
plaintiff had the right to sell to him, so far as the agreement
is concerned. It is stipulated that Green should have the
purchasing of all goods that are used in said store. The only
limitation of that right was that Stacy should name the parties
from whom purchases might be made by him, and that limita·
tion Stacy has never attempted to enforce upon Green. Green
had the right, therefore, to purchase from whom he pleased. If
Green had the right to pul"Chase, the plaintiff had the right to
sell. What right had Stacy to forbid the plaintiff from selling
to Green or any one else? The agreement contains no such
pro':'ision. This must be the legal construction of the agreement. But the notice is not that the plaintiff shall not sell
to the firm of Stacy & Green fcrr their store. But it is: "Don't
let F. F. Green have anything to be charged to me, unless by
order [or upon order] given by me." The notice provided for
in the agreement is personal t? Stacy and Green as individuals.
unon't let Green have anything on my account, without my
order," is the effect of the notice. The plaintiff had the right
to construe and understand this notice according to its Ian·
guage. The plaintiff had no notice from Stacy not to sell
goods to the partnership to be charged to the partnership. The
notice, therefore, has no effect whatever upon the liability of

WIPPBRlU.ll

vs.

STACY.
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But if the
notice can be construed to mean that the plaintiff shall not sell
to the concern to be charged to the concern, which was the only
thing he had been doing or offered to do, it is equally nugatory,
because not provided for in the agreement.
The only other contention of the learned counsel is that
the agreement does not constitute a copartnership between
Stacy and Green. It seems to us that it contains every essen-_
tial element of a partnership. Stacy was to contribute his
money, and Green his skill a:nd labor as a merchant, and to
conduct the business and make all the purchases, and they
were each to have one-half the profits. Although there is no
provision that each was to bear one-half of the losses, the equal
division of the profits implies that of the losses. Upham vs.
Hewitt, 42 Wis. 85. As is said in that case, where there was no
such express provision, "there was necessarily a communion of
profit and loss." Rosenfield vs. Ha.i ght, 53 Wis. 260, 10 N. W.
Rep. 378, 40 Am. Rep. 770, 1 Lindl. Partn. 12. See Gilbank vs.
Stephenson, 31 Wis. 592, and other cases cited in respondent's
brief. But the evidence that Stacy knew that these goods
were being sold to the firm, and that they were received into
the store, and were being sold oot, and tacitly aasented to the
purchases, and participated in the profits derived therefrom,
without dissent or objection, is a ratification of the purchases,
and it is now too late for him to shield himself by such a
notice, even if it had been given to Green himself with the
knowledge of the plaintiff. The liability of the partnership
is beyond question.
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
NOTB: See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., § 168.
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DAWSON BLACKMORE & CO. vs. ELROD.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1899.
105 Ky. 624, 49 S. W.

4~.
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Appeal from circuit court, Pulaski county.
Action by Dawson Blackmore & Co. against Walter Elrod ·
& Co. upon an account. Judgment for defendant Walter Elrod,
and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
0. H. Waddle, for appellant.

James Denton and James R. Cook, for appellee.
. I

~

WHITE, J. This action was.instituted in the Pulaski circuit
· court by the appellant against appellee and W . F. Hansford,
as partners under the style of Walter Elrod & Co., upon an
account for goods and merchandise sold to ~hat firm. Hansford
made no defense. Appellee, Elrod, admitted the sale and delivery of the goods charged for to Hansford, and that they were
used by the firm, but denied liability therefor, for the reason as
alleged, that before the goods were sold or delivered by appellant he (appellee) notified appellant that he would not be bound
to pay for any purchases made by Hansford on a credit or on
time, and that appellee also notified Hansford not to buy any
goods except for cash, to be paid for on delivery; that noth~ith
standing this notice to both Hansford and appellant, these goods
were sold and delivered by appellant to Hansford, who had
charge of the business, all of which was done without appellee's
knowledge or consent, but against his expressed wishes. To
thisanswer a reply of denial of notice was filed. On this issue
the case was tried before a jury, which resulted, after a mistrial and a second jury, in a verdict for appellee. Appellant's
reasons and motion having been overruled, this appeal is prosecuted.
On the question of fact the jury might have concluded either
way, so close was the testimony; and their finding will not be
di~turbed, if they were properly instructed. The court gave
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one instruction as follows: "If you believe from the evidence
that defendant Elrod before the 5th day of April, 1894, gave
notice to Adams not to sell Hansford any more goods on credit,
you will find for defendant; but unless you so believe from the
evidence you will find for plaintiff." It was shown that the
sale was made by Adams, agent and stockholder in appellant
company. We are of opinion that this instruction embraced
the law of this case. The rule of law that one partner can bind
all the members of the firm about matters within the scope of
the partnership business rests upon agency; the principle being
that all the partners have agreed that he should do so. This
agreement to be bound by the acts of one within the scope of
the business is implied by law from the very nature of the association, and from the customary course of dealing. But a
partnership may be dissolved~ and then the power to bind all
ceases after notice of dissolution. Likewise it seems clear that
notice that the authority to bind all did not exist in one partner would relieve from liability the other partner, just as after
dissolution he is no longer bound. The partner selling or trad·
ing with one partner cannot bind the other partner after notice
that he will not be bound. It is nQtice that the implied agency
had ceased. Nor do we think this rule is changed by the fact
that the goods came to the firm, and were used by the firm.
This might have been the very thing that the appellee did not
desire, and the very thing he undertook to guard against; yet
if the acts of his partner, against his wishes and over his protest, in receiving the goods and using them, can bind appellee
to pay for them, the notice to appellant might as well not have
been given. The effect of the notice, if given, must be to put
the seller on notice that if you sell over my protest, in no event
will I be liable. This view is sustained by :Monroe v. Connor,
15 Me. 178, 32 Am. Dec. 148. The instruction being in
accordance with these views, and the verdict not being against
the decided weight of the testimony, the judgment is affirmed.
NoTE.-See Mechem's Elements of Partn., ·§ 163.

X.
WHO IS LIABLE FOR THE ACTS OF A PARTNER.
(See also the cases under Subd. IX, ante.)

1.

IN CONTRACT.
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PITKIN vs. BENFER.
Supreme Court of Kansas, 189!.
80 Kan. 108, 81 Pac. Rep. 695, 84 Am. St. Rep. 110.

Action by Geo. W. Pitkin & Co. against John Y. Benfer, H.
C. Settle and L. B. Keith, as copartners doing business under
the firm name of John Y. Benfer, to recover for goods sold and
delivered. There had been such a firm, but, in pursuance of a
notice given in January, it was dissolved on the last day of
February, 1888. Benfer gave a written order for the goods on
February 9, but stipulated that they should not be shipped
until March 1, 1888. Plaintiffs, at the time of the sale, did
not know of the partnership, and charged the goods to Benfer.
Judgment below was in favor of Settle and Keith, and plaintiff
appealed.
H.{). Solomon, for plaintiffs.
Wells & Wells, for defendants.

'
JoHNSToN,
J. (After stating the facts.} It is insisted by
plaintiffs in error that, as Settle and Keith were dormant part·
ners of the firm of John Y. Benfer, they are liable for the goods
ordered during the existence of the partnership. It will be
observed that, while the goods were ordered during the con·
tinuance of the partnership, they were not to be shipped or
delivered until the partnership bad expired. By agreement of
the parties the partnership was to be discontinued on the last
day of February,1888,and Benfer ordered the goods in his own
name, to be shipped the day after the dissolution of the partner-
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ship occurred. It is true, as contended, that the persons who
participate in the profits of a trade or business ostensibly carried on by another are liable for contracts made and credits
given during the existence of the partnership. The credit is not
presumed to have been given on the sole and separate responsibility of the ostensible partner, but binds all for whom the
partner acts, if done in their business and for their benefit,
to the same extent as though the partnership bad been open
and avowed. Here, however, no goods bad been furnished, no
sale made, nor was any credit given while the partnership
existed. Particular attention is called to the case of B-romley
va. Elliot, 38 N.H. 287, 75 Am. Dec. 182, as being on all fours
with the case at bar. In that case the goods were furnished
and the credit given while the dormant partner was a member of the firm. He received the benefits of the transaction,
and, according to all the authorities, was equally liable with
the ostensible partner. The distinction in this case is that the
goods were not received while Settle and Keith were connected
with the partnership, nor was it intended by Benfer that they
should be shipped and delivered to the firm. Knowing that
the partnership would expire with the month of February, Benfer ordered the goo~s in his own name, and particularly
directed that they should not be shipped to him until the 1st
of March, after the expiration of·tbe partnership. It was evidently his intention that no sale or shipment would be made
to the firm, and that delivery would be purposely d€:ferred until
be would·bave absolute control of the business. No benefits
were received by Settle and Keith from the transaction, nor
was there any credit given to the firm for these goods while
they were members of it. A dormant partner, when discovet;ed, is liable to the same extent as an ostensible partner, but
no further; and, if the partnership had been open and avowed
in t'his case, and its duration known, and Benfer bad ordered
goods in his own name, to be shipped and delivered after the
dissolution of the partnership, Settle and Keith would not have
been liable for the value of the same. Judge STORY, in speaking of the liability of dormant partners, remarks that "of
course, the retiring partner is not, by his retirement, exonerated from the prior debts and liabilities of the firm. In the first
place, then, a dormant partner is not liable for any debts or
other contracts of the firm, except for those which are con-
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tracted during the period that he remains a dormant partner.
Upon his retirement, his liability ·ceases, as it began, de jure,
only with his accession to the firm. The reason is that no
credit is, in fact, in such case, given to the dormant partner.
His liability is created by operation of law7 independent of
hi's intention, from his mere participation in the profits of the
business; and ther·e fore it ceases by operation of la-w as soon
as such participation in the profits ceases, whether notice of his
retirement be given or not." Story, Partn. § 159. See, also,
Pars. Partn. (3d Ed.) p. 451. Here no liability was created
until Settle and Keith had retired from the firm. The goods
never came into the possession of the firm, nor was it the purpose that they. should. They were sold to Benfer, and came
into his individual possession as his own property, and he sold
them as such. We think the court correctly held that he alone
was liable for the price of the same.
The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.
All the justices concurred.
NoTB.-8ee Mechem's Elem. of Pa.rtn., §§ 198, 2M.

GRIFFITH vs. BUFFUM.
Supreme Court of Vermont, 1850.
22 Vt. 181, 54 Am. Dec. 64.

Action by Griffith & Co. against Buffum and Ainsworth as
partners, to recover for marble sold to Buffum. Judgment to
account was rendered in the county court, and an auditor was
appointed t.o report the facts. Judgment was rendered for the
defendants upon the report. The facts appear from the
opinion.
Oook, HarringtOn " Ross, for the plaintiffs.
D. E. Nicholson, for the defendants.

HALL, J . The question for our decision fs, whether, upon
the facts reported by the auditor, the defendants are properly
chargeable with the marble slabs sold and delivered by the
plaintiffs to the defendant Buffum.
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There seems to be no doubt that if one partner purcb:ase
property upon his single credit, for the use of the partnership
concern, and the seller is not aware of the existence of the
partnership, he may, when he discovers it, have the benefit of
the partnership liability. The ground of making the partnership firm liable is, that the property having been obtained
for their .}pint benefit and to enable them to make a common
profit, it is but just that they should be jointly liable to pay
for it.
It is doubtless essential to the validity of such a claim
by the vendor that the partnership should have been unknown
to him at the time of the sale; for if he were a ware of the
partnership, or ignorant of it through his own ~ault, he would
be presumed to have made his election to give credit to the
individual instea~ of the tlrm, and having made such election,
would be bound by it: 3 Steph. N. P. 2402.
It is not claimed on the part of the defendants that the
plaintiffs had any knowledge that they were partners. The
existence of such partnership is denied, and the question is,
whether the defendants were in fact partners.
It is true, that .two or more persons may be made liable to
third persons as partners, when, as between themselves, they
are really not so. But such liability only arises when third
persons have trusted to their credit-have parted with their
property upon the faith of the acts or declarations of thf"
supposed partners, indicating that they were such. In this
case the plaintiffs were not deceived by any false appearances;
they gave no credit to the firm, but trusted Buffum only; and
if Ainsworth is to be made liable, it can only be because be was

really and truly a partner with Buffum.
In order to constitute a partnership between the parties
themselves, it is necesary that they should have a common
interest in the _profit and loes of the business in which they
are engaged.
•
It is not essential that each should furnish a share of the
capital or property which is to become the stock or subject
matter of the business of the partners.
One may furnish the capital or stock, and another contribute his labor and skill. And if it be agreed between
the parties that one shall furnish on his own account a par·
ticular kind of stock to be used in the business, yet if,
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whe!l purchased, it becomes the subject of labor and skill,
and ~n its altered state is to be sold for the common benefit,
it constitutes a pa~ership business; and if such particular kind of stock be purchased on his own account by the
party who is by the agreement to furnish it, yet the seller, on
discovering the partnership, may make the firm chargeable
for it. This position is sustained by many authorities referred
to in the argument: 3 Kent's Com. 26; Sylvester va. S-mith,
9 Mass. 119; Everitt "8. Ohap-maf\, 6 Conn. 347.
In the present case the parties agreed to work together in
the business of manufacturing marble. Buffum was to furnish
the marble and Ainsworth to pay him one-half of the cost
of it. Buffum was to. board Ainsworth, and both were to contribute their labor and skill in the business; and the products
and avails of the business were to be equally divided between
them. We think the parties became strictly partners as
between themselves. Whatever the manufactured articles
should sell for, above the cost of the materials and labor
bt-~towed upon them, would be profits, which the parties were
to share in common; and if the sale should be for less than such
cost, the parties would suffer a loss, which would fall equally
on both. The defendants thus having a common interest in
the profits and loss of the business, and the marble charged in
the plaintiff's account having ·been used by the defendants .
in such business, we think they are liable for it as partners.
·The judgment ot the county court is therefore reversed, and
judgment is to be rendered for the plaintiffs for the amount
of their account, as reported by the auditor.
NOTB.-See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., § 197.
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CLEVELAND vs. WOOD,VAllD.
8uprerne Com-t of Vermont, 184S.
liS Vt.. 802, 40 Am. Dec. 682•

.-\ ction upon a book account. The opinion sufficiently states
the case. Judgment for plaintiff below
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S. H. & E. F. Hodges, for the plaintiff.

By Court, \VILI.IAMS, C. J. This case seems to be conclusively settled by authority. The plaintiff bad dealings with
the defendant. The only dispute is in relation to the four last
items in the plaintiff's account, which were for labor performed
·on a farm, of which the defendant and Stillman Woodward
were owners, and which they carried on in company. The
defendant contracted with the plaintiff for the labor, who did
not know of the existence of the company until after the commencement of this suit. If these items are disallowed, the
balance would be due to the defendant. It is to be remembered that it is only in tb.is action that advantage can be taken
of the non-joinder of a joint debtor, on trial of the merits. It
is settled that a plaintiff cannot be compelled to be a creditor
of two, one of whom be did not know, as his joint debtors, and
not be the sole creditor of the one he does know. In the case
of Dubois VB. Ludet·t, 5 Taunt. 609, it was decided that if a man
enters into a contract with one person, not knowing he has a
partner) it is competent for that partner, being sued, to plead,
in abatement, that he has other partners who are not joined.
That case, however, stands alone, and is opposed to the decision in the case of Ba.ldney vs. Ritchie, 1 Stark. N. P. Cas. 338;
Doe VB. Chippenden, there cited; to the opinion of Lord ELoo:-;
in Ex pa·rte Norfolk, 19 Ves. 455, and directly overruled by
Lord TENTERDEN, in 1Iullett t'8. Hook, Moo. & M. 88, and by the
oourt of king's bench, in the case of De Mautort v1. Saundert,
1 Barn. & Adol. 398. By these cases it is fully settled that,
even in the case of a general partnership, if a contract is made
with one of two partners alone, and the plaintiff is not aware
that he is dealing with the partnership, and it is not disclosed

BERKSHIRE WooLEN Co. vs. JurLLARD.

389 ·

to him by the defendant with whom he deals, the non-joinder
cannot be pleaded in abatement. A. fortiori, it cannot be d<>ne
in the action on book, where a failure to recover might endanger all the security he may have by attachment for his debts.
The judgment of the county court is, therefore, affirmed.
~OTE.-See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., 1197.
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BERKSHIRE WOOLEN CO. vs. JUILLARD.

New York Court of Appeals, 1879.
75 N. Y. 535, 31 Am. Rep. 488.

Action in the nature <>f a creditor's bill.
The material facts are as follows :
In April, 1873, the Riverside Mills and The City Woolen
Company owed the firm of Hoyt, Spragues & Co., about
$1,000,000 which was secured by the personal guarantee <>f
Josiah Chapin. To reduce this debt Chapin, on the 4th of April
1873, borrowed *600,000 from the five savings banks, giving
his individual notes due in one year, and as security, executed to trustees a mortgage on certain real estate. On the
same date for further security, a bond was given conditioned
to pay so much of the loan as should not be paid by the real
estate.
The bond contained the following covenant:
"For which payment well and truly to be made, we bind ourselves and each of us and any si~, five, four, three or two of us,
our and each of our, and any six, five, four, three or two of our
heirs, executors and administrators jointly, severally, and respectively by these presents." This bond was executed by Josiah
Chapin as principal and by all the membe1'8 of the firm of Hoyt,
Spragues & Co. individually as sureties.
Albert S. Gallup testified that he negotiated the loan to
Chapin; that he was acting for and as a member of the firm of
Hoyt, Spragues & Co., and that the loan was negotiated to enable Josiah Chapin to reduce the indebtedness of the Riverside
Mil1s and the City Woolen Company on said company's books.
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H. Hubbard, for appellant.
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Oharlea M. Da Ooata, for respondent.
RAPALLO, J. The bond upon which the banks found their
claim against the copartnership asset·s of the firm of Hoyt,
Spragues & Co. is executed by all the six members of that firm,
and purports to be their joint obligation, as well as the several
obligations of each of them. It also purports to create a
joint obligation on the part of any two or more Gf them. The
only aspect in which it is nece88ary to consider it on this
a.ppeal,.is as the joint obligation of all the members of the firm,
and the question presented is whether it can be enforced as
a copartnership obligation against the copartnership assets,
notwithstanding that the firm name is not mentioned therein,
but it appears on its face to be simply the joint obligation of
the c-opartners, contracted in their individual names, and is
unde~ seal.
We are of the opinion that, notwithstanding the form of the
instrument, if it was executed in the business of the firm and
for its benefit, it should be regarded as a copartnership obli·
gation payable ~mt of the copartnership funds.
In the present case it is quite clear from the proofs that the
transaction in which the bond given was for the benefit of
t!he ftrm of Hoyt, Sprague& & Co., and that all burt a fraction of
the sum advanced by the banks on the credit of the bond was
·p aid over by them to that ftrm, and applied on account of its
claims against the Riverside Mills and the City 'Voolen Company. The loan from the banks to Chapin was negotiated by
Mr. Gallop, one of the firm of Hoyt, Sprogues & Co., in behalf
of that firm, as he testifies. The two companies last namoo
being indebted to Hoyt, Spragues & Co. in a million of dollars,
for which indebtedneas Mr. Chapin was surety, Mr. Gallup
negotiated the arrangement whereby the banks agreed to loan
to Mr. Chapin the sum of '600,000 on bi<s notes for that amount,
secured by mortgage on his real estate and the collateral guaranty of the bond in question executed by all the members of
the firm of Hoyt, Spragues & Co. All this was done to enable
Chapin to reduce the debt for which he was surety to Hoyt,
Spragues & Co, and accordingly be gave that firm orders on
the several banks for their respective proportions of the loan
of f600,000, all of which sums were paid to and receipted for
by Hoyt, Spragues & Co. except the first six months' interest
in advance, which was retained by the banks, and the sum
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of about '55,000 of the principal sum loaned, which Hoyt,
Spragues & Co. do not appear to have received. The form of
the bond is peculiar, but seems to have been contrived for the
purpose of giving to the banks power to enforce it against
either the joint or separate estates of the members of the firm
of Hoyt, Spragues & Co., or any of them, as might prove most
to the interest of the banks. From the nature of the transaction we think it must have been the intention of the parties
that the firm should be bound, and that the individual names
of all the partners were used for the reason that 'the instrument
was under seal, and that a several as well as joint liability was
desired. We can see no objection to a firm binding itself in
that form, where the transaction is one for the account of the
partnership and all the partners unite in the act; while it
would be in the highest degree inequitable to deny to the credi·
tors whose funds have under such circumstances gone into and
increased the copartnership assets, the right of resorting to
those assets for repayment.
When funds or property are obtained on the obligation of
only a portion of the members of a firm, the fact that the property thus obtained goes to the use of the firm is not of itself
suftlcfent to render the firm liable. But where the property
is not only obtained 'for and applied to the benefit of the firm,
but is SQ obtained .by thejoint act and upon tbe joint written
obligation of all its members, and the credit is given to all,
the transaction is in substance a copartnership transaction,
though the firm name is not actually used in the writing and
though the partners may have superadded to their joint obli·
gation the several liability of each of them. The cases cited
on the part of the appellant in support of the proposition that
the joint obligation of all the members of a firm is not equivalent to an obligation of the firm do not sustain that proposition, where the transaction is in the business or for the benefit of the firm. In Forsyth vs. Woo~, 11 'Vall. (U.S.) 486, the
reaSQning is strictly confined to an obligation contracted by
the members·ontside of the partnership business and proceeds
wholly on the ground that the firm property should be applied
in the first instance to the payment of debts incurred for the ·
benefit of the partnership, as its property presumably consists
of what has been obtained from its creditors. In Tur1zer vs.
Jaycox, 40 N. Y. 470, I do not understand, from the note of

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 16:48 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112102486216
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

392

•

OASES ON

p .A..BTN'ERSBIP.

the reporter, anything more than that the majority of the
court declined to hold as a general proposition that a note
signed by all the members of a firm was the same as one signed
by the firm. That nothing m')re was decid~d is apparent from
the judgment, which sustained the note in that case as a
copartnership debt. In In re Weston, 12 Mete. (Mass.) 1, the
decision is placed upon tbe ground that the partnere had
signed as sureties and there was no evidence that it was a
partnership transaction. In Ea: parte Stone, L. R. 8 Chan. App.
914:, 917, where the obligation was shown to have been given
for money borrowed for partnership purposes, it was allowed
to be proved against the partnership estate though signed and
sealed by the partners as indiYiduals without naming the firm.
We think it sufficiently appears in this case that the purpose of the transaction was to raise money from the banks, to
be paid to the firm of Hoyt, Spragues & Co., for which loans
Chapin ·and his property we~ to be primarily liable to the
banks, and that the bond now in question was·given by the
members of th~ firm to induce the banks to make the loan,
so that the firm might receive the avails in part payment of the
claims for which Chapin was liable to them as surety, and
that these circumstances are sufficient to justify the allowance
of the claims of the banks against the copartnership.
The orders should be affirmed, with costs out of the fund.
All concur.
Orders affirmed.
See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., § 200.

HASTINGS NATIONAL BANK vs. HIBBARD.
Supreme Co1trt of Michigan, 1882.
48 1\Iich. 452, 12 N. W. Rep. 6151.

Assumpsit. Plaintiff sued W. and M. Hibbard, Peter Graff
and Covode as makers, and Hinsdale and Philip Graff as
endorsers of a promissory note for $5,000 made and discounted
in December, 1879, and payable April 1, 1880, when it was dishonored. The only question which became material related to
the legal ident~ty of the makers, who signed as "Hibbard &
Ur·aff."

-.
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Upon certain facts there was no dispute. The two Hibbards
and Peter Graff for several years did business at Grand Rapids
un~r the name of Hibbard & Graft, and in that name ran two
flouring mills, called the Valley City mills and the Crescent
mills. The Valley City mill was a rented building and bad
only been occupied a.b out a year.
On January 27, 1879, Hibbard & Graft formed a partnership
with Covo~ to run the Valley City mill, that firm to own
three-fourths and Covode one-fourth ·interest. The business
was to be entirely distinct from the Crescent mill business, in
which Covode was to have no inte~·est, although the business
so far as practicable was to be done in the Crescent mill office,
but the accounts were to be kept separate. Different bookkeepers kept the books, and the Valley City mill office was in
a difterent room from the other. The name of the new firm
was to be the same as the old one, Hibbard & Graff.
After the new firm was organized letter beads were printed
which at the top contained the names of all four. Beneath .
these names appeared the name Hibbard & Graff, as proprietors of the two mills. These appear to have been used indiscriminately. The Valley City mill kept no bank account and
did no bank business, but borrowed when necessary of the.
Crescent mill, and was charged for such advances and credited
with money and other counter credits furnished by itself to
the other. No notes were issued by the Valley City mills in
the course of their business, and all moneys recE7ived on loan
discounts were paid into the Crescent mills where an account
was kept of advances made to the Valley City mills as with
any other individual debtgr.
Blair, Kingsley & Kleinhana, for appellant.·
John Patton, Jr:., and N. A.. Earle for defendant Covode;
John 0. Fitzgerald for '\V. Hibbard; and Simonds, Fletcher &
Wolf for P. M. Graff, M. Hibbard and P . Grail, Jr.

CAMPBELL, J. The note in suit is one of two $5,000 notes
executed by Wellington Hibbard while Covode was absent in
Europe, under the name of Hibbard & Graff, not for the benefit
of the firm, but to use in his and Philip Graff's outside gambling wheat speculations, which seem to have been destroying
the means of the business. The money was obtained as claimed
by plaintiff under pretense that it was wanted for actually
contemplated wheat purchases for milling business. The ques·
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tion is, if this was so, which firm was the maker in the eye of
the law? The jory found that the new firm was not the
maker. The errors assigned relate to the charge of the court,
given or refused, on various parts of the case.
The court actually charged that Oovode would not be liable
merely because be was a partner in the Valley City business,
if the loan was negotiated as part of the business of the Crescent mills, but that presumptively a note might be made by
a partner which would bind the finn for which he made it, if
taken without knowledge in the bank, on reasonable grounds
of inquiry, that it was unauthorized. Also that Covode might
be bound by allowing himself to be held out as a member of
the firm purporting to act, if faith was given in the discount
to his being a partner.
It was charged that if credit was given exclusively to the
other members of the firm and not to Covode, he would not be
bound unless by subsequent ratification, if the money was not
negotiated for the business of the Valley City mill. But on
the other hand if the bank only knew of a firm which it sup·
posed to be composed of the four, and made the loan on the
credit of that fit·m, then all would be bound if the transaction
was in good faith; and further, that although ·covode was not
a member of the Crescent mills firm, he would be bound if he
had allowed himself to be held out as a member of a firm operating both mills, if the bank ·relied upon t'hat in g_ood faith.
The letter heads were held to authorize the jury to draw such
an inference if they thought them calculated ~o create such an
impression, and if acted on by the bank as before mentioned.
And it was also held that unless the bank had reason to belieYe
to the contrary it could rely on the representations of Mr. Hib·
bard concerning the purpose of tne loan, and if informed it was
for the firm of four, credit should be presumed to ha-re been
given to the four.
The jury, in answer to specific requests, found that Covode
was not known to plaintiff, and that exclusive credit was given
to the other persons as a firm. They also found that the note
was gi-ren by Wellington Hibbard to obtain mone~· to speculate
in wheat margins on his own account, and · that this was a
gambling transaction.
It is assigned as error that these findings are not supported
by evidence.
Error is also a.ssigned on the charges bearing on the effect of
giving exclusive credit to others than Covode and on his lia·
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bility in case be was not actually a partner of the ·firm relied
on. Also to so much of the charge as held that if the money
was lent with notice that it was for business beyond the scope
of the partnership business and for different parties, the bank
might be affected by the fraud without absolute knowledge
of it.
Error is also alleged on the refusal of t'he court to make
several charges substantially as follows: First, that when
two firms in one city of the same name have some members in
common, and a person who is a member of both issues a note
which is discounted in good faith without information as to
which firm issued it, the bolder may elect which firm he will
hold. Second, a charge was asked to the same effect as applied
specifically to the firms in question and Mr. Covode's liabmt,.
Thirdly, that in such case the partners were themselves responsible for the hardship which they might have avoided by using
different firm names. Fourth, that writing the letters which
were sent in regard to obtaining the discounts, on the letter
heads before referred to, was such a holding out of Covode
as a partner in both mills as, if relied on in good faith, would
render him liable. And fifth, that there was no evidence that
the bank officers knew it was for an improper purpose.
•The special findings of the jury, if based on testimony, render the fourth and fifth requests just named unimportant. It is
distinctly found that credit was not given to Covode as a partner and was given only to the others. It is not claimed, bowever, and the court below did not hold, that the use of the letter .
heads in question would not have bound him if credit wa.s
actually given in reliance on them as showing one firm for
both mills. But we are. not satisfied that the jury had not testimony enough to act on, which justified them in the conclusion
that the bank officers relied on the formerly existing firm,
w'hich had been known for some time, and paid no •heed to
the names printed in the corners, Qr to the letter bead itself.
It is not uncommon for persons dealing with business houses
to pay very little attention to their printed letter beads, and
if the inference the jury drew from the whole testimony and
demeanor of the witnesses before them was, as it seems to have
been, that the bap.k officers acted on other grounc:ts, we have
no right to say, a.s matter of law, that their conclusions are
wrong. It was, after all, a questiQn of fact.
The case, 90 far as we can see, comes down to the question
which was the chief one relied on upon the bearing, whether
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the fact that Hibbard represented both firms and both bad a
eommon name, gave the plaintiff a right to elect which firm
to bold responsible, without reference to the credit actually
relied on.
The cases referred to in the elementary works cited by coun.
sel for plaintiff do not, in our opinion-whether correctly
decided or not--eover just such a case as the present. They
bold unquestionably that where money is lent or credit given
to a partnership business, unknown as well as known partners
will be bound. It is held also in one or more of these cases
that where several firms are concerned together in oommon
interests and a member of some of the firms bas 80 acted COD·
oerning paper issued by one of the firms in which he was not
a partner, as to give reason to believe him a member, tboee
who deoalt on that belief might ~old him personally. This is
all that was actually decided in the Scotch case of McNair vs.
Fleming, in which the House of Lords partially affirmed the
decision of the Court of Sessions, 3 Dow. P . C.· 229. This is
the case which Mr. Collyer (Par\nership, p. 222) says was'
regarded by Sir Samuel Romilly as deciding that where different partnerships do business under the same firm and make
negotiable paper under the same signature the bolder ma1
select whicheYer of them he pleases as his debtor, but cannot
se~ect them all. Neither this nor any other well-defined class
of cases went-so far as we can judge-outside of the general
rule that partnership liability rests on the ground of agency,
and that those who have authorized any one to act on their
behalf, either actually or impliedly, are bound when he does
so act, to those who deal with him as representing them or the
firm to which they belong. It must always be remembered
that general language in legal discussions is to be construed
with its surroundings, and cannot be dealt with in the
abstract.
In the case of McNair vs. Fleming, after sustaining the gen·
eral view of the Court of Sessions, the House of Lords allowed
the defendant to set up the defense that plaintiff was barred
by sequestration proceedings against the partnership in whose
name the paper was issued, of which he was not actually a
member, although they supposed him to be. The case of YtJrkshire Banking Co. vs. Beatsott, 4 C. P. Div. 204; s. c. on appeal,
5 C. P. Div. 109, refers to several of the familiar cases on the
subject, and like most of them regards the facts of each case as
material in fixing the liability.
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In the present. case there can be no doubt that as between
himself and his partners Hibbard had no right to borrow this
money for his own purposes. If not absolutely determined by
the evidence it certainly tends to show that under their usual
course of business even the main firm of Hibbard & Graff could
not properly bind Covode by any such loan for firm purposes.
As between the two firms the usual practice seems t() have confined lo~s to the original firm. In a.n y e~ent the latter firm
if bound at all could only be bound on the principle that it is
incident t() such business that one partner may bind it. And
it is equally clear in our judgment that the finn to be bound
must be the firm in whose name and for whose benefit Hibbard
was understood to be acting. The court below charged very
clearly that if the bank officers sup~sed there was but one
firm of all the four doing business, all would be bound.
But as a matter of fact the original firm of Hibbard & Graff
had never changed, and continued on the same relations as
before. It had only made an arrangement for two years, subject to termination on ninety days' notice, whereby it allowed
the use of one of its mills to a firm in which it held a three·
fourths interest, as a partnership, and uot in the several names
of its members. The case does not theref()re differ materially
from that of an individual making a partnership arrangement
for a separate part of his busineBS; where it bas always beev
held that it must depend on the facts of the case whether paper
signed in the individual name was sole or firm paper.
If therefore the bank dealt with the firm it had always
known and which was still doing business, and lent money
supposing it to be for that firm, the new firm could not be made
liable unless ~he money was actually borrowed &r used for
its benefit. But this is not pretended, unless on the theory
that credit was given to all four, which is clearly negatived.
When this case was here before-although not then in perfect shape for dis~sal-it was intimated that the result now
arrived at appeared to be the proper one. If the jury were
right on the facts, we think the oourt was right on the law.
There was evidence from which a different conclusion might
have been reached, but the verdict has been allowed to stand,
and we must assume justly.
We discover no error in the record, and the judgment must
be affirmed with costs.
NOTB: See

Mech~::w·e~

Elem. of Partn., § 20i.
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ENGLAR vs. OFFUTT.
Cow·t of Appe.al8 of Maryland, 1889.
'70 Md. 78, 16 Atl. Rep. 497, 14 Am. St. Rep. 832,

, ,( , ~., f

On the 21st of May, 1883, John P. Shriner, who was engaged
'. ...
~~ )\ in business in Baltimore, was appointed guardian of .Mary and
J \\John Englar, infants, and as such guardian received of their
't>state the sum of $10,846.25. He deposited this sum in his
Y\ ~"'
own account and used more or less of it in his business. On
,\"'
December 31, 1885, he took his brother, Edward C. Shriner,
~
Into partnership with him in the business. On November 15~
,.....
1886, the firm was insolvent and made an assignment for the
benefit of creditors. The partnership assets amounted to but
f9,500. The wards, l!ary and John Englar, sought to impress
this fund with the trust in their behalf and in priority to the
firm creditors upon the ground that their money, in the hands
of John P. Shriner as guardian, had gone into the stock of the
firm, and that the firm had received the money knowing that
it was trust money and was so used in violation of the trust.
Edward C. Shriner denied any knowledge that the trust funds
had gone into the business. 'fhe claim of the wards was
denied and they appealed.

" I'

\ ·'f

If. 0. Slinglutf and Robert BiggB, for appellants.
John P. Poe, for appellee.
ALVEY, C. J. (After discussing the principle upon which
trust funds may be traced.) But suppose at the time of the
partnership formed between John P. Shriner and Edward C.
Shriner that some portion of the trust fund remained invested
in the stock of goods then on band, or was otherwise em·
vtoyed in the business; in such case the question whether
the appellants can be entitled to occupy the position
of creditors of the firm, so as to share in the distribu·
tion of its assets, and to hold Edward 0. Shriner liable,
depends upon the fact whether Edward C. Shriner had
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notice of and acquiesced in the breach of trust by John P.
Shriner, the guardian; for the principle of law is very clear
that if a partner, being a trustee or fiduciary, improperly
employs th;e money of his cestui que trust in the partnership
business, or in the payment of partnership debts, this fact
alone, and without anything more, is not sufficient to entitle
the cestui que w-ust to occupy the position of creditor, and to
enforce repayment of his money as against the firm.. To render the firm liable in such case the firm itself must be shown
to have been implicate-d in the breach of trust, and this can. not be unless all the partners either knew whence the money
came,or knew that it did not belong to the partner making use
of it. But if the other partners have knowledge of such misuse of trust money, and know that such money is being
employed in the partnership business for common benefit, they
will all be bound for the money so employed, and be made
answerable for the breach of trust committed by their copartner with their acquiescence. Ea: parte Hea-ton.,- Buck, 386; E:JJ
patie Apsey, 3 Brown, Cb .. 266; Smith vs. Jameson., 5 Term R.
601; Ea: parte Watson, 2 Ves. & B. 415; Story, Partn. § 368;
1 Lindt. Partn. (5th Ed.) 161. Here, however, the proof would
seem to establish the fact of the entire absence of knowledge
on the part of Edward C. Shriner of the use of trust money by
John J. Shriner in the partnership business; and in this class
of cases it is clearly established by the authorities that the
know ledge of the partner committing the breach of trust does
not affect the other members of the firm. 1 Lindl. Partn. 161.
Edward C. Shriner swears that he had no such knowledge, and
he is fully supported in his testimony as to this fact by the testimony of his brother, who swears that no part of the trust fun<l
was used in the business after the formation of the partnert~hip. It is true, Mr. Englar testifies to a declaration or admission made by Edward C. Shriner to the effect that he knew that
the trust money was used in the part.nership business; but we
think there must be some mistake or misunderstanding in
regard to the matter, as Edward C. Shriner is emphatic in
denying that he ever made such declaration, and he is strongly
corroborated in this by the testimony of his brother, and the
circumstances of the case. Upon the whole, we are of opinion
that the court below committed no error in overruling the
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appellants' exceptions to the auditor's account and distribution, and in dismissing the petition, and the order appealed
from will therefore be affirmed.
NOTB.-8ee Mechem'• Elem. of Partn., § 201.

HESS vs. LO,VREY.
Supreme Court of Indiana, 1890.
122Ind. 221S, 28N. E. Rep. 1M, 1'7 Am. Mt. Rep. SM.

V\ Action for

damages for malpractice, brought by Isaac Lowrey against Luther
Hess and Frank C. Hess. There was
judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appealed.

~('·""
' )- ..

..

~.1

•

•

w.

Menett" Bundy and Brown." Brown, for appellant

'1" ~ /.~ "'1'. B. Reqding, Ohamberl 4 Hedge~ and Oharlu Roehl, for
.__v."' •
appellee.
. .cl
~"
•
.
-·f. •
\ v MITCREr.L, C. J. This action was originally instituted by
V~', Isaac Lowrey against Luther W. and Frank C. Hess, to recover
\ ..} ~;· • damages for an injury sustained to the person of the plaintiff,
·. .,v'- ~ '- • alleged to have been caused by the negligent and unskillful
· ,\ ,_, _\ '
manner in which the defendants, who were partners engaged
in
the practice of medicine and surgery, reset and treated the
~
. (, '
• _..
•
1
plaintUf's shoulder, which had been dislocated. Pending the
'\• '-\;' · · / action, Luther W. Hess died, and the case proceeded to judg-~ • ."' . _.L .. ment against his personal representative and surviving part. ·. .;- ·.f ner jointly. On appeal to this court, the judgment was
reversed. Boor "'· Lowrey, 103 Ind. 468, 3 N. E. Rep. 161, 53
' ..:
.:
Amer. Rep. 519, and note. On the former appeal we arrived
at the conclusion that, even though the action was in form
et~ contractu, since the principal or only damages sought to be
recovered grew out of an injury to the person, the action would
not survive against the personal representative of a deceased
partner. Hegerich 'VB. Keddie:, 99 N. Y. 258, 1 N. E. Rep. 787,
52 Am. Rep. 25; Ott 'VS. Kaufman, 68 Md. 56, 11 Atl. Rep. 580.
The nature of the d~mage sued for, and not the nature of its

V

M

HEss vs. Low.aRY.

rause, determines whether or Dot the action survives. Cutter
Rep. 397; 1 Chit. PI. 101.
The case is here on a second appeal, and the question is now
• presented whether or not, tlie action having been abated
against the estate of the deceased partner, it can be prosecuted to judgment against the. survivor. That each partner
is the agent of the firm while engaged in t.M prosecution of
the partnership business, and that the firm is liable for the
torts of each, if committed within the scope of his agency,
appears to be well settled. Oham.plin VB. Laytin, 18 'Vend.
407, 31 Am. Dec. 382; Tucker VB. Cole, 54 Wis. 539, 11 N. \V.
Rep. 703; Plctche1· vs. Ingram, 46 \Vis. Hll; 'l'aylot vs. Jones, 42
N. H. 25; lSchu:abacker vs. IUddk, 84 HI. 517; Story, Partn.
§§ 107-166; 1 Bates, Partn. § 461. "It follows from the principles of agE:>ncy, coupled with the doctrine that each partnet•
is the agent of the firm, for the purpose of carrying on its business in the usual way, that an ordinary partnership. is liable
in damages for the neg-ligence. of any one of its members in
eonducting the businE-ss of the partnership." 1 Lindl. Partn.
299. Thus, in Hyrne t:s. E1win, 2:3 S. C.. 226, 55 Am. Rep. 1G,
which was an action ngainst two physicians for an injury
I'PSnltin~ from the ne~ligent and unskillful setting of a broken
::rm, it was held thnt the act of one within the seope of the
partnership business \Vas the act of each and all, as fully as
if each was present, participating in all that was done, and
that each partner guaranties that the one in charge shall dis·
play reasonable oare, diligence, and skill, and that the failure
of one is the failure of all. It is contended, however, that if
the appellant was liable at all, he was only liable jointly with
his deceased partner, and that, the action having abated as to
the deceased partner, the case falls within the rule that, wher<•
one or more of the joint plaintiffs or joint defendants dies, the
nction shall not thereby be abated, if the cause of action
survives, but if the cause of action is one that does not sur,·ive, thE-n the death of either joint plaintiff or joint defendant
nbntes the whole action. Meek vB. Ruffner, 2 Blackf. 23; Wil·
liamB vB. Kent, 15 Wend. 360. The general rule established
h;v the cases is that, where several persons jointly commit
a tort for which an action in form e:» deUcto may be maintained, without reference to any contract relation between
the parties, the plaintiff has his election to sue all or any
r.B. Hamlen, 147 Mass. 471, 18 N. E.
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one of those engaged in t~e wrongful act, even though the
existence of a contract may have been the occasion, or fur·
nished the opportunity, to commit the act complained of.
But· where. the action ia founded on a joint contract, and
is in substance, whatever its form may be, to recover dam·
ages for a breach at the cont~ upoo which the action is
predicated, all those jointly liable must be sued, in case all are
alive, and within the jurisdiction of the ~ourt. Lotc vB. Mumford, 14 Johns. 426, 7 Am. Dec. 469; WeaU VB. King, 1~ East.
452; Whittaker vs. Collins, 34 Minn. 299, 57 Am. Rep. 55, 25 N.
W. Rep. 632; 1 Lindl. Partn. 482; Bish. Non-Contract Law,
§ 521; Chit. Pl. 469. In a case like the present, where the
gravamen of the action is the breach of a contract, by the terms
of which two persons undertook, as partners, to reset the
plaintiff's shoulder, and to treat him with the skill and dili·
gence ordinarily displayed by competent surgeons, and the
action is not maintainable without referring to the contract,
it may well be, even though the action be laid in tort, that the
non-joinder of one of them would be ground for a plea in abatt~
ment. Colly. Pnrtn. § 732; Dicey, Parties, 455. But a plea
in abatement for non-joinder of parties must, in order to be
good, show that the person alleged to be jointly liable and not
sued is living, and subject to the process of the court. Dillon
vs. Bank, 6 Blackf. 5; Wilson vs. State, Id. 212; Bragg VB. Wetzel, 5 Dlackf. 95; Levi vs. Haverstick, 51 Ind. 236; Ferguson vs.
Hagans, 90 Ind. 38; Colly. Partn. § 741; Merriman VB. Barker,
121 Ind. 74, 22 N. E. Rep. 992.
If, in an action against partners to recover damages for a per·
sonal injury growing out of the breach of a contract, it is neces·
sary, as in ordinary actions w contractu, to join all the part·
ners, it must follow that upon the death of one, notwitbstand·
ing the action may abate as to the deceased partner, the rule
applicable to ordinary actions upon contracts against part·
ners must obtain. At the common law, the contract of partners was always treated as a joint agreement, but the firm
creditors could not proceed against the estate of a deceased
partner, because the death of one of the partners extinguished
the contract as to him, leaving it in force as the separate
engagement of the survivior. The legal remedy of the cred·
itor was thereafter confined exclusively to the surviving part·
ner, except as the common law was modified by statutes, or
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by the principles of equity. {3herman "'· Kreul, 42 Wis. 33.
'fhe right to sue for claims due the firm, as well as the liability
to be sued for claims against the firm, devolves exclusively
upon the surviving partner. Meek vs. R1~{fner, supra; McLain
vs. Carson's E:r'r, 4 Ark. 164, 37 Am. Dec. 777; Ghil48 vs. Hyde,
10 Iowa 294, 77 Am. Dec. 113; Emanuel vs. Bird, 19 Ala. 596,
54 Am. Dec. 200; 2 Lindl. Partn. 665. Upon the death of one
partner, the creditor has a right to collect his claim at law
from the survivor, or, if the cause of action survives against
the personal representative, to proceed, in the manner.pointed
out by the statute, against the estate of the deceased partner.
Ralston vs. Mom-e, 105 Ind. 243, 4 N. E. Rep. 673; Kimball vs.
Whitney, 15 Ind. 280; Gere vs. Clarke, 6 Hill, 350. If a partner
dies pending an action against the firm, the death being suggested on the record, the action does not abate, but may pro·
ceed to judgment against the surviving partner unless th~
cause of action dies, not only as against the personal repre·
sentative of the deceased partner, but as against the surviving
partner also. Colly. Partn. § 727; Pom. Rem. §§ 250,- 251;
Bates, Partn. § 1055; Williams vs. Kent, s-upra. When the
damages sued for arise out of an injury to the person of tbe
plaintiff, the cause of action dies with the person of either
party; but the cause of action dies only 80 far as it affects the
liability of the decedent, or his personal representative.
Neither by the common law, nor under the statute, does the
cause of action die as to a surviving partner or defendant, who,
as we have seen, remains liable for all claims against the firm.
King vs. Bell, 13 Neb. 409, 14 N. ,V. Rep. 141; 8 Wait. Act. &
Def. 502. ·while the members of the firm were all alive, each
was liable in solido as pl'incipal, the firm being 10 law a single
entity. Upon the death of one partner, his liability was extiu· '
guished, but the surviving partner, as the sole represcntativ·~
of the firm, continued liable. Shale vs. Scltantz, 35 Hun, 622.
It is only wbere ·the cause of action does not survive in favor
of, or against either of, the joint plaintiffs or deftmdants that
the death of one abates the whole action. If the action is, as
doubtless it should be, regarded as a suit quasi e:r contractu for
damages, for an injury to the person occasioned by the breach
of a joint contract, the death of one of the defendants simply
severed the joint liability and extinguished the claim against
the decedent, while it continued in full force as to the sur-
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vivor. If the action is regarded as purely in tort, as where the
lDJury is willful and intentional, then the liability of the
defendants may be joint and several, and the death of one
does not abate the action as to the other. Colly. Part:D. (6th
Ed.) 1079, note. The death of one partner in no wise affects
the liability of the survivor, who, upon the happening of that
event, becomes individually liable to make good the joint
undertnking of both. Ordinarily, in actions e.J: delicto, where
the liability ai"ises from the misconduct or wrongful act of the
parties, each is liable for all the consequences, and there is
no right to enforce contribution; but this rule does not apply
between partners, unless the liability resulted from a medi·
tatc•d or wi11ful wrong, intentionally inflicted by the one seek·
. ing to enfor·cc contribution. Armstrong Co. t'B. Clarion Co.)
66 Pa. St. 218, 5 Am. Rep. 3G8; Pearson vs. Sk-elton, 1 Mees. &
'V. 504; Jacobs t:s. Pollard, · 10 Cnsh. 287, 57 Am. Dec. 105;
Arlleson t·s. !!illN·, 2 Ohio St. 203, 59 Am. Dec. 663; Bailey vs.
Bussin!f, 2S Conn. 455; 4 Amer. & Eng. Cyclop. Law, 12, 13;
Lindl. P;u·tn. 771.
'l'llat the cause of action died as to Luther W. Hess does not
at nll nfTl•ct the question ·of the right of contribution between
the sunh·or nnd llis personal rep•·~sentative. The right of
contl·ibution grows out of tlie partne•·sl.lip relation, and rests
upon the implied obligation of each pnrtner to contribute in
JWopot·tion to the liquidation of all pal'tnet·ship liabilities,
unl0ss th<? liability arose out of an intentional tot·t, committed
by the p:utnet• nsldng contribution. That the l'ight of con·
tribution exists, affords a persuash·e reason for llolding that
the n<:tiot~ Hut~· be maintained against the sut·vhing partner.
From evc~l'Y point of view the conclusion follows that the
enuse of action did not die as to botll partners because one
tn<?mber of the firm died, and that the proceeding to judgment
against the survivor was not of itself erroneous.
(Omitting questions of practice.)
Aftit·med.
NoTB.- See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., § 204, and cases cited.
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BOSENKRANS n. BARKE&
Supreme Court of Illinois, 1885.
ltiS ru. 881, I N. E. Rep. 98, 66 Am. Rep. t6t.
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This was an action brought by A. E. Barker in the superior
court of Cook county against 0. L. Rosenl~rans and J. B. rv-o
\Veber, to recover damages for an alleged malicious prosecu-Y,
~
tion and false imprisonment. A trial of the cause before a
~...Y~..,.
jury resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of the plaiu·lr ' ' N-' \.oY. .
tiff for $2,000. The defendants appealed to the appellate ~ ,...,.r ~
court, where the judgment was affirmed, and they now appeal ~ - \..- yr ,; ~
to the supreme court. The facts out of which this litigation ':.f <..\.. ~-' .-'
grew, so far as is necessary to state them, 'are substant ially C{"' /
..
r
as follows: In 1882 Barker resided in Iowa, and was engaged
X t..·
in a small way in· the jewelry business. In the latter part of
~ .the year be bought a bill of goods of Rosenkrans & ·w eber, nf ~
Chicago, amounting to $350. The goods were sold l;>y a traveling man named Johnson. \Vhen the bill became due $100
was paid, but no part of the balance has ever been paid.
Rosenkrans resided in Wisconsin and did business in .Milwaukee, but at the same time be was a partner in the jewelry business of Rosenkrans & Weber, in Chicago, the firm being composed of Rosenkrans and Lucy B. \Veber, who was the wife of
J. H. ·weber~ J. H. Weber bad the general management of
the business of this Chicago firm. On or about the first of
February, 1883, the bill of goods remaining unpaid, Johnson,
who had sold the goods, induced Barker to visit Chicago under
the pretense that he would enter into partnership with him .
in the jewelry business in Chicago. Upon the arrival of Darker, Weber was notified by Johnson o-f the arrival, and on the
fifth day of February, 1883, Weber filed a petition and obtained
an order for a writ of n.e ea:eat. The writ was issued and
placed in the hands of the sheriff, who arrested Barker a nd
held him in custody ten or twelve hours, when he was released
an bail. Subsequently, and on the 17th day of March, 1883,

if.'"'

W6

.
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on demurrer, the petition was dismissed. It does not appear
that Rosenkrans had any knowledge that the proceedings hatl
been instituted against Barker until about the 1st day of
April, 1883, and at this time a petition for a ne e:ceat bad been
held bad on demurrer and dismissed, and Weber had then or
a few days thereafter appealed to the appellate court. When
Rosenkrans learned · what had been done he notified " 7eber
that it was wr<>ng, and advised the dismissal of the appeal
from the appellate court, and under his advice no further steps
were taken to prosecute the appeal.
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RosenthaZ ~Pence, for Omar L. RosenkranL
Sh1tman ~ Defrees, for J. Hawley Weber•
.Abbott, OZivcr ¢ Sho-waJter, for appellee.
tT. (After stating the facts.) At the request of
the plaintiff the court instructed the jury: "If R<>senkrans
became acquainted with the facts in the matter about the la~:~t
of March, 1883; that, being so informed as to said facts attend·
ing the commencement of said proceedings, said R<>senkrans
suffered said proceedings to be continued in the courts through
the medium of an appeal, nnd did not in any way discounten·
. ance said proceedings, or put a stop to the same,-then the.
court instructs the jury that if they find from the evidence thnt
said nc exeat proceedings were instituted maliciously and with·
out probable cause, and said Rosenkrans was so informed, but
allowed the ne e:ceat case to proceed, then all such facts, if thP.
jury so believe, may be taken into consideration in determining whether said Rosenkrans ratified and approved of the
arrest of said Barker; and if he did so approve and ratify the
·a rrest of said Barker, tht>n he would be equally liable with
\Veber, if said arrest was made maliciously and without prob·
able cause." The court also instructed the jury that if they
found the defendants guilty under the evidence, that the arrest
was malicious and without probable cause, and that plaintitr
has sustained actual damages, then, on assessing damages,
they are not limited to compensation for actual damages sustained, but may give exemplary or vindictive damages.
These instructions are claimed to be erroneous as to the
defE-ndant Rosenkrans. An instruction which is not based on
CRAIG,
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the evidence in the case is improper, and should not be given;
it is liable to mislead the jury, and usually results in a wrong
verdict. As to the first instruction supra, we find no evidence in the record upon which it could. fairly be predicated.
Rosenkrans testified, and in this he is corroborated by other
evidence, that when he came to Chicago and learned for the
first time of the proceedings, he notified Weber, who was in
charge of the matter, that it was wrong, and the appeal ought
to be dismissed. Here he not only failed to sanction and
approve, but condemned; what had been done, and under his
direction no further steps were taken to prosecute the appeal.
The conduct and acts of Rosenkrans contain no element of
approval, and the instruction based upon the theory of an
approval, in the absence of any evidence to sustain such theory,
could do no less than mislead the jury. As respects the oth(>r
instruction, we are of opinion as to Rosenkrans it is erroneous.
It is not claimed that he ordered, advised, or directed the
arrest, or that he even knew of the occurrence until after the
proceeding in the ne ea:eat case had been dismissed. The claim
is that after knowledge of the arrest he approved what had
been done. If such was the case, he would only be liable for
the l"(>al injury sustained, and not for vindictive damages, as
held in Gnmd. vs. Van Vleck, 69 Ill. 478. But under the instruction the jury were directed that each defendant was liable for
actual and vindictive damages.
It is, however, claimed by appellee that Rosenkrans is
liable upon either one of two grounds: First, because those
who caused the arrest were servants or agents of Rosenkrans,
acting within the scope of their agency; second, the wrongful
proceeding was instituted for Rosenkrans, and in his name,
and when he became aware of what had been done he ratified
it. Weber, who caused the arrest. of Barker, was not in fact
a partner of Rosenkrans, but he acted for his wife, who was
the partner, and, so far as the acts are concerned, they may
be regarded as the acts of Roeenkra.ns' partner. In man1
respects one partner is the agent of the other. In the. purchase
and sale of goods, within the scope of the partnership business
the acts of one may be regarded as the acts of both. In such
cases the one that transacts the business acts for himself and
in the capacity as agent of the other, and in that capacity he
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binds himself and also binds 'his partner. By entering into
partnership 'e ach party reposes confidence in the other, and
constitutes him his general agent as to all partnership con·
cerns. Gow, Partn. 52. But the question involved here is
aot as to the liability of one partner for the contracts of the
other, but it is whether one partner may be liable in damages
for the w~ongs of the other. Mr. Collyer, in his work on Partnership, § 457, says: "A learned writer observes that though
partners are in general bound by the contracts, they are not
answerable for the wrongs, of each other. In general, acts
or omissions in the course of the partnership trade, or business, in violation of law, will only implicate those who are
guilty of them." And, in 1 Lind!. Partn. bk. 2, c. 1, § 4, the
author snys: "As a rule, however, the trillfttl tort of one partner is not imputable to the firm. For example, if one partner
maliciously prosecutes a person for steali~g partnership property, the firm is not answerable unless all the members are in
fact privy to the malicious prosecution."
In Gilber·t vs. Emmons, 42 Ill. 143, where a question arose ·1s
to the liability of one partner for the act of the other in causing
the arrest of a person charged with larceny of money belong·
ing to the finn, it was held thAt the mere knowledge and con·
sent of one partner that the other should have the person
accused arrested would not render the partner so knowing
and conRenting liable to an action for malicious prosecution;
it was necessary that the consent should be of such a char·
acter as to amount to advice and co-operation. In Gr~tnd t•s.
"Van Vleck, 69 Ill. 478, a question arose as to the liability of one
partner for the tort of the other, and it was held that one partner cannot involve another in a trespnss unless in the ordinary
course of their business, and in a case where the trespass is
in the nature of a taking which is available to the partnership;
and in such case, to render the partner liable who did not join
in the commission of t~ trespass, he must afterwards ha\'e
concurred and received the benefit of it. Here no part of the
debt was collected by the commencement or prosecution of the
proceedings against Barker, and it is not claimed that a liabil·
ity exists on account of receiving any benefit from the arrest;
.and if Rosenkrans is to be held liable, it is upon the ground
that he was a member of the firm which instituted the suit and
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caused the arrest. This, under the authorities cited, cannot
be done. As to the second ground relied upon by appP.Ilee,-·
ratiftcation,-what was said in passing upon the instructions
given for appellee is sufficient to dispose of that matter, and
no further discussion of the subject is deemed necessary.
(Omitting questions of practice.)
Reversed.
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NOTE.-See Mechem's Elem. of Pa.rtn., §§ 204 and 205, and notes.
The soundness of the rule. laid down in Collyer on Partnership and
quoted in Rosenkrans v. Barker, that the firm is not liable for the wrong·
ful acts of a partner, is, at least, open to qaestion.
See also Chester m. Dickerson, ante.
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Exchequer Chamber, 1862.
1 Hurlstone & Cottman,

526.

/ \:.\. · ~ : The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion of
~" ~. • _, WIGHTMAN, J. It appears by the evidence in this case that
,;J' ·/ the defendants wer~ the proprieters of an omnibus plying
1
\ ,.~ }!' , between the Bank and Hounslow, which at the time in question
· -..l<... (J' .!
was driven by a coachman in their service; that whilst upon
\.\.~ .V • J" the road, in the course of his employment to drive defendants'
.Y. ... ~· ) .."· l omnibus from Piccadilly to Kensington, he wilfully and on
rtf'"" ~ :t '.. J'. purpose, and contrary to the express orders of the defendants,
1
'.. \. ~
\,'(".;\wrongfully endeavored to hinder and obstruct the passage along
the road of another omnibus belonging to the plaintiff; and for
1
• .,
J'
that purpose, he, who was ahead of the plaintiff's omnibus 80 or
· " .f"
100 yards, slackened his pace, until the plaintiff's omnibus
ry.._ ~ ',.:/",.; · came up to him and·was about to pass, and h~ then purposely
~rt , ~ pulied across the road in order to prevent. and obstruct his pro~ ,,.. ' , A \._,.... \gress, and in so doing ran again~t one of the plaintiff's horses
· . .- ."' ·. c with his (the defendants') omnibus, thereby causing consider"'. \ ....~ t 1.;· able damage.
The reason assigned by the defendants' coachman
. l .; \ ....
for this wrongful proceeding was that he pulled across the
~ .v
",
plaintiff's coachman to keep him from passing, in order to serve
"
him (the plaintiff's coaebman) as he had served him (the
,., :defendantR' coachman).
It seems clear upon the evidence that this was wholly a wilful and unjustifiable 'act on the part of the defendant's coachman, and not in the lawful prosecution of his master's business.
I
A master is undoubtedly responsible for any damage
occasioned by the negligence or carelessness of his servant
whilst employed upon his master's bu~iness. In the present
case it was no part of his employment to obstruct or hinder the
passing of other omnibuses or carriages; on the contrary be was
directed not to do so.
The case appears to me to fall within the principle of the
decision in the case of Croft t'. Alison, 4 B. & Ald. 590 (E.
C. L. R. vol. G), cited upon the argument. In that case the

'\" :r- ":
<

J.

" ...
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Court said that the c;listinction was this: "That if a servant
driving a carriage, in order to effect some purpose of his own,
wantonly strikes the horse of another person and thereby pro.
duces an accident, the master is not liable. But if, in order to
perform his master's orders, be strikes, but injudiciously and in
order to extricate himself from a difficulty, that will be negligent
and careless conduct for which the master will be liable, being
an act done in pursuance of the servant's employment."
In the caHe of Lyons vs Martin, 8 A. & E . 615 (E. C. L. R.
vol. 35 ), Mr. Justice Patteson, in his judgment, says,
"Brucker vs. Fromont, G T. R. 659, and other caset; where the
master bas been held liable for the consequences of a lawful act
done neglig~ntly by his servant, do not apply. Here the act
was utterly unlawful. A master is liable where his servant
causes injury by doing a lawful act negligently, but not where
be wilfully does an illegal one." There are other cases. some
of which were cited upon the argument, to the same effect.
In the present case the defendants' coachman wilfully did an il
legal act contrary to his masters' orders, and quite beyond the
scope of his employment. In this view of tl' e case, it appears to
me that if the evidence of the defendants' coachman was believed.
as well as that of the other wituesses in the case, the verdict
ought to have been for the defendants. The question however
before us is whether the direction of tho learned judge to the
jury, as it appears upon the bill of exceptions, was right in
point of law upon the ca~e as it appeared in evidence. I entertain the highE>st and most sincere respect for the opinion of my
brother Martin, but it does appear to me that the mode in
wbich the questions were put to the jury was such as might
mislead them, and induce them to find a verdict which I cannot but think waR wrong.
He appears to have told them "that if the act of the defendants' driver in driving c-ts be did across the road to obstruct tbe
plaintiff's omnibus, although a reckless driying on his part, was
nevertheless an act done by him in the course of Ids serm·ce,
and to do that which be thought best to suit the interests of his
employers and to interfere with the trade and business of the
other omnibus, the defendants were responsible; and that the
liability of the master depended upon the acts and conduct of
the servant in the course of the service and employment, anrl
that the instructions given to the coachman not to obstruct an-
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other omnibus or hinder or annoy tho driver in his business
were immaterial."
It certainly appears to me that the wilfully or wrongfully attempting to obstruct the }:rogrt:&.:; of another omnibus contrary
to _the express directions of tho o~fendants, though done by
their coachman whilst employed in the service of the defendants, cannot be considered an act Ilene by him in the course of
his set·vice. It was quite besirle the course (,f his service and
what he was employed to do; a,r-d !.cannot consider the express
prohibition to the coachman to do "hat be did as immaterial in
considering what was the course of his service in that respect.
This was not a case of reckless or careless driving, but of wilfully and wrongfully attempting to obstruct t e passage of another omnibus, and in so doing running against one of the
horses. This cannot, I think, under the circumstances be considered as an act done in the course of his service, even though
the coachman might think that it was for his masters' interest
by such wrongful means to obstruct the business of the other
omnibus. The defendants' coachman was not employed to obstruct or hinder the plaintiff's omnibus, nor was it in the course
of his service, in the proper sense, to do so. Upon the evidence
it was entirely his own wrongful and wiJful act, for which I
think, according to the distinction taken in the case to which I
have referred, the defendants are not responsible. The jury,
upon the direction to which I have referred, might v••ell have
thought that if the act was done during the time that the defendants' coachman's employment was to drive their omnibus, and
that he thought it for their benefit to obstruct the other omnibus, the defendants would be liable.

This I think was wrong

for the reasons I have given; and I am therefore of opinion that
there should be a trial de novo.
WILLIAMS, CROMPTON, BYLES and BLACKBURN, JJ., concur with WILLES, J., that instructions given by Martin, B.,
was corn~ct.
Judgment for plaintiff affirmed.
NOTE.-See Mechem's Elements of Partn., § 204.
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STRANG vs. BRADNER, et al.

U. S. Supreme Com·t, 1881,.
114

u. s.

~.

' \ 'tl

\~
.~ rr- v··~· .. ._,

~J

555.

,,..

. act'xon was commenced by. d e f end ants m
. error as pam-~,..,..
1.
,/ ). \r"''
Th1s
tiffs in a court of the State of New Y01·k, to recover of the"-"' .....~..."'.~
.
plaintiffs in error a sum which they alleged they bad been com-?, ..~·,\ .>· ·
pelled to pay, through false and fraudulent repn·~entation8 of
i\.
./
one of the mem hers of a partnership. consi::;tiug of the th~ft•n•l- r.,rr '- j.. '. "· ~
ants, made iu the course of partnerf;bip business. The ddctHl- ->.....
~-" \
. b arge m
. b·an k ruptcy. J Ul1gment f or the,.. ·,. ' ·, ..)' ·L. ' ~-. '
ants set up a tl tsc
plaintiff;-;, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court., and the · ... ·
··
judgment of that court affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
. ·, ~~ ·~.J"
- )<_

Mr. George H. Forster for plaiutiiT:-; in err0r.
J.llr. lY·i ll£am F. Co(JaSWell fot· defendants in error.
l\IR. JuSTICE HARLAN

•

delivered the opinion

~f

the court.

The evidence before the jury tended to establish the following
facts: That for some years prior to Ju11e, 18';'5, the plaintiffs
were doing business in the city of Rochester, New York, M
partner:-:, under the style of LO\vrey & Bradner, wldll:', during
the same period, the defendants were engaged in bn~iness in the
City of ~ew York, under the style of Stwng & Holland Bros.;
that the special business of plaintiffs was the pnrchase of wool,
which -they forwarded to the defendants, as commission
merchants, to sell on account; that plaintiffs, for the accommodation of defendants, often fumishcd them with promisS()l'Y
notes, for tho purpose of enabling them to carry on bnl:line~s;
that the defendants took care of these note~, paying tho same
at maturity out of the procee1h of the property consigne1l, and
with money remitted by the plailit iffs; that in the t.r·ansaetions
between the parties the plaintiffs were credite1l with tho~e notes,
with the proceeds of property sold on tl.lt'it' account, and with
money remitted by them, and were charged with tho amounts
paid to take np the notes; that on or about l\larch 1, 1875, the
defendant:> reques ted the plaintiffs to fumish them "·it.h four

· ~~-· \ ·,

> -~ .,.,

.,..
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· promissory notes, for about $4,000 each, to enable them to raise
money thereon, and to be credited to plaintiffs on their account,
in accordance with the course of business existing between the
parties-such notes to be of odd amounts and made as of different dates before the time they were transmitted to the defendants, so that they might appear to be given for real indebtedness; that, pursuant to that request, the plaintiffs made and
transmitted to defendants their ·four promissory notes, for
$4,325.50, $!,326.25, $!,327.13 and $!,:327.15, each at four
months, dated, respectively, on the 1st., 9th, 15th and 20th days
of February, 1875, and eacu payable to the plaintiffs at the
office ofthe defendants, in the City of New York, and indorsed
hy the plaintiffs; and that, ou or abont April 4, 1875, Strang
represented to plaintiffs that his firm had not used, nor been
able to use those notes, because they were made payable at their
office, and requested plaintiffs to lend them four other notes of
the same amount, payable at the Metropolitan National Bank,
in New York City, to be used in the place of those dated in
February.
There was also evidence tending to prove that the plaintiffs,
relying upon the representation that the February notes bad
not been used, and that the defendants desired other notes to be
used in their place, executed and delivered to the latter four
other promissory notes, each at 4 months, for $4,850, $4951.25,
S-l,8G0.30 and $4,!l70, respectively, dated 13th, 14th, 16th and
20th of 1\larch, 1$75, payable four mouths after date to their
own order at the Metropolitan National Bank, New York, and
by them indorsed; that at tue time defendants requested to be
furnished with the notes last descri~d they had in fact discounted and put in circulation the February notes, whereby the
plaintiffs, as makers and il!dorsers, were comJ.~elled to pay the
same to the holders; that when Strang applied for tue March
notes the defendants knew that they were insolvent, but that
fact was not known to plaintiffs; that be made such representations and procured said notes with the intent to defraud the
plaintiffs; and that the latter was compelled to pay such part
of the March uotes as amounted, principal and interest, to the
sum for which they obtained judgment below.
In the misrepresentations made by Strang to Lowry & Bradner there was no active participation by his partners, the Messrs.
Holland. But it was proven that the proceeds of the notes last
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obtained from plaintiffs, as well as the proceeds of the February notes, all went into the business of Strang & Holland
Brothers.
·
(Disposing of another question.)
The only other question to be determined is, whether the
defendants John D. Holland and Joseph Holland can be held
liable for the false and fraudulent representations of their partner, it being conceded that they were not made by their direction nor with their knowledge. Whether this action be regarded as one to recover damages for the deceit practiced upon
the plaintiffs, or as one to recover. the amount of a debt created
by fraud upon the part of Strang, we are of opinion that his
fraud is to be imputed, for the purposes of the action, to all the
mem hers of his firm. The transaction between him and the
plaintiffs is to be deemed a partnership transaction, because, in
addition to his representation that the notes were for the benefit
of his firm, he had, by virtue of .his agency for the partnership
and as between the firm and those dealing with it in good
faith, uuthority to negotiate for promissory notes and other
securities for its use. Each partner was the agent and represnntative of the firm with reference to all ·business within the
scope of the partnership. And if, in the conduct of partnership
business, and with reference thereto, one partner makes false
or fraudulent misrepresentations of fact to the injury of innocent persons who deal with him as representing the firm, and
without notice of any limitations upon his general authority,
his partners cannot escape pecuniary responsibility therefor upon the ground that such m_isrepresentations were made without
their knowledge. This is especially so when, as in the case
hofore us, the partners, who were not themselves guilty of
wrong, received and appropriated the fruits of the fraudu1en
c11uduct of their associate in business. Stockwell v. United
States, 13 WalL 531, 547-8; Story on Partnership, sees. 1,
102-3, 107-8, 166, 168; Chester v. Dickerson, 54 N. Y. 1;
Locke v. Stearns, 1 Mete. 560; Lothrop v. Adams, 133 Mass.
471; Blight v. Tobin, 7 T. B. Monroe 612; Durant v. Rogers,
87 Ill. 508; Collyer on Partnership, Wood's Ed., secEI. 446,
44fl-50; Lindley on Partnership, Ewell's Eel., sec. 302.
The judgment is affirmed.
XOTE.-See Mechem's Elements of Partn., § 204.
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JAFFRAY, et al. vs. JENNINGS, et al.

,)Zx~J~

· Supreme Court of Michigan.

1894.

101 Mich. 515, 60 N. W. 52, 25 L. R. A. 646.

·· .~.. Y

Certiorari to circuit court, Lapeer county; Joseph B Moore,
~
~t
\.# \Fudge.
.
..
1 X'
Attachment by Howard F .. Jaffray and another, copartners,
· If'..; )\ '
against W ru·d H. Jennings and Ward L. Jennings, copartners,
~ \ , "\.
for a debt due on goods sold and delivered. Judgment for de. ••/
;-<.
fendants, and plaintiffs bring certiorari. Affirmed.
r..

,,/ .:·

,J

~

_,fl!

,_

.. '
'c...'. . " ...

..

I

Fletcher & Wanty, for appellants.
Geer & Williams, for appellees.
HoOKER, J. Plaintiffs were copartners, residing in New
York, and were jobbers, of whom the defendants (father and
son, and also partnf!rs) purchased goods. The son, Ward L.
Jenning, having ·purchased a quantity of goods for his firm
from the plaintiffs, the latter commenced procf!edings by attachment upon an affadavit which alleged that the defendants
fraudulently contracted the debt upon which the action was
brought, viz. that arising from the purchase mentioned. The
writ was levied upon- property belonging to the father, and
upon his application the attachment was dissolved by the circuit judge. It was ~dmitted that at the time of the levy the
firm bad sufficient personal property out of which the claim
could have been satisfied. Defendants' contention is that the
individua.l property of the innocent defendant was not subject
to seizure by attachment. Counsel for the plaintiffs build a
strong argument upon the doctrine that each partner is an
agent of his fellows, citing Jfay vs. Newman, !l5 Mich. 501,
55 N. W. 364, to the proposition that an attachment lies
against a debtor whose agent fradulently contracted the debt.
But the statute upon which the remedy by attachment depends
has relieved the innocent partner from the application of this
rule.
An examination of the statutes may aid in solving this qnes-
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tion. We ~:;tart with the proposition that Hattachment is a
harsh and extraordinary remedy, unknown to the common law;
and the statutory provisions upon which the right depends,
being in derogation of the common law, must be strictly construed, and cannot be extended beyond their terms." See cases
cited in 1 Jac. & C .. Dig. p. 96, § 1; Estlow vs. Hanna, 75
Micb, 219, 42 N. W. 812. An action against joint debtors is
like any other action. It is aimed at the individual debtors.
A se-rvice on one is not a service upon the other; they may ap·
pear separately; their defenses may be different; the judgment
is against each for the whole amount; the execution issues
against the individuals, the officer being commanded to collect
the debt from the goods and chattels, and, for want thereof, cf
the lands and t~nements, of the individuals. And this is as true
where the joint obligation is a partnership debt ns in cases
where the debtors are not copartners.
The act authorizing proceedings in attachment permits any
creditor to hm·e an attachment against his debtor, upon condL
tiona mentioned. The conditions are that he shall show that
the defendant- i. e. the debtor-is believed to be guilty of certain acts, or to possess certain intentions regarding the debt or
his property, fraudulent in character, the general tenor of which
indicates danger that such debtor will put his pr()perty beyond
the reach of the creditor. The law lays hold of the property of
such debtor, to preserve it for the creditor. So long as there is
a sole debtor, no difficulty is lik~ly to arise, but when the debt
is joint the question arises, bow far should the fraudulent acts
and intentions of one subject the property of another to seizure?
The acts, .if strictly construed, only provide for attachment
against the debtor who is guilty of tho fraud. An additi~nal
remedy, summary in itts nature, is given against him. It is
given, in terms, against no others. And where the act is done
by one only, the law can only be made applicable to another by
invoking the doctrine of agency.
No one will question the fact that one can, through an agent,
subject his property to attachment; and this is as true where the
agent is a partner as where he is not, and where the act complained of is the fraudulent purchase of goods by a partner, as
in this case. There is much persuasiveness in the argument
that, aa the firm received the benefit and appropriated the fruit
of the transaction (w.hether with knowledge upon the part of
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both or not,) the rule that.a partner is an agent of his copartners
make his act the act of both. It would not be so convincing if
the cause for attachment were another of those named in the
stAtute,-e. g. if one only was shown to have an .intent to dispose of the firm property, or had actually done so without the
knowledge of his partner, or where he absconded, or removed
out of the state, or was about to do so, with intent to defraud
the firm creditors. Still more hard would be the attachment
against one where his copartner had merely resided out of the
state for three months, which in itself is ground for attachment
regardless of the honesty of his intention.
Can it be said that in all of these cases these acts are partner·
ship acts, binding the partners under this application of the
doctrine of agency? Is it true that the creditors of a· firm in
Michigan, one of the members of which lives in Chicago, have
the absolute right to commence all actions against the firm by
attachment, and to levy not only on the firm property, but that
of each resident member, as well as that of the nonresident?
If not, it must be that this doctrine is improperly applied, or a
distinction must be drawn between the different causes for at.
tnchment named in the statute, and the liability limited to
those acts which, we may say, either as a conclusion of fact or
law, are the acts of the firm, which would seem to limit the
cases to those where the debt w.as fraudulently contracted, and
where the property of the firm had been assigned, <>oncealed, or
disposed of with intent on the part of one to defraud the firm
creditors. If plaintiff's theory is correct, these would be the
:acts of all partners, and subject to seizure not only the partner:ehip property, but the individual property of each partner, no
matter how honest, and notwithstanding their solvency.
There can be no doubt that partners are bound by the contracts, and many times by the torts, of one of their number, to
ihe extent of liability. But is it as clear that the nature of the
remedy is always subject to the same rule? As already stated,
this remedy is statutory, and the statutes must show the design
to cover such cases as this, or they are not to be treated as
within them. The attachment statute is borrowed from New
York. It will be found in the Revised Statutes of 18:38 and
1846 and the Compiled Laws of 1857. The section of which
Howell section 8015, is an amendment remained unchanged .
from the time of its adoption until1861. It is section 19, c. 1,
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tit. 4, pt. 3, p. 512, Rev. St. 1838. The same is found in Rev.
St. 1846, chap. 114, ~ 30, p. 517, and Comp. Laws 1857, § 4771.
It reads as follows, viz. : "When two or more persons are jointly
indebted as joint obligors, partners, or otherwise, the attachment
may be it;sued against the separate or joint estates or property
of such joint debtorR or any of them, and the same proceedings
shall be bad as hereinbefore prescribed."
It goes without saying that under this act, where all of the
joint debtors are shown to have participated in the statutory
act, or where it appears that each hRs entertained the fraudulent intent, the writ should issue againet all; and it is as plain
that in such case the writ could be issued against the separate
or joint estates of the debtors. So far it lays down a plain,
conl:!istant, and just rule. Shall we go further, and say that it
was meant that the writ would be as far-reaching in cases of
joint debtors, who are not partners, where one was innocent of
wrong? That would probably not be claimed by any one. As
to partners, the same claim might be made as is made here,
viz. that in dealing with the partnership property the act of one
is the act of all, and that the consequences are the same to all.
But this act bad received a construction before it became a law
in Michigan. In the case of Cyrus Chipman, an absconding
debtor (14 Johns. 217), decided in 1817, it was held that an
attachment might issue against the property of one of several
partners who absconds, for a debt due by the firm, although his
copartners are resident within the state and subject to process.
This is not conclusive of the question here, and is cited only
to show that counsel in that case did not resort to the remedy
by attachment ngainst all of the partners. Two years later the
same court held that an attachment might issue against the
separate property of an absconding debtor upon a debt due
from his copartnership. Here, again, the writ appears not to
have been sought against the partner who remained. But the
case went further, and held that the partnership property could
not be seized; and the reason was that the other partner bad a
right to retain it to pay the partnership debts. In re Smith,
16 Johns, 102. It may still be said that in neither of these cases
were all of the partners sued in attachment, and therefore there
yet remains doubt if the right contended for does not exist under this statute, and it is probable that such doubts led to the
amendment of l8ll1, which reads as follows: "When two or
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more persons are jointly indebted as joint obligors, partnerB, or
otherwisE>, and an affidavit shall be ma.de, as provided in section
two of this chapter, so as to bring one or more of such joint
debtor~ within its provisions, and amenable to the process of
of attachment, then the writ of attachment shall issue against
the property and effects of such as are so brought within the
provisions of said section ; and the officer shall be also directed
in said writ to summon all such joint debtors as may be named
in the affidavit attached thereto, to answer to the said action as
in other cases of attachment."
·
Before discussing the statute, let us review the situation.
Under the previous statute, attachment lay against all joint
debtors, whether partners or not~ where it could be shown as
matter of fact that all participated in the act constituting a
cause. It was also plain that, where one joint debtor only
committed such act, his property only was subject to the writ,
u'nless there was a partnership. There was, then, no necessity
for legislation to reach either of these cases. for joint debtors,
where not partners, were fnl1y protected where innocent of
wrong, and the creditor had his remedy against both where
both participated, and against the offender where only one was
guilty. In this condition of Hffairs, the legislature passed section 8015, thereby giving immunity from attachment to joint
debtors, including partners, who were not them~lves participants in the wrongful act. Now~ by a construction of thfs act,
it is sought to say that partners are not within its terms, because the act of one is the act of all, and that, as a matter of
law, they are, therefore, all participants in the fraudulent act.
If that is so, the statute seems to have no office to perform. It
has relieved nobody. Joint debtors, not partners, could not be
attacked by attachment before unless guilty. But there may
have been a doubt about partners. That doubt seems to have
caused the enactment of a law whose only object must have
been to reach and relieve the very class of cases which the construction contended for seeks to exclude from its protection .
. As said at the outset, attachment is a harsh and extraordinary remedy. The law mny well restrict its use, and deny it
as against all honest persons, though they have the misfortune
to be connected in busine~s ns pHrtners with dishonest persons.
Such persons have 1egal obligations to discharge in relation to
the partnership affairs. They must see that obligations are dis-
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charged, and the law presumes that they will faithfully do so.
No very good reason suggests itself why the private fortune of
an honest partner should be seized because his partner hRS been
detect~d in a fraudulent act in connection with partnership
affairs. It is common knowledge that few men or firms can
survive an attack by attachment. It is the almost certain precursor of insolvency, as in former days it was of bankruptcy,
and we should hesitate before broadening the scope of the act
in question. A case quite similar to the present was before
the court, viz., Edwards vs. Hughe.<r, 20 Mich. 289. Mr.
Justice CooLEY wrote the opinion, and seems to have taken a
similar view of these statuteR to that expressed above. It is
true that the facts in that case may permit it to be distinguished
from the present, but the language used is broad, and it is
hardly possible that the court could have overlooked tbe contin·
gency of such cases as this. Since this decision we think the
bar have understood that the liability was limited to such partners as personally participated in the fraudulent act. See Tiffany's Justice Guide, p. 62, note 1, where this doctrine is laid
down; Shinn, Pl. and Pr. § 307. See, also, People vs. Circuit
Judge, 41 Mich. 326, 2 N. W. 26, where a writ issued against
nonresident partners only. We think the learned circuit judge
correct in his conclusions, and that his order dissolving the
attachment should be affi.r med, with costs. Ordered accord- .
ingly.
LONG and GRANT, JJ .• ooncur with HooKER, J.
MONTGOMERY, J., writes a dissenting opinion. McGRATH,
C. J., c~ncurs with MONTGOMERY, J.
NOTx.-See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., §§ 204-205.
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LOCKE vs. STEARNS.
"'

•

t

Supreme Court of Massachusetts, 181,.0.
1 Mete. 560, 85 Am. Dec. 382 .

Trespass upon the case against G. L. and H. L. Stearns and
They were partners in manufacturing
·
..
oil and s€1lling linseed meal. The facts sufficiently appear in
··
·,: _ the opinion. The instructions of which defendants complain
~ ~~ . .(,.\ were: 1. "That if one of the defendants sold the meal to the
r ·' ~·
plaintiff, such defeudant knowing that teelseed meal was of an
"'
~l
inferior quality and less value than linseed meal, this know' . 'ledge would bind all the defendants, and be the same.as if they
• \\:"\ ,.'"'~ all knew it"; and. 2. "That if L. Richardson, as foreman of the
defendants, acting within the scope of his authority, sold the
~..,- .. ./
meal to the plaintiff, he (Richardson) knowing that teelseed meal
,.
was of an inferior quality and less value than linseed meal,
t.
this knowledge would bind the defendanw, and be the same as
if the defendants knew it." Verdict for plaintiff.
. .. · , (

'"'. :(1. C. Hall for deceit.

,
}·
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Farley for the defendants.
Buttrick for the plaintiff.
By Court, SuAw, C. J. Most of the questions in the present
case turned upon matters of fact and were decided by the jury.
The evidence, taken in connection with the verdict, shows that
the purpose of the plaintiff was to purchase of the defendants
linseed meal, and that the defendants, who carried on the business of manufacturing oil from seed, 80 understood it, but that
they, that is, one of them personally, when present, and their
foreman and general agent, acting within the scope of his
authority, when they were absent, delivered ~o the plaintiff an
inferior article, called teelseed meal, mixed with the linseed, in
such a manner as to deceive the plaintiff, who purchased and
paid for the whole as linseed, without knowledge of such
mixture.
The defendants object to two of the instructions of the court.
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of common pleas as being incorrect in point of law. (Here the
chief justice stated the instructions excepted to.) But we are
of opinion that both those instructions were right. For although the action in form charges the defendants jointly for a.
deceit done by one only, or by an agent, yet it is still a civil
action, and the claim is for damages. The deceit was done for
the defendants' benefit, by their agent acting under their orders,
in the conduct of their general business, and responsible to
them; and when one party must suffer by the wrong and misconduct of another it is more reasonable that he should sustain
the loss, who reposes the confidence in the agent, than he who
has given no such confidence: #ern vs. Nichols, 1 Salk. 289.
The point is well i11ustrated by the law of insurance, where the
party is always held r~sponsible ~iviliter for the fraudulent
mi:srepresenta.tion or other deceit, or for the negligence of his
agent. Fitzherbert vs. Mather, 1 T. R. 12. But the rule is
not confined to cases of insurance, in relation to which a somewhat stricter morality, perhaps, is held to prevail; but it is laid
down as a general rule of the common law, that the principal is
civilly responsible for the acts of his agent: Doe vs. Martin, 4
Id. 66. In a late case, in which it was held that a master was
liable for the acts of his servant in a case quasi criminal-as
for penalties incurred by a violation of tlie re:venue law-it was
taken for granted, on all sides, that for deceit in articles sold
by a servant in the shop of his master, or for acts done in the
manufacture of articles in a manufactory usually carried on by
the master, the latter is answerable: Attorney-general vs.
Siddon, 1 Ty~w. 41; s. c. 1 Cromp. & J. 220. The rule proceeds upon the ground that the servant is acting within the
scope of his authority, actual or constructive. The case of a
sheriff who is liable civiliter, even in an action of trespass, for
the misconduct of his deputy is another familiar application of
the same rule: Grinnell vs. Phillips, 1 Masa. 530.
The rule is laid down generally, in a recent compilation of
good authority, that though a principal, in general, is not liable
criminally for the a~t of his agent, yet he is civilly liable for
the neglect, fraud, deceit, or other wrongful act of his agent in
the course of his employment, though in fact the principal did
not authorize the practice of such acts; but the wrongful or unlawful acts must be committed in the course of the agent's em-
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ployment: 3 Chit. Law of Com. and Man., 209, 210. As to
the other point, which is indeed little more than a further application of the same principle, it is laid down as the general rulo
that one. partner is liable civiliter for damages sustained by
the deceit or other fraudulent act of his copartner done within
the scope of his general partnership authority: Collyer on Partnership, 24:1; Rapp vs.• Latham, 2 Barn. & Ald. 795; Willet
vs. Chambers, Cowp. 814.
Two cases were cited by the counsel for the defendant to
support the contrary doctrine; but we think they are both distinguishable from the present. In Pierce vs. Jackson, 6
Mass. 242, it is said by Parsons, C. J., in the course of his
opinion, that "a fraud committed by one of the partners shall
not charge the partnership." This must be taken in connection
with the subject-matter to which it was applied. That action
was not brought by an innocent party who had sustained
damage by the fraudulent act of a partner in the course of the
partnership business. On the contrary, it was a case of competition between different classes of creditors, one of whom
was a creditor of one of the partners, and the other claimed a
preference as creditor of the firm. But it appeared that one of
the partners had , by fraud and by means of a forged indorsement of a note, given or attempted to give the latter creditor a
preference to which he was not entitled. It was in reference
to this transaction that the remark above cited was made. The
plaintiff in that case must have been in collusion with one of
the partners to obtain an undue preference; and to have sustained the claim of preference under those circumstances, would
have been to give effect to a fraudulent and collusive act in favor
of a party to the collusion, against an honest creditor.
The other case cited was Sherwood vs. },fanvick, 5 Greenl.
295. In that case two persons were the beneficial owners of a
foreign vessel held in the name of a third person. O~te of them,
under a power from that third person, sold the vessel, and at
the time of the sale made a false representation of her national
character. The other was sued by the purchaser, in an action
to recover damages alleged to have been sustained by reason of
such false representation. It was held t4at he was not liable .
. The defendant and the seller, in that case, were not general
. partners, if indeed they were partners at all. The seller was not
the general agent of the defendant, nor had he any authority,

LATHROP VS. ADAMS.

actual or constructive, t.o act for him. It seems to us therefore quite clear that the decis~an in that case is not in conflict
with ours in the pre~ent.
·
Exceptions overruled.
NOTE. -See

Mechem's Elements of Partn. § 204.
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Supreme Court of .Massachusetts, 1881!.
1!33 ?tla!'ll. 471; 43

Am.~Rep.

528.

Action of Hbel. The opinion states the point.
had judgment below.

.J
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The plaintiff :i_,tC-..'
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D. Saunders, C. P. Thompson and C. G. Saunders, for . •
("
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., ..
defendants.
t

S. B. Ives, Jr., and G. B. Ive[!, for plaintiff.
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FIELD. J. (Omitting minor points.)
"'r"~~, ·'
In a civil action for libel, before the passing of any statute v"
on the subject., the truth of the words published was a defense,
whether they were published with or without malice; but if the
words published were false, it was no defense that the person
who published them believed them to be true, unless the communication was pri\'ileged. Except then in cases of privileged
communications, it was generally true that evidence of actual
malice or the want of actual malice was immaterial to the right
of action, and was admissible, if admissible at all, only for the
purpose of enhancing or diminishing the damages.
The Gen. Sts., ch. 129, sec. 77, provide that, "In e\·ery
prosecution and in eYet·y civil action for writing or for publishing a libel, the defendant may upori the trial give in evidence
the truth of the matter contained in the publication charged as
libellous; Hnd such evidence shall be deemed a sufficient justification. unless malicious intention shall be proved." This is a
re-enactment of the statute of 1855, ch. 396. For previous
statutes, see Rev. Sts., ch. 100, sec. 19; ch. 133, sec. 6; St.

t '
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1826, ch. 107, sec. 1. Since the passage of the Stat: of 1855,
ch. 396, the truth of the words published is no longer an absolute defense; the plaintiff may, notwithstanding the words are
true, maintain his action if he can show that they were published with malicious intention.
The defendants in this case were co-partners, engaged in the
publication of a. newspaper. The court was requested by the
defendants to rule ''that express malice of one of the defendants could not affect the other defendants, unless it appeared
that they participated in such malice; and if the jury should
find a verdict on the ground of express malice, they could
find it as to those only who were shown to be actuated by
such malice." The court refused to give this ruling. The
statute undoubtedly, by using the words "malicious intention," means an actual malicious intention, which the defendants in their request properly enough denominate "expres& malice." The malice which it has been said the law
ordinarily implies, in actions of slander or libel, from the uttering or publishing of false defamatory words, is in one sense a
fiction, invented to satisfy the forms of pleading. The words
"express malice" have been used in contradistinction to the
malice which it was said the law implies, to mean actual malice,
or malice in fact, which is the same thing as malicious intention.
The correctness of the ruling asked for must· be determined by
the rules of law applicable to civil actions, in which a specific
actual intention or purpose must be shown to exist in order to
maintain the action. But it has been established, on much consid.e ration, as one of the general principles of the law of agency,
that the princ~pal is liable civilly in damages for the torts of his
agent done for his benefit in the prosecution of his business and
within the scope of the agent's employment, and thit:J rule has
been extended to willful trespasses, fraudulent misrepresentations, malicious prosecutions and libels. The greatest difficulty
has been felt in extending this liability to corporations aggregate. Reed vs. Home Savings Bank, 130 Mass. 443; s. c. 39
Am. Rep. 468, was an action of tort against a savings bank for
malicious prosecution. In the opinion Mr. Justice Lord says:
"By the great weight of modern authority, a corporation may
be liable even when a fraudulent or malicious intent in fact is
necessary to be proved, the fraud or malice of its authorized
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agents being imputable to the corporation;" and many authorities are cited. For additional authorities when the a.Ction is
for libel, see Aldrich vs. Press Printing Co., 9 Minn. 123;
:Maynard vs. Fireman's Fund In~. Co., 47 Cal. 207; Johnson vs. St. Louis Dispatch Co., 2 Mo. App. 565.
In Philadelphia, Wilmington &: Baltimore R. R. vs. Quigley, 21 How. 202, it was held that a corporation may be responsible for the publication of a libel. The court below had instructed the jury that they might find exemplary damages.
This wa8 held erroneous, because "the circumstances under
which the evidence was collected, and the publication made,
repel the presumption of the existence of malice on the part of
the corporation, and so the jury should have been instructed;"
but the opinion of the majority of the court does not intimate
that on proper evidence express malice might not be shown
against a corporation. In 'Whitfield vs. South Eastern Railway, El. Bl. & El. 115, which was an action of libel against a
corporation, Lord Campbell, C. J., says: "But considering
that an action of tort or trespass will lie against a corporation
aggregate, and that an indictment m~y be preferred against a
corporation aggregate, both for commission and omission, to be
followed up by fine, although not by imprisonment, there may
be great difficulty in saying that under certain circumstances
express malice may not be imputed to and proved against a
corporation."
In Lawless vs. Anglo-Egyptian Cotton and Oil Co., L. R.
4 Q. B. 262, which was an action of libel against a corporation,
it was held that the publication was prima facie privileged, and
that there was no evidence of express malice which ought to
have been left to the jury; but it was not intimated that a corporation aggregate could not be guilty of express malice in the
publication of a libel. See ]t[ackayJvs. Commercial Bank, L.
R. 5 P. C. 394.
In criminal prosecutions for a libel i~ this Commonwealth,
the liability has been restricted to acts in which the defendant
participated, or to which he assented. Comm,onwealth vs.
Morgan, 107 Mass. 199, 203. In England at one time the law
was thought to be otherwise, but it is now governed by the
Stat. of 6 and 7 Viet., ch. 96, sec. 7. Regina vs. Holbrook, 3
Q. B. D. 60, and 4 id. 42.
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The logical difficulty of imputing the actual malice ,or fraud
of an agent to his principal is perhaps less when the principal is a person than when it is a corporation; still the foundation of the imput.<i.tion is not that it is inferred that the principal
actually participated in the malice or fraud, but the act having
been done for his bem•fit by his agent acting within the scope
of his employment in his business, it is just that he should be
held responsible for it in damages.
As partners are the general agents of each other and of the
firm, within the scope of the business of the partnership, we
think a test of the question we are considering is the liability of
the proprietor of a newspaper in damages for a libel maliciously
published without his knowledge by his agent whom he has
intrusted with the management of the newspaper, and this we
regard as well settled. Shepheard vs. Whitaker, L. R. 10 C.
P. 502; Dunn vs. Hall, 1 Ind. 344; Andres vs. Wells, 'i' Johns.
260; 5 Am. Dec. 267; Pe1Tet vs. New Orleans Times Newspaper, 25 La. Ann. 170; Storey vs. Wallace, 60 Ill. 51.
Smith vs. Ashley, 11 Mete. 367, rests on its own facts, and
decides nothing in reference to the liability of a principal for
the malicious acts of his agent, done for his benefit, in the
prosecution of his business within the scope of his employment.
Upon this ground of agency, partners have been held
liable in civil actions f(lr the fraudulent or malicious conduct
of one of them, done without the knowledge of the others,
for the benefit of the partnership and within the scope of its
business. Locke vs. Steanzs, 1 Mete. 560,; 35 Am. Dec. 382;
Gray vs. Cropper, 1 Allen 337; White vs. Sawyer, 16 Gray
586; Durant vs. Rogers, 87 Ill. 508; Wolf vs..Mills, 56 ld. 360;
"Chester vs. Dickerson, 54 N. Y. 1; s. c. 13 Am. Rep. 550;
Guillou vs. Peterson, 89 Penn. St. 163; Rex vs. ~Marsh, 2 B. &

c.

717, 723.
If the ·Jiability of the principal for the fraudulent acts of the ·
agent, done within the scope of his employment, be limited to
those cases in which the principal derives a benefit from the
act of the agent, and a corresponding limitation be put upon the
liability of one partner for the fraudulent acts of another, done
within the scope of the partnership business, yet when a partnership publishes a newspaper, whatever benefit, if any is derived from the publication of a libel is necessarily received by
the partnership.

LATHROP VS. ADAMS.
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The statute requires that an actual malic1ous intention· in
making the publication shall be found, if the matter published
be true; but we- are of the opinion that the legislature, in enacting this statute, did not intend to change the rules of law whereby one person is made responsible in damages for the wrongs
done by another, but left them to be applied according to the
principles which govern the administration of the law; and that
the court rightly refused to give the ruling requested.
In the opinion of a majority of the court the entry must be
Exceptions overruled.
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NoTE.~e Mechem's Elements of Partn., § 2M.

OF THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF A PARTNER'S
LIABILITY.

HARALSON vs. CAMPBELL.
8upretM Oourl of Alabama, 1879.
fJ3 Ala. 278.

..

\

\
. •:

~

t
'4~

~ \.

.. ..·\
~~

..

Appeal from a judgment denying a petition to supersed<!
or quash an ~xecutlon. The opinion states the fact&
Bragg and Thorington, for appellant&

L. A. Dobbl, contra.

.. ' .-:
STONE, .J. Partnership debts and liabilities, except In lim·
.\·'" ~\ ·, · ited
partnerships, are equally the debts of the firm and each
I'
'
\

J

,.

..
..

.....

..

member thereof; and the individual property of the several
members, as well as the partnership property, may be taken
In executon for the payment of such partnership debt. Partnership debts (under the code in this state, though not at com·
mon Ia w) are joint and several, if evidenced by promise in
writing, and may be sued on against the members jointly or
severally. . Code of 1876, Sec. 2905, Emanuel v1. Bird, 19 Ala.
596; lValdrcm vs. Simm0fl.8, 28 Ala. 629; Va.n Wagner VI. Ohapman, 29 Ala.. 172. A modification of this principle exists, in
cases of bankruptcy and insolvent . administration, and u.
mardballing of assets will sometimes be decreed; bot that doc·
trine has no application to this case, as no bankruptcy or lnsol·
vency is averred.
The suit and the judgment in the present case are against
\V. J. Haralson and Terrence Reynolds, defendants, under tbe
firm name of W. J. Haralson & Co. The mandate of the exe-

JuDD OIL

Co. vs.

HuBBELL.

eution Ia, that the sheri1f cause the amount of the judgment
to be made "of the goods and chattels, lands and tenements,
of William J. Haralson and Terrence Reynolds." There was
a motion in the court below to quash the execution, because
it directed the money to be made out of the individual effects
of the defendants, and not out of the partnership property.
The circuit court overruled the motion. This suit is not gov·
erned by Sec. 2904: of the Code. That section contemplates a
suit against the partnership, in its partnership name .merely,
without naming the individual members composing the firm.
In this case the individuals are named, and sued as such. The
individual property of each partner is liable to seizure in aa.tia·
faction of this judgment. • • •
The judgment is affirmed.
NoT&.-See Mechem's Elem. of Partn. ~ 209 JlJ
See alao the two cues next following herein.

JUDD OIL CO. vs. HUBBELL.
Courl of Appeala of New York, 1819.
70 N.Y. MS.

\

Y

Appeal from an order made upon a motion to set aside a
.,·\
judgment, obtained by the Oil Co. against Hubbell and one
-\,.
\ ,·
Taylor, as copartners. The opinion states the facts.
\ ';"'"
Oharles H. Tweed, for appellant.

Qeorge H. Forater, for respondent.

J. (After disposing of other matters.) At the
outset tpe plaintUY was called upon "to show cause why the
judgment should not be vacated an(l set aside as irregular, in
that a several judgment is entered against the defendant,
Hubbell, for '40,950.29, and a several judgment is entered
against the defendant, Taylor, for '43,4:20.70, instead of a judgment against the defendants jointly, pursuant to the summons and complaint; also as unauthorized by law." The
moving papers establish beyond controversy that the cause
of action was a joint liability on the part of Hubbell and Tay·
DANFORTH,

\
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lor as oopa:rtners. Thls the ('A)IIIlplaint alleged, the defendant
HubbeH by his default admitted, and the defendant Taylor .has
had that fact found against him by a referee, and by his silenc(~
acquiesces in the finding. lJpon that determination the plaintiffs, at the 88Dle time and by means of the same record or
judgment roll, took judgments against the defendants separately, as stated in the order to show cause. This was clearly
ll'l'egular; but we think it was nothing more. The plaintiffs
did not adhere "to the prescribed rule or mode of proceeding,''
by which they were entitled to a joint judgment, and which
a due and orderly conduct Qf the suit required them tQ take.
But this defect was merely technical and does not affect any
substantial right of the adverse party. It does not in an.v
way increase the liability of the defendant, for upon each partner rests an absolute liability for the whole amount of eve1·,\"
debt due from the partnership. Parsoru! on Partnership (2d
Ed.) 63; and although originally a joint contract, it may b'~
separate as to its effects. Though all are sued jointly and a
joint judgment obtained and a joint execution taken out, yet
it may be enforced against one only.· Each partner is answerable for the whole, and not merely for his proportionable part;
and as the judgments were taken against each partner, for a
partnership debt, the partnership property is bound to the
same extent as if there had been but one judgment,-·for the
whole, against both partners. Brinkerhoff vs. Marvin, 5 Johns.
Ch., 326. Nor does the form of the judgment in any way affect
the debtor's relations with his copartner; for if he pays the
debt Qr judgment, he will be entitled to contribution or to ct
credit for the sum paid, in any accounting respecting the partnership affairs.
Motion to set aside judgment denied.
NOTL-8ee .Mechem's Elem. ot Partn., §§ 209, 215,218.
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lfASON vs. ELDRED.
BUf'rMM Oourl of United Statu, 1861.

'wa11. 281, ts L.

Ed. 788.

)~"-

-a· ··'.

\v , . ._· • ...:~· ·:··

.

~ ·~.

Mason sued, tn the circuit court for Wisconsin, Anson~u' \.'' · \
Eldred: Elisha Eldred, and one Balcom, trading as partners, c:··" v,;
upon a partnership note of theirs. Process was served on "f • • \_. ·-"
.<\nson Eldred alone, who alone appeared, and pleaded Mn!~~¥
assumpsit. On the trial, tlle note being put in evidence by the ~ ~
plaintiff, Eldred offered the record of a judgment in one of the-f • / . . ~\Y'
state courts of Michigan, showing that Mason had alreadyt;\ } .r
brought suit in that court on the same note against the part...> ..
~
u.ership; where, though Elisha Eldred was alone served an~..)( --t. . r
alone appeared, judgment in form had passed against all the~-"
. · · .:t~
defendants for the fo11 amount doe upon the note.
~
·\ ~
The evidence being objected to by the plaintiff, because not~
.1a •.
admissible onder the pleadings, and because it appea·red on
'c~ ... ~
the face of the record that there was no judgment ag~inst ~J- ~c"
either of the defendants named except Elisha Eldred, who
. ~
alone, as appeared also, was served or appeared, and because~ fiiV- ~ '
it was insuffi.cient to bar the plaintUf's action, the qoestionv. ..., \r. ·
whether it was evidence onder the issue in bar of, and to·'- ~ '-...t.·
defeat a recovery against Anson Eldred, was certifi,ed to this~"'~ ~\ro-~ ..\
court for decision as one on which the judges of the circu~'tV
_, · ,.. ,~

;r

y\'

v' .

court were· opposed.

.
G. W. lAkin, for plaintiff.
J. W. Oary, e<mtra.

· ~~•

·
.

. ~~ .....

-~

1r

,~
\

..._/
..c\J" ~ )..· ... i
~
rf'•

J-

...

..,GJ.r • .,.,.

./' ~ ......

J. (After stating the facts.) If the note in sui('~,.../-~ '\,•
was merged' in the judgment, then the judgment is a bar to'(--~, ')t~"
the· action, and an exemplification ·of its record is admissible,~.. 1 '·. \ for it has long been settled that onder the plea of the general~.. ' ....·.....~~
issoe in assumpsit evidence may be received to show, not \ t"-merely that the alleged cause of action never existed, but also ~\.. · .
to show that it did not ·subsist at the commencement of flae i f · t t. , ,· '
suit. Young vs. Black, 7 Crancb, 565; Young vs. Rummell;: 2 1':- ~
Hill, 480. On the other band, if the note is not thus mergfd,
.
FIJIILD,

' ... . . -!

.
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it still forme a subsisting cause of action, and the judgment
i8 immaterial and irrelevant.
The question then for determination relates to the operation
of the judgment upon the note in suit.
The plaintUf contends that a copartnership note is the several obligation of each copartner, as well as the joint obliga-·
tion ·of all, and that a judgment recovered upon the note
against one copartner is not a bar to a suit upon the same note
against another copartner; and the latter position is insisted
upon as the rule of the common law, independent of the joint
debtor act of Michigan.
It is true that each copartner is bound for the entire amount
due on copartnership contracts; and that this obligation is so
far several that if he is sued alone, and does not plead the nonjoinder of his copa.rtners, a recovery may be had against him
for the whole amount due upon the contract, and a joint judgment against the copartners may be enforced against the property of each. But this is a different thing from the liability
which arises from a joint and several contract. There the
contract contains distinct engagements, that of each contractor individually, and fhat of all jointly, and. different remedies may be pursued upon each. The contractors may be
sued separately on their several engagements or together on
their joint undertaking. But in copartnerships there is no
such several liability of the copartners. The copartnerships
are formed for joint purpoeee. The members undertake joint
enterprises, they assume joint risks, and they incur in all cases
joint liabilities. In all copartnership transactions this common risk and liability exist. Therefore it is that in suits upon
these transactions all the copnrtners must be brought in, except
when there is some ground of personal release from liability,
as infancy or a discharge in bankruptcy; and if not brought
In, the omission may be pleaded in abatement. The plea in
abatement avers that the alleged promises, upon which the
action is brought were made jointly with another and not with
the defendant alone, a plea which would be without meaning,
if the oopartnership oontract was the several contract of each
oopartner.
The language of Lord MANSFIELD in giving the judgment of
the king's bench in Rice vs. Sh1tte, 5 Burr. 2611, "that all contracts with partners are joint and several, and every pa~tner
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ls liable to pay the whole," must be read in connection with the
facts of the case, and when thus read does not warrant the
conclusion that the court intended to hold a copartnership
contract the several contract of each copartner, as well as the
joint contra<lt of all the copartners, in the sense in w4ich these
terms are understood by the plaintiff's counsel, but o~ly that
the obligation. of each copartner was so far several that in a .
suit against him judgment would pass for the whole dl'mand,
if the non·joinder of his copartners was not pleaded in abate·
ment.
The plea itself, which, as the court decided, must br. intt'r·
posed in such cases, is inconsistent with the hypothesi~ of n
several liability.
For the support of the second position, that a judgment
against one copartner on a copartnership note does not con·
stitute a bar to a suit upon the same note against a not her
copartner, the plntntiff relies upon the case of Sheehy vs. Mau·
deville ~ Jamcssan, decided by this court, and reported in 6
Crancb, 254. In that case the plaintiff brought a suit upon a
promissory note given by JaJDesson for a copartnership debt
of himself and Mandeville. A previous suit bad been brought
upon the same note against Jamesson alone, and judgment
recovered. To the second suit against the two copartners the
judgment in the first action was pleaded by the defendant,
Mandeville, and the court held that it constituted no bar to
the second action, and sustained a demurrer to the plea.
The decision in this ease bas never received the entire appro·
bation of the profession, and its correctness bas been doubted
and its authority disregarded in numerous instances by the
highest tribunals of different states. It was elaborately
reviewed by the supreme court of New York in the case o!
Robertson 118. Smith, 18 Johnson, 459, where its reasoning was
declared unsatisfactory, and a judgment rendered in direct
conflict with its adjudication.
In the supreme court of Massachusetts a ruling similar to
that of Robertson 118. Smith was m'a de. Ward vs. Johnson, 13
Mass. 148. In Wtmn vs. McN-ulty, 2 Gilman, 359, the supreme
court of Illinois commented upon the case of Sheehy vs. Man·
devi.lle, and declined to follow it as authority. The court
observed that notwithstanding the respect which it felt for
the opinions of the supreme ~ourt of the United States, it
H

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 16:48 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112102486216
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

436

OASES ON PA RTNER8HIP.

was well satisfied that the rule adopted by the several state
courts--referring to those of New York, Massachusetts, llaryland, and Indiana-was ·more consistent with the principles of
law, and was supported by better reasons. ·
In Smith vB. Black, 9 Sergt. & Rawle, 142, the supreme court
of Pennsylvania held that a judgment recovered against one
of two partners was a bar to a subsequent suit against bGth,
though the new defendant was a dormant partner at the time
of the contract, and was not discovered until after the judgment. "No principle," said the court, "is better settled than
that a judgment once rendered absorbs and merges the whole
cau~ of action, and that neither the matter nor the parties
can be severt•d, unless indeed where the cause of action is joint
and seve.ral, which, certainly, actions against partners are
not."
·
·
In its opinion the court referred to Sheehy t'B. Mamleville,
and remarked that the decision in that case, however much
entitled to respect from the character of the judges who composed the supreme court of the United States, was not of
binding authority, and it was disregarded.
In King t~a. Hoar, 13 Meeson & \Velsby, 495, the question
whether a judgment recoverc>d against one of two joint con·
tractors was a bar to an action against the other, was presented to the court of exchequer and was elaborately consid·
ered. The principal authorities were reviewed, and the conclusion reached that by the judgment recovered the original
demand had passed in rem judicatam, and could not be made
the subject of another action. In the course of the argument
the case of Sheehy va. Mandeville was referred to as opposed
to the conclusion reached, and the court observed that it had
the greatest respect for any dedsion of Chief Justice MAR·
SHALL, but that the reasoning attributed to him in the report
of that case was not satisfactory. Mr. Justice STORY, in
Trafton VB. The United. States, 3 Story, 651, refers to this case
in the exchequer, and to that of Sheehy VB. Mandet:·ille, and
observes that in the first case the court of exchequer pronounced what seemed to him a very sound an~ satisfactory
judgment, and as to the decision in the latter case, that he
bad for years entertained great doubts of its propriety.
The general doctrine maintained in England and the Unl·
ted States may be briefly stated. A judgment against one
upon a joint contract of several pet'8ons, blrs an action against
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the others, though the latter were dormant partners of the
defendant in the original action, and this fact was unknown
to the plaintiff when that action was commenced. When the
contract is joint, and not joint and several, the entire cause
of action is merged in the judgment. The joint liability of
the parties not sued with those against whom the judgment
is recovered, being extinguished, their entire liability is gone.
They cannot be sued separately, for they have incurred no
several obi igation; they cannot be sued jointly with the others,
·because judgment bas been already recovered against the latter, who would otherwise be subjected to two suits for the
same cause.
If, therefore, the common-law rule were to govern the decision of this case, we should feel obliged notwithstanding
Sheehy v. Mandeti'ille, to bold that the promissory note was
merged in the judgment of the court of Michlgan, and that the
judgment would be a bar to the present action. But, by a
statute of that state, compiled laws of 1857, vol. 2, chap. 133,
page 1219, the rule of the common law is changed with respect
to judgments upon demands of joint debtors, when some only
of the parties are served with process. · The statute enacts
that "in actions against two or more persons jointly indebted
upon any joint obligation, contract, or liability, if the process
against all of the defendants shall have been duly served upon
either of them, the defendant so served shall answer to the
plaintiff, and in such case the judgment, if rendered in favor
of the plaintiff, shall be against all the defendants in the same ,
manner as if all had been served with process," and that, "such
judgment shall be conclusive evidence of t'he liabilities of the
defendant who was served with process in the suit, or who
appeared therein; but against every other defendant it shn II be
evidence only of the extent of the plaintiff's demand, nfter the
liability of such defendnnt shall have been established by other
evidence."
Judgments in cases of this kind against the parties not
sened with proce!:is, or who do not appear ther(•in, have no
binding force upon them, personally. The principle is as old
as the law, and is of universal justice, that no one shall be personally bound until he bas bad his day in court, which nwans
until citation is issued to him, and opportunity to be hNtrrl is
afforded. D'Arcy vs. Ketchum., 1 Howard 165. Nor is t~
demand against the pat-ties not sued merged in the judgm£>nt
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against the party brought into court. The statute declares
what the effect of the judgment against him shall be with
respect to them; it shaJl only be evidPnce of the extent of the
plaintiff's demand after their liability is by other evidence
establisl.ted. It is entirely within the power of the state to
limit the ~peration of the judgment thus recovered. The state
can as well modify the consequf:'nces of a judgment in respect
to its effect as a merger and extinguishment of the originnl
demand, as it can modify the operation of the judgment in any
other particular.
A similar statute exists in the state of New York, and th~
highest tribunals of New York and Michigan, in construing
these statutes, have held, n~twithstanding the special proceedings which they authorize agninst the partiE's not serveo
to bring them afterward before the court, if found within the
state, that such parties may be sued upon the original demand.
In Bonesteel t•s. Todd, 9 Mich. 379, an action of covenant was
brought against two parties to recover rent reserved upon a
lease. One of them was alone served with process, and he
appeared and pleaded the general issue, and ~n the trial, as in
the case at bar, pr~duced the record ~f a judgment recoverE>d
against himself and his co-defendant under the joint debtoxact of New York, process in that state having been served upon
his co-defendant alone. The court below held the jud~ment to
be a bar to the action. On error to the supreme oourt of the
state this ruling was held t~ be erroneous. After referring to
decisions in New York, the oourt said, "No one ha.s ever·
doubted the continuing liability of all parties. We cannot,
therefore, regard the Jiability as extinguished. And, inasmuch
as the new action must be based upon the ~riginal claim, while,
as in the case of foreign judgments at common law, it may be·
of no great importance whether the action may be brought in
form upon the judgment, or on the previous debt, it is certainly more in harmony with our practice to resort to the form·
of action appropriate to the real demand in controversy.
While we do not decide an action in form on the jodgmt•nt to
be inadmissible, we think the action on the contract the better·
remedy to be pursued."
In Oakley va. Aspinwall, 4 N. Y. 513, the court of appeals
of New York bad occasion to consider the effect of a judgment
recovered under the joint debtor act of that state upon the·

l·
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original demand. Mr. Justice BRONSON, spenking for the court,
Rnys: ''It is said that the original demnnd was mct·gcd in,
and extinguished by the judgment, and consequently, that the
plnintiff must sue upon the judgment, if he sues at all. That
would undoubtedly be so if both the defendants had been before the court in the original action. But the joint debtor act
creates an anomaly in the law. And for the purpose of giving
effect to the statute, and at the same time preserving the
t·ights of all parties, the plaintiff must be allowed to sue on the
original demand. There is no difficulty in pursuing such a
course; it can work no injury to any one, and it will avoid the
absurdity of allowing a party to sue on a pretended cause of
action which is, in truth, no cause of action at all, and then to
recover on proof of a different demand."
Following these authorities, and giving the judgment recovered in Michigan the same effect and operation that it would
have in that state, we answer the question presented in the
certificate, that the exemplification of the record of the judg·
ment recovered against the defendant, Elisha Eldred, offered
by the defendant, Anson Eldred, is not admissible in evidence
in bar of, and to defeat, a recovery against the latter.
NOT&: See )(eobem'a Elem. of Pan..., II 810,

au..
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HALE vs. SPAULDlNG, et al.

Supreme Oourt of Massachusetts, 1888.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 16:48 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112102486216
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

145

M~.

482, 14 N. E. Rep. 534, 1 Am. St. Rep. 475.

Contract, upon an instrument under seal, dated May 23,
1885, by the t~rms of which the defendants, six in number,
~ ( agreed to pay to the plaintiff, on demand, six-sevenths of any
\\
loss to which he might be subjected as the indorser of a certain
,.. ~ note for a corporation.
\, " •. \~
Aaron ~· Saltmarsh alone defended. He filed an answer
~ 7 · \f
'alleging that the plaintiff, since the execution of the contract
· ~(
declared on, had executed and delivered the following paper,
under seal, to ·one of the joint obligors under the contract:
"Received of L. V. Spaulding $1060.84, in full satisfaction
/
for his liability on the document" signed, etc., and dated May

,§('
.
·
V
,,

23, 1885.

·.

'v.'
, .,
J*
~/
~
~. .

v

.. N..,.
-· - ,

.,;
(.

~r

.l

.

At thEI trial in the Superior Court before HAMMOND, J., it
appeared that on September 20, 1886, the defendants, except
Saltmarsh, settled with the plaintiff for their proportionate part
of the amount alleged to be due under the agreement declared
on, and the plaintiff executed the paper under seal, annexed to
the answer, and delivered i.t to the defendant Spaulding. The
plaintiff offered to prove facts showing that, in giving said
sealed paper annexed to the answer, there was no intention of
releasing the defendant Saltmarsh. The judge ruled that said
offer was not material, and that said sealed paper released the
defendant Saltmarsh, and ordered a verdict for the defendant.
The plaintiff_alleged exceptions.

W. H. Mondy for the plaintiff.
H. N. ]Je1-rill for Saltmarsh.
C. ALLEN, J. The words "in full satisfaction for his liability"
import a release and discharge to Spaulding, and, the instrument being under se.al, it amounts to a t-echnical release. The
plaintiff does not controvert the general rule, that a release to
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Wiggin vs. Tudor, 23 Pick. 434,
Goodnowvs. Smith, 18 Pick. 414. Pond vs. Williams,

one joint obligor releases all.
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1 Gray, 630, 636.

But this result is avoided when the instrument is so drawn as to show a contrary intention. 1 Lindl.
Part. 433. 2 Chit. Con. (11th Am. ed.) 1154 et seq. Ex parte
Good, 6 Ch. D. 46t 55. The diffi~ulty with the plaintiff's case
is, that there is nothing in the instrument before us to show
such contrary intention. U sua.lly a reservation of rights
against other parties is inserted for that purpose; or the instrument is put in the form of a covenant not to sue. See Kenworthy vs. Sawyer, 125 Mass. 28; Willis vs. DeCastro, 4 C .
.B. (N. S.) 216; North vs. Wakefield, 13 Q. B. 536, 541.
Parol evidence to show the actual intention is incompetent.
Tuckerman t•s. Newhall, 17 Mass. 580, 585. The instrument
given in this case was a mere receipt under seal of money from
one of several joint obligors, in full satiE~faction for his liability
on the document signed by himself and otherH. There is
nothing to get hold of to show an intent to reserve rights
against the others. He might already have discharged each of.
them by a similar release.
Exceptions overruled.
NOTE.-See Mechem's Elements of Partn., § 21~.

.. ..
_) .'~

GOODNOW vs. SMITH.

j _l ,. ·

Supreme Court of Massao~usetts, 1836.
18 Pick. 414, 29 Am. Dec. 600.

f\
I

lj<.

./\...,/ ..
~l,;

~,JAssumpsit on a joint and several promissory note for five
.· ~ r
hundred and fifty-one dollars, executed by the defendants Smith)_..,.,· :, ~" ·
and Adams. Plea, by the defendant, Smith, the general issue, \ · ,_,,...
,
'
f\ '·
•
the defendant,· Adams being defaulted. Smith's defense was,• '-:
"·
that before the note was due the plaintiff agreed with him, if he ,..'; \.•
would pay half the note and take at par a certain note for a "
~mall sum of one Willis, indorsed by the plaintiff, without recourse, he would exonerate and discharge him from payment
of the other half; and that he, the said Smith, then paid said'
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half and took Willis' note as agreed. The jury were instructed:
1. That the consideration for said agreement was sufficient.
2. That the agreement was a covenant not to sue Smith, and as
the plaintiff had recourse against the other debtor alone, the
agr~ement must be taken as equivalent to a release to avoid
circuity of action. 3. That the agreement was admissible in
evidence under the general issue.
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Farley and 1lfellen for the plaintiff.
Hoar and llfann for the defendant.
By Court, WILDE, J. This case turns on the distinction be- ·
tween a technical release and a covenant not to sue one of two
joint obligors or promisors. The distinction is, that a release
to one of two joint and several obligors discharges both, whereas a covenant with one not to sue him is not to be construed as
a release, so as to discharge the other.obligor. This distinction
is well founded on principle, and is supported by all the authoriti~. In the case of Lacy vs. Kynaston, 2 Salk. 575, which
was an action on a joint and several obligation, it was decided
that a covenant not to sue one of the obligors would not operate as a defeasance or release, because to construe it so would
discharge the other obligor; but if the covenantee had been the
sole obligor, then the covenant, although not a release in its
nature, should be so construed, to avoid circuity of action.
The same principles were laid down in the case of Dean vs.
Newhall, 8 T. R. 168. That also was an action on a joint and
several bond, and the defendant pleaded a release to Taylor,
the other obligor, upon which issue was joined. At the trial
it app~ared that the plaintiff had covenanted not to sue Taylor,
and in the deed of covenant be had agreed that in case be should
sue, etc., that deed "should be a sufficient release and discharge
to all intents and purposes, both at law and in equity, to and·
for the t;aid C. Taylor, etc., and as such should and might be
pleaded in bar by him the said C. Taylor." Notwithstanding
this agreement, it was held that covenant could not be plE>.aded
in bar as a release and discharge, on the distinction laid down
in the case of Lacy vs. KynlJston, and in other cases there
cited. And these decisions are approved and confirmed in
Hutton vs. Eyre, 6 Taunt. 289; in Rowley vs. Stoddard, 7
Johns. 207; in Shed vs. Pierce, 17 Mass. 623; and in Harri·
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son 1JS. Olose,2 Johns. 448 (3 Am. Dec. 444). It is therefore a
well-established principle that although an actual release to one
of two joint and several obligors or promisors is o. discharge of
the debt, and consequently may be pleaded in bar by both of
the obligors or promisors, yet that a covenant Ot' agreement with
one of several joint obligors, not to sue him, cannot be so
pleaded. For if such a covenant or promise not to sue were
allowed to operate as a discharge of one of several joint promisors or obligors, the creditor could have no remedy against the
other obligor or promisor, although he had expressly or impliedly reserved the right to proceed against him.
This consequence would not follow if the obligation or promise were joint and several; for in such a case the creditor might
sue the party with whom no agreement had been made, and
there would be no nec~ssity for his resorting to a joint action.
But if on this distinction the matter relied on by the defendant,
Smith, would amount to a defense to the whole action at common law, the plaintiff being entitled to a separate action against
Adams. yet since the stat. 1834, c. 189, no such defense can be
maintained. For by that statute the plaintiff is entitled to have
judgment against Adams, and Smith may defend himself, we
think, in this action in the same manner as he could if the
action had been brought against him alone.
It is objected that there was no consideration for the agreement with Smith, but certainly the pa:tment of half the note
before it was du-e, and taking the note of Willis at par, was a
sufficient consideration.
We are of opinion therefore that the plaintiff is entitled to
judgment against Adams, and that Smith is entitled to judgment for his costs.
·
Nom.-See Mechem's Elementa of Partn., § 212.

xn.
OF DISSOLUTION AND NOTICE.

Supreme Court of Minnesota,

188~.

81 Minn. 186, 17 N. W. Rep. 275.

Action f{)r an accounting and the winding up of the affaira of
a partnership. The plaintiffs in the action are three of the
partners and the widow and heirs-at-law of a fourth partner,
and the defendant is the only other partner. From the articles
which are dated March 15, 1880, it appears that the partnership was formed, under the name of the Clum Compounding
Company, for the purpose of manufacturing and selling a medicine, and that the partnership was "to have an existence of
thirty years from the date of these articles, un~ess sooner
dissolved by mutual consent." The articles also provide for
the taking of inventories at stated times, nnd that, in case any
member of the partnership may wish at any time to dispose of
his interest in the business, the other partners are to have the
right to purchase such interest by paying its value as determined by the last preceding inventory. The articles then provide that "in case of death of any member of the company, the
heirs of such member may retain their interest therein, with all
the rights and privileges of the original members; and the
administrator of his estate, or the executor under his will, shall
reJ•resent such heir or heirs at the meetings (or otherwise) of
said company, 8() as to share the burden of management; and
in the event that this cannot be done, the company shall have
the right to ~urchase the interest of such deceased member in
the same manner, and for the same amount, as in the case of

HOARD

vs. CLt:.M.

4!5

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 16:48 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112102486216
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

a member wishing to sell as before stated. Nothing· in the
foregoing articles is to be construed as meaning that the com·
pany is compelled to pay at the inventory price, but it simply
'ives the right to lmy on the above-named terms if it chooses
to do so; and each party to this agreement hereby grants such
right and privilege to buy such retiring or deceased party's
interest on above-n.amed terms; the company reserving the
right to buy at better figure and terms if they can." The
complaint further alleges the adoption of a resolution, on
February 17, 1882, for the discontinuance of business and the
~issolution of the partnership, and due notice thereof givf'n to
defen_d ant; also the death of one of the partners, on April 1,
18~2, and the refusal of f:'ach and all of the plaintiffs to purchase the interest of the deceased partner.
Df:>fendant demur red to the complaint on the grounds (1)
that there is a defect of parties plaintiff, and (2) that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action. The demurrer was overruled and the defendant ap·
pealed.

H. 0. Williston, for plaintiff.
J. 0. McClure, for appellant.
BERRY, J. 1. An excess of parties is not ground of demurrer
as "a defect of parties," in the meaning of Gen. St. 1878, c. 66,
f 92, subd. 4; Pomero.v on Rt>medies, § 206; Richtmyer vs.
Richtmyer, 50 Barb. (N.Y.) 55; Allen vs. Oity of Buffalo, 38 N.Y.
280; Leu:is vs. lV-illia.ms, !-l l-linn. 95 (151 )~
2. Three members of a partnership firm and the heirs of a
deceased fourth bring this action against the remaining member, for the purpose (1) of having the partnership adjudged
dissolved; (2) of having the partnership wound up, and, to that
end, an acconnting bad, a receiver appointed, its assets converted, its debts paid, and the rights of the partners arnong
themselves ascertained and adjusted.
In the absence of previous agreement to the contrary, the
death of a partner works a total dissolution of a partnership;
that is to say, a dissolution both as respects the deceased and
the surviving partners: Pollock on Partnership, § 183; Collyer on Parfnership, ~§ 103, 106; Story on Partnership, §§ 317,
319 a; Marlett vs. Jackman, 3 Allen (Mass.) 287; Roberts VB.
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Kel8ey, 38 Mich. 602; 1 Lindley on Partnership, 231. A simple

provision in the articles for the continuance of the partnet·ship
for a fixed period, as, in the present instance, for thirty years,
is not such an agreement: Collyer on Partnership, §§ 100, lOS;
Oratofora tB. Hamilton, 3 Madd. 251; Crosbie VB. Guion, 23 BeaY.
518; Story on Partnership, § 319 a. Mining partnerships
appear to be governed by somewhat different rules: Jones 'VB.
• Clark, 42 Cal. 180.
In case of such diBSolution, the right of surviving partners
and of the representative of a deceased partner to have the
partnership wound up, and any surplus property distributed,
is matter of course; 1 Collyer on Partnership, § 107.
In the case at bar the partnership was dissolved by the death
of the partner Hoard. 'l'he articles contain no stipulation
for the continuance of the business of the concern, except upon
specified contingencies, none of which have occurred, and none
of which, therefore, cut any material figure in the case. It
follows that the three partnera plaintiff can maintain this
action against the partner who refuses to recognize the dissolution, and to co-operate in closing up and adjusting the businees
of the concern. As respect! their right to maintain it, it is not
important that the heirs of the fourth partner, who are joined
with them as plaintUfs, have alleged no facts to show that
they are proper parties to the action, nor that the executor or
administrator of the deceased is not joined; for no objectioa,
as respects parties, has been taken, except that there is a defect
ef parties on account of the· joinder of the heirs, and this we
have disposed of.
Order affirmed.
Nou: Bee Mechem's Elem. of Partn., ~ 2(3.
See allo ouea under Subd. VW, A.O'l'IONS BftW&D PARTRD8.

HALSEY vs. .No ..To..s-.

4:47

HALSEY vs. NORTON.
Bu.preme Coort of Mississippi, 1871.
45 Miss. 703, 7 Am Rep. 745.
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Action by Norton as assignee in bankruptcy of H. F . Giren
and D. A. Giren, as members of the firm of Giren, Brown &
Co., n~ainst Halsey. Judgment below for plaintiff. Halsey
appealed.
W. & J. R. Yerger, for appellant.

No counsel for appellee.
J. It is urged for the plaintiff in error that the
judgment ought to be reversed because the assignee. Norton,
ought to have united with him as co-plaintiff the solvent partner. It wae said by the Chief Baron in Taylor vs. Fields, 4 Ves.
396~ "that the surplus of partnership effects is joint prop£>rty;
and that the interest of each partner is only his share of what
remains after the partnership accounts are taken." The
anignee takes precisely the position of the bankrupt, as
respects the joint property. That Interest is transferred to
him to be administered for the creditors. Bankruptcy does not
divest the title of the solvent partner. It dissolves the copartnership, and constitutes the assignee and the solvent partner
tenants in common or joint owners. To stand in a court of law,
the plaintiff must have th~ entire legal right; if tM title be
held by several, all must join in the suit. Eckhard 'VB. Wilson,
R Term Rep. 140, a.nd Murray 'VB. MurrG1J, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) ch.
70, a.re to the point that the assignee and the solvent partner
must unite in a suit respecting the joint effects and choses in
action. But it must be manifested. that there is another person, n'Ot co-plaintiff, who ought to, etc.; this may be by plea in
abatement, or by nonsuit if proved on the trial (1 Chitty's
Plead. 452, 453); or by demurrer if it a.ppears on the face of the
declaration. The declaration is thus: "E. E. Norton, assignee,
etc., of Henry F. Giren and Dickson A. Giren, as members of
the firm of Giren, Brown & Co." It is not averred who com•
SIMRALL,
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pose the firm, except these two bankrupts, nor does It appear
atllrmatively that there were any other members; the copart·
nership name may be and often is purely artificial, not discovering who are its members. Proof was not made on the trial
that any other person was a member, although objection was
made by the defendant to the admission of evidence, in truth
of the account, on that ground. If it was not apparent on the
record that there was a solvent partner; if the defendant pro·
posed to nonsuit the plaintiff or prevent his recovery, she
ought to have proved the existence of such a partner. We do
not think that the record presents the point made by the plain·
tift in error, so that she can avail of it in this court.
Atllrmed.
Nou: See Mechem's Elem. of Partn. • 1 247; Bank w. R. R., ante, p. 147.

HOWELL vs. HARVEY.
Supreme Oourt of .A.rkltnBtU, 18..f:J.
IJ Ark. 270, 89 Am. Dec. 876.

Bill for an accounting brought by Harvey, alleging that he
and one Shanklin sold a store of goods to John. Howell and
McConnell, taking their notes for the purchase price. That
McConnell afterwards withdrew; and Harvey bought his inter·
est, paying therefor hi8 share in the notes. One Smith was
afterwards taken in as partner. The remaining facts suf·
ftciently appear from the opinion. Judgment for the complain·
ant. The defendants appealed.

Linton, for the appellant&
Pike and Baldwin, contra.
LAOY, J. It is said that the bill should have been dism1s~f>d
upon the hearing, for the want of proper parties. We think
otherwise. The necessary parties were all before the con rt.
The ftrm of John Howell & Co. was composed of John D. Harvey, John Howell, and John B. Howell. nnd the record shows
• that no one else had any interest in their business, or the set·
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tlement of their accounts; Shanklin had not the most remote
connection with the partnership concern. Harvey bought an
interest in· a stock of goods of John Howell, and credited a
n<>te that he and Shanklin jointly held on Howell and McC<>nnell with the amount of the purchase money. This he had a
right to do. Should Harvey have used more than his just proportion of this joint note, he would unquestionably be answerable over to Shanklin; but then it is manifest that this mere
possible liability of Harvey would give Shanklin n<> interest in
the partnership concern, nor would it entitle him to be made
a party to the present suit. Smith was originally one <>f the
partners with Harvey and Howell, but after continuing in the
firm eight or nine months, he sold and conveyed all his interest
to John B. H<>well, with the consent and approbation of the
other partners. As it is evident that John B. Howell was substituted as a partner in the firm in the place of Smith, he of
course was subrogated to all the rights and privileges of
Smith, who has no interest in the present suit. The rule on
the subject of making the necessary parties in suits of equity,
is so plain and universal that it can neither be mistaken nor
misapplied. All persons should be made parties who have an
interest in the matters in dispute, or who may be benefited or
injured by the decree. This rule has been followed in the present instance, and therefore it was proper to hear the cause
upon its merits: Wendell vs. Van Rensselaer, 1 Johns. Ch. 349;
Petch vs. Dalton, 8 Price, 9; Duff vs. East India Oo., 15 Ve~. 213,
227. The business was to be conducted in the name of John
Howell and Company, and Howell and Harvey were to share
an equal moiety of the profits and l<>sses with Smith, and upon
the dissolution of the partnership, Smith was to be reimbursed
for the excess of his advances with six per cent interest.
Smith and Howell agreed to advance the necessary funds, as
far as practicable, to keep up a supply of goods, and Harvey
was to attend to selling them while at home. Smith, as before
stated, sold and cooveyed t<> Jo;tm B. Howell all his interest
on the sixteenth of December, 1838; thereupon Howell was
admitted as a partner, with all Smith's rights, and he took
upon himself the discharge of all his duties. The bill states
that the complainant performed his part of the agreement,
and that John Howell and John B. Howell violated their contract, in not furnishing the necessary supplies of goods for
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the store; that John Howell went to Philadelphia and bought
a large stock of goods and shipped them in his own name, and
on his return advertised a disaolution of the copartnership,
with the consent of John B. Howell, in the absence of the complainant, and against his Will. It avers that John Howell took
all the goods, books, and accounts into his own hands, and
excluded Haney from all participation in the business. The
bill makes John Howell and John B. Howell defendants, and
prays an account may be taken; that the partnership may be
continued or dissolved, as the equity of the case may be, and it
concludes with a prayer for general relief.
The answers admit most of the material allegatioos of the
bill. The answer of John Howell insists that he, together
with Smith, had purchaJ~ed the necessary supplies for the
atore, and that he bought the goods at Philadelphia, on his
own account and shipped in his own name, and that he
excluded the complainant from intermeddlin~ with the partnership effects and from taking charge of the goods of him·
self, and that h.e dissolved the firm, as he had the right to do,
because the complainant was guilty of groes negligence and
misconduct, in not attending to the busineu of the firm, and
in absenting himself unnecessarily from the state.
A partnership, in its most significant and extended sense,
is a voluntary contract of two or more persons for joining
together their money, goods, labor, and skill, or either or all
of them, upon an agreement that the gain or loss shall be
divided proportionably between them, and having for its object
the advancement and protection of fair and open trade: Gow.
Part. p. 1; Story's Part. p. 1; 1 Poth. Pand. lib. 17, tit. 2;
Introd. 1 Domat Civ. h b. 1, tit. 8, art. 1. This is, substantially, the definition given by all the writers on the sub·
ject, and it embraces within its terms and spirit all the
principal obligations and duties of the contract. It is per·
fectly clear, upon principle aa well as authority, that
wherever the conditions of the partnership are incapable
of being fulfilled, or· the fruits arising from the agreement can not be properly enjoyed, that such a case furnishes a good cause for the renunciation of either party. Under
such circum~tances the further continuance of the partner·
ship would be productive of serious inconvenience and great
injury to the other partners, and might end in their immediate
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ruin or the utter prostration of the busines1. Story on Part.
'19, 421. ·The same doctrine is fully borne out by the civil
law, and is illustrated by the case of a partner, where one of
the partners is grievol}sly oppressed with insolvency, or where
from some bodily infirmity he is unable to discharge his
engagements. The jurisdiction of a court of equity, in cases
of copartnership dowing from the peculiar trust and duties
growing out of that connection, is of the most extensive and
beneficial character. It often declares partnerships utterly
void, in cases of fraud, imposition, and oppression in the original agreement; or decrees a dissolution of a partnership which
was unobjectionable in its origin, but which subsequent causes
have rendered onerous and oppressive; gross misconduct, want
of good faith, or crimisal want of diligence, or such cause as
is productive of serious and permanent injury in the partnership concerns, or renders it impracticable to carry on the business, is good ground for a dissolution at the suit of the injured
partner. . Habitual drunkenness, great extravagance, or
unwarrantable negligence in conducting the business of the
partnership, justifies a• dissolution; but then it must be a
strong and clear case of positive or meditated abuse to authorize such a decree. For minor misconduct and grievances, if
they require redress, the court will interfere by way of injunction to prevent the mischief: Story on Part. 4H, 415.
The application of the pri~ciples here stated will test the
conduct of the complainant, and show whether or not the
defendan.t~John Howell, was justified in renouncing the copart·
nership at the time and under the circumstances of the present case. The proof is somewhat contradictory on this point;
still the weight of the testimony, both in respect of numbers
and the circumstances detailed by the witness, is clearly with
the complainant. The articles of partnership show that the
defendants were to furnish the funds to keep up the necessary
supplies, when it was in their power to do so, and that the
complainant was to attend to selling the goods while he
remained at home. The terms of this agreement clearly indicate that the parties never contemplated that slight negle~t
or accidental failure of their respective engagements should
dissolve the partnership. The articles of the partnership oonclusively show that the parties themselves looked to unequivocal demonstrations of gross acts of abuse and misconduct,
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where the injury would be imminent and irreparable, to authorize a dissolution. It is true that the complainant was absent
in Kentucky upon several occasions, but then, business or his
family afflictions seem to have called and detained him there;
and the proof is that .Howell was apprised of his absence, and
so far from objecting to his going the last time to Kentucky,
or making it a cause of complaint against him, that upon- the
eve of starting for Philadelphia to purchase goods, he urged
the complainant to get back against his return, and be ready
to receive the goods. This the complainant tried to do, but
was detained by the sickness of his family, and did not arrive
until after Howell's return with the goods, which he claims
to have purchased for himself, and until after he had published
the diS&Olution of the copartnership. Jiowell, it seems, never .
intimated a wish or desire to dissolve the copartnership before
he started to Philadelphia. The testimony is that in the opinion of some of the witnesses, the complainant was not a very
profitable or attentive partner, but it wholly fails to establish
such overt acts of misconduct or gross negligence aa would
authorize a dissolution of the partnership.
In the present case the partnership was to continue during
the pleasure of the contracting parties. It is therefore strictly
a partnership at will, and subject to the rules that govern
such agreements. Chancellor KENT says, that It is a.n established principle of the law of partnership, that if it be without
any definite period, any party may withdraw at a minute's
notice when be pleases and dissolve the pa.rtnersbip. The existence of engagements with third person.s will not prevent
the dissolution, though their engagements will not be affected
by the act. lie admits that cases may occur where reasonable
notice might be advantageous, but be holds it not to be requisite, and be adds that a party may, in a case free from fraud,
choose an unreasonable time for the dissolution. The exception
be makes in a case of fraud, indicates to our minds that the
rule is not so unbending or universal, as it is laid down, unless
the limitation is intended to include those cases where the
renunciation is made in good faith and at a proper time. As
a general principle, contracts subsisting during pleasure, are
naturally and necessarily dissolvable by the mere exercise of
the will of either of the parties; and this is the principle according to the civil law under ordinary circumstances, and to
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such an extent is it carried that a positive stipulation against
the dissolution at the will of either of the parties will be held
utterly void, as inconsistent with the true nature and intent
of such relation. In cases of equity, we think the true rule to
be this,that to enable one partner to dissolve at will the partnership, two things must occur; first, the renunciation of the
partnership must be in good faith, and secondly, it must not
be made at an unreasonable time. This is the doctrine of the
civil law, and of the code of Louisiana, and Pothier lays down
the same rule, and inculcates it in the same manner; for be
says that no partner bas a right to prefer his own particular
interest to that of the firm, or to take away its profits, or to appropriate them to his own private advantage, and it is upon
this principle, that while a partner is engaged in business,
courts of equity will restrain him from like pursuits. He bas
no right to divert from the firm the diligence, skill, or capital
that rightfully belongs to it. The French civil law expresses
the whole law upon the subject in the following brief terms:
"Dissolution of partnerships," says Domat, "by the will of
one of the partners, a.pplies only to partnerships the duration
of which is unlimited, and is effected by a renunciation notified
to all the parties; provided such renunciation be bona {ilk; and
not made at an improper time." Renunciation is held not to
be made bona fide, where one partner renounces in order to
appropriate to himself the profits which the partners are entitled to receive. It is said to be made at an improper time,
when the things are no longer entire that were of consequence
to partnership, and which should have deferred the dissolu·
tion. A partnership for a limited period of time cannot be
dissolved at the mere pleasure of one of the parties, within the
time prescribed. On the contrary, it only can be dissolved from
just motives and for a reasonable cause. There is an implied
understanding that the partnership shall continue to the expiration of the term, unt .. ss where one partner fails in his
engagements, or any habitual infirmity renders him unfit to
carry on the business, or where the renunciation is for the
benefit of the partnership and not for the advantage of the
dissolving partner. The principle here stated is extracted from
all the authorities by Justice STORY, and ·fully approved by
him in his complete and admir·able treatise upon partnerships.
In cases where the partnership is to endure for a limited
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period of time, the question, whether within that period it
may be dissolved by the mere act and will of one of the partners, without the consent of the others, is not definitely or
absolutely settled, says Justice STORY, in our- jurisprudence.
He clearly intimates, if ever such a case should arise; where
one partner claimed the right, sua sponte, of dissolving the
partnership, that he pO'Ssesses no such power; and he takes
the distinction between a court of equity dissolving the partnership, and that of a partner, acting upon his own caprice and
pleasure, dissolving the engagement. He admits the doctrine
to be somewhat different according to the Roman law; but he
denies that a partner has a right to found his own claim to
immediate indemnity and safety by committing a known injury
on the interest and privile~s of his copartners: and in this
opinion he is sustained by many elementary writers and a
number of adjudged cases of unquestionable authority: Gow.
on Part. c. 5, sec. 1, 219, 225, 226, 288; 3 Coli. Part. b. 1, c. 2,
sec. 2, p. 62, 2d Ed.; Kent's Com. sec. 43, pp. 61, 4th Ed.;
Peacock vs. Peacock, 16 Ves. 56; Orateshay VB. Maule, 1 Swans.
495; Peat·point vB. Graham, 4 'Yash. 0. C. 234.
The partner who breaks off the partnership with an unfair
design, or for selfish objects, discharges his copartners from
all liabilities to him, but he does not thereby free himself from
his obligations to them. W'hen he quits the partnership, that
~e may buy for himself what the partnership has a right to
purchase, or that be may make a profit for his own advantage
and to their prejudice, he is answ.erable to the community for
the loss and damage; and so, if he quits at an unreasonable
time, which occasioned a deprivation of profits to the community, it is but right he should repair and make good such
loss: Poth. Pand. lib. 17, tit. 2, n. 64-68; Domat, b. 1, tit. 8, sec.
5; arts 1-8, by Straham; Story on Pal'lt. 383-420.
The proof in this case clearly shows that Howell renounced
the partnership for his own private advantage, and not to benefit the firm. He said nothing to his partner of his wish to
dissolve until his return from I>hiladelphia. He then advertised a dissolution of the firm, and seized all the goods and
effects into his own hands. While he was In partnership with
Harvey, he had no right to purchase the goods in his own
name; for in doing so he would have acted in bad faith, and
besides, Harvey would have been answerable for the purchase.
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Was it more to Howell's interest, or to the firm's, that the dissolution should take place at the time it did? The answer to
this inquiry is neither difticult nor doubtful. At the time
Howell published the dissolution of the copartnership, merchants were realizing large profits upon their stock, and goods
were sold readily at an advance of fifty to one hundred per
cent. Did be not dissolve the partnership that he might buy
for himself and realize this profit? ·were not the other part·
ners of the firm prejudiced in their business, and he benefited
by the transaction? Were not his motives sinister and selfish,
and did be not withdraw from the community at an unwarrantable time and in bad faith? The proof leaves no doubt
upon this subject, and if the rules and principles above stated
be correct, then he is unquestionably answerable to the complainant for the damages he may have sustained. That da.mage
seems to have been calculated and awarded upon a correct
basis. The chancellor, in rendering the decree, debited and
credited ea.ch of the partners in conformity to the articles of
agreement, with their respective advances and expenditures,
taking a list of the notes and accounts furnished by the books,
and properly auditing them; and he then charged Howell with
fifty per 'Cent profit upon the whole amount of goods ·he purchased at Philadelphia, as well as the stock on hand belonging
to vhe firm. In this calculation and adjustment, we perceive no
error.
Decree affirmed.
NOTE: See 'PtfechPm'e Elem. of Partn., §§ 237, Ml,
Compare with following C&Ee.

SOLO.MON vs. KIRKWOOD.
Supreme Court of Michigan,

188~.

M Mich. 2M, 21 N. W. Rep. 386.

The plaintiffs, who are, in the .c ity of Chicago, dealers in
jewelry, seek to charge the defendants, as partners, upon a
promissory note for $791.92, bearing date November 9, 1882,
and signed "Hollander & Kirkwood." The note was given by
the defendant Hollander, but Kirkwood denies that any part46
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nership existed between the defendants at the date of the
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The evidence given on the trial tends to show that on July
6, 1882, Hollander & Kirkwood entered into a written agreement for a partnership for one year from the first day of the
next ensuing month, in the business of bl;lying and selling
jewelry, clocks, watches, etc., and in repairing 'clocks, watches,
and jewelry, at Ishpeming, ·Michigan. Business was begun
under this agreement, and .continued until the latter part of
October, 1882, when Kirkwood, becoming dissatisfied, locked
up the goods and excluded Hollander altogether from the
busineSB. He also caused notice to be given to all persollB
with whom the firm bad bad dealings that the partnership
was dissolved, and bad the following inserted in the local
column of the paper published at Ishpeming: "The copartner·
ship heretofore existing between Mr. C. H. Kirkwood and one
Hollander, aa jewelers, has ceased to exist, Mr. Kirkwood
having purchased the interest of the latter." This was not
signed by any one.
A few days later Hollander .went to Chicago, and there, on
November 9, 1882, he bought, in the name of .Hollander &
Kirkwood, of the plaintiffs goods in their line amounting to
'791.92, and gave to the plaintiffs therefor the promissory note
now in suit. The note was made payable December 15, 1882,
at a bank in Ishpeming. When the purchase was completed
Hollander took away the goods in his satchel. The plaintitfg
had before had no dealings with Hollander & Kirkwood, but
they bad heard that there was such a firm, and were not aware
of its dissolution. They claim to have made tb.e sale in good
faith, and in the belief that the firm was still in existence. On
the other hand, Kirkwood claimed that Hollander and the
plaintiffs had conspired together to defraud him by a .Pretended sale to the firm of goods which the plaintiffs knew Hollander intended to appropriate exclusively to himself; and he
was allowed to prove declarations of Hollander which, if
admissible, would tend strongly to prove such a conspiracy.
The questions principally contested on the trial were-First,
whether the acts of Kirkwood amounted to a dissolution of the
partnership; second, whether sufficient notice of dissolution
was given; and, third, whether there was any evidence to go
to the jury of an understanding between Hollander and the

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 16:48 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112102486216
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

SOLOMON VS. KIRKWOOD.

457

plaintiffs to defraud Kirkwood. The trial judge, in submitting
the case to the jury, instructed them that Kirkwood, notwith·
standing the written agreement, had a right to withdraw from
the partnership at any time, leaving matters between him and
Hollander to be adjusted between them amicably or in the
courts; and for the purposes of this case it made no difference
whether Kirkwood was right or wrong in bringing the part·
nership to an end; if wrong, he might be liable to Hollander
in damages for the breach of his contract. Al90, that when
partners are dissatisfied, or they cannot get along together,
and one partner withdraws, the partnership is then at an end
aa to the public and parties with whom the partnership deals,
and neither partner can make contracts in the future to bind
the partnership, provided the retiring partner gives the proper
notice. Also, that if they should find from the evidence that
there was trouble between Holland~r and Kirkwood prior to
the sale of the goods and the giving of the note; that Kirk·
wood informed Hollander, in substance, that he would have
no more dealings with him as partner; that he took poesession
of all the goods and locked them up, and from that time th~y
ceased to do business-then the partnership was dissolved.
Farther, that whether sufficient notice had been given of the
dissolution was a question for the jury. Kirkwood was not
bound to publish notice in any of the Chicago papers; be was
only bound to give actual noti~ to such parties there as had
dealt with the partnership. But Kirkwood was bound to use
all fair means to publish as widely as pos~ible the fact of a dis·
solution. Publication in a newspaper is . one of the proper
means of giving notice, but it is not absolutely essential; and
' on tbjs branch of the case the question for the jury was
whether Kirkwood gave such notice of the dissolution as under
the circumstances was fair and reasonable. If he did, then he
is not liable on the note; if be did not, he would still continue
liable.
The judge also submitted to the jury the question of fraud
in the sale of the goods. The jury returned a verdict for the
defendants. Plaintiff brings error.
Ball & Han8com, for appellants.
W. P. Healy, for appellee.

CooLEY, C. J. (After stating the facts as above.) I. "Ve
think the judge committed no error in his instructions respect·
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ing the dissolution of the partnership. The rule on this subject is thus stated in an early New York case: The right of a
partner to dis90lve, it is said, "is a right inseparably incident
to every partnership. There can be no such thing as an indissoluble partnership. Every partner bas an indefeasible right
to dissolve the partnership as to all future contracts by publishing his own volition to that effect; and after such publication the other members of the firm have no capacity to bind ·
him by any contract. Even where partners covenant with
each other that the partnership shall continue seven years,
either partner may dissolve it.the next day by proclaiming his
determination for that purpose; the only consequence being
that be thereby subjects himself to a claim for · d~mages for a
breach of his covenant. The power given by one partner to
another to make joint contracts for them both is not only a
revocable power, but a man can do no act to divest himself of
the capacity to revoke it:" Skinner vs. Dayton, 19 Johns. (N.
Y.) 513, 538, 10 Am. Dec. 286. To the same effect are Mason
vs. Connell, 1 Whart. (Pa.) 381, and Slemmer's Appeal, 58 Pa.
St. 155. · There may be cases in which equity would enjoin a
dissolution for a time, when the circumstances were such as to
make it specially injurious; but no question of equitable
restraint adses here. When one partner becomes oissatisfied
there is commonly no legal policy to be subserved by compelling a continuance of the relation, and the fact that a contract
will be broken by the dissolution is no argument against the
right to dissolve. Most contracts may be broken at pleasure,
subject, however, to responsibility in damages. And that
responsbility would exist ·in breaking a contract ·o f partnership as in other cases.
II. The instruction respecting notice was also correct. No
court can determine for all cases what shall be sufficient
notice and what shall not be; the question must necessarily
be one of fact. Publication of notice of dissolution in a local
newspaper is common, but it is not the only method in which
notice can be given. The purpose of the notice is to make
notorious in the local community the fact that a dissolution
bas taken place; and publication of a notice may or may not
be the most effectual means for that purpose. Very few per90ns in any community probably read all the advertisements
published in the local papers; and matters of local importance
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which are advertised are quite as likely to come to them from
other sources as from the published notices.
That publication in a newspaper is sutllcient, is not disputed by the defense, provided it appears on its face to be'
authoritative: Ketcham 1'8. (Jl(J.rk, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) 144; 6 Am.
Oec. 197 ; GratJU vs. Merry, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 701; 16 Am. ·Dec.
471; National Bank vs. Norton, 1 Hill (N. Y.), 678; Nott vs.
Demming, 6 La. 680; 26 Am. Dec. 491; Watkinson t:8. Bank of
Pennsylvanw, 4 Whart. (Pa.) 482; 34 Am. Dec. 521; Rose vs.
Coffield, 53 Md. 18; 36 Am. !rep. 389. But in this case it is said
the notice did not appear to be authoritative; it appeared as a
local editorial item, and such items are often baseless, and
may in any particular case have no better foundation than
rumor or even suspicion. They do not bear upon their face the
verity which a notice signed by tM party would import.
All this may be true without being conclusive. "\Vhen the
purpose is to put the fact of dissolution before the public, it
certainly cannot be affirmed that the purpose is more likely
to be accomplished by a formal advertisement than by an
item in the local column of the newspaper. Many publishers, it is belleved, have in their papers a local column in which
items appear which seem on their face to be editorial, but
wbjch are really advertisements; and not only paid for, but
paid at extra rates, for the reason that in that column they
would be more likely to be seen and read than if published
as advertisements in the ordinary way. When such is the
case, a court could hardly hold as matter of law that the·
advertisement would be sufficient, but the notice in the local
column not. To do so would be to make form more important
than the purpose to be accomplished. One who derives knowledge of the fact from public notoriety is sufficiently notified:
Bernard vs. Torrance, 6 Gill & J. (Md.) 383; Halliday vs. McDougall, 20 Wend. (N. Y.) 81; and probably in many small communities a fact would sooner be made notorious by a notice in
the local column of the county or· village paper than in any
other way. In a large city it might be otherwise. But all that
can be required in any case is that such notice be given as is
likely to make the fact generally known locally: Vernon vs.
Manhattan Co., 22 Wend. (N.Y.) 183, 193; Lovejoy vs. Spafford,
98 U. S. 430. When that is done the party giv.ing the notice
baa performed his duty, and any one contemplating for the:
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first time to open dealings with the partnership must at his
peril ascertain the facts. This, in effect, was the instruction
given.
III. But we think the judge erred in receiving evidence
of HoH:.nder's iWmissions or declarations tending to show
fraudulent collusioo between him and the plaintiffs. The dec·
laratioas of a conspirator may be evidence against his associates after the conspiracy is made out; but to receive them as
proof of the conspiracy would put e":'ery man at the mercy of
rogues. We find in this case no evidence of the conspiracy
except in the statements of Hollander; and those having been
erroneously received, there was nothing on that branch of the
case to submit to the jury.
For this error there must be a new trial.
NOTE: See Mechem's Elem. of Partn.• ~ 240.
See also }'letcher "'· Pullen, ante, p. 184.

GERARD vs. GATEAU.

Supreme Court of Illinois, 1818.
8t Ill. 121, 25 Am. Rep. 438.

Bill for dissolution of partnership, etc. The facts appear in
the opinion.
Emery A.. Stm'rB, for app«:>lJant.
Geo. W.

Oass~

R. Riddle Roberta, and E. Haruy, for appellee.

ScoTT, J. The copartnership between the pa-r ties to this
litigation wa.s for the manufacture and sale of zinc roofing and
~inc and other metal ornamrotal work. It was forme·d in Jan·
nary, 1872, and was to continue through a period of ten years .
.~lthough equal partners the capital put in was not equal.
Complainant put in $12,000 in cash,_ and defendant was the
owner of plaBter of Paris dies which would be needed in
the business of the firm, and which were rated to him as
capital at $3,500. It was stipulated that the firm was to
pay interest on the excess of capital put in by complain·
ant, and it was secured to him upon the stock of the firm.
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In the articles of copartnership it was provided what causes
should operate as a dissolution: First, death of either party;
and second, "incapacity, embezzlement or gross neglect or
misconduct of either party." On account of the latter causes
either party could have the firm dissolved by giving thirty
days' notice to the other party, of such intention, stating in
such notice his grounds and reasons for so doing. After the
lapse of a little over two years complainant filed this bill for
a dissolution of the copartnership, for an account and for an
injunction restraining d~fendant from interfering with the
affairs of the company. No notice was given of his intention,
as provided in the articles of copartnership, to ask a dissolution, but without regard to the agreement, complainant invokes the general powers of a court of chancery.
It is not set forth in the bill, th~t defendant is wanting in
capacity, or that be has b('(>n guilty of embezzlement or any
other act affecting his integrity of character. Among the
causes alleged for a dissolution of the copartnership is, the
plaster of Paris dies, formerly owned by the defendant, were
p\lt in as capital at a sum greatly in excess of the real value.
Conceding the fact, we do not understand it would constitute
any ground for canceling the partnership contract. On the
dissolution of the copartnership, by lapse of time or otherwise,
equities between the parties arising out of this cause, could
be adjusf{'d. But upon the principal fact, as to the value of
the dies, the evidence is quite conflicting, and if trying the case
as an original qu~stion, we would be at a .loss to determine
with whkh party is a preponderance of the testimony. Cer·
tainly there· is no decided preponderance in favor of com·
plainant.
With regard to the overc·h arge on the work for Oxley & Co.
for work done under a special contract for that company it is
hardly of sufficient importance to deserve much consideration.
It was ornamental work of elaborate design, to be- used on the
State House and as to the actual oost of the material and
labor, persons skilled in that department of labor differ widely
in their ~stimates. It may or it may not have been an overcharg~. There tos nothing that shows defendant acted corruptly in 1he matter. Tbl:' differences in regard to the price
oharged wert' aft<~rward adjusted with the parties in interest,
and no harm came to complainant.
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Another cause of complaint is, the prosperity of the firm
was impaired by the personal bearing of defendant t-oward
customers. If the inven-tory taken of the assets of the ftrm Ia
anywhere near oorreet, it cannot be the prosperity of the concern was in any great degree atfected by the oonduct of defendant, whatever it may have been. An unusual measure of
success seems to 113.-re attended their e.ffaiN. In the brief
period the firm had been doing business, according to the test!·
mony, the assets of the company ·had more than doubled, without contraeting any considerable amount of ·indebtedness.
The charge is, defendant had an irascible temper, was in·
aolent in his deportment, or, as one of the witnesses expressed
tt, was ''high and mighty with customers." Evidence intro·
duced shows that, while defendant was disagreeable, and
perhaps wanting in cour.tesy to some, with others he was
always pleasant and affable. It is shown that for some time
before and after the formation of the copartnership, the
social· relations of the partners were of the most friendly
character. The causes that interrupted those relations wer~
not more serious in their nature than >the annoyances that
often attend the traneaetion of any business. We find no well
considered case going to the extent that such defect as indicated in the character of one partner would justify a dissoluti-on of the copartnership contract. Should such a rule be
adopted it is apprehended, on acrourit of the infirmities of
character, no association of persons for the transaction of
business would endure for any great length of tim.e.
As was said by this court in Cash vs. Eamshaw, 66 Ill. 4:02,
it is not for every act of misconduct on the part of one partner,
a court of equity, at the instance of another, wlll dissolve the
partnership and close up the affairs of the company. The
court will require a strong case to be made, and it is laid down
as a general principle, a court of equity has no jurisdiction to
declare a separation between partners for trifling causes or
tempot•ary grievances, involving no permanent mischiefs.
'Dhat defendant's conduct toward eome of the customers of the
firm is subject to severe criticism admits of no doubt, but that
it worked any permanent mischief to the partnership interests
is not estnblish(:'d by any evidence in the case.
The debatable point in the case is, as to the personal rela·
tions between the partners, and whether the hostile relations
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existing are justly attributable to the unreasonable conduct
of defendant. This is always a difficult question, and cases
differ so essentially in their constituent elements, that we
find no accurate an.d diatinct definitions on this branch of the
law. That such embittered relations may exist as would
render it impracticable to conduct the business, and justify
a decree dissolving the partnership, admits of no discussion, on
pripciple as well as upon authority. Permanent mischiefs
would be the result that could only be avoided by a severance
of the partnership relations. But that is not the case here.
Under the copartnership articles defendant had the principal
control of the affairs of the company. Complainant was not
obliged to give any more personal attention to the business than
be chose to bestow. Defendant was a skilled workma.JJ in their
business, and complainant was not. This fact was well understood and canvassed· before t}J.e partnership was formed.
Although..the social relations between the partners were not
what they ought to have been it is not perceived how the existing ill-feeling could seriously impair the prosperity or
interfere with the management of the firm affairs. By positive
agreement the business was onder the principal control of
defendant, a.nd, nMwithstanding the want of cordiality, it
might be carried on with equal success.
In all the cases we have examined, where the partnership
has been dissolved on account of the unfriendly relations between the partners, it bas generally been at the instance of a
party who was not himself at fault, and where the estrangement was Rucb as would prevent the successful management
of the business. A party who is the author of the ill-feeling
betwe<>n himself and partners ought not to be permitted to
make the relation he bas induced the ground of a dissolution
of the partnership. His conduct may have been taken with a
view to that very result, and it would be inequitable to allow
him advantage from his own wrongful acts. It would allow
one partner, at his election, to put an end to his own delibero.te
oontraot, when the other had been guilty of no wrongful a.ct or
omission of duty. The results flowing from the premature
dissolution of a partnership might be most disastrous to a
partner who had embarked his capital in the enterprise.
Complainant's conduct in relation to the affairs of the company is not altogether blameless, and it may be, defendant's
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conduct, to which exceptions are taken, was induced, in some
measure, by ~s own action. Principally, it seems, the ill-feelIng between the partners was engendered by the employment
of a nephew of complainant as a traveling salesman for the
bouse. It was done against the wishes of defendant, ·and
proved, as he anticipated, unprofitable. This young man had
before been discharged from the service of the firm on account
of his incapacity, and the last employment seems to have been
because complainant became responsible for his successful
management. A loss ensued, and it was in regard to the
salary and traveling expenses of this salesman the parties
disagreed. Evidence offered tends to show complainant was
in the wrong; but, however, that may have been, it ought not
to have affected, permanently the social relations of the
partners.
We have given this case a most careful consideration, and
we dan see nothing that WQUld prevent, among rea·sonable men,
a harmonious co-operation between the partners, so far as any
is necessary to a profitable prosecution of the common business
of the firm, and hence, no reason is perceived for dissolving the
partnership.
The decree dismissing the bill and dissolving the injunction
will be affirmed.
Decree affirmed.
NOTE: See Mechem's Elern. ot Partn , § 256.
See also New w. Wright, ante.

AUSTIN vs. HOLLAND.
Court of Appeals of New York, 1811.
69 N. Y. ts71, 25 Am. Rep. 246.

Action on a promissory note datA3d August 31st, 1869, signed
in the firm name of Dillon, Beebe & Co., and payable to Horace Loveland.
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Defendant Holland alone appeared and answered, ad.m itting
the making of the note and that plaintiff was the holder, but
denying that he was a member of the firm.
Defendants were copartners in the lumber business under
said firm name prior to March 29th, 1869, having their principal office in Toledq, Ohio. Loveland, who lived in Detroit was
employed by the firm to purchase lumber in the western states
.and Canada. The note in question was given for his services.
A notice of dissolution was published in the Toledo papers and
a copy was mailed to plaintiff at Detroit.
Loveland, as 4 witness for plaintiff, was asked if he received
·the notice. This was objected to on the ground that it, having
been shown that notice was published and a copy mailed to
witness, this was sufficient to relieve defendants from liability,
and it was immaterial whether the notice was received or not. ·
The objection was overruled and exception taken. Witness
answered that he did not. Upon cross examination he testified
that he bad no recollection of receiving or seeing the notice,
and that if be bad he should have borne it in mind. Defendant's counsel moved for a nonsuit on the same ground as stated
on objection to evidence of non receipt of notice; also upon the
ground that the evidence on the part of plaintiff was insufficient
to rebut the presumption of the receipt of notice; also that an
employe of a firm it~ not a dealer within the meaning of the
law merchant requiring notice ~f dissolution.
The motion was denied, and said counsel duly excepted.
The court submitted to the jury the question whether the notice was actually received, to which defendant's counsel excepted.
E8ek

Oowen, for defendant.

Martin I. Townsend, for plaintiff.

ANoa:mws, J. The plaintiff was a dealer with the ftrm of
Di11on, Beebe & Co., so as to entitle him to the protection of
the rule which makes a retiring partner liable for subsequent
engagements made QY his former copartner in the firm name,
with thoee who had previous dealings with the firm , and who
entered into the new trans"ction without notice of the change
in the partnership. In l'ernon vs. The Manhattan Oo.,'22 Wend.
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(N.Y.) 190, the chancellor said: "The word 'dealing' is merely
used as a general term to convey the idea that the person who
is entitled to actual notice of the diBSOlution must be one who
hu had business relations with the firm, by which a credit
is raised U·pon the faith of the c~partnemhip," and this statement of the chancellor is recited with approval by DENIO, J.,
in Clapp vs. Rogers, 12 N. Y. 286.
There does not seem to be any reason for distinguishing the
case of an agent who is in the employment of the firm at the
time of the dissoluti~n, and who thereafter, without notice
of the dissolution, continues under the same apparent employ·
ment, from that of a person who has had mercantile trans:
actions and relations with the firm, as a vendor or otherwise.
In each case the credit is presumed, to have been given originally upon the responsibility of the individual members of the
partnership, and justice requires as much in the one case as
the other that all the members should be bound so long as the
partnership may be supposed to exist. Watson on Part. 384.
The principal question in this case is, whether Loveland had
notice of the dissolution of the firm of Dillon, Beebe & Co.,
which occurred March 29, 1869, prior to August 31, 1869, when
the note upon which the action was brought was made. The
firm was engaged in the business of the purchase, shipment
and sale of lumber, and its pr~ncipal office was at Toledo, in
the state of Ohio. The plaintiff was employed to purchase
lumber in the western states and in Canada, and resided at
Detroit. Notice of the dissolution was published in the news·
papers at Toledo, and a copy was mailed to the plaintiff,
addressed to him at Detroit.
·
Loveland, on his direct examination, testitl.ed positively that
he never received a notice. On his cross·examination, he
stated that he bad no recollection of receiving or seeing the
notice, and that, if he had seen u; he thought he should have
remembered it. The judge submitted it to the jury to find
whether the plaintiff received the notice. The defendant's
counsel excepted to the submission of the question to the jury
on the ground that the jury would not be justified in finding
from the evidence that the plaintiff did not receive the notice,
and upon the further ground that it was immaterial whether
he received it or not; that the mailing of the notice was all
that the defendant was required to do to protect him from
liability for the subsequent services of the plaintiff.
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The p·ublication of notice of the dissolution of a partnership in a newspaper at the place where the business was carried on is notice to all persons who had not had prior dealings
with the ftrm; and, if thereafter one of the partners enters into
a contract in the ftrm name with a new customer or dealer, the
other partners will not be bound. The rule is different in
respect to pel'S()nS who have dealt with the ftrm before the
dissolution. The rule_ in such cases in this state requires that,
to relieve a retiring partner from subsequent transactions in
the partnership name, notice of the dissolution must be
brough.t home to the person giving credit to the partnership.
If, in any way, by actual notice served, or by seeing the publication of the dissolution, or by inf~rmation derived from third
persons, the party, at the time of the dealing, ls made aware
of the fact that the partnership bas been dissolved, the contract will not bind the firm. It is sufficient to exempt the firm
from liability that the person so contracting with a partner in
the firm name knew or had reason to believe that the partnership bad been dissolved, but this must appear and be found by
the jury, or else the contract will be treated as the contract
of the partnership: Ketcham VB. Clark,. 6 Johns. (N. Y.) 144; 5
Am. Dec.197; Gravesvs. Merry, 6 Cow. (N.Y.) 701; 16 Am. Dec.
471; Vet·non vs. Manhattan Co., 17 Wend. (N.Y.) 524; 22 Id.
183; Nat. Bk. vs. N01·ton, 1 Hill (N. Y.), 572; Coddington VB.
Hunt, 6 Id. 595; Clapp vs. Rogers, 12 N. Y. 287; City Bank vs.
McChesney, 20 Id. 242; Bank of Commonwealth vs. Mudgett, 44
ld. 514; l"an Eps vs. Dillage, 6 Barb. (N. Y.) 244; Mechanics'
Bank t'B. Li-vingston, 33 Id. 458. In Vernon vs. The Manhattan
Co., the chancellor says: "But to exempt the copartners from
liabiljty (on a contract with a previous dealer with the ftrm),
the jury must be satisfied that the person with whom the new
d~bt was contracted either had actual notice that the copart·
nership was dissolved, or that facts had actually come to his
knowledge sufficient to create a belief that such was the fact."
The same rule is recognized in the other cases cited, and by
elementary writers: 3 Kent's Com. 607; Story on Part. sec.
161; Coli. on Part. sec. 533; Lindley on Part. 337. Lindley
says: "Those who have dealt with the ftrm before a change
took place, are entitled to assume, until they have notice to the
contrary, that no change has occurred. • • If notice, in
point of fact, can be established, it matters not by what means
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for it has never been held that any particular formality m.u st
be observed." In this case, the jury have found that the plaintift' did not receive the notice sent by mail, and had no infor·
mation of the dissolution of the firm of Dillon, Beebe & Co.
prior to the transaction in question. The mailing of notice
P:l'Operly directed to the party to be charged raises a
presumption of notice in fact, for it is presumed tl:rat letters
sent by post to a party, at·his residence, are received by him
in due course. Best on Presumptions, sec. 403. But this is a
presumption of fact, and not of law, and may be repelled by
proof; and, if the receipt of the letter in this case was disproved, then the defendant failed to show the actual notice
required in order to exempt him from responsibility, and the
question whether the letter was received was, we think upon
the evidence, for the j~ry. The learned counsel for the defendant ·ha.s nM: referred us to any case whlcll decides that the
mailing of a notice of dissolution is in law equivalent to actual
notice, and exempts a retiring partner from liability to prior
dealers on subsequent engagements in the firm name. Notice
by mail of the dishonor of commercial paper is in most cases
sufficient by the law merchant to charge an indorser. It is a
part of the contract that notice may be given in this way, and.
it is not material in fixing the liability of the indorser whether
he receives it or not.
But we think the rule requiring actual notice of the dissolution of a partnership to prior dealers is a part of the law of,
this state, and should not be departed from. It may subject
parties in some cases to inconvenience, but the I¢nciple upon
which the rule proceeds is that, when one of two parties is to
sustain injury from the giving of credit, the one who originally
induced it should bear the loss, rather than the one who, with·
out notice of the change, relied upon the continued existence
of the partnership: Story on Part. sec. 160; Wat. on Part. 384.
The judgment of the general term should be affirmed.
All concur, exc_ept MILLER, J., not voting.
Judgment affirmed.
NO'B: See lrlechem•e Elem. of Partn., § 262, and noa
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V ~~n on a check.

The opinion states the case.
· VliJf had judgment below.

~~

The plain-
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\JA-',.)rj/'t:t) William A. Stewart for appellant.

Y,tt-~.._

Thomas B. Horwitz for appellee.

t..r~ILLER, J.

This suit was brought by the appellee against
the appellants, Rose and Porter, as partners, composing the
,A '
)'fu-m of" J. B. Rose & Co.," upon a check, of which the plain. _/tl' .. c.,,\"' tiff ' was the indorsee and bolder. This check was upon the
C.f' r ~..
Citizens' National Bank for t430, was dated the 29th of
¥'" '": \.
November. 1871, and was payable on the 2d of December following. .It was drawn by "Eastman & Rogers," to the order
of '' J. B. Rose & Co.,'' and bears the indorsement of the payees
and also of two other firmA. The proof shows that this check
was given in renewal of a promiBBory note for the same amount,
dated the 27th of October, 1871, payable one month after date,
drawn and indorsed by the same firms, and also indorsed by
another firm. The plaintiff received this note on the day of its
date, from Rose, in good faith, and paid him therefor $430 in
cash. He also received the check in renewal' of the note on the
day of its date from Rose, who then.indorsed the name of "J. B.
Ros.e & Co." thereon. At the date of the note and for some
Jears prior thereto Rose & ·Porter had been partners, conducting the printing business under this firm name, Rose being the
active business manager of the ~rm. On the 16th of November,
1871, after the date of the note, but before the check was given,
the firm was dissolved, and notice of the dissolution published
iu the newspapers of Baltimore city for several days. But there
is no proof that the plaintiff took or read either of the papers in
which this publication was made, and there is therefore nothing
in the case bringing home to him actual notice of the diBBolu-·.}

.• , .....

~ ~l

r
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tion or affecting him with notice thereof. Boyd vs. JJcCann~
10 Md. 118. In this state of case the question arises whether
Porter is liable upon this check, the firm having been in fact
dissolved before Rose indorsed the firm's name thereon.
It is familiar law that after dissolution one partner cannot
impose new ob1igations on the firm, or vary the form or character of those already existing. Ellicott vs. Nichols, 7 Oill85,
100; Bell vs. Morrison, 1 Pet. 351, 370. He has no authority
alter dissolution to give a note in the firm's name, even though
its consideration be a pre-existing debt of the firm, nor to renew
an existiog note of the dissolved firm, for these constitute new
contracts, and cannot therefore bind his former partner.
Hurst t'S. Hill, 8 Md. 399; Hopkins vs. Boyd, 11 id. 107; 1lfartin vs. K i1·k, 2 Humph. 529; National Bank vs. Norton, 1 Hin
67t. But to this general rule there are certain well defined and
clearly established exceptions or qualifications. For instance,
the agency of each partner to bind his copartners can only oo
effectually determined by giving notice of its revocation. The
principle is therefore now well established that where a partnership is voluntarily dissolved, or one of the ostensible or known
partners retires from the firm (which is in fact a dissolution),
and there is no public notice of the dissolution given, by public-ation iu a newspaper or otherwise, the power of each to bind
the re1't as to third persons, wlio have no knowledge of the dissolution, remains in full force, although as between the part- .
ners themselves, a dissolution or a retirement is a revocation of
the authority of each to act for the others; and hence if a known
partner retires, and no such notice i8 given, he will be liable ro
be sued in respect to a promissory note made after his retirement by his late partner in the nanie of the firm-even though
the plaintiff may have had no dealings with the firm previous
to the retiremeut or before th{, making of the note. Lindley on
Partnership, 327; Parkin vs. Carruthers, 3 Esp. 248; Williams v.~. Keats, 2 Stark. 200; ]fulj01·d vs. Griffin, 1 Fot>t. &
Fin. 145; Anderson vs. Weston, 6 Bing. N.C. 296; Ketcham
vs. Cla'rk, 6 Johns. 144; 5 Am. Dec. 197; Dickinson vs. Dickinson, 25 Gratt. 321. In such cases the law regards the contract as made with the firm and on their credit, and holds the
retiring partner liable, upon the principle that where one of two
innocent persons must suffer from giving a credit, he who has
misled the confidence of the other, and has been the cause of
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the credit, either by his representations or his negligence, ought
to suffer instead of the other. Again, while public notice by
advertisement, such as was given in this case, may suffice to
conclude all persons who have not bad any pt"evious dealings
with the firm, it will not be sufficient as to those who have had
such dealings. All ·the aut.horities agree that as to persons
who have previously dealt with the firm, it ·is requisite that
actual notice of the dissolution should be brought home to them,
or at least that the credit should be given under circumstanMs
from which actual notice may be inferred. Story on Part.,
sec. 161; Pars. on Part. 412. But what will amount to such
previous dealing as to entitle a party to notice of this kind is
sometimes a difficult question, and this in fact is the real and
only point of difficulty in the case before us.
It has been argued with much force that the plaintiff had
but a single transaction with this firm before its dissolution,
which consisted simply of the purchase by him of the note of
the 27th of October, and that this did not amount to such dealing with the firm, as to entitle him to actual notice. So far as
our researches have extended, the cases in which this question
has been considered are not numerous, and those in which the
decisions have necessarily turned upon it are very few. It is
certain that no inflexible rule or standard of dealing, by which
all cases can be governed or measured, bas been established.
There was a very able discussion of the question in the Court
of Errors of New York in the case of Vernon vs. Manhattan
. Co., 22 Wend. 183. In that case a note for $5,000 was given
by Vernon & Co., in December, 1831, payable to Moore. It
was indorsed by another firm after Moore's name, and in that
shape was discounted by the bank for Moore's accommodation.
There were then several renewals of it in the same form, with
payments reducing the amount until the 15th of April, 1833,
when the note sued on for the bala nee of $1,700 was drawn by one
of the partners in the partnership name. The firm of Vernon
& Co., continued until the 28th of February, 1833, when it was
dissolved, and notice of the dissolution published in the newspapers. There was therefore but one original note, though it
was followed by several renewals before the di~olution, and
the court hold that the bank must be considered as having bad
dealings with the firm within the m~aning of the rule requiring
actual notice of the dissolution. That decision was followed
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hy the Supreme Court of the same State in National Bank vs.
.Norton, 1 Hill 572, where a note was endorsed by a firm and
discounted by the bank, and several renewals with deductions
followed. In that case the original note was discounted on the
24th of January, 1837, and the firm was dil:Jaolved, and notice
of dissolution duly published on the 1st of February, 1837, so
that the first as well as the subsequent renewals took place after
the dissolution. The court held that the note sued on being an
attempt to renew an old note of the firm which lay in the bank,
and was confessedly binding on the.firm, the partners must be
considered as dealers with the bank, and that the latter was
therefore entitled to actual notice of the dissolution. In Wardwell vs. Haight, 2 Barb. "549, two previous transactions, one
consisting of a purchase of goods for cash and the other a purchase on credit, which was paid prior to the dissolution, were
held sufficient. In Clapp vs. Rogers, 2 Kern. 283, two previous
very small purchases on credit, one to the amount of ~11.03,
and the other to $20.40, which had been paid prior to the dissolution, were likewise held sufficient, and the Court of Appeals,
by Denio, J ., said the rule requiring actual notice "proceeds
upon a general presumption that one giving credit to a mercantile firm does so upon the responsibility of the individual partners; and we cannot annex to it a distinction based upon the
amount of the credit without destroying that certainty which is
essential to its utility." In the subsequent case of City Bank
of Brooklyn vs. McChesney, 20 N. Y. 240, there was no public
notice of the dissolution by publication in the newspapers or
otherwise, and what is said by the court in that case, upon the
question we are now considering, may well be regarded as a
mere dictum. Reference has also been made to the cases of

Uutchins vs. Bank of Tennessee, Hutchins vs. Sims, and
Hutchins vs. Hudson, 8 Humph. 418, 423, 426; Grinnan vs.
Baton Rouge ."4fills Co., 7 La. Ann. 638, and Amidown vs.
Osgood, 24 Vt. 278, in which are to be found decisions or dicta,
bearing to some extent upon this question, but we discover
nothing in any of them in conflict with the New York decisions
we have cited.
The principle, as shown by these authorities, upon which this
rule of actual notice is founded, seems to embrace the present
case. That principle is that credit already raiijed on the faith
of the partnership is presumed to be continued on the same
footing, unless special notice of a change be given; and as every

RosE vs. CoFFIELD.

pal'tner knows, or has the means of knowing, who are the
persons with whom his firm has transacted business, and from
whom it has received credit, public policy and natural justice
alike demand that ·he should give to every such party personal
and special notice of the withdrawal of his responsibility. As
was said by the Chancellor in Vernon
Manhatten Co., the
word "dealing" when used in reference to this rule "is merely
used as a general term to convey the idea that the person who
is entitled to actual notice of the dissolution must be one who
has had business relations with the firm, by which a credit is
raised upon the faith of the copartnership." It may be true,
as was most forcibly stated by Senator Verplanck in the same
case,. that one who merely takes the negotiable paper of a firm
from a third hand, and receives payment through a bank, or
passes it away to another, cannot be called a dealer with the
firm; and it may well be said that it would be to require impossibilities, to insist that the partners of a large commercial house
in extensive business should be able to know for years who had
been the last holder of their paper, or through whose hands it
may have passed, and to send to all of them. special notice, as
dealers. But th.e case now before us is not of that character,
and no such difficulty arises. The plaintiff received the note
of October, 1871, with all the subsequent indorsements then
upon it, directly from Rose, one of the partners of this firm,
· then subsisting, and paid him for it its full face value, thus
bringing the plaiutiff aml the firm into a mutual dealing. It
cannot be doubted but that by this transaction a credit was raised
upon the faith of the partnership, that the plaintiff gave them
credit, and relied upon the unitetl r esponsibility of the two
partners. Porter, the other ostensible and known partner,
knew, or had the means of knowing, through whom the money
upon,this note was raised. The plaintiff dealt in this transaction immediately and directly with the firm, and did not receive
the note from a third party, and merely pass it away to another.
Nor is there any proof to show that this firm was a great commercial hous~, eng11ged in extensive trade, and constantly
issuing their negotiable securities, so as to make it difficult for
them to know through whose bands their paper may have
passed. We are therefore of opmion, thls case must be governed by the general rule, and that actual notice of the di~olu
tion should ha,·e beeri given to the plamtiff in order to relieve
the defendant, Porter, from responsibility on this check.

vs.
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H follows there was no error in the rulings upon the prayers
contained in the third exception. The evidence offered in the
first and second exceptions was also clearly admissible. It was
part of the plaintiff's case to offer in evidence the note of October, 1871, not only to show the consideration for the check· sued
on, but to establish a previous dealing with the firm and. to
show the circumstanr.es under which he received the note, what
he paid for it, and that he, in fact, received it from one of the
partners of the firm.
Judgment affirmed with costB.
NOTE. -See Mechem's Elements of P~n., § 262.
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Error from tl1e city court of Jackson. W. W. Stark, Judge.
Action by Mrs. S. E. Silman against Elbert Askew and
others. From a judgment for plaintiff, and an order denying a
new trinl, defendant Askew brings error. Brought fo1·ward
from the last term. Code, §§ 427la-4271c. Reversed.

TV. I. Pike, E. C. Armstead, G. C. Thomaa, and J. J.
Strickland, for plaintiff in error.
J. A. B. Mahaffey, E. T. Brown, and Erwin, Cobb &
Woolley, for defendant in error.
SIMMONS, C. J. Mrs. Silman sued .Askew and others, alleged
to bu members of the firl'n of Austin & Co., upon a promissory
D• to ~i~jucu in the firm name, and dated June ~7, 1890. Askew
plea<ku "Not indebted;" also that he had not signed the note,
nur authorized any person to do so for him, and had never ratifit·tl the siguing; and further, that he was not a member of the
firm w ben tue note was signed, and was not bound by the contract; that the ·firm was dissolved January 11, 1888, and had
<~<"» sl.;!d to do business from tuat date, which fact was known to
the plaintiff when the note was executed. There was a verdict

._,or:-,
A__
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for the plaintiff against all the defendants sued, and Askew
made- a motion for a new trial, which was overruled, and he
excepted.
1. The main question at issue on the trial of the case was
whether there was such notice of the dissolution of the partnership as would relieve Askew from liability for the debt in question. It appeared from the eviuence that t.be dissolution took
place, as alleged in the plea, more than two years prior to the
date of the note, and that the note was given by Austin, one of
the copartners, without the knowledge or consent of Askew,
for money borrowed by Austin in th~ name of the firm at the
time the note was executed.
Askew's withdrawal from lhe partnership was announced
soon after the dissolution, in a newspa!J6r published in the
town in which the plaintiff resided and the firm conducted its
business, the announcement appearing at different times, in the
form of news items, written by tlle editor of the paper. The
plaintiff was a subscriber to the new~paper when these notices
appeared, but testified that she. did not see them, and that she
had no notice or knowledge of the dissolution at any timo prior
to the exect1tion of the note, but supposed, when she took the
note, that Askew was still a mem her of the firm. She hau been
a customer of the firm, us a purchaser of goods, during Askew's
connection with it, but was not a'creditor before the date of the
note. The court, in certain instruction·s to the jury, which are
cornplain('d of by th~ plaintiff in error, charged them, in effect,
that if the plaintiff was a "customer" of the firm, she would be
entitled to actual notice of the dissolution. We think the court
erred in ~o charging. In order to relieve an ostensible partner
from liability for debts contracted in the partnership name subsequently to his withdrawal from the firm, the dissolution must
be made known ''to creditors and to the world" (Code, § 1895) ;
but it is not necessary that the notice should be .actual 9r personal except to creditors. Although it is often said in textbooks and decisions that actual notice or knowledge of the dissolution must be brought home to former ''customers" of the
firm, this language has reference only to creditors. See 2 Bates,
Partn. § 613: 17 Am. & E.,ng. Enc. Law, p. 1124. A customer,
in the sense in which the term was used in this case,-that is
to say, one whose dealings with the partnership have been confined to the purchase of its goods,- is entitled only to such notice as @hould be given to "tho worl<l."
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2-4. As to the notice which should be given to "the world,"
no inflexible rule can be ]aid down. Publication in a public
gazette circulated in the locality in which the business of the
partnership has been conducted, if such publication is fair and
reasonable as to its terms and the number of times it is made,
is usually sufficient notice to the world. Ewing vs. Trippe,
7:3 Ga. ?76; T. Pars. Partn. (-!th ed.) § 317, and notes.
And
see Richards vs. Butler, 65 Ga. l)9:3; Ellison vs. Sexton, 105
N. C 35li, 11 S. E. lt:$0. An editorial notice, uot signed by any
mAm ber of the firm, may be as effectual for this pur.pose as an
adYertisement purporting to issue by authority of the partners·
over their signature. Solomon vs. K ,i ,·kwood, 55 Mich. 256, 21
N. 'V. 336; Young vs. Tibbitts, 32 Wis. 79. Whether this is
so or not is generally a question for the jury, and the court in
the JH·csent case erred in charging, as a matter of law, that .
such notice ~ould not be sufficient. "It is not an absolute, inflexiblu rule that there must be a publication in a newspaper to
protect a retiring partner. Any means of fairly publishing the
fact of such dissolution as widely as possible, in order to put
the public on its guard,-as, by advertisement, public notice in
the manner usual in the community, the withdrawal of the exterior indications of the partnership,-are proper to be considered on the question of notice." Lovejoy vs. Spafford, 93

u.s. 430.

It should be left to the jury to say whether the retired partner made a reasonable and bona fide effort to acquaint the public with the fact of his retirement, and whether, on the other
hand, the creditor, with the means and opportunity afforded
him, knew, or ought to have known, of the fact. Even in the
absence of any showing that notice of the dissolution was given,
the fact that a considerable time elapsed between the dissolution
and the contracting of the debt has been deemed sufficient to
render the creditor chargeable with notice. Certainly this fact
would go far to show that the debt was not or ought not to
have been contracted on the credit of a former partner. T.
Pars. Partn. (-lth ed.) §§ 317, 322. There is some question as
to whether the jury may infer notice from general notoriety of
the dissolution. See 2 Bates, Partn. § 622, and cases cited.
We think, however, that the .e vidence excluded by the court
below in this case, as to the general notoriety of Askew's withdrawal from the partnership, although such notoriety may not
of itself have been sufficient to charge the plaintiff with notice

AsKEW vs.
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of the fact, ought to have been allowed to go to the jury, to be
considered by them for what it is worth, in connection with the
other evidence bearing on the question of notice.
5. If the money for which the note was given was borrowed,
and the note given without ~kew's knowledge or consent, and
without subsequent ratification on his part, and if he was not
liable on other grounds, the fact that the money was used in
paying debts contracted by the firm prior to his withdrawal
therefrom would not render him liable; and the court below
erred in charging the jury as it did on this subject. Judgment
reversed.
.
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Actioo by Heney Dickin60n against Henry J. Dick·lnson,
Stephen Banner and Geo~e Banner, late partners o:nder the
firm name of H. J. Dickinson & Co., to recover upon a l>romissory note signed in that name, and dated March 9, 1860. Stephen
and George Banner defended on the ground tbat they did n-ot
sign or authorize the note and were not mem·b ers of ·fhe 1lrm
of H. J. Dickin90n & Co., at the date of the note.
Judgment for defendants and plaiDtitr a.ppealL
Burm, for appellant.

Gilmore, for the appellees.
J. (After stating the facts.)
.
'mle main question before us arises upon the plaintiff's 1lrst
· bHI -of execeyti.ons, and is presented in the sixth assig·nment
of error. T.bis alleged error is in an instruction given to the
jury on motioo of the defendants. This instruction declares
tm.bsta.ntially :that if the defendants, as early as some day in
the mcm·t h of March, 1859, dissolved, by mutual consent, the
partnership previously thereto existing between them, then
STAPLES,

~

~

t.lt
• (',· .......
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neither partner had thereafter authority to create any new
obligation, or ex:?cute a note therefor in the name of the firm,
binding upon the other pe.rtn~; unless the new obligatioll was
created in the usual course of the partnership busine,s to a
person who ·had no notice or kno.wledge of the dissolution of
the partnership. An·d if the jury sh.ould believe from the evd·
d~ee, that as early as ~he spring of 1859 the defendants ceased
to buy and sell goods, their lrtorehouse was closed up, H. J.
Dickinson, the active partner of the firm, ·h ad m~ved .awa.y
from t·he storeh<Ouse, and had engaged in another employment;
that the storehouse remained clQSed up until the nQte in OO'll·
troversy was executed, and was then still closed up; that
nothing pri~r to the execu.tioo of the n10te was done in the
business of the partnership after the •botl!Se was closed, in the
spring of 1859, exoopt what was done by the active partner,
H. J. Dic:l~inson, in settling up the bum ness, and tbat all these
facts were km()WD. to the plaintiff at the time the note in con·
troversy was executed, on the 19th of Mar-oh, 1860, then these
bets are sufficient to charge the plaintiff with kno~ledge of
the dissolution, and tlhe jury abould consider him u having
sueh kmowledge.
The manifest error in tbis instruction is in assuming that
the facts therein mentioned, if ·brought home to the plaintiff,
were sufficient of themselves to charge ·him with actual k.D!owl·
edge of the diseolution oo the partnersh-ip, whether in facl•he
had or had not suc.h knowledge.
It seems that the defendants did oot give notice, public or
private, of the dissolution; they did not notify their oustoon·
ers <Yf the fiact; they did not even take the trouble ro publish
or post it at their place of business. At least the instruction
does not assume that either of these acts was done by t'he de
fendanrts; but it does assume that, in the absence of
each and all of them, certain other acts coostituted
notice which the plaintiff was not permitted t.o con·
trovert. Now these facts, as stated in the instruction,
may be sufficient to satisfy a jury that the plaintiff
was informed of the dissolution of the partnership; but certainly they do IliOt coostirote ootice; t'hey are 111ot sufficienrt: as
a matter of law, to charge the plaintiff with snob notice. Ea.oh
and all of them may •have been known to him, and still the
plaintiff may niQt have had such knowledge Ql' information in
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regard to the dissolution u would. invalidate the note in his
possession.
The instruction was therefore a manifest invasion of ·t he
province of :the jury, and as suoo was clearly erroneous. The
learned coun·sel in-sists, -however, that no injustice wae done
!'he plaintiff, beoa.use the question of notice is JWt inrolved in
the inquiry. His propositi<m is, that one partner eaD!Do.t, by a
new oontract entered inro ~fter the dissolution, impose any
new obligation upon his -copartners without ·some special
authority for that purpose. The oote in controversy ·h aving
been executed after t'be partnership was dissolved, was not
binding u.pon the partners who did not unite in its execution,
although t·h e creditor may have had no notice of sucll. dissolution. '.l,'he plaintiff could not, therefore, have been prejudiced
by anything in tpe instruction up<m the subject of notice, 'OOw·
ever erroneous it may have been..
If the learned ooun·s el's premises are oorreet, his oondusion
is undou·btedly oorreot also. But are his premises correct?
The only authority he cites to sustain his position is that. of
Parker vs. OousiM, 2 Oratt. (Va.) 372, 44 Am. Dec. 388. Tha:t
case does, unquestionably, affirm the general pl'oposition that
one partner cannot, after the dissolution, create a binding obligation upon the firm without ·soone special authority for tblt
purpose; but this decisioo was ·m ade upon a state of facts
which sh-6wed that the pel'60n dealing -w ith tihe partner was
informed of the dissolution at the time of the renewal of the
note.
The principle is well established tbat, if a part·n er contracts
in the name -of the firm with a third peMOn after the partnership is dissolved, but that fact is not rna~ public, or known
by such third person, the law considers the cootMJCt as being
made with the firm and upon their credit. The rule upon this
subject is thus laid down in Lindley on Partnership, p. 213:
"So if a . partnership is dissolved, or one of the known members retires from the ftrmr. until the dissolution or retirement
is duly notified, the power of each to bind the rest remains in
full foroe; although as between themselves, a diseoluti-on or
retirement is e. revocati-on of the authority of eacll to aot for
the other. Thus, if a known partner retires (which is in fact
a dissolution), and no notice is given, -h e wlll be liable to be
sued in respect of a promissory note made since his retirement

-
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by his late pa.r tner, even though the plaintiff had no dealings
'With the firm before the making of ·tihe note. And in determining which was first in point of time, to wit: notice of the
dissolution or the making of the note, effect must be given
to the presumption that the illBtrument was made and issued
on the day it bears date, unlees some reason to rt·h e contrary
can be ahown."
In Ketcham VB. Olark, 6 John. (N. Y.) 144, 5 Am. Dec. 197,
the draft lft.S aooepted in the name of the ftrm a.fter the disaolutioo. It was. held that botb partners were bound by the
acceptance, there being no eviden-ce of any public notice of ~
dissolutio.n of the partnership, nor any special notice of its dissolution to the party dealing with the firm.
It is m~eless to multiply citations upon the point.. The
authorities are believed to be almost u-niform in support of
rthe proposition. National Bank VB. Norton, 1 Hill, (N. Y.) 572;
Story on Partne1"9hip, seca. 160, 161, 334, 336.
In regard to notice of dissolution, a dimnction 'has been
justly made betwee-n persons who ·have 1ha,d previous dea:lings
with the firm, and those who .h•a.v e :bad no such dealings. As
to the former, it ·bas been universally held that actual notice
is indispensable. It must not _be inferred, however, that
special n10tice must be given to each customer. If actua I
kn0owledge ot the dissolutiOon is brought home to the party, he
will be ooncluded, although no ·notice whatever may
have been given. "'hether in such case the evidence
is sufficient to justify the inference of aetual knowledge, is a question of fact for the consid.e ration of a jury,
tu1der the supervision of vhe court. Irby VB. Vining, 2 M·cCord,
(S. Car.) 379; Coddington VB. Hunt, 6 Hill, (N. Y.) 595; Collyer
on Partnership, sec. 332.
It may be proper to add, that rthese rules apply only to oases
where t1te dissolnt.i()n is by act of the parties. It -is well settled that, upo-n the death or bankruptcy of a partner, noti<'e
of the dis90lution to third persons is not neeessary. The rea90'11 seems to be, that in those oases the dissolution is by operation of law. It would be the height of injustice to allow the
acts ()f the other partners to bind the estates ()f persons who
are i·ncapahle of acting ·fhemeelves, or of oontlnutng an authority for toot purpose.
It follows, from what 'bas been said, tba.t the circuit court
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erred in giving the instruction set out in the plaintiff's first
bill of exceptions. This view renders it unnecessary to consider particularly t •h e instruoctioo asked for by the plaintiff and
refused by the court, which is set <mt in the SOOOOld bill of
excepti-ons. • • •
For the err.or already mentioned, the judgment ()f the cir.c uit court must •be reveMed, and the cau.se remanded to. be
proceeded with in accordance with the views herein
81Dnounced..
Judgment reversed.
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NOTB: See Mechem's Elem. of ParJn., §§ 259, 271, 273.
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1 Tex. Civ. App. 151, 20 S. W. Rep. 886.

This suit was brought hy appellant against A. N. Carter and
~..,......
Louis Bergstrom, as partners under the firm name and style
~-i.." .. JOf A. N. Carter~ seeking to recover judgment for the sum of
,5,216.91 on account of mone~-~ loaned and advanced to said
q , ...> (.l firm .. Appellee Be-rgstrom denied the partnership, and that he
};. ,J-: was mdebted to appellant. Judgment below was rendered in
;t-" ~ favor of appelhmt fl{!ainst Cartt•r, and that it take nothing
t ...... -1_._.-e, against appellee Bergstrom. From this judgment, appellant
1'-~1
prosecutes this appeal.
J. ' ,. ·
The evidence shows that Carter and Bergstrom, in Septem·
f"\ ,.{.... c. r .ber, 1881, entered into n ('Opa rtnership for one year for the
,.c.-· •
purpose of dealing in bides, wool, and produce. In October,
1~81. the a('count sued on was opened with appellnnt by
Cnrtt-r, for the purpose of obtnining advnnces to be userl in
carrying on the business of the flrm. Cnrter was the businf'BS
manager of the firm at Lnredo. and continued to obtain money
from the bank until in the spring of 1~8~·, when tpe a('connt
sued on was closed. It appE>nrs from the evidence that, at the
time the account with appellnnt was opened, Carter informed
the officers of the appellant bank that Bergstrom was a part·
ner in the firm of A. N. f'!lrt(>r. and upon the faith of thi8
4
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information the advances were made. It was contended by
appellant that, at t~ beginning of the dealings between it and
Carter, Bergstrom was actually a partner with Carter, and
that credit was extended upon the faith that he was such
partner, and, although he may have ceased to be a partner
after September, 1882,-the time when the contract of partnership terminated,-he is liable to appellant because it had
no notice of the dissolution, or of the contract of partnership,
until after the account was closed,. in 1883. Upon the other
hand, it was contended by Bergstrom that although he was a
partner for one year from September, 1881, at that time the
firm was dissolved, and that be is no~ bound by the statements
made by Cartel' during the year that he, Bergstrom, was a
partner; that he was a secret or dormant partner of the firm,
and, being such, be was not required to give notice of his dissolution with the firm and is not bound or liable to appellant.
The seventh paragraph of the charge()f the court is as follows:
"If, however, you believe from the evidence that said firm of
A. N. Carter ceased to exist on the 23d day of September, 1882,
and that plaintiff had no knowledge, directly or indirectly,
that Louis Bergstrom continued as a partner of said firm of A.
N. Carter, and if you believe, further, from the evidence, that
said Bergstrom did no act, directly or indirectly, to lead plaintiff or his agents to believe that said firm of A. N. Carter was
continued, and that the plaintiff had his dealing~ with A. N.
Carter in his individual capacity, then and in that event the
defendant Bergstrom is not liable for any dealings had
between the plaintiff and the said A. N. Carter so made with
said Carter in his individual capacity." This charge is assigned
as error.
J. 0. Nicholson and 8. M. ElliB, for appellant.

UpBon & Bergstrom, for appellees.
C. J. (After stating the facts.) When credit fa
extended to a finn upon the assumption that certain persona
comprise the membership, and such assumption in point of
fact is correct, the members of such firm are liable to the creditors for future dealings with the firm until notice of dissolution is given to the creditor. Under such state of facts · the
cred-itors will not be aftecl:ed by a diBSOlution ()r change in the
firm until notice be given or knowledge of such fact has been
FIBBER,
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brought home to them, and the burden of proving such notice
or knowledge rests upon the partner claiming such exemption. 17 Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law, 1117, 1118; 2 Dates, Partn.
§§ 611-613. This rule of law does not apply to partners who
are regarded in law as dormant or secret partners, for no
credit is extended upon the faith of their membership, and
they, in retiring from the firm, are not required to give notice
of such fact. The uncontradicted evidence in the record is
that Carter notified the appellant, at the time tllat the account
was opened, that Bergstrom was a partner of the finn. Sucll
in fact was his relationshjp to the firm at that time. 'Ve
think this information given to appellant is sufficient to
make Bergstrom know~ to appellant as a member of the firm,
and as to appeUant he cannot claim that he was a dormant
partner. If it be true that Bergetrom was a member of the
firm at the time appellant received information of that fact,
it makes no mfferenoe from what SO'Urce received, the effect
is :to make his -connection with the fi.rm known to a.ppel·
lant, and, as to it, he cannot c1aim that he is a dormant part·
ner. 1 Rates, Partn. §§ 151, 153; 2 Bates, Partn. §§ 608-623;
17 A.mer. & Eng. Enc. Law, 1119-1123. Under these rules of
law it was error to give the charge complained of, and for this
reason we reverse and .remnnd the case. • • •
Non: See Meohem'a Elem. o! Partn., f 266.
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• I y appear 1n
' th e optmon.
. .
e •J.acts suffi ctent
·
•
LoRD BLACKBURN: This-was an action against Scarf to re~
cover
.the price of goods sold and delivered. It is admitted
1
r:;Y
that on the 30th of January, 1878, the goods were ordered from
(Y"'
/ , . . • the plaintiff Jardine by Rogers, he sending the order in the
name of the firm of W. H. Rogers & Co., which was the name
/ : UQ.der which he and Scarf bad traded, and under which name
they bad dealt with the plaintiff; that the plaintiff well knew
; ~ .~ \ •~ that he and Scarf bad been the persons so trading; that ihoee
, L;.~
goods thus ordered upon the 30th of January were afterward
:~.l~)
supplied, part upon the 1st of February, part upon the 16th and
~- ~ part upon the 20th. One question of fact was, when bad the
~
plaintiff, Jardine, notice of what was the fact, namely that
. ~
·'t... Scarf bad ceased to be a partner, and that at tbe time when
'(\ \_,. ~ _ the goods were ordered and at the time when the goods were
, , .• ~. ·
...... ..
supplied the firm of Rogers & Co., consisted not of Rogers and
:'-·· r-.. .., \~ Scarf hut of Rogers and Beech, who had not been formerly a
~ ....... \, .· ·
., _ partner but had come into partnership with Rogers afterward,
· '..{' , ., ... to\
and not till Scarf had retired? Now on that, I understand, the
.. ~--.,\._.:' ).-""' question went to the jury.
"' r t '
The fact was plain that on the 5th of February, 1878, this
'••.....,Ill \
notice was printed in the Gazette: "Notice is hereby given
that the partnership heretofore subsisting between us, the un\'...-"
dersigned Benjamin Scarf and William Henry Rogers, carrying
on business as merchants at 32 Church street, Manchester,
under the firm name of W. H. Rogers & Co., was dissolved by
mutual consent on the 27th day of July last. All debts owing
to or by the said firm will be received and paid by the said
vV. H. Rogers alone, who will continue to carry on the business as heretofore, in partnership with the undersigned James
Beech, under the firm of W. H. Rogers & Co." If Mr. Jardin<',
the plaintiff, had not been a person who hatl dealt with 1h"

·
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former firm, the notice in the Gazette would have given him
notice as from that 5th of February which was after the order
had been given upon the 30th of January. The goods were
delivered at different times, as I have stated, substantially after
the 5th of February; and it was material to ascertain when it
was that Mr. Jardine got actual notice. As soon as he was
aware of this notice being published in the Gazette it is quite
plain that be would know that the authority which bad originally belonged to Rogers to bind himself and Scarf had been revoked. But he was not bound to read the GazetteJ· and in point
of fact it appears, according to the finding of the jury, that he
did not read it; and it was not until the 25th of February that
he received a circular, at the bottom of which was appended
the Gazette notice, and which circular was in theRe terms:
'' Sir, I beg to call your attention to the annexed notice of dist:;Olution of partnership lately existing between Mr. Benjamin
Scarf and myself, and I have the pleasure to inform you that
1\fr. James Beech bas joined me in the business, and will take
an active part. '!'he style of the firm will not be altered. Undernoted are the signature of each partner. Yours truly, W.
H. Rogers;" then the signatures were given, and below that
was a copy of the notice which bad been previously published
in the Gazette. The finding of the jury was that this notice
came to Mr. Jardine on the 25th of February, and not sooner.
Now that being the case, the question then arose, what defense, if any, was proved. It was agreed that this should be
determined by the Court without asking any further question
of the jury, but taking the evidence and drawing the inferences
of fact, whether there was a defense or not. On that Denman
J. who tried the case thought (it was apparently put to him in
that way) that the question was whether or not there was
novation; which the Lord Chancellor bad just said (and I quite
agree with him) i::l another word for accord and satisfaction by
giving in substitution the liability of another person upon another contract in lieu of the contract for which the former
partners were liable; and Denman J. thought that there had
been a novation proved.
.
When the case-came before the Court of Appeal the majority
of the Court of Appeal (Baggallay L. J. seems to have doubted
about it) thought that the novation in that sense was not proved.
I do not feel quite certain whether if I knew all the evidence

..
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(for it nas not been brought fully before us)-if I thought the
question was whether there was novation or not-I should have
agreed with them that on the evidence brought before us it wns
not in this case proved. I need not, however, enter into the
question how that was; because my opinion; which leads me to
concur in the judgment which has just been moved, is that
that was not the real question-that there was a mistake and a
misapprehension on the part not only of the counsel who argued
it, but of the Judges who heard the case, when they thought
that the question was that of novation, the defense really depending upon a prior question.
Though the amount now in dispute is very small, the question is an important one. I do not think there can be any
doupt (it is a very old law indeed) that where a person has
given authority to another (it is not peculiar to partnership),
the authority being such as would apparently continue, be is
bound to those who act upon the faith ofthat authority, though
he has revoked it, unless be has given the proper notice of the
revocation. In this case I think there can be no doubt that
Rogers having been partner with Scarf bad authority, and apparently continuing authority, to bind Scarf as to all matters
concerning the partnership, and that Mr. Jardine being an old
customer had a right to believe that that authority continued
until he was told that it was revoked. But then I do not think
that the liability itJ upon the ground that the authority actualJy
continues. I think it is upon the ground, ~s bas been very
well put and explained in Freeman vs. Cooke, 2 Ex. 654, that
there is a duty upon the person who has given that authority if
he revoke it, to take care that notice of that revocation is given
to those who might otherwise act on the supposition that it ccntinued; and the failure to give that notice precludes him from
denying that he gave the authority against those w·ho acted
upon the faith that that authority continued. I put rather an
emphasis upon those last words "against those who acted upon
the faith that that authority continued," for I think that no·
ma.n has a rigi.1t to say "I know now that the authority was in
fact revoked, but I will continue to go on, and will do things
subsequently, and act upon the supposition that I bold this
person liable, though I am not actually acting upon the faith
that he has given authority, but I am acting upon the ground
that I find another is really liable, and I will only come on him. ..
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if that other does not pay." I do not think he can do that.
The question therefore is this, was Mr. Jardine acting upon the
faith that it was so?
Now Mr. Jardine upon the 30th of January, as far as appears
upon the evidence, had never so much as heard of Mr. Beech.
Mr. Jardine when· he received the order from W. H. Rogers &
Co., had every reason to think he was contracting to supply
these goods to Rogers and Scarf, and he did supply the substantial part of the goods on the 1st, 16th and 20th of February,
before he had any notice that he was not supplying them to
Rogers and Scarf. Therefore clearly at that time he was in the
case of a person who had acted upon the faith that W. H . Rogers'
authority when he gave.the order still continued when he supplied the goods; and he therefore certainly had a right to hold
Scarf liable on that ground. But it is quite clear from the
notice, and the circular which I have already read, that on the
25th of February he became aware that though Rogers bad
apparent authority, and though he having act~ upon that
apparent authority had a right, if be pleased, to bold Scarf
liable, yet in point of fact Scarf was not really a principle and
bad not given real authority; that in point of fact Rogers was
not acting by Scarf's authority but by Beech's authority, and
that Rogers and Beech were the real persons who bad ordered
the goods and who had received them, and were the persons
who were therefore liable; because in fact Rogers had authority
from Beech and had not in fact authority from Scarf.
The first question therefore which arises is, could a person
who knew that he held both Beech and Rogers liable, and had
very rightly the power to say "I will treat this as being a joint
liability of Rogers and Beech," say "I will treat it not only as
the joint liability of Rogers and Beech, but as the joint liability
of Rogers, Beech and Scarf," treating them all three as jointly
HaLle? And. certainly, though counsel could not produce any
preci.:;e authority upon the point, I should myself, unless I had
seen "'hat the Judges of appeal had here said, never ha.ve entertained the slightest doubt that he could not. I should not
myself have entertained a doubt that in old times a plea. in
abatement, in an action against Rogers and Beech for not joining Scarf, would have been bad; nor could I have doubted that
in oltl times if an action had been brought against Rogers,
Scarf and Beech jointly there would have been a nonsuit
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entered, upon tho ground that there was a variance in tuo
proof-that there was no proof that the three were liable. I
say, I should not have doubted that at all if I had not found
(unless there has been some misprint, or some inaccuracy in
the shorthand note) tuat that was not the view of the Court of
Appeal. Lord Coleriuge is reported to have said, "The three
partners are all primarily liable clearly." I think that at the
moment when he said that he could not have had the facts before him. The three never were partners at all-1 <'.annot seo
how he could possibly say that that was the case if he remembered the facts. Brett L. J . does not say that in terms, but he
does say what almost involves the same thing. \Vhen
treats it as a novation he says "I cannot infer from the fact of
his making a claim against people with respect to whom he had
a valid cl{lim" (by that be means Rogers and Beech) "that he
had given up his claim against another person who was liable
to him., Now I do not think that that other person (Scarf)
was as I b~ve said before, liable to Jardine. Scarf was pre. eluded or estopped from denying that he had given the authority which would have mad~ him liable, if the fact had been so,
but I do not think that it was so: and I agree with what the
Lord Chancellor has said, that the di1ference is an·important
one.
There seems not only t-o be no distinct authority upon the
subject, but there really seems to have been a doubt in the
minds of these able Judges (at least it is quite clear that they
do not seem to have perceived the point clearly) whether or no
the plaintiff could consider all three persons jointly liable. I
think it important to say distinctly that in my opinion he could
not, and to say that the right which the plaintiff had when he
got the notice on the 25th of February was to sue either at his
option, but he was not bound to sue Scarf. He might very
reasonably and properly say, "I think that I have a legal right
to holJ Mr. Scarf liable because he did not give notice to me in
time; but I am not going t.() do so. I find no'v that I hR.ve a
ritiht to hold Rogers and· Beech liable and will do so;, and if
he bad communicated that to the parties, there ·could be no
doubt at all that when h~ had elected thus to charge Rogers
and Beech and Rogers and Beech only, there would have been
no question whatever that it was a final and conclusive election
and that he could in no way after that charge Scarf. But he
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had also a right if he pleased to say, ''I will proceed upon the
ground that Scarf has made himself liable to me. I will hold
Scad liable." But in that case I think he oou~d not hold Beech
also liable. It seems to me that he had his choice between the
two; be bad his choice whether be would hold Rogers and
Beech liable as in fact they were, or Rogers and Scarf liable as
he bad supposed they were, though Scarf was not liable in fact;
but he could not bold both sets of persons liable. And then
comes the question which ought to have been decided, not
whether there was a novation (upon which probably if I had
thought that that was the question I should have agreed with
tbe majority of the Court of Appeal), but whether too plaintiff
had before the 30th of September, the date at which he for the
fiTBt time made a claim against Scarf, made a final determination of the election by which he had to choose which of the two
sets of parties he would hold liable.
Now on that question there are a great many cases; they are
collected in the notes to Dumpor's Case, 1 Sm. L. C. 8th ed.
47, 54, and they are uniform in this respect, that where a man
has an option to choose one or other of two inconsistent things,
when once he has made his election it cannot be retracted, it is
final and cannot be altered. "Quod semel placuit in electionibus, amplius, displicere non potest." That is Coke upon
Littleton (146a), and I do not doubt that there are many older
authorities to the same effect; but that rule has been uniformly
acted upon from that time at least down to the present. When
once there has been an election to do one of the two things · you
cannot retract it and do the other thing; the election once made
is finally made.
But upon that comes the question which is the one that now
arises, whether there was evidence here on which your Lord
ships should find as a fact that there was an election. In
Clough vs. London and .1Vorthwestern Railway Co., L. R. 7
Ex. 34, the Exchequer Chamber had to consider that question
a good deal in a case of some importance in which the judgment was carefully considered. I wrote it myself and I f>aJ"
nothing further about it than this, that it had the full assent of
all the other Judges. The result of what is there said iR that
where there is a right to elect the party is not bound to elect nt
once; he may wait and tbiuk which way he will exercise hil:>
election, so long as he can do so without injuring other persons,

CASES ON pARTNERSHIP.

and accordingly in that particular case it was held that be bad
not lost his right to elect by a reasonable waiting under rather
peculiar circumstances; but when .he has once fully elected it
is final.
I may also refer to the case of Jones vs. Carter, 15 M. &
W. 718,$8 most neatly stating the point. The principle, I take
it, running through all the cases as to what is an election is this,
that where a party in his own mind bas thought that be would
choose one of two remedies, even though he has written it down
on a memorandum or bas indicated it in some other way, that
ulono will not bind him; but so soon as he has not only determined to follow one of his remedies, but has communicated it
to the other side in such a way as to lead the opposite party to
believe that be has made that choice, he bas completed his election and can go no further; and whether he intended it or not,
if be has done an unequivocal act-I mean an act which would
be justifiable if he bad elected one way, and would not be justifiable if be had elected the other way-the fact of his having
done that unequivocal act to the knowledge of the persons concerned is an election. In Jones vs. Carter, 15 M. & W. 718
(the principle is general, though the particular application is
peculiar) the question was whether a man, who bad a right to
avoid a lease, bad avoided it or not. He bad at tirst brought a
writ of ejectment for the purpose of avoiding it, by which, in
modern times, you do not actually enter; but it had procee<le11
so far that the defendant had ent.ered into a consent rule; atH:
the defendant having entered into a consent rule by which b~:
had admit.ted the entry, the court held that it must be taken as if
the plaintiff had entered, and that inasmuch as the entry to
avoid a lease was unequivocal in its nature be could not aft-erwards say, "The lease was not void."
Now that is the question which I think the court below ought
to have decided, and which I think your Lordships now, having power to find all the facts, ba veto decide upon the evidence.
Was there before the ·30th of September, which was the date
when plaintiff first came upou Scarf, an unt'quivocal election to
take Beech as his debtor? I do not think that at firat there was.
I do not think that the mere fHct of his hnving continued to ent-er in his books these goods along with others which he had
undoubtedly contracted to supply after th~ 25th of February,
when he bad full notice (entering them in one account), would
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preclude him; because I think as I said before, that it was
merE-ly an exf>ression of his own private intention and opinion,
which did not bind the matter until it was communicated to the
otbE>r side, which it nevE--r was. I do not think that his having
demanded money from Rogers after he knew that Rogers was
carrying on the nE>w firm of Rogers & Beech will do, for the
reasons given by Brett L. J., that the notice of dissolution dis·
tinctly said, " Whatever Rogers & Scarf owe, go to Rogers,
and Rogers will pay it." But then the evidence goes further.
I am not sure that taking a check from Rogers & Beech as payment was enough to make an election, because I think that in
acting on the authority given by Scarf to Rogers to pay the
debts for him and Scarf, Rogers might pay money by the new
firm's check or otherwise as he pleased. But then the plaintiff
goes on and issues a writ against Rogers & Beech-he sues
Beech. I am unable to conceive a more unequivocal act; he
has thereby adopted Beech as his debtor at that time. I do not
think its going to judgment or not going to judgment is material. How be could possibly do a more unequivocal act than
issuing a writ against Rogers & Beech I cannot imagine. The
re~:mlt of his issuing the writ was that Rogers & Beech, not being
able to get time to obtain terms, went into liquidation, and then
the plaintiff sent in his affidavit, claiming to prove against Rogers
& Beech for this sum which is now in dispute, and also for the
subsequent debts, treating them all as one. I think that also is
an unequivocal act. And taking the whole together I can bring
myself in no way to doubt that upon the facts we ought to find
that Mr. Jardine, having the right of election between holding
Beech liable and holding Scarf liable, had, before be ever came
upon Scarf, finally determined his election and taken Beech as
liable, and that he could not hold both Scarf and Beech liable.
I am consequently of opinion that the judgmE-nt should be
for tbe defendant, though not upon the ground on which it was
originally put, namely, that.there was a novation, but upon the
ground that Scarf was never liable, for this reason, that before
any step was taken to make him liable a final and coqclusi ve
election bad been made to bold Beech liable, which involved
impliedly that Scarf was not.
SELBORNE, L. C., WATSON and BRAMWELL, LL. JJ .• delivered concurring opinions.
NOTE. -See Mechem's Elements of Psrtn., § 262.
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91 Wis. 90, 64 N. W. 812.

from circuit court, Pierce county; E. B. Bundy;
!\~:Judge.
·
~~-~ ~-6.' Action by Lottie Thayer against Alfred J. Goss anJ J. B.
'\_,)or I'("~..s I.Goss on a note executed to plaintiff by J. B. Goss & Co. From
~ ~-,
a judgment for plaintiff, defendant Alfred J. Goes appeals.
~ 0.' ~ . \l""\ Affirmed.
~~?~ ~ This action was brought against Alfred J. 0~ and J . B.
rp~. .
Goss, as copartners under the firm name of J. B. Goss & Co.,
" •
..
upon a promissory note signed by that name, dated April 19,
t" ~ ·'\ r'""
1893, payable on demand to the plaintiff, with interest, etc.,
..r~"" ~ ·~ oeharging, in substan<-e, that the defendant J .. B. Goss wat:J the
......_,r · _.,)' ~ ostensible and active managing member of a firm doing a mill~\).. ) ~\co- ing business at River Falls, Wis., and that t.he said firm was
~ ~ . .. composed of the said J. B. Goss and Alfred J. Goss; that the
,.... 'l.' ; . .~... plaintiff believed, w ben she took the said note, that the con"'(' \ ". ~) sideration for it was money loaned to the former firm of J. D.
~ '(\..~c. 'Putnam & Co., consisting of J . D. Putnam and the defendant
~...
Alfred J. Goss, which firm was dissolved November 3, 18!.11,
\.,...."
\t-i'
when the firm of J. B. Go~s & Co., was formed, and the prop~erty and effects of the former firm were transferred to it, and
it ·assumed and agreed to pay the debts of said former fi·rm;
that the plaintiff, at the request of the said J. B. Goss & Co.,
surrendered..,the note of J. D. Putnam & Co., for said Joan,
and, relying on the promise and credit of the said firm of J. B.
Gos3 & Co., took the note sued on in lieu thereof. The defendant. J . B. Goss made default, and the defendant Alfred J.
Gos:J at.swered, admitting the allegations in respect to the existence and dissolution of the firm of J. D. Putnam & Co., but
denying that any firm or partnership of J. B. G~s & Co., was
formed, or that he was ever a member of any such firm, or that
the property and effects of the fil'm of J. D. Putnam & Co.,
were ever transferred to the firm of J. B. Goss & Co., or that
it assumed or agreed to pay the debtt~ of the former firm; and

'+-
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he a1leged ihat the business carried on under the name of J. B.
Gosa & Co., was the private business of the said J. B. Goss, in
which he, defendant Alfred J. Gosa, had no interest.
At the trial by th.e court it was found, among other things:
(1) That prior to November 5, 1891, the defendant Alfred J.
Goes and J. D. Putnam were doing a milling. business together
as copartners under the firm name of J. D. Putnam & Co.
(2) That on that day the partnership was dissolved, and the
said Putnam and the defendant Alfred J. Goss signed and
caused to be published, at the pl~ce of said business, n ugtice as
follows, to wit : '' Notice of Dissolution. Notice is hereby
given that the copartner~;hip formerly existing between the undersigned, J. D. Putnam and Alfred J. Goss, under the firm
name of J. D. Putnam & Co., is this day dissolved by mutual
consent, and the business will in the future be carried on under
the firm name of J. B. Goss & Co., who will settle all claims
of the late partne~hip. J.D. Putnam. Alfred J. Goss. November 3rd, 1891."
(3) That it was then understood that the partnership property should be conveyed to the defendant J . B. Goss, and that
be should carry on the said business, and pay the debts of the
firm of J. D. Putnam & Co., doiug business under the name of
J. B. Goss & Co. ; but by mistake the property was conveyed
to the defendant Alfred J. Goss, who pnnmant to &till agreement, afterwards conveyed it to the defendant J . B. OosR, and
he carried on the bu~iness under the namE\ of J . B. Goss-& Co.,
having no partner. That there was in fact no partnership existing between the defendants, and Alfred J. Goss ha<l uo interests in the profits of the business of J. B. Goss & Co., as
partner.
(4) That the note sued on was executed in the manner and
for the consideration set forth in the complaint, and the plaintiff, when she took the same, understood and believed that
J. B. Goss & Co., was a firm consisting of J. B. Goss and Alfred J. Gose-, and that there was such a ho.l ding out by the said
Alfred J. Goes as to induce her to so believe, and to act upon such
belief.
As a conclusion of law .tLe court held that the plaintiff was
entitled to judgment against both defendants for the amount of
the note. and co~ts. Aside from the proof of the signing and
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publishing of the notice as before stated, it appeared in evidence
that the plaintiff saw the published notiee in the River Ji'alls
Journal, and she testified that she believed that the defendant
Alfred J. Gos~ still continoued in the business, but she had never
hearu any one say so ;0that she believed that J. B. Goss and
Alfred J . Goss continued the lm~ines. From the judgment on
~uch finding the defendant Alfred J. Goss appealed.
Spooner, Sanborn:, Kerr & Spooner, for appellant.
0
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·w hite, for respondent.

PINli."EY, J., (after ·stating the facts). The familiar and
well-st. Uled rule is that a dissolution of the copartner:::ship by
l.Ct cf the parties, whether a comvlete discontinuance of the
concern or the retirement of a single partner or addition of a
memLer, dee~ not affect the outside world, unless proper notice
is given; that actual notice must be brought Lome to former
customers, or those who are creditors by having dealt with it,
but notice by publication is sufficient as to all others. Bates,
Partn. § 606; 1 Lindl. Partn. *2tl. The plaintiil must be regarded as a former customer or dealer with the firm of J. D.
Putnam & Co., and, as such, entitled to actual notice, she h_aving loaned them monAy, though but in a single instance, fur
which she was then their creditor. She comes within the reason of the rulA. Bates, Partn. § 613; Bank vs. IIoward, 35
N. Y. 500; Lyon vs. Johnson, 28 Conn. 1; Wardwell vs.
Haight, 2 Barb. 549; Vernon vs. Manhattan Co., 22 Wend.
182; Bank vs. Norton, 1 Hill, 572.

The ground upon which notice of the discontinuance of the concern by act of the parties or the retirement or addition of a member is required is stated ns arising from a species of -estoppel to
dt•ny the continuance of the agency of each of the partners for
the firm, or on the ground of negligence whereby credit is given, ..
or from a presumption of a continuance of the former relations,
giving to one who once knows of the existence of a firm the
right to assume that it remains the same, so that, until proper
notice of dissolution, a partner's attitude is like that of a partner by holding out. Bates, Partn. § 607; Vernon vs. Jfanhrtftan Co., 22 Wend. 189, 19:J. In Scmj vs. Jardine, 7 App.
Cas. 3-15, it is stated that the principle upon which those who
have dealt with the firm before a change took place are entitloo
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to assume, until they have notice to the contrary, that no change
has occurred, "is that of the estoppel of a person who bas
accredited another, as his known agent, from denying t.hat
agency at a aubsequent time, as against the persons to whom he
bas accredited him, by reason of any secret revocation, "-in partnership, there being an agency by which one partner is the
ng:ent. of the firm for tho time being to carry on the partnership
according to the usual course. 1 Lindl. Partn. 40; Thompson
v.~. Bank, 111 U. S. 5~9, 541, 4 Sup. .Ct. 689.
The plaintiff saw the published notice, and about 18 months
afterwards she took the note upon whkh sho sues in lieu of the
J. D. Putnam & Co. note, and the question is whether ·the
published notice, and the manner in which the new note was
executed, can be fairly belit to constitute notice to the plaintiff
that the defendant Alfred J. Goss bad ceased to be a partner in
the concern. If the change in the name was such as to indicate that he was no longer a member, there would certainly be
no ground for holding him liable. In the firm na.me of J.
D. Putnam & Co., Alfred J. Goss was mentioned under the
ambiguous and uncertain designation "& Co." The notice
affirms that the partnership of J. D. Putnam & Co. is dissoh·ed, and that the ''business will, in future, be carried on
undPr the firm name of J. B. Goss & Co.," who are to settle all
ci .ims of "the late copartnership. It is fairly evident that a
tww mt'm her, J. B. Goss, has been introduced into the business,
~nJ it may fairly be inferred that Putnam had retired. Now,
what business was it that in future would be carried on under
the new firm name? Plainly, the business of the former firm.
H re it-> no intimation that Alfred J. Goss has retired. On the
('outrary, the fair implication is that he remains under the designation "&Co.," as was the ease in the name and style of
J. D. Putuam & Co.
Beyond the fact of the dissolution of the former copartnership, that the business would in future be carried on under the
firm name of J. B. Goss & Co., and that they would settle all
claims of the }ate copartnership, the r.oticf' wholly fAils t.o COnvey any direct information; but, as observed, we think it may
Le fairly inferred that Putnam had withdrawn and that Alfred
.J. Goss remained in the business; that the change was substantially a reorganization by the withdrawal of a firm member
and by taking in a new one. There is no intimation that Alfred
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J. Goss had sold out his interest, or that be had no interest in
or was not a member of, the alleged firm of J. B. Goss & Co.
The proposition is laid down that when tho change of name is
relied on it "must indicat~ the retirement of the particular partner sought to be held, for otherwise, though it be a dissolution
of the identical partnership, it is also notice of a new one, in
which all the former members may be presumed to continue.".
Bates, Partn. § 623. We regard this rule as eminently practi. cal and just, and it has the sancti9n of high authority.
In Howe v.~. Thayer, 17 Pick. 91, there was, in effect, a dissolution, and the organization of another firm with a different
name. The retiring partner, Thayer, was held liable to the
former dealers, because the chauge of name did not indicate
that he wa.q the partner going out; and SHAw, c. J.' ti8id:
"When a business is carried on by three or more as partners,
and one withdraws, or one is added, or both, and notice thereof
given, and the b~iness is carried on as before, those as to
whom no notice is given must be presumed to hold the same
relation to the concern that they did before; and such a change
furnished no presumption that the others have ceased to be
partners. If the plaintiff knew that Colton had withdrawn,
and ceased to be a partner, it was not, in law, ll notice to the
plaintiff of the dissolution of the partnership, as to all its members, to the effect contended for, and to the purpose for which
that proposition was advanced, namely, to exempt the other
members from liability. Or if it was, in a certain sense, evidence and notice of the dissolution of the same identical partnership that existed before, it was at the same time evidence
,. and notice of the formation of a new partnership arr.ong all
the remaining members of the firm to carry on the san:e business, holding the same relation to its customers and the public,
with the single exception implied from the fact that the retiring
member will be no longer liable for new contracts, and that the
acceding partner will thenceforward become liable."
But it is insisted that the new note was not given by the firm
with which the plaintiff had been connected; that that firm had
been dissolved, and that there never was in fact any such firm asJ.
B. Goes & Co. But this contention is met and answered in the case
of American Thread Co. vs. lVm·tendyke, 24 N. Y. 650, in
which the rule laid down in Hou:e vs. Thayer, supra, is cited and
approved. In that case DENIO, J ., says that: "In every case
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where a partner has withdrawn, and there is a further dealing
with the remaining partners under such circumstances as to
leave the retiring partner responsible, the contract is not
between the creditor and the former firm, but it is with a new
firm, which the creditor has been led to believe still embraced
the partner who bas in fact gone out. The bare fact, therefore,
of the dissolution of the old firm and the creation of a new one,
with which the credit sought to be enforced was had, and which
did not embrace one of the old partners, is not conclusiye
against the plaintiff."
In the present case the notice was to the effect that ''the
business will in future be carried on under the firm name of
J. B. Goss & Co.," who will settle aU claims of the late partnership, and it is said that no such firm was created; but .
whether so or riot, the signature to the new note, as well as t.he
notice, gives rise to the just inference, we think, that Alfred J.
Goss C!Jntinue<l in the business under the new name, and, if
there was no new firm formed in fact, it is difficult to see how
·he can claim to be exonerated from liability. In the case of
Thread Co. v.~. Wm·tendyke, supra, the firm with which the
plaintiff bad dealt was "Wortenclyke Brothers." Subsequently the firm was dissolved, and one of the brothers retired.
and a new firm was formed, another brother becoming, with
the others, members of the new firm under the firm name of
"Wortendyke Brothers & Company"; and a note was given to
the plaintiff, a former dealer, in the latter name, for goods sold
after the dissolution. The plaintiff having had no.actual notice
of the dissolution, it was held that the retiring member was
liable on the note, notwithstanding the change in the firm
name, and that the plaintiff bad a right to assume that the former partners remained in the business; that a change of firm
name, in order to exonerate a retiring partner, must show that
he had withdrawn from the business, and that a change not indicating this is insufficient to put dealers on inquiry.
It must be held, we think, that the notice in this case was an
assurance or holding out to the plaintiff and former dealers that
the business would be carried on under the new name of J. B.
Goss & Co. Alfred J. Goss had been described in the firm
name of J.D. Putnam & Co. as the company, and the fact that
the name of J. B. Goss took the place of that of J. D. Putnam
was no notice of the withdrawal of Alfred J. Goss, but, upon
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the principles already stated, was equivalent to a holding out
that he still remained in the business, and as a member of the
firm of J. B. Goss & Co., designated therein in like manner as
in the case of the firm of J. D. Putnam & Co., whether any
such firm existed or not; so that be is liable on the note in suit,
signed in the name of J. B. Goss & Co., as by holding out and
by estoppel. We think that the judgment of the circuit court
is correct.
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
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~ -.~·. ~fendants petition for a new trial.
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Thla was an action of trover brought by the plaJntlff, who
was aole surviving partner of a copartnership known aa
Jamee A. Capron & Co., again.Bt the defendant for the conweralon, after Oa.pr<m's death, of certain person·a lty of tlle firm·.
The defendant w~s executrix and sole legatee of Capron. This
action was brought in the rourt of common pleas, and the
jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, whereupon the de·
feJldant filed this petition, alleging that the presiding justice
erred in his instructions to the jury.
S~plum

A. Oooke, Jun., and Louil L. AngeU, for plaintiff.
Samuel W. K. Allen ,for defendant.

Pn Ouauw. Whether the relation between corpa rt n~rs
with reference to their ownership of the partnership assets is
miOre IIUle.logoU6 to a tenoocy in common or to a joint tooa nc.v,
we need not decide. In either case, a sole surviving partner is
entitled at law to the possession of the assets of the firm until
Its affairs are settled, as wt:!ll against the representatives of the
deceased to whom he is ultimately liable to account, as against
.trangers. 17 Amer & Eng. Encyc. of Law, 1161 ; Parsons on
Partnership, 458. 2 Lawson. nights, Remedies, and Practice,
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1256. Trover is a proper remedy for a refusal of such posse&·
sion. The court properly construed the articles of agreement
in C] U e~tion , and instructed the jury to consider them as a
wh(ll<> in deciding the question of fraud.
'fhe cause of action in this case, the con'\"ersion of the goods
occurred after the death of the late partner. It was an injury
to the right of possession of the plaintitl', not to the joint pos·
session of the plaintiff and his late copartner. Hence the
plaintUf properly sued in his own name. Smith v. Barrow, 2
Term Rep. 476, 478. The amendment allowed him to add to
bls name the words 11surviving partner," etc., which were an
unnecessary but harmless description of the way he claimed to
have acquired title to the goods. • • •
~
The motion for a new trial must be denied and~~~~:/ r. ~

~-

......._.~~ . ~;;. ~~~·~·~~'r
~~, ~~~-t;.::;r~

~·,~~~9~:".7'
~,._, ~ . ~ ~p
.t..-.;1" ~~~TINE

.Jc:k1?.... .

~~~~ -t ~:~ \.) ~

~\.. ":. .. ~. .' Y~~ ,
,...-

~ "'(''

~~

......

~ '1.

~~

/J '

~-

vs. 'W YSOR.

.' c,?jrtprem.e Court of Indiana, 1890.
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.... •1ss Ind. 47, 28 N. E.

Rep. ta711, 7 L R. A. 788.

~ \rl"'~ ~,
~\ ......... ~\. <...·, ·.»-~his solt was instituted by Emily E. Valentine, Martha M.

·'

0'' -

r/ .- ~~ ~ ~ Little, ParmeJia R. Gilbert, Mary E. Wood, and Florence T.
<"~ • • \.r~ Horne, the children and heirs at law of John Jack, late of

~...,... ..1(1. •\ l)elaware county, deceased, against Jacob H. Wysor. John
I '•(~ -\.'".. .~ ... ~-~":~~ Jack, father of the plaintiffs below, died testate in the month
1 ~·: '.:-~

~·,.

,-·~of October, 1859.

At and before that date, be was in partner·

:~· · ·"' .'--~·- ~ ....(..\ J' , ship with the defendant, Jac()b H. Wysor, the two composing

,. >;· ..
,~

~~-•
. ·.....

4"

;\/the ftrm ot. Wysor & Jack. The testa,tor was also a member of
, ( ... ·Y...J'~
the firm of Wysor, Jack & Kline, which was composed of the
v ., ~ ~ 1 v ~"'above-named Jacob H. Wysor, John J ack, and William B.
~ · ' .• -~.....~'}'}'kline.
This last-named firm waa engnged in the milling busi! ~
,.
'/~ _;\.:'" ~ ,~ \.- ness, and owned a flouring-mill, together with 65 acres of land
1
~
~·~ adjacent; each member being the owner of a n undivided one: ·~~· · ..'.-, · ..•. ·, , third of the business and property. The business of the firm of
::., -:,~\ \.' ·..:- · \~t Wysor, Jack & Kline ~as in no way connected with that ot
. · r'·· .•
firm being the owner of 380 acres
·....:·,
. "'4 ~. .../ _, ·•\ .... . )· ·w ..vsor&Jack ; the last-named
.
o:·.. ;··J~ . . --: .
, • of land, which constituted part of the firm assets, in which each
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partner bad an equal interest. The character of the business of
Wy_sor & Jack does not distinctly appear, but the land owned
by them is treated by both parties as partnership property. By
the first, second, and third clauses of his will, the testator
appointed executors to carry the will into execution, made provision for his wife by giving her a life-estate in his real estate,
and expressed a desire tltat she should be admitted into the
firm, and continue the business as a partner with Wysor and
Kline, his former associates in the milling busin('Ss. The
fourth and fifth clauses of .his will read as follows: "(4) I will
and direct that my said executors, and, in case of the death or
failure to ser\·e of either, the survivor of them, shall adjust,
settle; and compromise any and all debts, claims, or demands
due to or from me according to the best of their or his judgment, without any further authority from any court or jurisdic·
tion whatever; and, further, that. they shall make settlement
w_ith my said partners, and each of them, of the partnership
affairs, and of the profits heretofore arising therefrom,
together with any matters of dealing between myself and them,
or either of them, in manner according to his or their judgment,
without any further authority from any court whatever. (5) 1
'do further will and direct that my said executors, or, in case of
the failure, from any cause, of either to serve. the-n the remaining executor, shall sell and convey so much of my personal or
real estate, at either pnblic or private sale, witll or without
appraisement, on such terms, at such plaee, and in such man·
ner, as to hiru or them shall seem best, as may be necessary to
pay and satisfy all my just debts, reserving~ however~ to my
said wife the title and possession of the bouse and grounds
where I now live; otherwise, selliug such parcels~ the sale of
wbich will least injure the remainder." As to the remainder
of his property, after the termination of the life-estate of the
widow, the t~tator died intestate. After the testator died,
Wysor,·as l"nrviving ·pat·tner of the firm of "~ysor & Jack, and
Wysor & Kline, as surviving partners of Wysor, Jack & Kline.
continued in possession of the property of their respective
firms until June 25, 1S6G, when the executors of the last will of
John .Jack, assuming to act _under the provisions of the fourth
and fifth clauses of the will, a~ove set out, made a settlement,
and entered into an agreement with the defendant, Wysor,
whereby, in consideration that the latter agreed to pay the in
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debtedness of the firm of Wysor & Jack, and certain debts due
!rom the testator to Wysor, and also to pay his share of all the
unpaid indebtedness of \VyRor, Jaek & Kline, and all other
indetJtedness of the testator, including the cost of adminif;tration, and, in addition, convey certain property to the widow~
aud secure to her one-third interest in the property of Wysor,
Jack & Kline, free from any debts, the executors and widow
ng-rc~d to convey to the defendant, Wysor, all the interest of
the testator, excepting certain designated parcels, in the real
estate owned by the finn of Wysor & Jack. This agreement
was consummated, and conveyances were made, accordingly,
by the widow and executors, in June, 1866; and it is charged
that the defendant claims, in virtue of these conveyances, to be
the sole owner of the property, and denies the title of the
plaintiffs. These co.nveyances stood without question until
in February, HS80, when this suit was instituted.
Defendant obtained judgment. Plaintiffs appeal.
0. T. Boaz, W. W. Herod and F. Winter, for appellants.
William Brotherton. and 0. E. Shipley, for appellee.
MITCHELL, J. (After stating the facts.) It does not appear
from the complaint that there was any disparity between
the value of the property conveyed and the a.moun t of de.bts
assumed, or that the debts have not been paid according
to the agreement, or that there was any fraud or collusion
between the surviving partner and the executors, or that the
latter were in any way overreached. It is claimed, however,
that the power of sale contained in the will did not extend
to the partnership real est~te, except that specifically mentioned therein; that, if it did, it only authorized the executors to sell the testator's interest in so much thereof as
remained after full payment of the partnership debts. Moreover, it is claimed that, even if the executors had authority to
sell, the transaction, as disclosed by the complaint, was not a
sale, within the meaning of the language employed in the will,
and that because the sale was made by the executors without
having given notice of the time, place, and terms of sale, and
without having included the value of the real estate in thebond given by them when they qualified, the conveyance was
invalid and void. It is claimed, too, that Wysor, being the
surviving partner of the firm of Wysor & Jack, was a trustee-
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of the partnership property, under a duty to the heirs and
creditors, and that be was therefore incompetent to purchase
and receive a conveyance from the executors. For all these
r.easons, it is urged that the conveya·n ce is illegal, and ought to
be set aside, and that an accounting of the aftairs of the firm
of Wysor & Jack should be bad; the appellants alleging their
readiness to pay whatever may be found due the defendant,
Wysor.
\Vhile it is undoubtedly true, as a general rule, that an action
to compel a surviving partner to account can only be main·
tained by the personal representative of the deceased partner,
yet circumstances may appear which create an exception to
the general rule, and make it proper that a court of equity
should entertain an action on behalf of the heirs. Where it is
shown that there is a collusion between tb.e surviving partner
and the executor, the latter refusing to compel an accounting
by tJhe former, or where there ·h as been such dealing between
the two as renders it probable that the executor will not make
a bona fide effort to secure an accounting, or other like circum·
stances appear, it bas been held that the heirs may maintain
the action. In the absence of special circumstances, heirs have
no locu,s stand,i against the suniving partner. 2 Lindl. Partn.
494; Ha1'rison vs. Righter, 11 N.J. Eq. 389; Hyer vs. Burdett, 1·
Edw. Ch. 325.
Assuming, without deciding, that the facts, as pleaded in
the present case, make it apparent that the executors have
placed themselves in such an attitude towards the surviving
partner, and the transaction sought to be set aside, as to bring
the case within the exception, it becomes pertinent to inquire
whether or not the appellants, as heirs, show any interest in
the property of the late firm of \Vysor & Jack upon which to
predicate an action. It the executors bad no power under the
will to sell and convey, or the surviving partner was incompe·
tent to purchase, or receive a conveyance, or if, for any of the
other reasons urged, the transaction between the executors
and the surviving partner was illegal, and the conveyance void,
then the property remained in the possession, and under the
qualified ownership, of the .surviving partner, unaffected by
what transpired. It is familiar law that a surviving partner
has the right to the control and possP~~ion of the property of
the firm. and that he mav dispose of it in order to adjust the
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partnership accounts, and he is only liable to the representa
tives of the deceased partner for what remnins in his lnnda,
after the partnership affairs are settled; and there is nothing
more thoroughly settled in the law of partnership than that the
rights of the M·i rs of a deceased partner are subject to the
adjustment of all claims between the partners, and a.ttach only
to the surplus which remains when the partnership debts are
aJI paid, and the affairs of the firm wound up. Until all the
debts are paid, the rights of the heirs d~ not attach. Grissom
VB. Moore, 106 Ind. 296, 6 N. E. Rep. 629, 55 Am. Rep. 742, and
oases cited.; Walling vs. Burgess, 122 Ind. 299, 22 :N. E. Hep.
4.19; Deeter VB. Sellers, 102 Ind. 458, 1 N. E. Rep. 854. The heirs
~f a deceased partner have no interest, as such, in the propet·ty
of the firm. Their only remedy is to rompel the surviving part·
ner t~ aeoouut for the surplus after rhe settlement ot all th<>
partnership liabilities; and, ordinarily, a court of equity will
not entertain jurisdiction of the affairs of a partnership until
by its decree a final adjustment of the business can be effected.
Thompson vs. Lowe, 111 ·lnd. 272, 12 N. E. Rep. 476, and ca~.~JeS
cited; Scott VB. Searls, 5 Smedes & M. 25; Rossum vs. Sinker, 12
Cent. Law J. 205, and note. Now, while it appears that the
deceased partner was indebted to the firm, and that the firm
was indebted on partnership acoount, and that the surviving
pat'tner agreed, in consideration of the conveyance which is
assailed, to pay these and other debts for which the testator's
estate was liable, and while it may be inferred from the facts
alleged in the complaint that the surviving partner bas paid
all the debts of the firm except what remains due to himself
on the partnership aooount, it n()where appeara but that the
entire interest of the deceased partner would be a.bsorbed in
the adjustment of the partnership acecrout with the surviv·ing
partner. Having averred facts from whic-h the inference arises
that the surviving partner has paid all the partnership debts,
and that the estate of the deceased partner is indebted to him,
it is essential to the right of the heirs to call him to account
that they make it appear that he has in his hands partnership property in excess of the amount required to reimburse
himself. The averments in the complaint wholly fail to do
this, and the conclusion is therefore unavoidable that th(:
complainants fail to show such an interest in the property
as entitles them to invoke the aid of a court of equity. This
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r.oncluslon necessarily follows from the application of the rule
that a surviving partner is entitled to the custody and man·
agement of the assets, unless it be shown that he is committing
waste, or otherwise mismanaging the affairs of the firm, and
is only liable to the heirs or representatives of the decl~ased
partner for what remains after everything is settled up. RoyB

vs. Vilas, 18 Wis. 179; Shanks vs. Klein, 104 U. S. 18, ante,·
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.Anderson VB. Ackerman, 88 Ind. 481; Cobble vs. TomUnson, 50

Ind. 550.
If, however, it were conceded that it appeared that the pari·
nership assets exceeded in value the amount' necessary to
adjust the partnership account, it would by no means follow
that the appellants could maintain this action. It appears
that, more than 14 ~·ears before the commencement of thiR
action, the executors of the deceased partner, on the one hand,
acting under the authotity conferred by the will, and the sur.
viving partner, on the other, consummated a final settlement
and adjustment of the partnership account of Wysor & Jack.
The powers conferrP.d by the will are broad and comprehensive,
and include the power to settle, ~djust~ and compromise all
debts owing by the testator and to make settlements with his
former partners, and each of them, without any authority from
any court, and to sell and convey, either at public or private
sale, with or witho.ut appraisement, any or all of the testator's
real estate, on such terms as to them should seem best, in order
to pay and. satisfy debts against his estate. It thus. plainly
appears that it was the purpose of the testator to invest his
executors with power to make compromises and settlements
at their discretion, and to sell and convey his real and personal
estate according to their best judgment. The statute in force
at the time the sale was made provided, in effect, that, where
lands were directed to be sold by a will, the sale, as to giving
notice, conveying, taking notes, and mortgages, return and confirmation, should be conducted as sales by an administra.t or
for the payment of debts, "unless, by the terms of the will, dif·
ferent directions are ~iven; but no petition or notice of the
filing thereof shall be required." 2 Rev. St. 1876, p. 530. As
was, in effect, said in Jlunson vs. Cole, 98 Ind. 502, the la.nd was
not directed to be sold by the will. That was left to the discre·
tion ·of the executors. But, if it had been, the executors were
authorized to sell at their own discretion, upon such terms as
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they might think best; and the authority thus conferred necessarily operated as "different directions" from those prescribed
by the statute. The conveyance was not, therefore, invalid
because the terms of the statute were not observed, or on
accoull't of any defect in the power of the executors.
This brings us to inquire whether the surviving partner occupied such a relation to the property, and to those concerned,
as to disqualify him from purchasing the interest from the
executors of the deceased partner. It is not to be doubted
that a surviving partner is regarded as a trustee, primarily for
the creditors of the firm, and~ secondarily for the heir.s or personal representatives of the deceased partner in all that
remains, or fairly ought to remain, after adjusting the partnership account. Accordingly, it haB been correctly loid down
that "the s.urvivipg partners are held strictly as trustees, and
their conduct in discharging their trust is carefu1ly looked
after, by the courts of equity. Thus, like Qther trustees, the;v
cannot 8ell the property of the firm, and buy it themselves;
nor, as the converse of this, can they buy from themselv£'s
property for the firm. Their trust being to wind up the con·
cern, their powers are commensurate with the trust. • • *
Their trust is to wind up the concern in the best manner for all
interested, and therefore without unnecessary delay." ParR.
Partn. 442; Oase VB • .A.beel, 1 Paige 893; Sigourney vB. Munn.
7 Conn. 11; Jona VB. De.:cter, 130 Mass. 380, 39 Am. Rep. 459.
Being in a sense a trustee, the surviving partner cannot. o'
course, speculate upon the property which the law commits to
his custody, solely for his own advantage, i.n disregard of the
interests of his ceBtuiBque trmt; and, if .be makes profits oot
of the trulrt property, in the course of the adjustment of the
affairs of the partnership, be is held to accounJt to those inter·
ested for their share. He cannot purchase the trust property
from himself, no matter whether the attempt be made by
means of a public or private sale. This is so, not only because
his duty as seller, and his interest as purchaser, are in irrecon·
cilable conflict, but for the more cogent reason that it is indispensable to every legal contract of sale and purchase that there
be two contracting parties competent to enter into a binding
engagement with each other. Hence, an attempt by a trustee
who holds property in trust, whether he be surviving partner,
administrator, or whatever his designation, to sell the trust
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estate to himself, is everywhere held to be void. Martin vt.
Wyncoop, 12 Ind. 266; 74 Am. Dec. 209; Hunsucker VB. Smith,
49 Ind. 118; Murph;y VB. Teter, 56 Ind. 545; Rochester VB. Lever~
iug, 104 Ind. 562, 4 N. E. Rep. 203; Nelson vB. Hayner, 66 Ill. 487.
In the case of a sale thus made or attempted, it can well be said,
it is of no avail to show that the trustee acted in good faith.
~uch transactions are poisonous in their tendencies, and viola·
fions of the principles of public policy. They are declared
\"Oid, not for the purpose of affording a remedy against actual
mischief, but to prevent the possibility of wrong. Potter vs.
Smith, 36 Ind. 231; Mo1·gan 1;s. lVattles, 69 Ind. 261. These principles do not apply or control in the case of a sale made by the
personal representative of a deceased partner to a surviving
partner. No good reason can be suggested why a surviving
partner should be held legally incompetent and absolutely
disqualified from becoming the purchaser of the interest of
his deceased partner in the partnership business from his properly authorized legal representative, while very many reasons
occur why such transactions, fairly entered into, should not
only be upheld, but encouraged. In addition, the adjudged
cases firmly support the right to make such sa.les. Brown vs.
Slee, 103 U.S. 828; Baird vs. Baird, 1 Dev. & B. Eq. 524, 31 Am.
Dec. 399; Chambers vs. Howell, 11 Beav. 6; Rays vs. Vilas, supra.
In Kimball vs. Lincoln, 99 Ill. 578, after reiterating the rule
that a surviving partner could not become a purchaser of tht
firm property at his own sale, nor from a co-trustee, the cou rt
~aid: "But the reason that would forbid a transaction of this
tharacter has no application to a case where a surviving partner purchases property from the executor or administrator ot
the deceased partner, and hence the rule which would govern
the one case cannot control the other." See Ludlow's Heirs vs.
Cooper's Devisees, 4 Ohio St. 1. It has thus been seen that the
....xecutors bad plenary power to make settlements of the partnership account, and to sell and convey the real and perRonal
estate of the testator at their discretion, and that the surviving
partner was competent to negotiate a settlement of the affairs
of the firm, and to purchase the interest of his decea8'E.'d partner.
It is contended, however, that the power which the will conferred upon the executors was a power to sell the real or per·
sonal estate of the testator, and that the power thus conferr(~
was not well executed by the conveyance of the testator's intE-rest in the real estate of the firm in ooneideration of the agr·ee-
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ment to pay debts, as already indicated. The argument is that
the agreement between the executors and the eurviving part·
ner was the same, in legal effect, as an exchange of property,
and that a power to sell does not authorize an exchange. Rus·
sell t·s. R11ssell, 36 N. Y. 581; 93 Am. Dec. 540; Taylor VB. Gallotcay, 1 Ohio, 232, 13 Am. Dec. 605; IU119!/0ld VB. Ringgold, 1 Bar.
& G. 11, 18 Am. Dec. 250; King vB. Whiton, 15 'Vis. 684; OletJ6.
la.nd VB. Bank, 1G Ohio St. 236, 88 Am. Dec. 445. Conceding
that the proposition above stated is correct as 3 general rule, it
c:mnot be made available in the appellant's behalf, for two
t•easons: (1) The power conferred upon the executors comprehended much more than a mere naked authority to sell and
convey the testator's real estate. They were especially invested
with power to malce settlement with the partners of the testator, and with each of them, of all matters pertaining to the
partnership business, and to adjust, settle, and compromite all
debts, claims or demands against the estate of the testator,
according to their best judgment; and, in addition to the foregoing power, they were authorized, at their discretion, to sell
and convey the testator's real estate. R~garding the partner·
ship assets, although consisting of lands, as personalty, and
the power conferred by the fourth clause of the will to make a
settlement of the partnership affairs invested the executors
with ample authority, in case it became expedient or necessary,
in the courl'e of the settlement, to trr.nsfer property to the surviving partner to make sueh transfer. Ludloto'B Hei1·s vs.
Cooper's Vedsees, srtpra. MoreoYer, the· power contained in the
fifth clause must be construed in conncetion with the duties
imposed upon the exec-u tors by the fourth clause of the will.
lt will be observed that the executors are directed to sell and
convey so much of the testator's real estate as they shall deem
ne<'es&ary to pay and satisfy his debts. Construing both
clauses of the will together, it becomes apparent that the execu.
tors had authority to make any proper settlement which, in
their discretion, seemed fit and best. (2) A settlement and
final accounting with the surviving partner of the partnership
matters having been actually consummated by the executors
who were duly empowered, to that end, a court of. equity will
not disturb the settlement so made until it is impeached as
fraudulent or unfair, or unless collusion between the executors
and surviving partner is shown. Nothing less than fraud or

WALKBL
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collusion will invalidate an arrangement between an executor
and a surviving partner, whereby the latter became the purchaser of the deceased partner's share. Trat>i8 va. Milne, 9
Hare, 141; Davie8 t:B. Davie8, 2 Keen 534; Chambers vs. Howell,
supra; Stait1ton va:Oarron Oo., 18 Beav. 146; Smith vs. EL-erett,
27 Beav. 446; 2 Lind. Partn. {Rape.lj&11 Ed.) 487. As has been
seen, there is no pretense of any fmud or oollu8ion in the
present case.
Finally, after the settlement and accounting b~ween. the
executors and the surviving partner has been had, and the
account closed, as appears to have been the fact in the present
case. a court of equity will not, after this long acquiescence,
unexplnined by circumstances, decree the opening up of the
account, even though it appeared that the settlement had bt'en
irregularly ~a de. It is the settled doctrine of courts ·of equity
that unexplained delay in the prosecution of a right, until it
-becomes stale, constitutes such laches as forbids the intet·ference of the ron1·t. Smith vs. Thompson, 7 Grat 112, 54 Amer.
Dec. 126, and note; Hottgll vs. Cou!Jhla.n, 41 Ill. 131; 2 Story,
Eq. Jur. § 15:.!0. Here, as we have seen, there is an unexplained
delay of 14 years. The statute of limitations would have
barred an action between the partners themselves in case the
settlements had be('n made by them. After this lapse of time
a presumption of innocence and fair dealing arises, and
removes every inference or imputation of bad faith from the
transaction, and the settlement must repose as the parties
made it. Pt·eoost vs. Oratz, 6 \Vheat. 481; Roche~ter v1. £ever.
mg, 104 Ind. 562, 4 N. E. Rep. 203.
The judgment is affirmed, with costs.
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of the clauses of the will provided for the continuance of the
partnership and the conduct of this business after his death.
It is in this language:
"It is my wish that my son Frederick carry on the boainesa
of W. H. "'alker & Co. in that name and style, and in my
storehouse where it is now carried on, giving him power to
change the place, until my youngest child living to be twenty·
one years of age arrives at that age, or for a shorter time, if he
does not find it profitable. To that end all my capital and
interest in said concern shall be continued therein, and shall
be chargeable for its debts and liabilities; but my other prop·
erty shall not be so chargeable while Frederick carries on said
business; my share shall pay the salary of an efficient man to
aid him therein o·r he shall have compensation for his services
as to and from my share. Agents and employes of the con·
cern are to be paid by it. Frederick is not to be cha.rged with
$5,000 advanced by me to him on his coming of age, and he is
to have the privilege to purchase, at a fair valuation and upon
reasonable time, such portion of my share in said concern and
its good will ~ will make -h is share equal to one-half. What
he may so pay is to be divided as profits of the concern. While
my storehouse is occupied by the concern it slsall pay ren·t
therefor. The 'profits of said concern, which shall be ascer·
tained and declared in the first of January after my death,
and annually thereafter, shall be divided between my wife and
children, or their descendants, and others. As my personalty
is to be divided among them when my youngest child living
to be twenty-one years of age arrives at that age, or at the
death of my son Frederick before that time, or when he discontinues the business, my interest in the concern and its
good will !Jhall be sold as my executors may direct, a111d the ·
proceeds divided, as the profits thereof are to be divided, with
an obligation, if possible, that the business may be carried on
under the old name and style."
The testator died in 1872, and the business was conducted
as directed in the will until February 27, 1877, when the firm,
on the petition of its members, was declared bankrupt by the
proper court.
The appellant Jones was made assignee, and very shortly
afterward filed the bill in the present case against the devi·
sees of W. H. \Valker's will.
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Martin Bijur and W. 0. Dodd, for appellant.
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John M. Brown., conrt:ra.
MILLER, J. (After stating the facts as above.) The object
of the bill is twofold, namely, to subject the property of the
deceased, which had not been embarked in the partnership
enterprise, in the bands of the devisees, to the payment of the
pnrtnership debts, and to recover from the defendants money
which they bad received as dividends out of the profits of the
business after the death of the testator.
In the recent case of Smith vs. Ayre, !01 U. S. 320, the
legal principle lying at the foundation of the first of these
grounds of relief was. fully discussed and determined. It was
there h~ld that a testator might authorize the continuance of a
partnership, in which be was engaged at the time of his death,
without subjecting any more of his property to the vicissitudes
of the business than what was then embarked in it, and that,
unless be bad expressly placed the whole, or some other part of
his estate, under the operation of the partnership, it would not
be presum~ that be bad so intended. s~ also Burwell vs.
Mandeville, 2 How. (U. S.) 560; E0 parte Garland, 10 Ves. Jr.
110. In tb~ case before tis the testator declares, in express
terms, that his capital and interest in said conc~rn shall be
continueu therein, and shall be chargeable for its debts and
liabilities; but his other property shall not be so chargeable.
We see no reason in the present case for d~arting froon
the priDJCiple adopted in Smith vs. Ayre, after much consideration.
If dividends of profits out of the partnership business were
honestly and fairly made, and when paid did not diminish the
capital, nor withdraw what was necessary to pay the indebtedness of the concern, we see no reason why the per~ms receiv·
ing them should now be called on to refund them.
The will of the testator has a clause a~tborizing these divi·
dends. The partnership had a long time to run and a large
part of his capital was engaged in the business. There were
children to be reared and educated, and it would have been
very unreasonable that all the profits should be continually
converted into capital, and that neither these children, nor
Frederick, the other partner, should be permitted to receive
dividends of profits, except on the condition of a liability to
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that extent for any future transactions of the partnership
through a period of fifteen or twenty years.
If these dividends ·h ad not been declared in good faith, nor
really earned, if they had diminished the capital, or if, when
they were made, debts existed which would have been left
without means of payment, the persons sharing in the dividends would probably have been liable to these creditors to
the extent of the money so received.
But we are satisfied that none of these conditions existed.
The case is mainly one of fact, and the testimony is very
full. We do ..not think its discussion here profitable or useful.
We are satisfied that at the time the last dividend was made
the capital of the company was undiminished, and the firm
amply able to pay its debts. Its misfortunes followed after
· this. It very fully appears that the insolvency was brought about
by accommodation indorsements for others, made after the
laBt dividend was paid; thrut the firm, but for this, would have
remained soh·ent, and that, in regard to this, none of the
defendants were to blame except Frederick, who, being a full
partner, is liable personally for all the debts of the firm.
An important matter in the case is a stipulation of the
parties to the suit that all the debts owing by the firm were
contracted subsequently to the declaration and payment of all
the dividends, and none of the debts of the firm were in existence at the time these profits were declared and paid.
No creditor whose debt was in existence when these dividends were made was injured. All the debts then existing
have been paid. What ri~ht had subsequent creditors to reclaim these dividends, who had no interest in the matter
when they were paid? These defendants, except Frederick,
were not partners. Their money was in the concern, and they
received dividends instead of interest.
We repeat that there is no evidence of fraud or intentional
wrong.
Decree affirmed.
NOTB: See Mechem's Elem. of Partn.,
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William E. DoggE>tt died on the 3d of April, 187ti, testate,
and Kate E. Doggett, appellant, who was named as executrix,
qualified as such in the probate court of Cook county. Doggett, at the time of his deatb, and for many years before, was
a member of the firm of Doggett, Barrett & Hills. In 1871, T.
C. H. and Lucy W. Smith executed their two promi8800"y notes
for certain sums of money, payable to Charles H. Dill. The
two notes, on t·he date of their execution, were guaranteed by
Doggett, Barrett & HiUs, the firm name to the guarantee being
executed by Doggen. No effort was made by Dill to collect
the amount due on the notes from the firm assets, or from
surviving members of the firm of Doggett, Barrett & Hills,
but after the death of Doggett be presented his claim to the
probate court, to be allowed against the estate of the deceased.
The probate ·c ourt, upon the evidence introduced, allowed the
claim, and the executrix appealed to the circuit court where
a second trial was had resulting in a judgment against the
estate. An appeal was then taken to the appellate court,
where the judgment of the circuit court was affirmed, and
this record is brought here by the executrix for the purpose of
reversing the judgment of the aprpellate court.

Slila and Lewis and R. W. Pike, for appellant.
De~eter, Herrick & Allen, for appellee.
CRAIG, J. (After stating tbe facts as above), proceeded:
It is insisted by appellant that a partnership demand cannot be allowed against the individua 1 estate ·of a deceased partner until the legal remedy against t·he partnership assets and
surviving partners has been exhausted.
In Mason vB. Tiffany, 45 Ill. 392, which was a proceeding in
chancery, by a creditor of a finn, to enforce payment of a firm
debt against the esta te of Titfnny, a deceased member of the
firm, it was held, that every partnership debt being joint and
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.several, it follows neeessarily, that. resort may be had, in the
first instance, for the debt, to the surviving partners, or to the
e.ssets of the deceased partner. In the deeision of the case it
Is sa.ld: "If it was a fact that the surviving partners remained
solvent for a long time before the assignment, and the assigned
asseis were sufficient to pay t.his claim, still these did not
require. the complainant to press ltis claim against them, the
estate of the deeeased partner being equally a fund on which he
had a right to rely." This case seems to establish the doctrine,
in plain words, that a creditor, in equity, bas the right, where
he holds a claim against a ftrm, one member of which has died,
to proceed against the estate 9f the deceased member or the
surviving partners, as he may eleet.
In Silve~-man va. Ohaae, 90 Ill. 37, the same question arose,
and following the doctrine of the case last cited, it was said:
"A partnership debt is joint and several, and the creditor has
the right to elect whether he will proceed against t.he aasets
in the hand·s of the surviving partner or a~ainst the estate of
the deceased partner, as held by this court in Mason vs. Tiffany,
45 Ill. 392. Nor will the laches of the· creditor in followin·g
the assets o"f. the firm preclude a recovery. The creditor has
t'he right to proceed again·s t the estate at any time before th~
statute of limitations has run, and a failure to pursue the
partnership assets cannot be relied upon as a defense wh~n
suit is brought against the estate."
These two cases would ~m to be conclusive of the question presented, so far, at least, as t'his court is concerned, as
they, in terms, decide the same question involved in the record
before us, and it would not be deemed necessary to say anything more on the question were it not for the fact that it is
claimed that these cases are in conflict with prior decisions of
this court, and the doctrine therein announced i~ not !'ound,·
and in harmony with the current of authority on the su,b ject
We have therefore concluded to briefly refer to some of the
authorities which have a bearing on the question, wi tll the
view of showing that the decisions of this court are fully sustained by the weight of authority.
Story on Partnership, Sec. 362, says: "The doctrine formerly held upon this subjeet seems to have been, that the joint
creditors had no claim whatsoever in equity against the estate
of the deceased partner, except when the surviving partners
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were at the time, or strbsequently became in·solvent or bank·
rupt. But that doctrine ha.s been since overturned, and it is
now held, that in equity all partnership debts are to be deemed
joint and several, and consequently the joint creditors have,
in all cases, the right to proceed at law against the survivors,
and an election also to proceed in equity against the estate
of a deceased partner, whether the survivors be insolvent or
bankrupt or ·not." The same doc.trine, but in diffe1·ent language, II declared by Story in his work on Equity Jurisprudence, Sec. 676.
Collyer on Partnership, Sec. 580, declares the law in the
following language: "It is now established beyond controversy, that in t'he consideration of courts of equity a partner·
ship debt is several as well as joint, and that upon the death
of a partner a joint creditor bas a right in equity to proceed
immediately against the representative of the d('ceased partner for payment out of his separate estate, without reference
to the question whether the joint estate -be solvent or insolvent, or to the state of accounts amongst the partners."
lJi.xon on Partnership, 113, says: "\Vhen a lia~ility exists
the creditor may, at his option, either pur.sue his legal remedy
against the survivor, or resort in equity to the estate of the
deceased, and this altoget-her without regard to the state of
the accounts ·between the partners themselves, or to the ability
of the survivor to pay."
Lindley on Partnership, 1053, says: "Whatever doubt there
may formerly have been upon the subject, it was clearly settlf'd
before the judicature acts, that a creditor of the firm could
proceed against the estate of the deceased partner without
tlr~t having r~conrse to the surviving partners, nnd without
reff'rt>nce to the ~ tate of the nrconnts between them and the
deceased." Bee also Pars. Mere. Law, 192; Adams Eq. 17l_:Smith Mere. J.aw, -tS; !-l Kent Com. 63, 64, and note.
From the citation's made, it would seem that the law, as
declared in Mason vs. Tiffany, and Silverman vs. Chase, supra,
is fully sustained, at least by text-writers of high authority
both in this country and in England. But it will not be necsary to rely alone on the text-books for a solution of the ques·
tion. ns thf' drdsions in En~rhmd and in many of the states are
In harmony with the rule declared in the text-books. In England, as early as 1816, in Devayn.es vs. Noble, 1 Mer. 529, it was
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decided, that in equity partnership debts are j-oint and several,
and a creditor holding a firm debt could res-ort to the estate
of th~ dl'c~ased partner for payment, without showing the
insoh·ency of the survivor. The rule adopted in the case cited
was subsequently adhered to and foUowed in n·ukitlson vs.
Henderson, 1M. & K. 582, and since the decision of these cases
t·he doctrine there announced has been regarded as the settled
law of England. In Nelson vs. Hill, 5 How. 127, the supreme
court of the United States held that the creditor of a partnership may, at his option, proceed at law against the surviving
partner, or go in the first instance Into equity against the representatives of the deceased partner-that it was not neces- ·
sary to exhaust his remedy at law ag.ainst the surviving partner before proceeding in equity against t·he estate. In support of the rule announced, Story on Partnership, See. 362,
· note 3, is cited. In a later case (Lewi8 VB. United Statu, 92 U.
S. 622), Nelson vB. Hill Is cited with approval. In Camp VB.
Gmnt, 21 Conn. 41, 54 Am. Dec. 321, the supreme court of
Connetticut, in an able opinion, adopt the rule of the courts
of England. ~n Weaver VB. Thornburg, 15 Ind. 124, the question ~ll'ose, and the supreme court of that state adopt the rule
in the language of Story on Partnership, cited supra, md this
decision was followed in a number of subsequent cases. D§n
vs. Phillips, 17 Ind. 406; Hardy vs. Overman, 36 I<l. 549. In
Freeman vs. Stuart, 41 Mise. 141, the question arose, and the
supreme court of that state held, in equity all partnership
d~bts are joint and several, and a creditor baa the right to
proceed in law against the survivor, and an election also to
proceed against the separate estate of the deceased partner,
whether the survivor be solvent or not. See also Irby va.
Graham, 46 Miss. 428, where the English rule is fully approved.
'l'he same doctrine has been adopted in Vermont, in Washlnwtt
vs. Bank of Bellou;.'s Falls, 19 Vt. 278. In Tennessee, in
Saunders vs. lVil<ler, 2 Heoa.d 579. In Arkansas, in McLaitt
vs. Carson, 4 Ark. 164, 37 Am. Dec. 777. In New Jersey, in
Wisham vs. Lippi11eott, 1 Stockt. Eq. 35~. In Ala.bama, in T1·avis
vs. Tartt, 8 Ala. 577. In Florida, in Fillyau t'B. Laverty, 3 Fla.
72. In Texns, in Gaut vs. Reed, 24 Texas 46, 76 Am. Dec. 94.
In New Hampshire, in Bou::ker vs. Smith, 48 N. H. 111, 2 Am.
Rep. 1~9. In New York and Geor~ia a contrary rule has been
n<lop1(>d, as wm be found in the following cases: Lamenas v1.
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Trustees, 11 Paige BO; _Voorhis vs. Childs, 17 N.Y. 354:; Bennett
Upon an examination of the New
York cases, it appears that the rule there adopt~ was supposed to be predicated on the old English ca.ees, and when
the courts of England established the doctrine which is laid
down as the law in Devaynes vs. Noble, and Wilkinson vs. Hen-derson, s-upra, the New York courts refused to follow the English rule, but adhered to w.hat was supposed to be the law in
England as declared in that oourt prior to that time. Georgia
seems to follow the New York rule. In a late case in
Wisconsin (Sherman VB. Kreul, 42 Wis. 33), the supreme
court say: "We are disposed to adopt the New York
rule, that in order to recover against the administrators
the plaintiff should allege ·a nd show that the surviving
partner is insolvent." It is also claimed by appellant
that the New York rule has been adopted in North and South
Carolina, Ohio and Pennsylvania; but without stopping to
determine precisely what the rule of the courts of these states
may be, we are satisfied that the decided weight of authority
is in harmony with the rule adopted in this state, and we are
not inclined to change the rule heretofore adopted in tbis state,
and follow the doctrine established by the courts of New York
and Georgia, although we fully recognize the great ability of
those courts.
It ia also claimed tllat Silverman VB. Chase is in oontlict with

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 16:49 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112102486216
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

vs. Woolfolk, 15 Ga. 213.

Moline Wate1· Power and Man·u facturing Oo. vs. Webster, 26 Ill.
23!l, and Pahlman VB. Graves, Id. 405. This position is, in our

judgment, based upon a misapprehension of those cases. In
those cases there was a controversy between the partnership
and individual creditors, and the principle of marshalling
assets was applied, as it should have been. Where there are
individual creditors, and partnership creditors, there is no
d-oubt in regard to the law fhat all individual creditors have
a prior claim against the individual assets, and partnership
.creditors have a prior claim against firm as8ets, and an individ. ual creditor would have the right to insist thrut no part of the
sepamte assets should be taken and applied in payment of firm
debts until all separate debts had been paid in full. This
familiar rule was applied in the two ca.ees referred to, and alSQ
in the case of Ladd VB. Griswold, 4 Gilm. 25, 46 Am. Dec. 443.
But there is no oontest between the individual and partner-
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Ship creditors •here, and henoe the- doctrine of marshalling
assets does not apply. In thia case no claims had been presented or allowed against the estate, of any character, except
the one in controversy, and oo individual creditor is resisting
the allowance of the claim.
But indE-pendent of the authorities, we all'e satisfied that the
ruie, holding the estate of a deceasE:'d pa~tner primarily liable ·
in equity, is sound in principle. Doggett, in' his life1:ime, wus.
individually liable for this debt, and if he bad been sued, and
a judgment obtained against him, any of ·his individual property would have been liable to be taken and sold in satisfaction.
of the debt. It is true, if he had been sued at law in his life·
time: it would have been necessary to join his partnPrs as
defendants in the action; but after judgment, it was not nece~·
sary to exh~ust the partnership assets before individual }Jl't}JI
erty could be taken, but the creditor could resort to such property in the first instance, if he saw proper. Did the death of
Doggett in any manner change the liability which existed on
this contract before his death? We think not. The liability
continued as before, but the remedy to enfore that lia.bilit_y was .
changed from a court of law to a court exe,-cising equitable
powers. Before his death the liability could only be enforc~
by a joint action against Doggett and his partners; aft~r his
death the liability continued, but could only be enforced in tpe
probate court, which in the allowance of claims exel't·h•es
equi.table powers. The death of a debtor may extingnisll a
legal remedy on a joint contract, bu.t we are not: aware that it
bas ever been held that the death of a debtor could extinguish:
the debt or discharge the estate of the deceased.
In conclusion, we are satisfied, under the facts as disdosed
by this record, appellee's claim was a proper one to be allowedagainst the estate of the deceased, and that it was properly
allowed by the probate court.
The judgment of the appellate court will therefore be·
affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
\VALKER, J. If the doctrine of this opinion is to be applied.
in cases where there are individual creditors of ·the deceased
partner, I dissent.
NOTE: For other cue. upon thie question
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M N. Y. 124, 14 Am. Rep. 198.

Action by Charles C. Pope and others against Ann J. Cole,
executrix of Lewis K . Cole, to recover a debt of the firm of Draper
& Cole, of which defendant's testator was a partner. A judgment h arl been recovered by plaintiff for the same debt against
Draper, the surviving partner, but the execution thereon had been
returned unsatisfied. At the trial, defendant moved for a dis·
mis::;al of the complaint, on the gt·ound that the insolvency of
the :-;urvi,·ing partner was not alleged. The motion was denied. Evidence was then introduced to show that Draper had
property sufficient to satisfy the judgment, which the sheriff
did not discover. The court ruled that in the absence of collusion the sheriff's return was sufficient to sustain the action.
Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed at general term. The defendant appealed to this court.

Isaac D Garfield for appellant.
Frank Hiscock for respondents.
GROVER, J. The question arising upon the exceptions in
this case is whether an action will lie against the representatives
of A. deceased partner for the recovery of a partnership de bt,
after the recovery of a judgment therefor again st the survivor
and tbe return of an execution thereon unsatisfied, notwithstanding it may be shown that the survivor had property out of
which the execution might ha>e· been sa.tisfied, which was not
discovered by the sheriff. The position of th e counsel for the
appellant, that this is not a suit by a judgment creditor to.
obtain payment of his judgment out of the property of his
debtor, which cannot be seized upon execution, is correct. In
this class of cases the counsel concedes that, in the absence of
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collusion by the pl~intiff, the return upon the execution issued
to the proper county is conclutiive evidence, abd he might have
added , the only competent evidence, that the legal remedy has
been exhaustetl; at C• ·mmon law, when one joint debtor died,
the remt!dy at law couhl only be had against the survivor.
The estate of the deceased was only liable in equity for the payment of the debt. The Trustees of the Leake and Watts
01·phan House vs. Lawrence, 11 Paige 80. Same case in
error, 2 Denio 577, and cases cited. The same rule applied to
the case of a deceased partner. Cases supt·a.
This WRS formerly the rule in England. The rule there as
to a deceased partner has been somewhat changed, upon the
theory that partners were severally as well as jointly liable for
the payment of tbe partnership debts. This change has not
been adopted in this state. See cases supra, and Grant vs.
Shut·ter, 1 Wend!. 148. To enable a partnership ('reditor to
maintain an action against the representativ{'s of a deceased
partner, he must show an inability to collect his debt from the
survivor. Voorhis vs. Childs, 17 N. Y. 354; Richter vs.
Poppenhausen, 42 id. 373. But when such inability is shown,
the action may be maintained. The counsel for the appellant
insist8 that the only mode of t~howing such inability is to aver
and prove the actual insolvency of the survivor. His argument is that, inasmuch as the legal title to all the partnership
aSsets vests m the survivor, and that these are the primary
fund for the payment of the partnership debts, equity will not
enforce payment of such debtR from the estate of the deceased
until actual insolvency of the survivor is established. But we
have already seen that payment of a joint debt, when no partnership between the debtors ever existed, can be enforced out
of the estate of one of the deceased debtors under the same circumstances only as in the case of p-a rtners, that is, by showing
an inability to collect the debt from the survivor. This ig 80,
irrespective of the question whether there w~: R at the time of
the death of the joint debtor any joint property owned by the
debtors which vested in the survivor.
A surviving partner is equally liable at law for the payment
of the entire copartnership debts, although there were no as:sets
<)f the firm at the time of the decease of his partner, as though
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such assets were ample for that purpose. This shows that the
reason assigned by the counsel for the rule is not the true one.
That reason was given, by some of the judges in the cases above
referred to, for not adopting the later English doctrine, holding
partners severally, as well as jointly, liable for the debts ()f the
firm, and upon this ground sustaining actions against the repre. sentatives of the deceased partner for the recovery of the debts
of the firm, wholly irrespective of the ability of the survivor to
pay them . The legal remedy upon all joint obligations, in case
of the death of one or more, coul<i, by the common law, be had
only against the survivors. The estate of the deceased was, at
law, discharged, but equity hel!l such estates lial,Je. The creditor's case, then, was this: He bad a legal rem Hly against the
survivor for the collection of his debt, and a lien in equity upon
the estate of the deceased. But courts of equity, as n general
rule, wonld not entertain an action in case there was an adequate legal remedy, by which full redress could be obtained.
Hence, it followed that, to enable a creditor to collect hi~ del t
in equity from the estate of a deceased joint debtor, he mmt
show that he could not collP.ct it by proceedings at law against
the survivor. It was held sufficient, for this purpose, to aver
and prove the insolvency of the survivor. Hence, this averment will be found in the reported cases. But the want of an
adequate legal remedy is equally manifest wher~ that has been
resorted to by the creditor in good faith, and -exhausted, without obtaining satisfaction. It has there been demonstrated that
there is no Aueh remedy, and the creditor may then avail himself of the equitable liability of tho estate of the deceased debtor.
All this hfls been done by the plaintiffs in this case.
It is now said, by the counsel for the appellant, that the
plaintiffs ought to be precludeu from this equitable remedy, for
the reason that the survivor bad property from which, had the
sheriff discovered it, the execution might have been satisfied.
But the plaintiffs were not in fault for the failure of the sheriff
to diseover this property. They hau done ~11 that was required
of them when they had delivered the execution to sheriff. It
was not their, but the duty of the sheriff, to ascertain whether
the debtor _h ad property to satisfy it; and when the sheriff' returned that he had not, the legal remedy was exhausted, and
the plaintiffs were at liberty to pursue their equitable remedy
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against the estate of the deceased. It follows that, where the
plaintiff can prove the insolvency of the survivor and thus show
that he has no le~al remedy for the collection of his debt
· against him, he may proceed to enforce payment from the
estate of a deceased partner, or other joint debtor, without
bringing an action against the survivor, or he may exhaust
his legal remedy against the survivor, and then proceed
against the estate of tho deceased debtor. The representatives
of the estate of the deceased debtor have an adequate remedy
against the sheriff, in case of a wrongful return of the execution.
The judgment appealed from mm~t be affirmed, with costs.
All concur; ANDREWS, J., not sitting.
Judgment affirmed.
NoTE. -See Mechem's Elements of Partn., § 270.
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Bank brou ght this actton ngnfnst A bra~
v bnrn LoPb nod wifP. Lindn er, the administratQir, Rosa Hirsch,
~
the widow, and Denjamin and .Jacob Etrscb, the heirs, of Sam·
~)-~y uel llil'sch. decensed, to fore close a mortgage executed by Loeb
~)'.)('nod Sa muel Hirsch in favor of t he bank. The case proceeded
~ } / ~o foreclosure and sa le, and after sntisfying t he bank's debt
/ / ·~.r_ there remained a large sur·plus, one-half of which was after·
_,/ .•,,'~)-wards, by the court, ordered paid to the gna rdian of the heirs
"-= ,~
of Samuel Hirsch. The present controversy relates to the dis·
~';i /. position of the remainder of t he surplus, it being claimed on
..r, - one hand by an assignee of Loeb, and on the other band by the
_~.J<........
administrator of D irsch. The district oourt made an order
c'
directing its payment to William Kerr, t he assignee of Loeb.
This order was made on considerati()O of the appli cation and
the record in the case, wit hout evidence ; and the question presented for review is substantially, therefore, whether the
admini strator's applicati()O, taken in connection with facts
established by the record, was sufficient, if the a llegations contained in the application were true, to entitle him to the unpaid
sut·plus. 'fhe application a lleges, in brief, that Loeb and
Samuel Hirsch were, in the latter's life time, partners, and t hat
t he t·eal estate sold under t he decree of foreclosure was partnership property; that, after the death of llirsch, Loeb col·
lected the rents and profits of t he real estate, and continued
to carry on the business and collect debts due the partnership,
but failed to pay t he debts of the partnership, and bad refused
to apply moneys coming into his hands for the purpose of
discharging such debts, but had converted the partncrshi})
property to his own use; t hat the partnership owned property
largely in excess of its liabilities; that Loeb is insolvent ; t hat,_
on an accounting between Loeb and Hirsch's administrator,
Loeb would be indebted to the latter in at least $3,000. Lindner brings error.

J

/lf>

524

CASES 0~ PARTNERSHIP.

TV. S. Morlan and J. E. Kelley, for plaintiff in error.

Capps &

Steven.~,

for defendants in error.

IRVISE, C. (After stating the facts.) In the hri~fs many
questions are discussed with regard to the rights of surviving
partners, and the propriety of an examination into their transactions, and an accounting, in a proceeding of this charaoter.
\'le think, however, a single principle controls the decision of
the case. The assignment of the surplus arising from the sale
from LGeb to Kerr was made before the sale was confirmed.
It recites a consideration of $1,250 paid by Kerr to Loeb. Ita
legal effect was as an assignment of a chose in actioo belooging to a partnership, by the surviving partner, to a stranger.
Neither by any averment in the administrator's application for
the surplus, nor elsewhere in the record, is the bona. fUla or
consideration of this assignment attacked. On the dissolution
of a partnership by the death of one of the partners, the partnership property vests in the survivor, in trust, it is true, for
the settlement and winding up of the partnership business,
but nevertheless with power of disposition for that purpose;
and the surviving partner may, in such case, convey or tran•
fer the property to a stranger, who will take title by virtue of
such conveyance or transfer. Fitzpatrick vB. Flannayan, 106
U.S. 648, 1 Sup. Ct. 369. Not only may tangible property be
so transferred by a surviving partner, but also choses in .action.
Johnson V8. Berlizlteime.t·, 84 Ill. 54, 25 Am. Rep. 427; RoyB VB.
Vil.aB, 18 \Vis. 169; Daby vs. Et·icsson, 45 N.Y. 786; Bohler VB.
Tappan, 1 Fed. 469. It follows from this principle that the
assignment by Loeb, the surviving partner, to Kerr, of an·y
liurplus that might n?main after sa:tisfying the decree in favor
of the bank (such assignment being unimpeached) operated to
transfer the right of the partnership to such fund to Kerr,
and it remained no longer a partnership asset. So that the
question as to whether, in the absence of such an assignment,
an accounting might be had in this action between the surviving partner and the personal repres~ntative of the deceased
partner, and the surplus distributed in accordance with the
result of such accounting, is not material to the present case.
A case much in point is Willson VB. Nicholson, 61 Ind. 241. That
was an action on a promissory note made to a partnership,
which had been assigned by delivery to the plaintiff by the sur-
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viving partner. Certain creditors of the partnership had flied
counter claims, alleging insolvency of the firm and of all ita
members, and that the note in suit constttuted the firm's only
assets, and that the plaintift had purchased it with full knowledge of the facts. They prayed that the proceeds of the
instrument should be applied to the payment of their claims.
The supreme court aftirmed the action of the trial court in
striking out the counter claims, on the ground that the surviv·
ing partner succeeded to the assets, and had the right to dispose thereof, and that, in the absence of any allegation to the
contrary, it would be presumed that the _a ssignment to the
plaintiff was bona fide, and for a valuable consideration.
Affirmed.
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DURANT vs. PIERSON•

\....

,.,--~ Oout·t of Appeals of New York, 1891.

'-.124 N.Y. «4, 26 N. E. Rep. 109~. 21 Am. St. Rep. 688.
•

This action was brought to set aside an assignment made
~ -,, ~ ~ )by the defendant, Henry R. Pierson, as survivor of the late
-..~_,_,.,;
~rm of Henry R. Pierson & Son, to the defendant Robert C.
···Pruyn, for the benefit of creditors, upon the ground that it was
.· . fraudulent and void as against the creditors of the firm, for the
r -' .,...<
"" ~ ·'"' • .,..r reason that it directed the payment to the National Commerr-· \,).. ' :, cial Bank of the sum of fifteen thousand dollars.
~~ .. ' · .. · The referee has found as facts that Henry R. Piersoo, the
. ;_..,: ~ . · . elder, died oo the first day of January, 1890, leaving the
1
'r
defendant Henry R. Pierson, his son. as the sole surviving
'\: . o ·
member of the firm; that the ·firm kept a.n account with the
'<-" : · •·, National Commercial Bank of Albany in the name of Henry R.
, · • :... Pierson & Son, which was open and unsettled upon the books
~:· ' _)'of the bank on the ninth day of January, 1890, at which time
'
the defendant Pierson made- application to the bank for the
loon of f15,UOO; that upon making such loan the-re was cre(lited
upon the books of the bauk to th~ firm the sum so loonf>d, and
:-··
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a note was given therefor, payable on demand, signed in the
name of the firm by Henry R. Pierson, survivor; that f10,150
therE:'Of wns subseqoently drawn out of the bank by the checke
of the defendant Henry R. Pierson, signed by him a~t survivor,
and the same was applied and used in the payment of the debts
of the firm. The referee further found as facts that the purpose of said defendant Henry R. Pierson in a.pplying for and
obtaining such loan was to procure money with which to pay
the obligations of the firm whiC'h had mat1:1red or were about to
mature, and that the ·bank understood such to be the purpose
of the loan at the time of making the same; that the firm was
in fact insolvent on the first day of January, 1890, at the time
of the decease of the elder Pierson, but that such fact was not
known to either the defendant !Jierson or to the National Commercial Bank at the time the loan was made. He fnrthP.r
found as a fact that in inserting in the assignment the direc·
tion to pay the National Commercial Bank of Albany from
the firm property the amount of the note, the defendant,
Pierson acted with intent to ·hinder, delay and defraud
the creditors of the firm, but that at the time of making su<ili
r ssignment the defendant Pierson believed that such note
was a firm obligation, or an obligation which was legally
enforceable against the property and assets of the firm, and
that he therefore was not morally chargeable with wrong in
directing its payment out of the property of the firm; that the
nppropriation by him of the money borrowed of the bank to
the payment of the firm debts created a claim in his favor
ngainst the estate which before the assignment oould have
been properly paid out of the firm's assets. As a conclusion
of law, he found that the debt created by the loan by the
National Commercial Bank was the individual debt of the
defendant Pierson, and not that of the firm; that the assign
ment was consequently fraudulent as to the plaintiff, and
directed judgment accordingly.
JfarCU8 T. Hun, for appellants Pruyn and Pierson.

Abraham Lansing, for the National Bank of Albany, appellant. '
George L. Steadman, for the respondent.

HAIGHT, J. (After stating the facts as above.) If the delYt
created by the loan be the individual liability of the survivol'.
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and one that the firm ought not to pay, and the ft.rm be lnsol·
vent, the survivor. bad no right in his assignment to direct ita
payment out of the firm's assets, and by so doing the assign·
ment was rendered fraudulent as to the creditors of the firm.
Wilson vs. Robertson, 21 N. Y. 587; Menagh VB. WMtweU, 52 N.
Y. 146, 11 Am. Rep. 683; Second National Bank of Os-wego vs.
Burt, 93 N.Y. 233-245; Bulger VB. Rosa, 119 N.Y. 459-465.
It thus becomes important to determine whether the loan
contracted by the survivor became a firm obligation for the
payment of which its assets may justly be ·applied. As we ·
have seen, the note given upon procuring such loan bore the
name of the firm and that of Henry R. Pierson as survivor,
but at the time thls note was given it was known to all of the
parties concerned that the senior member of the firm had
died.
The death of a partner puts an end to the copartnership,
and there is no longer any power or authority of the surviving
partners to carry on for the future a paNnership trade or
business, or to engage in new transactions, contracts, or ua.
bilities on account thereof. Story on Part., sec. 342, 343; HaU
vs. Lanning, 91 U. S. 160·170; Farr VB. Morrill, 53 Hun (N. Y.)
31-35.
It is thus apparent that whilst the note in form would
appear to create an obligation of the firm, it is at law unavail- ,
able as such, for the reason that there was no power in the
survivor to make it. . But it does not follow but that it is a
claim which ought, in justice and equity, to be paid out of the
firm's assets. If it is, the preference in the assignment would
not be void, for the law will not declare fraudulent that which
equity adjudges right and proper. Denton vs. Mert·ill, 43 Hun
(N. Y.)

224-~29.

We must therefore consider whether there are equities
which will support the claim of the bank to be paid out of such
assets. It is apparent that the money borrowed from the
bank by the survivor was' for the purpose of paying the credi·
tors of the firm the claims then matured and pressing. The
amount of the loan was credited upon the open account of
the firm with the bank, and subsequently ten thousand dollars
thereof, or thereabouts, were drawn out by the survivor upon
his check, an-d used in the payment of the liabilities of the firm.
At the time this loan was made, it was not supposed by the oftl·
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cers of the bank, or the surviving partner, that the firm wa.s
insolvent, and no question is made but that both parties acted
in good faith. The question is therefore presented whether a
surviving partner may in good faith borrow money for the
express purpose of paying the debts of his firm, and by eo
applying the money borrowed create a.n equity for the satisfaction of which the assets of the firm may properly be
devoted. As we have seen, the survivor became entitled to the
assets, which he had the right to sell, mortgage, and dispose of,
in order to pay the debts and close up the affairs of the copartnership. If be had the power to sell or mortgage, it would
seem to follow that he had the power to borrow and pledge
the assets for the repayment ~f the loan, and the amount borrowed having been faithfully applied in liquidation of the debts
of the copat·tnership, equity will recognize the justness of the
claim of the party making the loan. Cases may a:rise where
the exercise of such authority may be highly expedient, if not
necessary, for the preservation of the rights of creditors and
persons interested in the di!'Jtribution of the assets of the finn;
as, for instance, creditors may by levy expose the assets to a
forced public sa1e under circumstances which would work
great sacrifice to the estate. In case a survivor should -be
insolvent, he might be able to raise money by a pledge to repaJ
out of the partnership assets when he could not obtain it upon
his own credit. We do not see that harm could result to tlle
other creditors by permitting this to be done; for it would
not increase the obligations of the firm nor lessen their sh;H·e
in the distribution of the assets in case the firm be insoln•ut.
It is not questioned but that the survivor bad the right to turn
out as a security or pledge the assets of the firm in payment
for the money received by him. He oould have sold the assets
and repaid the money loaned at any time before executing the
assignment, and without taint of fraud. It is not appareat
how the rights of the parties are changed and the act of the
survivor made fraudulent by doing that in the assignment
which he had the right to do immediately before executing it.
The precise question involved in this case does not appear
to have been passed npon in any reported ease, so far as we
have been able to discover, except in Haynes vs. Brooks, 8 Civ.
Proc. Rep. 106-113, where an assignment was made for the
benefit of creditors by a surviving pat·tner. In that case, as
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in this, the creditors had loaned money to the surviving partner to pay a note of the ftrm. VAN VoBsT, J., in commenting
upon the transaction, said: "If a ftrm obligation was retired
by the ~se of the money loaned or advanced by Brown & Co.,
the surviving partner would have been entitled to be repaid
out of the ftrm property. As the moneys of Brown & Co. in
tact paid a ftrm obligation, I see no objection in the subrogation of them in equity to the rights of the surviving partner, or
to the regarding of them as entitled to be repaid out of the firm
assets. That works injustice to no one." The learned judge
concluded by ordering the complaint dismissed, thereby suataining the validity of the assignment. This case was affirmed
in the general term, 4.2 Hun (N. Y.) 528, and in this court in
116 N. Y. 487. This question, however, was not considered
in either of the appellate courts.
In Matter of the Estate of Davis and Desauq'IUJ, 5 w ·h art.
(Pa.) 530, 34 Am. Dec. 574, it was held that after the dissolution of a copartnership the partner authorized to settle the
estarte may borrow money on the credit of the ftrm for the
purpose of paying its debts, and if the credit be given in good
faith, though with a knowledge of the dissolution, aond the
money borrowed be faithfully appl.ied in liquidation of the
debts of the partnership, the creditor has a claim against the
firm assets, and is not to be considered as a creditor merely of
the partner borrowing.
In the case of P-rudhomme vs. Henry, 5 La. Ann. 700, it was
held that where a liquidating partner, after dissolution, bas
•bolTowed money to pay the debts of the ftrm, the pal'tnerlilhip
is liable as far as the evidence shows that the money was used
for the benefit of the ·firm.
In the last two oases the partnerships were nat insolvent,
and the question arose as between the partners. The courts,
howevet:, recognized the claim of the lenders as one which
ought to be paid by the partnership.
In the case under consideration. it is· true that the partnership is insolvent, and the question arises as between the
bank and creditors of the partnership, but the creditors have
not been harmed or prejudiced by the action of the bank in
loaning the money to the survivor, for the assets were
increased in value to the amount of the loan, and the money
drawn out of the bank was applied in extinguishment oftbe
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claims of the creditors, thus reducing to thast extent the liabilities of the firm.
'When a partnership is dissolved by the death of a partner,
the survivor is entitled to the possession and control of the
joiDt property for the purpose of closing its business, and to
that end and for that purpose he may, according to the settled
principles of the law of partnership, administer the affairs. of
the firm, and by sale, mortgage, or other reasonable disposition
of the property, make provision for meeting its obligations.
He may, for that purpo8e, borrow money, and give a valid
pledge of the copartnership property for its repayment. William~ VB. Whedtm, 109 N. Y. 333, 4 Am. St. Rep. 460; EmeriiOfa
VI. Benter, 118 U. S. 3-8; /<'itzpatrick VI. Flannagan, 106 U. S.
648; Butcha1·t "'· DresBer, 4 De Gex, M. & G. 542, 10 Hare 453;
In re Clough, Rt·adford Commercial Banking Co. "'· Cure, L. B.
31 Ch. Div. 326.
In Case VB. Beauregard, 99 U. S. 119-124, Mr. Justice STRO~G,
in commenting upon the rights of partners in a suit involving
the marshalling of the assets, says: "The right of each partner extend-s ouly to the share of what may remain after payment of the debts of the firm and a settlement of its accounts.
Growing out of this right, or rather included in it, is the right
to have the partnership property a"pplied to_ the payment of
the partnership debts in preference to those of any individual
par-tner. This is a.n equity that partners have as between
thPmSE>lves, and in certain circumsta.nces it inures to the beneftt of the creditors of the ftrm. The latter are said to have the
privilege or preference, sometimes loosely denominated a lien,
to have the debts due to them paid out of the assets of a firm
in course of liquidation, to the exclusion of the creditors of its
t~everal members. This equity is a derivative one. It is not
held or enforceable in their own right. It is practically a subrogation to the equity of the individual partner1 to be made
effective only through him. Hence if be is not in a condition
to enforce it, the creditors of the ftrm cannot be: Rice vs.
Barnard, 20 Vt. 479, 50 Am. Dec. 54; Appeal of York County
Bank, 32 Pa. St. 446.
"But so long as the equity of the partner remains in hlm, so
long as he retains an interest in the firm assets as partner,
a court of equity will allow the creditors of the ftrm to avail
1!bemselvee ot his equity and enforce through it the applica-
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tion of th08e assets primarily to the payment of the debts due
them, whenever the property C{)mes under its administration."
In the case of Saunders t'8. Reilly, 105 N. Y. 12, 59 Am. Rep.
4.72, it was held that a mere general creditor of ·a finn having
no execution or attachment has no lien whatever upon its personal assets; that while firm creditors are entitled to a preference over creditors of the individual members of the finn in.
the payment of their_debts out of the assets, in the course of
liquidation, their ~quity is nm: held or enforceable in their own
rigbt, but it is a derivative one, practically a subrogation of
the equity of each indivi~ual partner to have the firm assets
applied primarily to the payment of its debts, and where oo
such equity exists in favor of any member of the firm, the finn
creditors have none, and therefore where a judgmenrt: is recovered against all the members of a firm upon a joint obligation,
but not an indebtedness of the firm, the finn property may be
levied upon and sold on execution issued Qn the judgment.
See also Dimon vs. Haza.rd, 32 N.Y. 65; Stanton vs. Westover,
101 N. Y. 265; Kirby vs. Scllormmaker, 3 Barb. (N. Y.) Cb.. 46;
Brown vs. H ·igginbotltmn, 5 Leigh, (Va.) 583, 27 Am. Dec. 618;
Peyton vs. Stnuton, 7 Gratt. (Va) 380; Stebbins vs. Willard, 53
Vt. 665.
It appears to us that the conclusion is warranted from the
authorities referred to that where a person in good fa;th loans
money to a surviving partner, and where the money is faithfully applied by such partner in satisfaction of the liabilities
of the firm, the claim becomes one which in equity should be
paid out of the assets of the firm; and in an accounting
between the survivor with the personal representative of the
deceased partner, equity will recognize the right <» the sur·
viving partner to have the money so borrowed and applied
by him repaid out of tlle a-ssets of the firm, and an assignment
ao directing is not fraudulent.
Attention is called to the fact that the deceased partner
left a will making his survivQr his sole ·devisee and legatee,
and it is claimed that he left no individual debts. If this were
so, 1t is not appnrent that it would affect the equities of the
bank, but the evidence is silent upon the question as to
whe-ther or not the deceased left individual debts. The referee
refused to so find, and we cannot assume that there were
none.
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It may also be claimed that, the firm being insolvent, the
survivor has no equities to which the bank can be subrogated,
for thE' l'Pnson that he is liable individually for the payment of
the firm c.h•bts. But the bank is not asking for any relief by
way of subrogation; it is only defending the provision, already
made for it in the assignment, from the claim of fraud. Even
though both the firm and the survivor were insolvent, the survivor still had the right to have his contract recognized, and
to say which of the creditors should be paid first, and to eo
provide in his assignment. WiUiam8 VB. Whedon, 109 N. Y.
333, 4 Am. St. Rep. 460.
It follows that the judgment should be reversed, and a new
trial granted, with costs to abide the final award of oosts.
V A:s~, J., dissents, upon the ground that the note preferred
in the assignment as a firm debt was simply an individual debt
of the surviving partner, who, as he did not bind the firm ill
creating the debt, could bind .neither it nor its property by
dirE>eting payment out of the firm assets.
Judgment reversed.
NoTE: See Moc,hem's Elem.

ot Parto. , ~ 268.

-\. ~ Cow~re ~~so with caoes in Subd. XV, po.L

~'

• -·
•·• '

., -- ..

• •
./

,. ...
.•

·.

-·\

l(..

_,-~
.

.

~

"·

'·

\ ~·

~·

' .·

J

••

'._ ,.

..

\..

\ : ..

HUMPHRIES vs. CHASTAIN.
Supreme Oourl of Gem·gia, 1848.
6 Ga. 166, 48 A.m. Dec. 247.

Assumpsit on a note indorsed in the firm name of Chut&ln
& Harvey, the indorsement having been made by Harvey (now

insolvent), without the autbority of Chastain, after the dissolution of the firm. Evidence, offered to show that the indoraement was in payment of a previous debt of the firm, having
been rejected, the plaintiff, after judgment against hlm,
brought error on that g1·ound.
L1.JOn, for the plaintiff in error.

St .-ozier, for the defl:'ndan t in E'l'ror.
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WAR~En, J. The question made by the record in this case
is, wh€'1:het· one partner, after the dissolution of the copartner·
Bhip, can bind his copartner by a new contract, for the payment of a pre-exiErting copartnership debt.
That after the dissolution of a copartnership, one copartner
cannot bind the other by indorsing a note in the copartnership
name, is, we think, well settled, both upon principle and
authority; and that the note so indorsed, is in payment of a
debt due by the copartnership, makes no d1fference. Lyon on
Part. 274; Sanford vs. Mickles, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 224; Hackley v1.
Patrick, 3 Id. 536; Foltz vs. Pourie, 2 Desau. Eq. 40. In Bell vs.
Mon·iBOn, 1 Peters (U. S.) 352, it was held that a dissolution of
a copartnership puts an end to the authority of one partner
to bind the other; it operates as a revocation of all power to
create new oontracts; and the court below did not err in rejecting the testimony offered, and ruling that Chastain was not
bound by the indorsement made by Harvey, in the name of the
partnership, after its dissolution.
Let the judgment of the court below be affirmed.
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1849.

Am. Dec. 822.

·'Appeal from a judgment of the supreme court, In favor of
the plaintiff, in assumpsit on a promissory note. The plee.
\ was' the statute of limitat ions, and the only question was,
. · <whether, under the facts stated in the opinion by BRONSON, J.,
..the apparent bar of the statute had been removed as against
all the makers, by a new promise made ~y one onl~.
0. W. Swift and H. Swift, for appellants, the makers not
parties to the new promise.
Dodge & OampbeU, for the respondent, the ·holder of the nQte.
BRo ~so~,

J. The question is on the statute of limitations;
and the case is shortly this: The plaintiff sues on a note made
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by three partners, on the first day of May, 1881, and payable
immediately. The partnership was dissolved in the spring of
1882~ the suit was oommenced in July, 1847, more ~han six. teen years after the cause of action had accrued; and the jury
find a promise by "John Van Keoren, one of the defendants,"
Within six years before the action brought, but they find oo
pt·omise by either of the other defendants. 1'he new promise
by John Yan Keuren was made more· than nine years after
the pa.rtnerShip was dissolved, and more than four years after
an action upon the note had been barred by the statute of
limitations. It cannot but strike every one with some degree
of astonishment that the promise of one, made at such a time,
and under such circumstances, should bind all of the defend·
ants. But still the question must be oonsidered upon author·
lty; and if the rule has been so settled, it must be followed~
whatever we may think of it as an original proposition.
ReCore looking at the cases, I will inquire, for a moment~
bow the matter stands upon principle. And ·however much it
may be out of the ordinary course, I will begin by refet·r·in!l tothe statute. The words are: "The following actions [indud·
ing assumpsit] shall be commenced within 'Six years next aftc!r
the cause of such action accrued, and not after." 2 R. S. 29:'i.
sec. 18. It the plaintiff sues on the note, "the cause of action
accrued'' more than sixteen years before the suit was com·
menced, and of course the action is barred. There is but on(>possible mode of escaping this difficulty, and that is by sa.,·iu~r
that the plaintiff does not sue upon the note, but upon the:> n"w
promise; treating it as a new contract, springing out of, an(T
supported by, the original consideration. That will do ver.'·
well w·bere the original promise was made by one. or· if
by more than one, where all join in making the nc•w
contract. But in this case, the new contract wns m:tdt•
by only one of the three original debtors; and tilt·
q1wstion is, what binds the other two? As tbe,v did not
contract for themselves, it is not their agreement. nnlt·N~
John Van KeurE>n, who made the new promise, had nnthor·it.'
to contract for them. The only authority claim?() for · iln i):.
that he bad before bE>en the pnMner of the oth<>r two. 'f ! 1i~
leads to an inquiry concerning the principle on whkh· ~:wh·
partner can bind all his associates. And it i& genera 1Jy ngl"f'«''l'
tha.t it is the p1·inciple of agency. Each partner, wlwn acting:
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within the scope of tbe partnership, is deemed to bethe author·
ized agent of all his fellows. The aut•h ority is presumed from
the nature and necessity of the case; for without it, third persons would not be safe in dealing with one of the associates,
and the business of the partnership could not be carried on
with success. Now, bow long does this presumed agency oontinut-? Clearly, no longer tba.t the necessity for it exists; and
for most purposes, the necessity ceases with the termination of
tbt> partnt-rship. When that is dissolved, there is no l-onger
any ground for presuming an agency, except as to wch things
as are indispensable in winding up the ooncernft of the com·
pany. If there be no agreement oo the contrary, it may be
presumt'd that each partner still has authority to dispose of
the partnership property, to collect, adjust, and pay debts,
and give proper acquittances. But there is no ground what·
evt-r for presuming a power to.make new promises or engagemt-nts in the name of the firm, even though they only change,
without increasing the prior obligations of the partners. We
shall presently see, upon authority, that they have no such
power.
In reference to the statute of limitations, a distinction has
sometimes been taken between a new promise made before the
statute has run, and one made after the parties have been
exonerated by the la:pseof time. That would sustain the defense
in this case, for the statute had run upon the claim long before
the new promise was made. But the defense may be rested
upon the still broader ground, that the dissolution of the part·
nership was a revocation of the agency, and the power of t~e
partners to bind each other by new engagements ceased from
that moment.
The statute of 21 James I, c. lS, which limited actions on
promises to six years, was not very well received by the legal
profession; and although the early decisions under it are not
open to much observa.tion, it was not long before the courts
began to rt-gard the statute with disfavor, and to re8()rt to the
most subtle construotions for the purpose of restricting its
intlnt>nce. There was a period when one who was spoken to on
the su.hjt>ct of an old debt could not well give a civil answer, ·
without saying enou~h to take ttbe case out of the statute. At
a later period, and since the commencement of the present century, the courts began to regard this as a beneficial etatute-a

;
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statute of repose-and commenced the difficult task of retracing their Bteps. But there were many obstacles in the way of
the ba<'kward movement, and the legislature, both here nnd in
England, took u.p tht> matter, and went beyond the old statute,
by requiring the new promise or acknowledgment to be in
writing. In consequence of the early departure from prin·
ciple in the construction of the statute, the different views
wllich prevailed at different periods, and the unequal paoe of
the courts in attempting to get back on to solid ground, the
books are full of conflicting decisions; and any attempt to
reconcile them would be a useless waste of time. I shall
~ot, therefore, go into a genE'ral review of the c.'lses.
The leading case oo this question in England is Whitcomb
vB. Whiting, 2 Doug. 652, where Lord MANSFIELD and his associates held, that part payment, within six years, by one of fow
joint and several makers of a promissory note, took the case
out of the statute of limitations as to all of the makers. Thrut
case is distinguishable from the one before us in two particu·
Iars. First, it does not appear in that case that the action wa.e
barred prior to the payment, while here ifue statute bar wa.e
complete long before the new promise was m8Ale. Second,
t·ha t was the case of a payment, which bas been deemed much
safer ground to go upon than a new promise or acknowledg·
ment. J.A>rd TENTERDEN's a.ct, 9 Geo. IV, c. 14, which requires
a writing in the case of a new promise or acknowledgment,
leaves the effect of a payment untouched; and such, in substance, is the provision in our recent code. Stat. 1849, p. 638,
sec. 110. In Wyatt vB. Hodson., 8 Bing. 309, TINDAL, C. J., .ea.id:
''The payment of principal or interest stands on a different
footing from the making of promises, which are often rash
m· ill interpreted, while money is not usually paid without
deliberation, and payment is an unequivocal act, so little liable
to misconstruction as not to be open to the objection of an
or·.<Jinary acknowledgment." There is force }n these remarks.
But I do not intend to lay much stress upon the distinctions
bl-twe~n that case and the one at bar. Lord l\IA~SFIELD made
no distinction betwet>n the influence of a pn~rml'nt and a prom·
ise, and if his reasoning is sound, it renches this oaae. His
words are, "payment by one is payment for all, the o·ne acting
virtually a.e agent for the rest, and in the same manner, an
admission by one is an admission by all, and the law raises

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 16:49 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112102486216
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

VAN KEUREN VS. PARKELBE.

537

the promise to pay, when the debt is admitted to be due.,.
Nothing but the great name of Lord MANSFIELD could han:
given cnrren,cy to this r€'8.soning. It is plain enough that
"payment by one is payment for all," so far as relates to the
satisf11ction of the debt, but that fact neither shows, n()r has
it any tendency to show, a new promise or acknowledgmelllt
by the other joint debtors. Payment is nothing more than an
admission that the debt is due; and like any other admission,
It can only affect the party who makes it, unless ·h e has
authority to speak for others, as well as ·himself. A joirut
debtor has no such authority. It cannot be justly inferr·ed
from the relation which he sustains to the other joint dl'btors; and t·h ough he ma.y conclude himself by an admission.
he cannot conclude them. His lordship, after saying that ''payment by one is pn,rment for all," adds, "the one actin~ yiJ·t ua IIJ
as agent for the rest." If the meaning be, that tillere is Rucb
an agency as will make the payment by one inu1•e to tlw lwneftt of all the joint debtors, the reasoning is well enon~h. but
it proves nothing on the point in controversy. If the meaning
be, that one joiut debtor is the agent of the others for the purpose of making admissions to bind them, that was assuming
the very point to be proved, and the assumption bad neither
authority not' argument to support it. There is nothing in
the relation of joint debtors from which such an agency cnn
be inferred. A joint obligation is the only tie which links
them together, and from the nature of the case, payment of
the debt is the only thing which one bas authority to do for
all. I am persuaded that such a decision would not have been
made had it not been for the strong disposition which prevailed
a.t that time to get around the statute of limitations. It was
in direct conflict with Bland vs. HCUJclrig,2 Vent. 151, which was
decided ninety years before, when the statute was in better
repUJt:e; and which Is an authority in point, against the judgment under review. The case was this: in assumpsit against
four, the statute of limitations was pleaded, and the ve1·dict
was, that one of the defendants promised within six yea1·s.
but the others did not. Upon this verdict, judgment was J'eudered for t·he def<>nrlants. The case of Whitcomb vs. Whitinq,
2 Doug. G5~, hns bf'<.> n several times questioned in En~l:t111l.
and in Atkins t'R. Trcdgold. ~Barn. & Cress. 23, t·he court seemed
much disposed to tlisrt·~ard it. But the authority of a
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great name has proven more than a meltch for common sense;
and the decision in Douglas is now rega•rded as good law in
England. Perham vs. Raynal, 2 Bing. 306; Pritchard VB. Draper,
1 Russ. & M. 191. But it is not so in this country. Although
the case in Douglas has been followed in some of the states,
it bas been questioned in others; and in several of the states,
and by •t he supreme court of the United States, it has been
wholly disregarded . I shall hereafter have occas.ion to refer
to 80me of the oases.
I will now inquire bow the question stands in this state. It
first ca.me up in Smith vs. Ludlow, 6 JohM. (N. Y~) 267, nearly
forty years ago, when the statute of limitations was in bad
repute, and whep few men ventured to think for themselvee
after Lord MANSFIELD had epoken. The court said, that where
the original debt was proved, the confession of one partner,
though made after the dissolution of the partnership, would
bind the other, so as to preve'llt him from availing himself of
the statute of limitations. This was said on the authority of
Whitcomb vs. Whiting, already mentioned, and J ack8on vs. Fair·
· bank, 2 H. Black. 340, which was decided on the authority of
the same case, though it went a more extravagant length.
Of the case in Douglas I have alrea,d y spoken; and of the case
in Blackstone it is enough to say that it has been condemned
in England, Brandram VB. Wha1·ton, 1 Barn. & Ald. 463; and
overruled in this state; !roosevelt vs..1/at·k, 6 Johns. Ch. (N.Y.)
266, 291. I may add, that what was said in Smith vB. Ludlow,
about binding one partner by the confession of the other,
made after the partnership bad been dissolved, was not nec~s·
eary to the decision of the cause; for there had been confessions by both of the partners, which the court held sufficient
to take the case out of the statute, without making the
admission of one evidence against the other. Still, on the
authority of this case, and those in Douglas and Blackstone,
it was decided in Johnson VB. Beardslee, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 3, that
the promise of one joint debtor was sufficient to take the case
out of the statute. And in Patterson vs. Choate, 7 Wend (N. Y.)
441, it was held, that althoitgb one parln~r can not after a dissolution bind the other by a new contract, yet his a.cknowledgment of a previous debt due from the partnership will bind
the other partner, so far as to prevent him from availing him·
self of the statute of limitations. This doctrine has been men-
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tioned on other occasions: Hopkin~ f'B. BanTu, 7 Cow. (N. Y.)
653; Roosevelt vs. Mark, 6 JohWJ. (N. Y.) Ch. 291; Dean VB.
Hewit, 5 Wend. (N. Y.), 262; but there are, I believe, no other
decisions in this state to the like effect. In Patterson vs. Choate,
the six years had run, and the bar was complete before the
acknowledgment was made. No one, I venture to say, who
does not go upon the ground that 'the statute of limitations
ought not to be iuforced, can assign a solid reason for the
distinction betwt-en contracting a new debt against a former
·partner, and making an acknowledgment which shall charge
him with that which, though once a debt, has ceased to be so
by the operation of law. I agree with the late Chief Justice
· SPENCER, in Sands vs. Gelston, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 519, that "the
etatute of limitations is the law of the land; " and that in point
of principle "there is no substantial difference between a debt
ba.rred by the statute of limitations and the debt for the payment of which the debtor bas been exonerated by a discharge
under a bankrupt or insolvent act." Still, if there was no
counterbalance in the adjudications of our own courts, l
should feel bound to follow the two or three cases which support the plaintiff's claim, and leave reforms to the legislature.
But those cases oonfliot, in principle, with many other decisions in this state, and cannot be supported. ·
Although the rule is different in England in relation to
admissions concerning partnership transactions, Wood vs.
Bmddick, 1 Taunt. 104, it bas been settled by a series of adjudi·
cations in this stat e that the authority of partners to bind
each other by any undertaking or admission, even though it
relate to partnership transactioWJ, ceases with the partnership. In Hackley VB. Patrick, 3 Johns. (N. Y.) 536, although
it was mentioned in the notice of dissolution that Hastie, on('
of the partners, would adjust <the unsettl ed business of the
partnership, it was hE-ld that his subsequent admission of a
balance due from the firm to the plaintiffs on a ccount would
not bind his copartner. The oourt said· it was "a clear
case. After a dissolution of a copartnership the power
of one party to bind the other wholly ceases. There is
no reason why his acknowledgment of an account should
bind his copartners, any more than his giving a promissory
note in the nnme of the firm or any other aot." This doctrine
wu reasserted and applied in Sanford vs. Mickles, 4 Johns. (N.
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:!24, where it was held that a partner to whom authority
th~ dissolution to collect and pay debts,
<·<mid not indot·se a promissory note belonging to the firm
so u.s to pass the title to the indorsee. See Yale "'· Eamu,
1 Met. (M.ass.) 486. In Walden vs. Sherbtwne, 15 Johns. (N. Y.)
409, it was again decided that the admission by one of the partners, after a dissolution, of a balance against the finn, did not
bind the other partner. And where the notice of dissolution
stated that the business would be settled by one of the part·
ners, who was duly authorized to sign the name of the firm
for that purpose, it was held that such putner could not renew
a note previously given by the firm, and which was running
in 1:he bank at the time of the dissolution. National Bank"'·
Norton, 1llill (N.Y.) 57~. Mitchell vs. Ost1·om, 2 Id. 5~0, assel'ts
the same general doctrine. And in Baker vs. Stackpoole, 9
Cow. 420, 18 Am. Dec. 508, the rule t-hart: one partner, after a
dissolution, cannot bind his fellows by an admiSBion relating to
partnership transactions, was sanctioned by the unanimous
judgment of the court for the correction of errors.
Enough has, I think, been said to justify the remark, that
the two or three cases on which the plaintiff relies cannot be
supported. They conflict in principle with a series of decisions
spreading over a period of forty years, and induding a determination of the court of last resort.
But this is not all. Since the sup1·eme cou1-t first fell into
the error of following Whitcomb vs. Whiting, the coui'Se of
decision upon the statute of limitations has undergone a great
change in this country, and particularly in this state. At the
former period, the statute amounted to li ttle more, in judici.n I
tonstruotion, than a ground for presuming the debt paiu!
which might be rebutted by the met·e admission that such wa~ not the fact. Bnt the law is not so now. '.rhet-e must be a
promise, a new contract, though founded on the original considet·ation, to take a case out of the statute. If the promise is
not express, t'he case must be su~h that it can be fairly implied.
There must, at the least, be a plain admission that the debt is
due, and that the party is willing to pay it. Allen VB. Webster,
15 Wend. (N. Y.) 284; Staffot·d f)8. Richardson, Id. 302; Bell VB.
Mon·ison, 1 Pet. (U. S.) 362.• It is the new promise and not
the mere acknowledgment that revives the debt a·nd takes it
out of the statute. Rooswelt vs. Mark! 6 Johns (N. Y.) Oh. 290.
Y.)

bad been gh·en on
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This doctrine is sustained by many decision.s in other states,
but I do not think it necessary to cite them.
The case of Whitcomb vs. Whiting· has, to a limited extent,
been followed in Massachusetts; Cady vs. Shepherd, 11 Pick.
400, 22 Am. Dec. 379; Bridge VB. Gray, 14 I d. 55, 25 Am. Dec.
358; Sigourney t'B. D1·ury, Id. 387, 391, 392; Vinal vs. Bun-ill, 16
ld. 401. In ()onnecticut: Bood vs. Lathrop, 4 Conn. 336; Coil
vs. Tracy, 8 I d. 268; Austin v8. Bostwick, 9 I d. 496.; OZark vs.
Sigourney, 17 Id. 511., 20 Am. Dec. 110. In Maine: Parker va.
.11errill, 6 Greenl. 41; Pike vs. Warren, 15 Me. 390; DiMmore vs.
/Jins1no1·e, 21 Id. 433; Sltepley vB. Waterhouse, 22 Id. 497; and in
\'em10nt: .Joslyn vs. Smith, 13 Vt. ~u3; Wheelock vs. Doolittle,
18 ld. 440. But I think that the judgment under review would
not be upheld in either of those states.
In North Carolina it has been held that the acknmvledg·
ment of the debt by one partner, though after the dissolution,
will prevent the operation of the statute. Mcb1tire vs. Olit:er,
2 Hawks 209, 11 Am. Dec. 760. And· the same has been
decided in Georgia , providing the new promise is made before
the action is barrro, but not when the new promise i.9 made
afterwards, as it was in the case before us. Brewster vs.
ila·rdeman, Dudl l'y 138. It has been decided by the couN of
appeals in South CarolinA, that a promise by one partner,
made after the dissolution, and after the statute had run, wiLl
not charge the other partner. . Steele vs. Jennings, 1 McMull.
~97. In the E:reter Bank vs. Sullivan, 6 N. H. 124, the authority
of Whitcomb t'B. Whiting was wholly denied, and the court held
that a payment by one of the joint makers of a promissory
note did not takE> tlhe case out of the statute as to the ather.
In Alabama, a promise by the principal debtor will not revive
the demand against a co·debtor, who is a surety. Lowther vs.
Chappel, 8 Ala. 353, 42 Am. Dec. 643. In Tennessee, a proonise
by one partner a.fter the dissolution of the partnership, to pay a
note made by the firm, does not take the case out of the statute
of limi-ta1ions as to the other partner. · Belote's E:r·rB VB.
Wynne, 7 Yerg. 534; Mttse vs. Donel:Jon, 2 Hnmp·h. 166, 36 Am.
Dec. 309. This is also the rule in PE>nnsylYnnia. Levy vs.
Cadet, 17 Serg. & R. 126, 17 Am. Dec. 650: Searight VB. Ora,ig·
1~-ead, 1 Pen. & ·w. 135. It is also held in Indiana, that the
power of one partner to bind the othE>r by the admission of a
debt <'E>asf:'s with tlle partnership. Yandes vs. Lefavour, 2

•
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Blackf. 371. And in Bell vs. Morrison., 1 Pet. 351, the Bnpreme
court of the United States followed the decisions in Kentucky,
and held that the dissolution of the partnership put an end bo
the authority of the partners to bind each other by any new
engagement, and consequen·tly that the acknowledgment of a
debt by one partner, after the di880lution, would not take too
(.'ase out of tlle eata.t ute of limitations. The elaborate argument
of Mr. Justire STORY, who delivered the opinion of the court,
covers the whole field of discussion, and stands on principles,
whic.h ~ though they may be disregarded, cann-ot be overthrown.
I have not stopped to inquire whether the statute operates
upon the debt or the remedy, for though this might be a point
to be considered in a court of conscience, it is of no practical
importance in a court of law. We are not dealing with moral,
but with legal obli~ations, and it is idle to talk of a debt where
there is no legal obligation to pay it.
I am of opinion that the judgment should be reversed, and
that judgment should be rendered for the defendants on the
verdict.
JEWETT, C. J., a·lso delivered a written opinion in favor of
reversal.
And thereupon the judgment of the suprP.me court was
revel'sed, and judgmen•t awarded for the defendants on the
spedal verdict. •
NoTE: Compare with the three cases following.

See also a valuable note

to the above case in 51 Am. Dec. 880. Three several viPwe are rf'J•rt'f;t>ntPd
in the cases. One-that of the reasoning in the principal case-that one
partner cannot after dissolution bind the otl1E'ts by a new promi!\e; another
-that of the following case-that he may do so if the statutory pt'riod haa
not yP.t elap<~ed: and a third-held in a few cases-that hs may hind the
othPrs notwithshnding the oparation of the statute, aa in Wheelock VI.
Duo:itt/e, 18 Vt. 440, •6 Am. Dec. 168. The last view held at one time in
North Carolina has there been changt-d by statute. See Paraona on Part.
flPtship, 4th Ed p. 160, where the authoritiea are collected.
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PENNOYER vs. DAVID.

Supreme Court of Michiga-n, 1860•
8 ?tlich. 407•

'

. This action was brought a~ainst James I. David and James
~ /. '-~- Campbell, as survivors, etc., of Daniel C. Vreeland, who
.'\.:~,:-·,_,. -to~etht>r~ during ~he summer of 1855, constituted ~ partner\~ .. \ i_;.}tllp, which was ~Issolved by the dea,th of Vreeland, m Novemc/ . ,1 ber of that year.
·_:--- ~" · • · The declaration was upon an account stated, to prove which
'- · · ~.-· · •'plaintiff offered evidence that in December, 1855, after the
.~
dissolution of the firm by the death of Vreeland, defenda.DJt
.:.('-~-~
Campbell accounted with plaintiff, and admitted that there
was a final balance of_ $507 due the plaintiff. Various items
entered into ·this account on ootb sides, spreading over the
time from May to December; some of them on both sides being
items that accrued after the death of Vreeland. The defendant objected to the evidence-,'' and thereupon the circuit judge
reserved for the opinion of this court the following questions:
1st. C:m one partner, after the diseolution of the copartnership, bind the surviving copartner by his admissions?
2d. Is the admission, by a -surviving partner, of a balance in
an account, of which some items accrued after the dissolution,
evidence of an account stated against a surviving copartner,
who bns neither before nor since such settlement authorized
or confir·med the same?
.

~"

'

.

,. t

,~~
• c :•.

DAVID.

\

-

C' .Y . ~ '
..;:r"'"

vs.

• •: <(

. ...,, ·. ..r 7"·..c" ' \ ·.
.. . ' '
... '
'
. , _.
\

l;·

.

" ..f
.\ ,
.\ .
~"
~ .... t:. -~ "'
. .\
PqNOYEB
;
c
'"
., ' -.· , · . ;
,'rfl

.'-

-·

,.·, ·•

f]

\ ,-

I ·. ''-:

, ~.

J. M. Holoard, for plaintift.
Han d & Hall, for defendants.

CaniSTIANCY, J. In reply to the first question propounaed,
we think it is well -settled, both upon principle a.nd authority,
that one partner, after dissolution of the firm, cannot, by his
admission or contraot, create a new partnership liability, nor,
for a like reason, can be, by his admission, revive a claim
ugainst the firm which bas been barred by the statute of limitations, siuce this is equivalent to a new contract.
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On the other hnnd, with the exception of claiiD8 barred by
the statute of limitations, and others coming within a similar
reason, we think it equalJy clear in principle, that the admission of one partner, made after such di8801Uition having refet'·
en;ce to previous actual partnership dealings or transactions,
rrtands upon the same ground, and is evidence againet the firm
in like manner as if made before SUCh diBSOlUtiOD. The dissolution cannot destroy the joint liability of the partners, nor
alter their rela tiona to third persons in re~rpect to contracts
made or transactions which occurred before the dissolU'tion.
The dissolution operates upon future, not upon past transnotions. As to persons whose claims have been contracted on
the credit of the firm, the partnership, for all substantial purposes, t•ontinues till such claims have been satisfied. And
persons who have had dealings with the firm during its con·
tinu.ance, are, as to all matters touching such dealings,
entitled to the same benefit from the admissions of a single
partner, whether made before or after the dissolution, unless
shown to be false or fraudulent in fact. See WootJ vs. Braddick, 1 Taunt. 103; Lacy vs. !JfcNeale, 4 D. & R. 7; Oady ""·
Shepard, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 400, 22 Am. Dec. 379; l'inal vs. Bur,·iU, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 401; Coli. on Part. (Perkins Ed. of 1848)
sec. 546 and cases cited; Story on Part. sec. 328; see also .I/ann
vs. Locke, 11 N. H. 246, where the principles upon which such
admissions are receivable are very clearly and ably presented.
But it is objected that the power of a single partner, in such
case, to make an admission of a previously existing lin;bili ty,
in.volves the power of creating a new liability where there had
been no previous dealings with the firm, and no such prior liability existed in fact. It was doubtless this supposed diffi·
culty which led the courts of New York, and a few others
which have followed their authority, to take the broad ground
excluding such admissions altogether. But the rule which
entirely excludes such admissions leads to another incon·
sistency, oo less obvious than that which is sought to be
avoided by it. Thus, the same courts which deny all pow~r of
one partner, after dissolution, to bind his former partners by
the admission of a previous liability, yet bold that he may liquidate a previous account (McPherson vs. Rathbone, 11 Wend. [N.
Y.] 96, 99), and that "if there be no agreement to the contrary,
It may be presumed that ~ach pnrtnE:'r still has authority to
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dispose of the partnership property, to collect, adjust, and pay
debts, and to give proper acquittances" (per BRONSON, J., in
VanKeuren vs. Parmelee. 2 N.Y. 523,51 Am. Dec. 322, ante. ,
Now the power to liquidate a previous account against the
ftrm, to adjust and pay debts, and to give acquittan-ces, would
seem necessarily to involve, if not to rest upon, the power to
make an admission of tbe correotness of the account liqoi·
dated, and the amount of the debt paid or adjusted. And
where (as is generally the case) there are mntual account!! in
·favor of and against the firm, the power to adjust, and to give a
valid acquittance or receipt for the amount found due the ftrm,
necessarily, we think, rests upon the power to state an account,
.and to admit the claims against the ftrm. If he has power
to state an account, and to agree upon a balance when that balance is in favor of the ftrin, upon the same principle he must
have the like power when the balance happens to be against
it. Without the power to admit a previous liability against
the ftrm, we can see no principle on which a receipt. or a:cquit- ·
tance, in such case, could be admissible evidence against the
firm.
But the admission by a single partner, after dissolutioo, of
a pre-existing partnership liability,. must be conftned to cases.
where there have been, in fact, previous partnership dealings.
with the plaintiff, or some transaction of the firm out of which
a liability to the plaintiff might have originated; and the fact
that there have been such dealings, or such transactions, muet
be shown by some general evidence at least, outside of the '
admission itself, otherwise the objection that the power to
admit a previous liability involves the power to create a new
one, would be insurmountable. But if such evidence be given,
1
it lays a proper foundation for the admission, as it brings tbe
subject matter within the power of a single partner to make
an admission in respect to a liability which may have grown .
out of such previous dealings or transactions, and the balance
that may have resulted therefrom. The admission is thus
shown to have reference to transactions which took place during the existence of the firm, and as to which the di880lution
could not alter the relations of the parties. We think this
very clear in principle, though we have been referred to no
authorities, and none have come under our observation,
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direotly in point for a case like the present. See, however, for
an analogous rule, 3 Kent Com. (3d Ed.) 50, and cases there
cited, especially 8mitA "· Ltullow, 6 Johns. 267, and Oail1 "·
Shepard, above cited.
In the case before us, there does not appear to have been any
evidence, aside from the admiBBion of one of the su"iving
paNners, tending to show any partnership dealing or tran&action with the plaintiff during the existence of the flrm. The
tlrst question propounded must therefore, as it applies to the
.{)resent case, be answered in the negative. Th~s, in. our view,·
.....! disposes of the ease, and the second question propounded ·
--.1: ) becomes abstract or hypothetical, and requiree no answer.
~ ;·:· \ .."fhe other justices concurred.
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v·• ...• :~·. ,·r-\~ _.'~
\ ~ NQ!a:, f3ee Meche~'s ~lem. of P~rtn., I m
..
r- ~ . '<9 .. '-:/
,. f'\.•
. "'- .. ' "

¥

.

-

,

··' ·
•

·~ •

\

t • ._ '

~

•

.

. .

' ..

'· .

..:.._.r .)'..//\

•

,,.· > )• / .
A

••

,_

....

:;..

l .. '\

· .. , ·' ... . . /

.. ,

..J

~,.

t.r ..
~

t. . . . t

.. ~'..

.....

. ./ ..:..:
~

"'

J'

~

<0

,/•

I

c ' (

<-

"•

(!'

..,__\...../~

,.:.; \

...
..· ·

.')..:-

~~

<.

11

•

.

'
·'

•

~ .0

'

WILSON vs. WAUGH, et al,

.

101 Pa. St. 233.

.. •. The facts are stated in the opinion.
':-

'Ma. JusTICE GREEN delivered the opinion of the court.

In delivering the opinion of this court in the case of Repperl
-.. _v s. Oolvin, 12 Wr. 248, Mr. Justice Read on p. 252 said:
"The law is well settled that after the dissolution of a partner'
1
ship the partners cea.'le to have any power to make a contract
in any way binding on each other. The dissolution puts an
end to the authority, and operates as a revocation of all power
to create new contracts. Of course a new promise of which the
original debt is the only consideration, by a partner after the
dissolution of the copartnership, will not take the debt out of
the statute of limitations so as to make the copartners liable.
The exception to this rule is when the partner takes the stook on
hand and becomes the liquidating partner, as in the case of
Hauser vs. Irvine, 3 W. & 8. 345." The authority of Smith.
.J
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in that case, says Chief Justice Gibson, "was to se~le partnership debts and pay them out of the effects in his bands."
That this is the well understood law of this Commonwealth
-cannot be disputed. It has been expressed so many times that
a repetition of the authorities is unnecessary. Generally there
is but little difficulty in its application to the facts 'of a given
-case. In the present case however the facts are somewhat
peculiar. The original debt was for a bill of merchandi~ sold
by the plaintiffs to a firm composed of R. M. Waugh, M. J.
Jack and E. H. Jack, called Waugh, Jack & Co. The goods
were sold during the year 1873 and the debt ~ame due on
November 3u, 1873. On December 11th, 1873, the interest of
R. M. Waugh in the firm was sold by the sheriff under an execution against him to one Marriett, who immediately assigned
it toM. J. Jack anu E. H. Jack, and these persons thereafter
conducted business at the same pl~ce under the firm name of
Jack & Co. On February 17th, 1874, a settlement took place
between the plaintiffs and M. J. Jack, of the claim against the
old firm of Waugh, Jack & Co. The plaintiff, H. M. Wilson,
testified that at that time he received a payment of $25:21 on
the account, and it was proved, and not denied, that he took
also a note of the new firm of Jack & Co. for $1,500 for the remainder of the claim. Wilson said be took it expecting it to be
paid. AB to the payment of t25.21 Wilson said he received it
but did not know who was present at the settlement. Waugh
said that no money was paid in his presence that he saw, and
Jack said that he did not remember of any money being paid
No one testified that any money was paid in Waugh's presence
The court below charged that the partnership was dissolved
by the sheriff's sale of Waugh's interest in the firm in December, 1873, that after the dissolution the remaining partners_
could not bind him by an acknowledgment of, or promise to
pay, the debt, that there was no evidence of any promise by
Waugh to pay it after it became due and if the jury so found
they should render a verdict for the defendant Waugh. Was
there any error in this? It is certainly true that the firm was
dissolved by the sale of Waugh's interest: Story on Partner
ship, sees. 311, 312, 313; Parsons on Partnership, p. 400;
Horton's Appeal, 1 Harr. 67. In Est. of Davis & Desauque 5
Whart. on p.-539, Rogers J. said: "There are various ways of
dissolving a partnership: effiuxion of time; the death of one
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partner; the bankruptcy of one, which operates like death;.or
a dry, naked agreement that the partnership shall be dissolvoo."
In Levy vs. Cadet, 17 8. &. R. 126, and in many cases since,
it wa.~ he1d that after the dissolution of a partnership one
partnercttnnot, by his acknowledgment, revive a partnership debt
so as to deprive the other partner of the benefit of the Act of
limitations. It is also true, however, that this rule is subject to
the exception that one who is a liquidating partner may, after dissolution, bind his former partner by either an acknowledgment,
or an express promise to pay, so as to take the debt out of the
statute: Fulton vs. Central Bank of Pittsburg, 11 Norr. 112;
Reppert vs. Colvin, supra.
Nor is it necessary that there should be an express and
s·pecific appointment of one as liquidating partner. His author·
ity may be inferred from acts done in liquidation, with the
knowledge and consent of his former partners: Ibid. In the
present case there was no evidence that M. J. Jack was a
liquidating partner by any express authority to that effect.
There was no evidence that he ever settled any other claim than
this one, against the old firm, or that he ever undertook or
agreed to do so. In fact the firm of Jack & Co. also became
inl:!Olvent a few months later, in June following. When Jack
settled this claim he did not give the paper of the old firm, but
of Jack & Co. Hence no inference can be drawn that he
intended thereby to keep alive the debt of the former firm.
Indeed Jack testified that the note of Jack & Co. was given and
accepted as absolute payment of the debt and that he took a
receipt for the debt. Wilson denied having agreed to discharge
Waugh but did not deny giving the receipt. But hl)wever that
may be, it is clear that no inference can be drawn from such a
settlement as this, that Waugh was assenting to any promise,
· engagement or acknowledgment of the debt as a continuing
partnership obligation. Moreover, he no longer had any ownership of the partnership goods and was not at liberty to dissent
from the control and disposition of them by Jack & Co.
Consequently no inference of assent to their possession and
appropriation of them can be derived from the absence of any
dissent on his part. He of course was liable for the debt due
the plaintiffs during six years from its maturity, but that was
the extent of his involuntary responsibility. If M. J. Jack had
at the settlement given to the plaintiffs a note fur the $1,500,
in the name of the old firm of Waugh, Jack & Co., there would
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have been an inference that, so far as be was concerned, he intended to continue the obligation of the old firm, and therefore
of Waugh as a member of it. In that event the question would
fairly have arisen as to his power to make Waugh liable by such
an instrument. But he did not do that, and hence so far as the
giving of that note is concerned, the inference would be, not
that he intended to preserve Waugh's liability or that of the old
firm, but to substitute for it a new and different liability, to
wit, that of the new firm of Jack & Co., of which Waugh was
nota member. The plaintiffs were under no obligation to accept
such a note, and if thE>y had refused it and insisted upon a ·note
of the old firm it would have been apparent that they intended
that the old firm should remain liable. But nothing of tha~
kind took place. If again it had been proved that the alleged
payment of $25.21 on account was made in Waugh's presence
and with his knowledge and consent, there would have been
some, though not a conclusive, basis for an inference that he
assented to such a continuation of the liability of the old firm as
would flow from a payment on account. But there was no such
proof, and hence there is no authority for such an inference.
As we have seen by the decided cases, the power of one partner
to bind another, after dissolution, by either ·a n express or implied promise is exceptional. The facts which give rise to it
must appear in any case where it is claimed to exist. If they
do not appear it does not exist and the general rule of nonliability applies and controls. In the present case there was no
express authority to Jack to act as liquidating partner, there
was no implied authority from his actually undertaking the
settlement of the affairs of the firm because there was no proof
of such an undertaking, there was no implied assent to any
continuation of the debt by the giving of the note of Jack &
Co. for it, and there was no assent expressed or implied to any
payment on account of the debt, since there is no-evidence that
such payment was made in Waugh's presence or with his know.
ledge or consent.
Iu these circumstaces there is absolutely nothing upon which
to found any legal obligation on the part of Waugh to pay the
deLt in suit within six years before suit brought and hence the
plea of the statute of limitations was a good plea, and there
was no error in the instructions given by the court.
Judgment affirmed.
NOTE.-See Mechem's Elements of Partn., § 272.
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CASES ON pARTNERSHIP.

FEJGLEY vs. WHITAKER.
Supreme Oourl of Ohio, 1811.
12 Ohio St. 606, 10 Am. Rep. 778.

Action by Whitaker against Feigley, as the survivor of Feigley & Davis, to recover for money loaned. On the trial, in the
court of common pleas, the plaintiff offered testimony tending
to prove that, in the year 1865, the firm of Feigley & Davis
was doing business as merchants and produce dealers at New
Lexington, Ohio; that the business of the firm was under the
general management and conrt:rol of James E. Davis, one of
the members of the firm; that the defendant, the other member,
resided at Cincinnati, and occasionally visited their place of
business; that, during the summer of 1865, the plaintiff wu
engaged in buying WQol at said t~n; that he kept his wool
money on deposit with Feigley & Davia, 'and took in the wool
purchased by ·him at their store, where the money was paid to
the plaintiff's customers by Davis, who al10 adjusted their
accounts; that plaintift purchased wool on commission for
Cone & Bickley, of Columbus, and that the ftrm of Feigley &
Davie received a portion ot his commissiQn for their services
and the use of room; that the firm of Feigley & Davis was
diaeolnd In September, 1885, and that pl&intltf, about the same
time, quit the purchasing of woor; that the firm of Feigley &
Davis was suooeeded by the firm of Feigley, Davis & Co., oom·
posed of the partners of the old firm and one Perry A. Eding·
ton; that the new firm con-tinued the same business, and wu
under the charge of Davis. No settlement was .shown to have
been made, between the plaintift and Feigley & Davis, before
the dissolution of the firm. Davis died in August, 1866. The
plaintiff also oftered testimQny to show that after the dissolutioo of the firm of Feigley & Davis, and both before and after
the death of Davis, be had in possession a ltatement, in the
handwriting of Davis, as foll~s:
"February 15, 1866. Feigley & Davia, to J. 0. W·hlta.ker. Dr~
To wool money, $200."
To the introduction of the testlmon)' tooohlng this sta.tement, the defendant excepted. No teatimOD)' waa oftered by
the defendant.
·
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Thereupon, the defendant asked the court to charge the jury,
that U they should find that Whitaker did. have in his posses·
sion a paper writing in these words: "February 15, 1866.
Feigley & Davis, to John C. Whitaker. Dr. To wool money,
$200," which was written by Davis, after the firm of Feigley &
Davis had been dissolv~ by the introduction of Edington, a ·
new member, the same cannot be regarded, and it is not evi·
dence to be considered by the jury of an indebtedness to Whita· .
ker and against Feigley, which charge the court refused to
give, but did charge that it was competent, but not conclusive,
to charge the other party; and further asked the court to
charge the jury "that if they should find that .after the disso.
lution of the firm of Feigley & Davis, and Feigley no longer a
member of the firm, Davis made any acknowledgments, or
admission-s or statements, of an indebtedness of the late firm to
the plaintiff, the evidence could not be regarded by them, as a
late partner cannot bind the old members of the firm by any
admissions after the dissolution," which the court refused to
charge, but did charge that the same was competent, but not
conclusive.
The bill of exceptions also S'howed that, after verdict, the
defendant moved for a new trial, upon the ground, among
others, that the court erred in refusing to charge the jury that
said paper writing "was not evidence of an indebtedness of
said firm to Whitaker, even if in the handwriting of one of the
firm; and in charging that the same was an item of evidence
to go to the jury, to be considered by them, and upon which
they might render a verdict or not, according as they might
be of opinion that said pa.per writing was sufficient or insuffi·
cienlt, in conneetion with other testimony upon which to found
a verdict in favor of, or against, the plaintiff."
Kelly & 1lfarsh, tor plaintiff in error.

Lyman J . Jackson, for defendants in error.
J. (After stating the above facts continues.)
The rulings of the court below must be reviewed in the light
of the whole case, as developed in the record. The principal
question thus presented is, whether or not the admission of a
partner, made while engaged in the adjustment of unsettled
partnership business, but after the dissolution of the firm, can
MclLVAINB,
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be used as evidence to charge the other partners in relation to
such business?
Reported cases upon this subject are in conflict with a
majority, perhaps, apparently in support of the negative of
the proposition. But when considered in the lig.h t of what
we conceive to be the true rule, the weight of authority, we
think, is in favor of the affirmative.
It cannot be disputed that the implied authority of a general
partner to bind his copartners to any new engagement, contract, or promise, although within the scope of the partnership business, is absolutely revoked by the dissolution of the
partners~ip.
.
Bu.t it is neverthelese true, when not othel"Wise agreed upon,
that an implied authority continues in e~ch partner after the
dissolution to act for himself a.n d his copartners in the maJtter
of winding up and adjusting the business of the firm; and while
actine within the scope of such limited authority, we can see
no reasoo why the several members of the firm should not be
bound b7 the aot. and admiB&ions of each other, as in other
oases of B.ienay. The marim, qtd facit per aUum facit per ~te,
should apply In Its full force.
Douibt'S IDIIly often arise in partroular caees u to whether
or not ~ pnrticular act or admi9Sion falls within or without the
s<:o!Je of such limited authority. But it is quite clear to our
minds that the settlement of mutual accounts, p~xieting
between the firm and its customers, and the adjustment and
aster·tainment of balances on claims and demands in favor of
and against the firm, are within the scope of such agen-cy.
We do nat think that a paper wrfting, made by a partner
after dissolution of hie firm, and purporting to be a statement
of accounts between the firm and a stranger, or of a balance
due him, would alone constitute even prim..a facie pl'oof of
indebtedness against the other partners. But with proof
a.liundc that an account was current between such pers'Ons and
the firm before and a.t the time of its dis.solution, such statement would be admissible as tending to prove the state ot
accounts between them at the date of the dissolution. Or, it
proof be made of certain dealings between the firm and a third
person, unsettled at the time ot the dissolution, then an act or
admission made by a partner after the dissolution, if made in
the matter of adjusting such busine&s, is competent to be given
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in evidence for the purpose of proving a -claim founded on such

dealings, against all the partnel'B.
In Wood vs. Braddick, 1 Taunton 103, MANSFIELD, C. J., said:
"Clearly t·he admission of one partner, made after the partnership had ceased, is not evidence to charge the other in any
tra·nsaction which ·b as occurred since their separation; but the
power of partners, with respect to rights created pending the
partnership, remains after the dissolution. Since it is clear
that one partner can bind the other during all the partnership,
upon what principle is it that from the moment when it is disaolved, his account of their joint contracts should cease to be
evidence?" And HEATH, J ., said: "Is it not a clear proposition
that when a partnership is dissolved, it is not diS80lved, with
regard to things past, but only with regard to things future?"
T.b{)ugh it is not necessary in this case to approve, to the fnll
extent, the doctrine of Wood vs. Bmddick, it is nevertheless
true that the rule of that case is fully approved by all the
English common law decisions, and is adhered to in many
American cases. See Joslyn, vs. Smith, 13 Vt. 353; Parker vs.
MttrriZZ, 6 Greenl. (Me.) 41; Mann vs. Locke, 11 N. H. 246; Oad!!
vs. Shepherd, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 400, 22 Am. Dec. 379; Gay vs.
Bowen, 8 Mete. (Mass.) 100; Brewster vs. Herdeman, Dudley (Ga.)
13'8; Wilto·n vs. McNeile, 4 Dowl. & Ry. 7; Pritchard vs. Draper,
1 Rull8. & My. 191; Whitcomb VB. Whiting, 2 Doug. 652; Jackton VB. Fairlxmk, 2 H. Bl. 340; Shelton vs. Ooclce, 3 Mun·f. (Va.)
191; Simpson vB. Ge-ddes, 2 Bay (S. Car.) 533. See, also, Smith
va. Ludlow, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) 267; Bridge va. Gray, 14 Pick.
(Mass.) 55, 25 Am. Dec. 358; and Hackley vs. Patrick, 3 Johns.
(N. Y.) 536.
It must be admitted, however, that the broad doctrine of
Wood vs. Braddick has been disapproved in many American
oases, especially by the oourts of New York, Kentucky, Illinois, Indiana and Missouri; and also by the supreme court of
the United States in Bell vs. Morrison, 1 Pet. 351. But it will
be observed that no well considered case, either in England or
America, baa denied that, in the absence of express stipulation to the contrary, an implied authority after di&Solution is
continued in the several partners to wind up the unsettled
atfaira of the partnership.
In Bell vs. Morrison, it is expressly declared that "each part·
uer may, therefore, bind the partnership by his contract in
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the partnership business; bot he cannot bind it by any con
tract beyond those limits. A dissolution, however, puts an
end to the authority~ By force of its terms it operates as a
revocation of all power to create new contracts, and the right
ot the partner can extend no further than to settle the partnership concerns already existing, and to distribute the
remaining funds. Even this right may be qualified and restrained by the express delegation of the whole authority to
.
one of the partners."
Tbia case (Bell va. Morrison.), is much relied on as an authority against the power of a partner, after dissolution of the
firm, to bind his copartners, by his act or admission, in any
transaction whatever. The question decided arose on a plea
of the statute of limitations, and we think the doctrine of the
case is by no .means as broad as that contended for. Justice
STOBY, in delivering the op~ion said: "The question is not
as to the authority of a partner, after dissolution, to adjust
an admitted and subsisting debt (we mean, admitted ·by the
whole partnership, or unbarred by the statute); but whether
he can, by his sole act, after the action is barred by lapse of
time, revive it as against all the partnel'B, without any new
authority communicated for that purpose. We think the
proper resolution of this point depends upon anot her.; that
is, whether the acknowledgment or promise is deemed a mere
continuation of the original promise, or a new cont1'acl sprmg·
ing out of, and supported by, the original consideration. We
think it is the latter." And again, he says: "The light in
which we are disposed to consider this question is, that after
a dissolution of a partnership no partner can create a cause
of action against the other partners, except by a new author·
tty oommunicated ro him for that purpose. • • • When
the statute of limitations ·h as once run against a debt,
the cause of action against the partnership is gone.
The .a.cknowledgmenrt, if it is to operate at all, is to croote
a new oause of action, to revive a debt whioh is extinct."
There is nothing in this decision that conflicts with the rule
we have stated. And it may be said that most of the oases
relied upon as supporting a contrary doctrine arose in the
same way, and were decided upon the principle that an
acknowledgment or promise to pay a debt, barred by statute
of limitations, does not revive the old debt, bot creates a new
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. one; and hence it is, that we stated above that the decided
weight of authority is, that a partner, after dissolution, to the
extent that is necessary to settle pre-existing cJai_ms against
the firm, may so exercise hill authority as to bind all the partners; but never, without new authority from them, can he
create a new cause of action against them.
The court in Palmer VB. Dodge, 4 Ohio St. 21, 62 Am. Dec.
271, held that the dissolution of a partnership worked an absolute revocation of all implied authority ln either of the partners to bind the other to new engagements or pramisea, made
with persons having notice of the dissolution, although springing out of, and founded upon, the indebtedness of the firm;
and in Myers va. Standish, 11 Ohio St., 29, it was held, that
under an averment of due demand and notice of the dishonor
of a bill of exchange, drawn by a firm, the declarations of
on·e of the partners made after dissolution (no notice, however,
of the di~:~solution ·h aving been given to the payees), showing
I1'Il acknowledgment C1f liability thereon, and a prom:ise to pay
the amount of the bill, were admissible in an action against
the other parties. But ln each of these cases the doctrine is
distinctly affirmed, that while the dissolution revokes the implied authority of each pa.r tner to incur new obligations for
his fellows, it leaves upon each the duty, and continues to each
the right of doing whatever is necessary to collect the claims
due the partnership, and to adjust, settle, and pay its debts.
And it is said in Palmer vs. Dodge, that "this right of each of
the partners to participate in the settlement of its concerns,
can not be interfered with by his copartners without subjecting them to the controlling power of a court of equity."
The ascertainment of the amount due to or from the partnership, on account of unsettled transactions, ls a; necessary
step in' the winding up of its affairs, and within the authority
vested by implication in each partner after dissolution.
We are, therefore, of opinion that the testimony objected to
by the plaintiff in error was competent, and that the jury, having found from other testimony in the case, that, at the date
of tbe dissolution of the firm of Feigley VB. Davis, there were
unsettled dealings between the plaintiff and the firm, and that
the paper referr·ed to was made by Davis upon the settlement
of such dealings, were authorized to find the amount due the
plaintiff thereon fMm the admission of Davis so made.
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It ~ay be proper to add that the proof in this case did not
strictly conform to the-allegations in the petition, but aa no
oojection baa been made upon the ground of variance, we do
not deem it our duty to consider that questioD.
Judgment affirmed.
NOTB: See Mt>chem's Elem. of Parto, § 279.
with the three cases preceding. There is much oonfiiot of 811•
thol'ity in the United States respecting the rule of Wood VI. Braddick,
See the autboritiee oollected iD Panons on Partnership, ith Ed., pp. let.
Compt~Te
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\'Action by James F . Benedict against Charles E. Cobb.
c :} • --.:"lodgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.
Affirmed.
· .....,,.. ·.. · ·- . The parties to tbis action, with one Wilson, were formerly
" "-- 1,.
engaged in business as partners. Benedict claims that October
~- · · 1
1, 1891, his copartners purchased his interest in the firm, for
...,_-'- ··
which they agl'eed to pay him the tJUm of tiO,OOO, and other
·)
considerations. He brought an action to recove1· the balance
of the money consideration, basing his right thereto upon the
foregoing statement, and claims that such balance is the sum
of $2,500. The defendant Cobb alone answered, by which he
tendered {1) the legal defense of payment; (2) the equitable de.
fense that the partners have never settled and adjusted their
partnership affairs as between each other; and prays for an
accounting.
Tbe averments upon which these defenses are based are
· denied by replication. The issues thus formulated were submitted to a jury. The evidence of Benedict was to the effect
that Cobb & Wilson purchased his entire interest in the partnership business, and assumed all the obligations of the firm.
When this transaction occurred, there was standing to his credit
on tbe books of the firm the sum of $3, 723.48. This item consisted of the balance of his share of the profits of the business,
11 (

..

-.··"!'"~
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which had been divided and placed to his credit, and money belonging to him 'individually. for which he had been given credit
on the books of tbe firm. Regarding this credit he stated, in ·
substance, that when the sale of his interest was made it was
distinctly ·understood. betw~n Cobb and himself, that he re·Served the privilege of withdrawing that sum. As to the agreement of purchase·, the statement of Wilson is that the subject
of Benedict's liability, as between themselves, for the old firm
debts, was not mentioned. He also states he did not understand that Benedict's individual account was included in the
purchaSt·. Cobb states, in substance, that when the agreement
of purchase was made nothing was said about Wilson and himself assuming the then existing liabilities of the firm.
On the subject of Benedict's individual account he says that
he never disputed his right to withdraw the sum it represef!.ts,
provided it was collected from the assets of the old firm.
Plaintiff received a sum largely in excess of $10,000, t7,600 of
which he applied on the purchase price for his interest in the
assets and business of the fil'm, and the remainder upon the account standing to his credit at the time of the sale. These
payments were made at different times, and in different
amounts. As to one of t2,500 it is claimed that when he requested a payment at the time this was made he asked for the
balance of the purchase price. The only evidence on this subject is his own, which, when analyzed, is to the effect that he
asked for the balance of his account, which, according to his
claim, included the balance of the purchase· price and the
amount due him on his private account. Of this sum he applied $2,000 on the ·Jatter, which discharged it in full, and the
remainder on the purchase price.
Counsel for Cobb, requested the court to instruct the jury to
the effect that Benedict was not exonerated from bearing his
proportion of the liabilities of the firm as between each member, unless it was expressly agreed between the partners that he
Rhould be. This instruction was refused. The court directed
the jury that "if one partner sells to his co-partners his interest
in a partnership for a certain consideration, and nothing is said
further than that, he is not liable to his partners for the debts
of the concern." The jflry returned a general verdict in favor
of plaintiff, and also a special verdict, from which they found
as a fact that Benedict, by the terms of the sale of his interest
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in the business of the firm, did not transfer his private account
then standing to his credit. From a judgment on the verdict,
derendant Cobb brings the case here for review on error. The
principal errors assigned may be all considered under one head,
namely the giving and refusal of instructions noted. It is also
claimed that interest should not have been allowed upon the
balance of the account.

W. C. Kingsley and W. J. Miles, for plaintiff in error.
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Alfred Muller, for defendant in error.
GABBERT, J. (after stating the facts).
The main question
between the parties is, what was their contract, either expressly or by implication, with respect to the assumption of the liabilities of the firm by Cobb and Wilson at the time they purchased the interest of Benedict? Incidentally there is also presented for determination what their contract was with respect to
the account standing to the credit of Benedict on the books of
the firm at the time of such purchase. Upon the determination
of these questions the rights of the parties principally depend.
In determining the main question, we will eliminate for the
present the consideration of any arrangement which they may
have made regarding the account of Benedict. It is urged, and
many Huthorities are cited in support of' the uncontrovertible
proposition, that one partner, by an·angement with his co-partnet·8, c~mnot shield himRelf from liability to creditors created
while a member of the firm. This case, however, does not
present that question. We are not called upon to decide how
the agreement of sale affected Benedict as to the then existing
creditors of the firm, but what their rights are as between each
other under that agreement.
The evidence of Benedict is to the effect that Cobb and Wilson assumed all liabilities of the firm as part of the consideration of the purchase of his interest. If this were the only testimony on the subject, we need go ·DO furth.er in discussing thiR
proposition, because the question of how the li~bilities of the
firm should be discharged by the partners as between each
other, upon dissolution, is one which they can arrange between
themselves by an express contract. Tootle vs. Cook, 4 Colo.
App. 111, 35 Pac. 193. According to Benedict's statement,
that was what they did. Therefore, if their agreement em-

'-,
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bodied the terms and conditions which he asserts, there could
be no doubt, so far as the payment of the balance of the tlO,OOO
is concerned, but that he would be entitled to recover without
respect to what the condition of the affairs of the old firm might
be, af.ter disposing of all of its assets, and discharging its liabilities.
The next question presented is, what contract does the law
imply in regard to the assumption of the liabilities of the firm
by Cobb and Wilson, according to th~ir version .of what the
terms of the contract of purchase were? Wilson and Cobb both
testified that nothing was said by either of the partners about
the assumption of the liabilities of the firm at the time they purchased the interest of Benedict. The interest of a partner in
the assets of a firm of which he is a member consists of his portion of the residue left after payment of the liabilities of the
firm and the adjustment of their partnership claims against
each other. 1 Bates, Partn. § 180; 17 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law
(1st ed.) 964; Douglas vs. Winslou·, 20 Me. 89; Lambert vs.
Griffith, 50 Mich. 286, 15 N. W. 458.
In determining the value of Benedict's interest, all the parties
must have adopted this rule of law in ascertaining that value.
The sale operated as a dissolution of the partnership. The
interest of Benedict in the assets was transferred to Cobb and
Wilson. If nothing whatever was said on the subject of the
discharge of the then existing liabilities of the firm, all must
have contemplated, according to the statement of Oobb and
Wilson, that they were to discharge such liabilities. They received the assets. From that source they would expect to dis.charge the liabilities. It was Benedict's interest in these assets,
after the debts were paid, which they purchased. Having
assumed the entire control of the property of the firm, and
agreed to pay Benedict a sum certain for what, in their judgment, his net interest was worth, it was, in effect, an accounting between the members of the firm of partnership matters,
from which it would naturally be inferred that the purchasing
partners assume the firm debts. Thereafter the rights of the
parties would be governed by their contract of transfer, and no
partnership matters were in issue, because, as we have noticE!d,
the sale operated as a dissolution of the partnership, and impliedly adjusted all partnership matters between the members
of the firm. Clark vs. 0a1'r, 45 Ill. App. 469; Edens vs.

\.
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1Villiams, 36 Ill. 252. On this branch of the case we conclude
. that, where one partner sells his entire interest in the ~ets
and business of a firm to his co-partners, for an agreed consideration, and nothing is said regarding the liabilities of the
partnership, tho presumption is that the purchasing partners,
as between themselves and the one retiring, assumed such liabilities. The trial judge correctly instructed the jury on this
subject.
Counsel for plaintiff in error contend that, if one partner retires with the consent of his copartners, there is an implied
promise on the part of the latter to pay the debts of the firm,
and sav6 the one retiring harmless only to the extent of the
assets of the firm. In support of thitt proposition, T. Pars.
Partn. (3d ed.) p. • 400, is cited. An examination of the cases
which the author cites as supporting his text discloses that the
facts in the cases in which the above rule has been announced
are entirely different from those in the case at bar in this respect: that the retiring partner bud not sold his interest in the
assets of the fit·m to those remaining, but to a third party, with
their consent. That, of course, would only make them responsible for the debts of the firm to the extent noticed, because the
remaining partm•rs were not parties to such sale; nor would
such a transaction ha~·e the effect of an adjustment of partnership matters as between the members of the finn.
The next, and iucideutal, question is what the parties agreed
upon regarding the account standing to the credit of Benedict
at the time of the sale of his interest. The law unquestionably
i!:! that, where one partn('r sell~ his interest in the aBSets of a
firm to a co-partner, iu tho ah~ence of any agreement to the
contrary, it will be presumed that all former accounts between •
them growing out of and connected with partnership transactions ~re adjuRted and settled. This applies to debits as well as
credits. 2 Bates Partn. § Gt!l; Norman vs. Hudleston, 64: Ill.
11; 17 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (Ist ed.) 1109. Such accounts,
however, may be the subject of express contract as between the
partners. According to the testimony of Benedict, he was to
have the right to withdraw the amount of his private account.
Wilson states that they did not purchase the individual account
of Benedict. On this subject Cobb states nothing futher than
to the effect that Benedict was not t-o be paid the amount of his
private account unless it was collected from the &Meta of the
firm.
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It appeal'S that, as between themselves, the amount of this
account was due Benedict as his share of profits made previous
to dissolution, and for individual moneys of which the firm had
received the benefit. According to his statement, he was to receive the amount of this account over and above the purchase
price agreed upon. The jury found, as a matter of fact, that
he did not transfer his private account by the terms of the sale.
The evidence certainly warranted this finding. There was a
sum largely in excess of •10,000 paid Benedict, whi_ch could not
ba ve been paid for any other purpose except to apply on this
private account; and, as the evidence fully sustains the claim
of BenMict that this account was the subject of an express
agreement between himself and copartnel'S, it is not necessary
to discuss the question further. It only became important in
view of the fact that Cobb had pleaded payment of the purchase price, and that part of the payments·made, according to
the testimony of Benedict, had been applied upon this private
account. As his copartners agreed to pay this, he ha4 the
right, in the abSence of directions to the contrary, to make this
application, and it left the balance due him on the purchase
price as found by the jury.
Section 2252, 1 Mills' Ann. St., provides that creditors shall
receive interest on money due on accounts from the date when
the same.became due. By the terms of the sale the purchase
price was to be paid in cash. Benedict was also to recei'\"e
from Cobb and Wilson, at the same time, t.he amount due him
as shown by the books of tbe firm. Each of these items became due on the date this arrangement was effected, and therefore drew interest at the legal rate from that time. The judgment of the trial court is in all respects correct, and it is, therefore, affirmed: Affirmed.
NoTE.-See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., § 274.

;:~{~;f;: ~ >f~
,. .

)0>

-'

'>6

~
't(~

,.:·~- _7:. ' .t-·

,';

~i'~ED;RDS, ET AL.

..r::r ""' ~~· ~ / .1- ,\_t
-J \} '-- 4 ~/\\ ~,y-' .

··563

~ff<c: ·A~ ~J;/f'y(~\jv~

·

Y- /

,P

M'

;> •

::.~~ •

r7 ·~

v

r

I:{H (vs: EDWARDS, et al.

preme Court of Tennes.•ee, 181,8.

26 Tenn. 77, 7 Humph. 106, 46 Am. Deo. 71.

"'):: • ~~:l'(;n in chancery. The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion.

'{A/'

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 16:49 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112102486216
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

~~

Trewhitt and Gaut, for the complainant.
_ Torbit and Montgomery, for the defendants.

By Court, REESE, J. The complainant and J.ames S.
Edwards and John S. Edwards became copartners m a mer- ·
cantile concern, and after some time, by mutual agreement, in
writing and under the seal of the parties, the partnership was
dissolved, and the defendants stipulated by their covenant to
pay the debts of the concern and indemnify the complainant
agaim:1t Raid debts and further, to allow him, for his profits, six
hundred dollars of his private account on the books of the firm,
and the complainant transferred all his i~terest to said James
S. and John S. Edwards. All the former parties were jointly
sued at law by eastern creditors. Upon which James S. and
JohnS. sold out the effects of their concern to one Alpheus S.
Ed wards, their younger brother, a clerk in the store, on credit,
taking his own note only; and he for some time conducted
business extensively on his own account, bought one thousand
five hundred dollars' worth of additional goods, and then sold
one-hal(of the concern to William A. Caldwell, who became
his partner. Judgment at law having been obtained against the
complainant, the said James S. and the said John S., by the
eastern creditors, and the same not having been paid, the complainant has filed this bill for the purpose <?f reaching specifically
and having an account of the effects of the late firm, of which
he was a partner, in the bands of any of the defendants, to the
end that they might be subject to the satisfaction of claims
against the first-mentioned firm. Is the complainant, under
the circumstances above set forth, entitled to this? The creditors are not made parties, but that is not material, for merely as
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creditors, and before execution levied, they have not strictly
any equity against the joint partnership effects; their equity is
subordinate to the equity of the partners, and to be worked out
through that of the partners (see Story on Part.), while the
partnership is solvent and going on. Creditors, therefore,
having no lien on such effects, they may for a valuable consideration be transferred bona fide to any .person, and as well to
the other partners as to a stranger: I d., sec. 358. In such a
case the retiring partner, who so transfers his share, has no lien
on the property for the discharge of the debts of the firm, for
by his voluntary transfer thereof he has parted with it, and
t-r usted to the personal security and personal contract of the
othet· partner8: 1<1., sec. 359. Thit:J principle is well settled in
England: Ex parte Ruffin, 6 Vee. Jr. 119, 127; Ex parte
William.~, 11 ld. 3, 5.
This is the situation of complainant. He dissolved the firm;
he as.signed his interest for a valuable consideration, and he
took the personal covenant of indemnity against the debts of
his assignE*'s, the former partners. He does not pretend that
this was not done bona fide. What lien, after this, can he
have against theae effects, any more than against the private
property and effects of his former partners? They alike belong
to them and not to him. If this were not so, business would
not be continued by some members who come into a firm upon
the retirement of a partner, for to give them both liens upon
the effects, which the one may have sold to the other, and taken
out his profits and obtained a covenant of indemnity, would be
attended with a confusion and inconvenience difficult to be estimated. The plaintiff~s claim set up in his bill is barred.
therefore, by his own assignment, and acceptance of a personal
security in the covenant of indemnity of his partners. He is
barred also by the purchase of the effects by Caldwell. There
is not any satisfactory evidence to show that this purchase was
not fairly made.
Upon both grounds we affirm the decree of the chancellor.
NOTE.-See Mechem's Elements of Partn., §§ 274-276.
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at the February term, 1859. The complainant appealed.

M. & H. Brown, for the complainant.
M. Bullock, TCJmlin and Stephens, for the defendanta.
WRIGHT, J., delivered ~he opinion of the court.
The Chancellor dismissed the bill, and amended bill, upon
demurrer, and in this, we think, be acted properly.
The case is governed by Smith vs. Edwards, et al., 7 Humph.
106. It is there held that where a partner sells his interest in
the partnership concern, either to his copartners, or strangers,
he has no lien on the partnership property for the payment of
partnership debts, for which he is liable, any more than those
against the private property, or effects of his former partners.
He cannot pursue specifically, or have an account of the effects
of the late firm of which he was a partner, to the end that
they might be subject to the satisfaction of claims existing
against the firm. And the fact that when he retired his copartners stipulated to pay the debts of the concern, and indemnify him, can make no difference, he having trusted to the
personal covenants of his assignees.
Here, the case made is, that complainants, N atbaniel W.
Bivens and William H. Stone, were at first partners under the
firm name of N. W. Bivens & Co., after which they took'in
one Emmerson, and the business progressed un'der the firm
name of Bivens, Croone & Co. After this complainant and
Bivens purchased out the interest of Stone and Emmerson, and
the concern was carried on under the partnership style of
Croone & Bivens, until the 8th of January, 1857, when complainant transferred all his interest in said firms to said ::(Jivens

~ ·
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and one Bryan, and placed the asset.~ of every. kind in their
possession, in consideration of which they in writing stipulated
to pay all the outstanding debts against ~aid firms, and to release complainant therefrom.
He retains no interest in, or lien upon, the effects so transferred; nor is there any stipulation that they shall be applied in
payment of the partnership debts.
Bivens and Bryan have failed to pay said debts, or to have
complainant released, and he has been sued and forced to pay
a part of them, and is liable to pay the residue; and the said
Bivens and Bryan are insolvent, and are applying the assets sotransferred to their own private use.
The object of the bill is to obtain an account of these assets,
specifically, to have the firm debts paid and complainant
released.
But, as we have seen, upon the authority of Smith v. Edwards, et. al.• and the cases there cited, the bill cannot be
maintained, and the complainant must look to the personal
covenants of Bivens & Bryan.
Neither is there any other aspect in which the case can bq
maintained. It is a rule, to be sure, thAt a surety bas a right
to bring his principal and the creditor into a Court of Chancery,
to compel the payment of the debt. ·But if we were to concede
that complainant occupies- toward the creditors of these firms
and the defendants-the relation of a surety, yet the bill makes
no case .under this head of ~uity . The creditors are not parties, and the case is, in other respects, perhaps, defective. 5·
Humph. 66.
Decree affirmed.
NOTE.-See Mechem's Elements of I'artn., §§ 274-276.
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action for taking and converting personal property.
The property consisted of ma~hinery, utensils, lumber and
other chattels formerly owned by the firm of J. C. Smith &
Co., and connected with a yeast factory carried on by them.
From the 17th of August to the 22d of December, 1866, the
firm consisted of John C. Smith, HoJJister E. Goodwin, John
Wride, Marietta Huntington and William B. Rubert, each 00.
ing interested to the extent of one-fifth. The firm being indebted
to the Geneva National Bank, judgments were recovered on the
24th of May, 1867, against the persons above named, viz.: one
for 11,403.83, and one for 1237.53. The first-mentioned judgment included claims to the amount· of 1330, which accrued
after the withdrawal of Vvride from the firm. Executions were
issued ·on these judgments on the 25th of May, and placed
in the hands of the defendant Ringer, who was deputy sheriff
of Ontario county, and he levied upon the property on the 19th
of July, 1867, and sold it on the 29th of that month. The defendant Whitwell was sheriff, and this action was brought
against him and hie deputy for such levy and sale.
The plaintiff claimed title to four-fifths of the value of the
property, as follows: On the 22d of December, 1866, John
W ride assigned aU his interest in the property and business of
the firm to John C. Smith, who agreed to pay the firm debts;
and on the 4th of February, 1867, Marietta Huntington assigned
all her interest in the firm property to the said John C. Smith,
who took her place in the firm. The busineBS continued to be
carried on by the remaining partners, under the same firm
name.
Both of these transfers were made with the consent of all the
other members of the firm, and in good faith, without intent to
defraud the creditors of the firm.
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On the 28th of February, 1867, the firm then consisted of
Smith, Rubert and Goodwin, and Smith's interest being threefifths, he gave to the plaintiff a chattel mortgage upon his interest in the yeast factory, property, accounts, etc., of the firm
to secure his individual debt to the plaintiff of t2,400; payable
in installments in two, five and Raven months, with power to
take possession and sell in case of default, or whenever she
should deem herself unsafe, before default. The referee found
that this amount waa.. justly due to the plaintiff for mon£~y
loaned by her to Smith, which he bad used for the firm, and
for which it was indebted to him; and that the mortgage was
given in good faith, with the consent of all the partners, and
without intent to defraud creditors. There was no finding as
to 't he solvency of the firm at 'the time.
On the 2d of February, 1867, Wm. B. Rubert had given a
like chattel mortgage on his one-fifth interest to Samuel E.
Rubert, to secure an individual debt of $500, payable in five
days. The referee found that this was a just debt for money
loaned, and that the mortgage was executed in good faith to
secure the debt, and without any fradulent iutent.
On the lOth of May, 1867, the plaintiff and Samuel E.
Rubert took possession of the property mentioned in their
respective mortgages, and, on due notice, it was sold on the
lBth of May, 1867, the three-fifths interest of John C. Smith
being purchased by the plaintiff for $1,000, and the one-fifth
terest of W m. B. Rubert beiug bought in by Samuel E. Rubert
for· an amount less than his mortgage. On the same day, John
C. Smith sold and delivered to the plaintiff all his interest in a
quantity of lumber, boxes and other material then on the
premises, and belonging to the firm, for $200, which was applied in part payment of the plaintiff's mortgage. The referee
found that this sale was in good faith, and without any fraudulent intent. This lumber, etc., was levied upon and sold by
the defendants, and was embraced in the plaintiff's recovery.
On the same lOth of May, Goodwin, the only remaining
m~rnber of tbe firm, transferred his undivided one-fifth interest
in the property and business of the firm to Mary B. Goodwin~
who still owna the same, but never became a member of the
finn.
The only finding of the referee in respect to the solvency of
the firm at the dates of these several transactions were, that on
the 22d of December, 1866, when 'V'ride withdrew from the
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firm, transferring his interest to Smith, the firm was largely indebted a~d somewhat embarrassed, but was not known or be·
lieved to bfl insolvent by either Wride or Smith; and that on
the 4th of February, 1867, when Marietta Huntington transferred her interest, the financial affairs of the firm were about
the same as they were on the 22d of December, 1866. That
the value of the property and assets of the firm depended in part
upon the continuance of its business; and that in case such business was continued, and properly managed, ·the property and
assets were more than sufficient to pay the debts.
The referee further found that, at the time of the seizure and
levy by the defendants, the preperty was in possession of the
plaintiff and Samuel E. Rubert, and was of the value of $2,150.
That the plaintiff was the owner of an undivided three-fifths,
and Samuel E. Rubert of one undivided fifth part thereof; and
that on the 15th of August, 18fi7, and before the commencement of this suit, the said Samuel E. duly assigned to the plaintiff all his right to the property and cause of action against the
defendants for seizing the same.
And as conclusions of law, the referee found that at the time
of the levy neither of the defendants in the execution bad any
leviable interest in the property, but that it belonged four-fifths to
the plaintiff and one·fift.h to Mary B. Good win; that the bank
bad no lien thereon, and that the plaintiff was entitled to re·
oover four-fifths of the value, amounting to $1, 7~0, with interest from the time of" the conversion.
The plaintiff recovered four-fifths of the value of the property.

W. F. Cogswell for appellants.
E. Countryman for respondent.
RAPALLO, J. The mortgages executed by John C. Smith
and William B. Rubert appear to have been regarded by the
learned referee as transferring an undivided four-fifths of the
corpus of the partnership property therein described. He ha~
found, a.a to the mortgage from Smith, that it was ex('cuted
-and delivered with the assent of the other members of the firm.
This mortgage, if such be its true construction, having been
given to secure the individual debt of the partner, eYeu if effectual as to the firm by reason of the concurrence of all .the pArtners giving it, would be a fraudulent misapplication of the
partnership property, and void, as to the creditors of the firm,
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under the principle of the cases of Ransom vs. VanDeventer,
4:1 Barb. 307, and Wilson vs. Robertson, 21 N.Y. 587, unless
the firm were solvent at the time the mortgage was given, and
sufficient property would remain, over and above that devoted
by that instrument to the payment of the individual debt, to
pay the debts of the firm. The supreme court have considered
that the findings of the referee fail to disclose any insolvency,
but, on the contrary, establish the solvency of the firm at the
time the mortgages were given. We cannot concur in this
view of the effect of the findings, but think that the facta found
show that the firm was insolvent when the mortgages were
given, and if there were any doubt upon that point they clearly
establish that the diversion of four-fifths of itB properties to the
individual debts of two of the partners would make it insolvent.
According to these findings, the firm was, in February, 1867,
and bad been from December, 1866, largely indebted and embarrassed, and the value of its property, and its consequent
ability to pay its debts, depended, in part, upon the continuance
and proper management of its business. The mortgages were
given on the 2d and 28th of February, 1867. If they were intended to be liens upon the corpus of the property, as they have
been treated by the referee, and not merely liens upon the surplus which should belong to the partners respectively after payment of the firm debts, it is evident, from the facts stated as
existing at the time, as well as from the result, that their enforcement would prevent the firm creditors from collecting their
demands out of the firm property, and that, under the principle
of the cases cited. they were fraudulent and void as to such
crooitors. If so, the mortgagees, by purchasing at the sale
under the mortgages, acquired no valid title as against such
creditors, and the plaintiff was consequently not entitled to recover.
Assuming, however, that the mortgages were intended to
pass merely the individual interests of the mortgaging partners
in the common stock, and for that reason were not fraudulent
as to the firm creditors, then it becomes necessary to consider
their legal effect upon the rights of creditors of the firm. It is
clear that the remaining partner was entitled to the control of
the firm property so long as he retained his interest, and to
apply it to the firm debts, and that the mortgagees acquired only
a right to the surplus, if any, which would be found to belong
to the mortgagors on the settlement ~f the accounts.
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And so long as any of the partners had this dominion over
the firm property it can hardly ·be questioned that it was subject to levy on execution at the suit of a. firm creditor. Lovejoy vs. Bowers, 11 N. H. 404; Coover's Appeal, 29 Penn. St.
!) ; Pierce 11s. Jackson, 6 Mass. 243.
But the point upon which the judgment was sustained in the
supreme court, at general term, was that after the execution of
the mortgages H. E. Goodwin, the only remaining partner,
made a separate tram•fet·, to a third party, of his individual interest in the partnership propertiet:~, and on this ground it was
held that when the execution was levied none of the defendants
in the execution had any leviable interest in the property levied
upon; anti it was further held that the plaintiff, who had purchased the interest of S. E. Rubert, under his mortgage, was
entitled by virtue of the two mortgages and of the purchase at
the sale under them, to recover the value of four-fifths of the
corpus of the partnership property levied upon by the defendants, without regard to the partnership debts.
This position is not without authority in its support. It is
founded upon the theory that the separate transfers of the individual interests of all the partners divested the title of the firm;
that firm creditors have no lien upon the partnership effects,
and no direct right to compel their application to firm debts in
preference to individual debts. That the right to compel this
application is an equity vested in the partners themselves, and
exists only as between each other. That so long as this equity
exists in any of the partners the creditors have an equity to
compel its enforcement between the partners, and may by this
means obtain the application of the partnerhip properties to
.their demands, in preference to the individual debts or separate
di~::~positi ons of any of the partners; in other words, "that the
equities of the creditors can only be worked out through the
equities of the partners." From these premises, the conclu~::~ions
have been drawn t.hat if such equities are waived or released by
the partners thernsel>es the creditors lose them, and that a
transfer of the individual interest of a partner in the firm property to a third person extinguishes the equity of the partner,
and consequently that of the creditors, which is dependent upon it. This doctrine has been carried to the extent of holding
that if the individual interests of each of the members of a firm
are successively sold under executions against such members,
respectively, for their individual debts, the purchasers acquire
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the corpus of the property, free from the copartnership debts,
and the equities of the partners and partnership creditors are
extinguished. Coover's Appeal, 29 Penn. St. 9.
The iujuustice-, R.nd it "'ay be said the absurdities, which result from such n view lead to an inquiry into its correctness.
A firm may be perft3ctly solvent though the members are itidividually insolvent, yet in sue~ a case the doctrine that the property of the firm is divested, and the equities of the partners and
partnership creditors are extinguished, by separate transfers of
the individual interests of all the partners, might result not only
in an appropriation of all the prope-rties of the firm to the payment of the individual debts, to the entire exclusion of the firm
creditors, but to a most unjustifiable SSC'rifice and waste of such
properties. For instance, suppose a firm to consist of three
members, each having an equal interest, and to be possessed of ·
assets to the amount of $300,000, and to owe debts to half of
that amount, the interest of each partner, supposing their
accounts between themselves to be even, is $50,000. The members of the firm are individually indebted. One of them sells
his share, and receives for it $50,000, which is its actual value;
the share of another of the partne~ is sold out under execution,
and bringR its full value, t50,000. Thus far one partner remains. and he bas an equity to have the firm debts paid, and
those who have sold out are protected against such debts. The
purchasers of the separate interests are entitled to the surplus
only; the joint creditors still have their resource against the
partnership property and the right to levy on such of it as is
subject to eale on execution; but before any levy the remaining
partner sells out his individual interest, or it is sold out on execution. According to the doctrine applied in the present case,
and maintained in the case of Coover's Appeal, supra, the firm
property is, by this last sale, relieved from the partnership
debts, the two shares first sold are at once changed· from intere8te in the surplus to shares in the corpus of the property,
free from the debts, their value is doubled, and the fund which
should have gone to pay the joint debts is, without any consideration, appropriated by the transferees of the individua~ interests of the partners.·
Such is, in substance, the operation performed in the present
case. Assuming that the mortgages are intended to convey
only the separate interests of the mortgagors (which, as has
been shown, is the only theory upon which they can escape
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being regarded as fraudulent), the mortgaged property was, at
the time the mortgages were given, liable to be taken for
the partnership debts. The mortgages were but a slender security, and their value dependent upon the firm debts being paid.
This state of affairs continued so long as Hollister E. Goodwin
retained his one-fifth interest in the firm. The firm property
was legally under his dominion for the payment of firm debts,
and the firm creditors, if they then had their execution, could
have rightfully levied upon it, or availed themselves of Goodwin's equity as to any property which must be reached in that
form. But on the lOth of May, 1867, Hollister E. Goodwin
made 11. t1·ansfer of his interest in the property of the firm to one
Mary B. Goodwin, and on the same day the plaintiff and Samuel E. Rubert took posses.;ion under their mortgages. The referee has not found what was the consideration or purpose of
this assignment from Hollister E. to Mary B. Goodwin, nor
has he expre~sly found that it was made in good faith. But
the effect claimed for it is that Hollister E. Qoodwin being the
only remaining partner, the tran~fer of his interest divested
him of his dominion over the partnership property, and of hi~
equity to require the application of the pa1 tnership pr perty to
the payment of its debts, and that as the p~rtnership creditors
could only reach the property through him, Le, by this t1ansfer
or surrender of his rights, had cut off their access to it, and
thrown it into the hands of the transferees of the individual
partners, unincumbered by firm debts.
Waiving any question as t .>the bona fides of this transaction,
the referee not having found it fraudulent, and treating the sale
of Goodwin's interest as if it had been made under an execution
against him, we come back to the question whether the consequences claimed do legally follow from separate sales of the individual interests of the several partners.
It would be a superfluous labor to trace the history of the
changes, which have, from time to time, taken plHce in the
views of the courts respecting the nature of the interests of individual partners in the common stock of a firm, and the respective rights of separate and joint creditors; but it is sufficient to
observe that they have resulted in a general recognition of the
doctrine that as between a firm and its creditors the property is
vested in the firm, and that no individual partner has an exclusive right to any part of the joiut-stock until the firm debts are
paid and a :balance of account is struek between him and his

I
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copartners, and the amount of his interest accurately ascertained.
The corpus of the effects is joint property, and neither partner separately has anything in that corpus; but .t he interest of
each is only his shal"e of what remains after the partnership
debts are paid and accounts are taken. West vs. Skip, 1 Ves.
Sr. 239; Fox vs. Hunbury, Cowp. 445; Taylor vs. Fields, 4
Ves. 3!)6; 15 id. 559, note; Pierce vs. Jackson, 6 .Mass. 243;
Doner vs. Stau.tfer, 1 Penn. (Penrose & Watts, see p . .164)
198; 2 Kent's Com. (11th ed.) 78, note; Collyer on Part., 3d
Am. Ed. (Perkins), notes to sec. 822, pp. 704 to 710; Story on
Part., notes to sees. 261, 263; Crane vs. _French, 1 Wend. 311;
. JV,i tfer vs. Richards, 10 Conn. 37.
Partnership effects cannot be taken by attachment or sold on
execution to satisfy a creditor of one of the partners, except to
the extent of the interest of such separate partner in the effects,
subject to the payment of the firm debts and settlement of all
accounts. 3 Kent's Com. (11th ed.) 76.
Purchasers of -the share of an individual partner can only
take his interest. That interest, and not a share of the partnership effects, is sold, and it consists merely of the share of the
surplus which shall remain after the payment of the debts and
settlement of the accounts of the firm. 3 Kent's Com. (11th
ed.) 78, note b.
No more property can be carried out of the firm by the assignee
of one partner than the partner himself could extract after all
the accounts are take~. 1 Ves. Sr. 241, Am. ed., note; 15
Ves. 557.
No person deriving under a partner can be in a better condition than the partner himself. Fox vs. Hanbury, Cowp. 445.
A partner has no right, by an assignment of his interest, to
take from the creditors or other pad:ners the right to have their
claims against the partnership satisfied out of its property. A
mortgage made by one partner, of his undivided interest, cannot avail against the creditors of the partnership who attach the
partnership property. Lovejuy vs. Bowers, 1l N. H. 404.
Thr:;e prin<'iples have been enunciated in a great number of
cas«'::' where some one at leagt of the partners retained his equity
to hn ,.e the firm debts paid, and the rights of the creditors to ·
nsscts or prO<'t>ed~, whi<'h have come under the control of a
court of E>qnity, have been worked out through the equity of
that partner. But I find no case in which the consequences of
transfers of the separate interests ?fall the partners to outside
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parties bas been considered, except the case of Doner vs.
Stauffer, 1 Penn. (Penrose & Watts) 198, and Coover's Appeal,
29 Penn. St. 9, before referred to. In neitb~r of these casee is
the point adjudicated, for in both cases the joint creditors intervened before the sale of the interest of the last remaining part·
ner, and their right to priority was sustained; though the
opinion of the court was expressed as to what the result would
ba ve been if all the individual interests had been first Rold.
There is another class of cases in which the partnership
effects have been held. to be liberated from liability to be applied
to partnership debts in preference to the separate debts of one
partner; 'that is where a bona fide sale has been made by a re·
tiring partner, in a s~lvent firm of. two members, to his co-partner, the latter assuming the debts. In such a case it is settled
that the property formerly of the partnership becomes the
separate property of the purchasing partner, and that the partnership creditors are not entitled to any preference as against
his individual creditors in case of his subseguent insolvency.
Ex parte Ruffin, 6 Yes. 119; Dimon vs. Hazard, 32'N. Y. 65.
But in those cases the joint property was converted into separate property by the joint act of all the members of the firm.
They had power to dispose of the corpus of the joint property,
and the exercise of that power, when free from fraud, divested
the title of the firm as effectually as if they bad united in a sale
to a stranger. It remained subject to execution for firm debts
so long as it continued in the hands of the purchasing partner.
It i!:! conceded that the creditors have no lien which would affect the title of a purchaser from the firm. But the question
now is, what ia the effect upon the title of the firm, as between
it aud its creditors, of transfers by the pat:tners severally of
their respective interests to third persons? Where the property
remains in specie, and no act has been done by the firm to
divest its title, but the partners have made separate transfers of
their respective individual interests to different persons, is it
still to be regarded, as t.o firm creditors~ as firm property, or
has it become the absolute property of the several transferees of
the interest of the individual partners?
It has been shown that no share in the corpus of the property
passed by either of these transfers separately, but merely an interest in the surplus, and which should be ascertained ·on an
accounting after payii;lent of the firm debts. But it is claimed
that when all the partners have assigned, their interest in the
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property is divested, and tlreir equity is destroyed, and there. fore the property is released from the debts, and what was at
the time of the assignment a share of a contingent surplus, has
been converted into a share of the corpus of the property. Is
this position sound ? When a partner sells his interest in a firm
to a person other than his copartner, or it is sold on execution
against him, does he thereby lose all equity to have the firm
·debts paid out of the assets ?
When he sells to his copartner he relies upon his assumption
of the partnership debts, and unless he stipulat-es for an application of the assets to that purpose he parts with all lien upon
them. But when he sells to a stranger not liable for the debts,
or his interest is sold on execution, is not the right to have the
debts paid out of the property a right of indemnity personal to
himself, and which does not pass by the sale? Could it be tolerated that the interest of a partner should be sold under execution against him, on which sale only the value of his interest in
the surplus could be realized, and that the purchaser should be
allowed to take tlie corpus of the property and leave him liable
for the debts? If the legal effect of the transfer were set forth
in the instrument, it would be seen that all the purchaser
acquired was a right to an account, and to the partner's share in
the surplus, after payment of the debts when ascertained, and that
he had no right to that part of the property which was required
for the payment of debts; that the sale was subject to the debts.
3 Kent's Com. 76-78. The partner whose share was sold would
manifestly have an interest in the protection and appropriation
of that part of the property in discharge of his own liability to
the firm creditors.
I do not see how this right can be affected by the question
whether the separate interests of all or only one of the partners
is thus sold. Each of the purchasers would acquire an interest
merely in the surplus, and each partner whose interest was sold
would have the right to indemnity against the firm debts by
the application to such debts of so much of the property as
might be necessary for the purpose. These debts must have
been taken into consideration in fixing the price of the interest
sold, and consequently allowed to the purchas-er, and the partnership assets are the primary fund for their payment. The
case differs materially from a sale by a retiring copartner to· his
copartn.er, who is personally liable for the debts directly to the
creditors; but even such a sale is valid only when there is no
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insolvency at the time. To sell to an insolvent partner would
be a clear frauu. How much more clearly apparent would be
tho injury to creditors by a sale to a person not liable for the
debts, if such sale had the effect to relieve the property from
them.
It can .hard(y be necessary, where the firm property remains
in specie and is tangible and capable of being levied upon, to
resort to the equities of the partners in case there has been no
transfer by the firm, and the only adverse claimants are
assignees of the individual interests of the several partners for
their separate debts. The right of the firm creditor to levy on
property thus situated can be sustained on two grounds. If
the effect of any of these transfers is to divest the title of the
firm, then, if effected by the acts of the partner, they are clearly
fraudulent and void as to firm creditors, as is shown in the
cases of Ransom vs. VanDeventer, 41 Barb. 307, and Wilson
vs. Robertson, 21 N. Y. 587. An appropriation to the individual d.ebt of one partner of any part of the firm property, even
with the Assent of his copartners, is illegal and . void, provided
the firm is not left with sufficient to pay its debts. How absurd
it would be to hold that all of the ·partners, by making separate
assignments of their respective shares in the firm property to
their indiYidual creditors, could effectually divest the firm of
all its property and apply it to their individual debts, leaving
nothing for the partnership creditors. But the simple solution
of the question is to bold that the title of the firm, as between
it and its creditors, to the corpus of the property, or at least to
so much of it as is necessary for the debts, is not divested by
these separate transfers to strangers.
As is stated by Prof. Parsons in his work on Partnership
(chap. 10, ~ec. 1, pp. 356 to 362, 2d ed.), a partnership, though
neither a tenancy in common nor a corporation, has some of the
attributes of both. The well-established rule which excludes
creditors of the several partners from the partner8hip property
until that has paid the debts of the partnership is derived from
the acknowledgement that a partnership is a body by itself.
In its relation to its creditors it il:! placed upon the basis of having its own creditors anti posset:sing its own property, which it
applies to the payment of its debts, and after this work is done,
there is a resolution of the body into its elements.
Until some act is doue by the firm to transfer the joint interest, no separate a<'t of either or all of the partners, or proceed-
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• ings against them individually with reference to their individual
interests, should be held to affect the title of ·the firm so as to
preclude a creditor of the firm, having a judgment and execution, from levying upon the joint property. To hold that separate 'transfers of their individual shares by the several partners
can convey a good title to the whole property, free from the
joint debts, would be to return to the doctrine, long since
exploded, that partners hold by moieties as tenants iu common.
In the present oovanced stage of the law upon this subject, no
established rule is violated by holding that the title of the firm,
as between it and its creditors, cannot be divested by the acts
of the partners severally, not in the business of the firm, nor by
the separate creditol'B of members of the firm (further than such
temporary interruption of the possession as may be necessary
to enable the officers of the law to make an effectual sale of the
interest of the debtor partner). This view does not recognize
any lien of partnership creditors upon the firm property. The
firm have power to dispose of it without regard to the creditors,
provided the disposition be not fraudulent. But the individual
members or their creditors ought not to have any such power,
and all transfers made by them for individual purposes should
be held inoperative upon the corpus of the property, so long as
there are firm debts unpaid for which the property is required.
As against firm creditors, no greater effect should be given to
such transfers when made by all the partners, separately, than
when made by a portion of them; but the property should be
deeined to continue in the firm until its title bas been divested
by some act of the firm.
My conclusion is that, as between the firm of J . C. Smith &
Co. and its creditors, the property levied upon by the defendants remained the property of the firm, and subject to levy on
execution against it, notwitbstandiug the transfers by the sev..
eral partners of their respective individual interests.
I have not adverted to the changes which took place in the
firm by the retirement of John W ride and M. Huntington, and
the transfer by them of their interests to J. C. Smith, intermediate the contracting of the debt to the Bank of Geneva, and
the levy, the effect of these changes being fully considered in
the opinion of my learned associate, ALLEN, J.
The judgment should be reversed and a new trial ordered,
with costs to abide the event.
ALLEN, J ., delivered a concurring opinion.
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All concur in both opinions.
FOLGER and ANDREWS, JJ., not sitting.
Judgment reversed.
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Appeal from circuit court, Morrow county; Stephen A. \
Lowell, Judge.
Suit by Ml'l:) J. H. Stahl and others against Dan Osmers and
others. From decree for defendants, plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.
The object of this suit is to compel the vendees of partnership
property acquired from the individual partners to account for
and apply the proceeds thereof to the payment of partnership
debts. The facts are practically uudisputed, and the only controversy is about the application of the law thereto. On July
6, 1893, the d~fendants Dan Osmers and Mat Hughes were
partners in the saloon business at Heppner, and were the owners of a stock of wines, liquors, and cigars of tho alleged value
of $800, and w'ere insolvent. On that d~ty the partnership
· property was attached for the indi vidual debt of Osmers at the
suit of Reuhl, and under an execution on a subsequently recovered judgment, his interest therein was sold to the defendant
William Hughes for the sum of $200. On the day following
the attachment, the other partner, Mat Hughes, sold and trans~
ferred ·an his interest in. th~ firm property to the defendant
John Hughes for the sum of SGOO, who, together with the
purchaser at the sheriff's sale, took possession of the entire partnership property, and disposed of it for their own use and
benefit. Tbe plaintiffs,-who are creditors of the firm of
Osmers & Hughes,- having reduced their claims to judgment,
and an execution having been issued thereon, and returned
nulla bona, began this suit on March 10, 1894-, to compel the
defendants and J ohn Hughes to account for and apply in payment of their judgment the proceeds of the property formerly
t "

·
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belonging to said partnership. The decree of the court below
was in favor of defendants, and plaintiffs appeal.
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Frank Kellogg, for appellants.
Rea & Lyons, for respondents.
BEAN, J ..• (after stating the facts.) The complaint charges
fraud in the sale and transfer by the defendant Mat Hughes of
his interest in the partnership property to his co-defendant,
John Hughes. But this allegation is wholly unsupported by
evidence, and therefore the only question for determination on
this appeal is whether simple contract creditors of a partnership
have such a lien upon the assets of the firm as will enable them
to follow and subject such assets, or the proceeds thereof, to the
payment of the firm debts after all partners have parted with
there interest therein. Upo~ this question there is some conflict in the adjudged cases, but the great weight of authority
favors the doctrine that the firm creditors have no lien in their
own right upon the partnership effects, and no direct right to
compel their application to firm, in preference to individual,
debts. The right to compel such an application of partnership
assets is generally regarded as an equity the partners have as
between themselves, but, so long as it exiRts in any of the partners, the creditors may, by a sort of subrogation to the right of
the partner, compel its enforcement and by this means obtain
an application of partnership property to their demands. The
right of the firm creditor in this respect is, however, a derivative one only, and not held or enforced in his own right; in
other words "the equities of the creditora.can only be worked
out through the equities of the partners.,
From these premises it necessarily follows that, unless a
partner is in condition to enforce such right, the creditors cannot do so. The quasi lien, as it is sometimes called, of the
creditor, being at best only the resultant of his debtor's lien, it of
cour~e cannot exist after the debtor had himself ceased to have
auy lien from which it could be derived. The leading case upon this subject is, perhaps, that of Case vs. Beauregard, !)9
U. S. 11 n, in which it was held that transfers made by the iniudividual members of an insolvent firm of their interest in the
partnership assets terminated the equity of any partner tore·
quire the application thereof to the payment of firm debts, and
was, therefore a complete bar to a Lill filed by the partnership
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creditors for that purpo!:!e. But probably no clearer enunciation of the doctrine is to be found than that of Mr. Justice
MATTHEWS in Fitzpatrick vs. Flannagan, 106 U. S. 654, 1
Sup. Ct. 374. He says: ''The legal rightofapartnershipcreditor to subject the partnership property to the payment of his
debt consists simply in the right to reduce his claim to judgment, and .to sell the goods of his debtors on execution. His
right to appropriate the partnership property specifically to the
payment of his debt, in equity, in preference to creditors of an
individual partner, is derived through the other partner whose
original right it is to have the partnership asset!:! applied to
the payment of partnership obligations. And this equity of the
creditor subsists as long as that of the partner, through which
it is derived, remains; that is, so long as the partner himself
retains an interest in the firm assets as a partner, a court of
equity will allow the creditors of the firm to avail themselves of
his equity, and enforce through it, the application of those assets primarily to payment of debts due them, whenever the
property comes under its administration.' Such was the language- in this court in Case vs. Beaure'gard, 99 U.S. 119, in
which Mr. Justice STRONG, delivering its opinion, continued as
follows: 'It is indespensable, however, to such relief, when the
creditors are, as in the present case, simple contract creditors,
that the partnership property should be within the control of
'the court, and in the course of administration brought there by
the bankruptcy of the firm, or by an assignment, or by the creation of a trust in some mode. This is because neither the partners nor the joint creditors have any specific lien, nor is there
any trust that can be enforced until the property has passed
in custodiam leg£s.' Hence it follows that 'if, before the interposition of the court is asked, the property has ceased to belong
to the partnership, if by a bona fide transfer it has become the
several property either of one partner or of a third person, the
equities of the partners are extinguished, and consequently the
derivative equities of the creditors are at an end.'"
And in Schml:dlapp vs. GutTie, 55 ·Miss. 600, the rule is admirably stated by Mr. Justice CHALMERS as follows: "The
firm creditors at large of a partnership have no lien on its assets
any more than ordinary creditors have upon the property of an
individual debtor. The power of disposition over their property
inherent in every partnership is as unlimited as that of an individual, and the jus disponendi in the firm , all the members co-
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operating, can only be controlled by the same considerations
that impose a limit upon the acts of an individual owner, namely, that it shall not be used for fraudulent purposes. So long
.as the firm exists, therefore, its members must be at liberty to
do as they choose with their own, and even in the act of dissolution they may impress upon its assets such character as they
please. The doctrine that firm assets must first be applied to
the payment of firm debts and individual property to individual
debts, is only a principle of administration adopted by the courts
where from any cause they are called upon to wind up the firm
business, and find that the members have made no valid disposition of, or charges upon, its assets. Thus, where upon a <lissolution of the firm by death or bankruptcy, or from any other
cause, the courts are called upon to wind up the concern, they
adopt and enforce the principle stated; but the principle itself
springs Rlone out of the obligation to do justice between the
partners. The only way to accomplish this is to marshal the
assets that property which was owned in common shall be applied to the joint debts, and that which was separately owned
shall be applied to the liabilities of its separate owner, so that
neither class of creditors shall be allowed to trespass upon the
fund belonging to the other until the claims of that other shall
have been satisfied. This right of the creditors is, therefore,
really the right of their debtors, and inures to them derivatively from the debtors. Hence it is said that the lien . or quasi
lien of the creditor 'is worked out through the partners,' the
meaning of which is that the firm creditors may demand the
primary application of the firm assets to the payment of their
debts, because each one of the partners would have a right to
demand this as against his co-partners."
This doctrine is likewise supported by the following authorities: 2 Bates, Partn. § 824; T. Pars. Partn. § 246 et seq. and
note; Huiskamp vs. Wagon Co., 121 U.S. 310, 7 Sup. Ct.
899; Goldsmith vs. Eichold, 94 Ala. 116, 10 South. SO; Jon.es
vs. Fletcher, 42 Ark. 423; Woolen Mills vs. Conkl-in, 26
Iowa, 422; and many ot-hers which it is not deemed nec~ary
to cite. The courts of New York (Menagh vs. Whit·well, 62
N. Y. 146), and perhaps those of another state or two, seem to
hold to a contrary doctrine, but they are decidedly in the minority, and we are not sufficiently imp·ressed with the soundness
of the reasons upon which their dedsions are founded to follow
them in opposition to what we conceive to be the great weight
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of authority. Applying the doctrine stated to the case in band,
the solution is clear. It is admitted by the complaint that the
entire right and interest of each of the partners in the firm of
Osmers & Hughes in the. partnership property had been sold
and tran~:~ferred long prior to the commencement of this suit,
and that neither of such partners bad any interest therein at
the time the suit was commenced, and hence, under the rule
st a t~c1, it cannot be maintained. The decree must therefore be
\. '.. affirmed, and it is so crclered.
.,
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Mich.

ot

.M-.c~ngan, 187tl.

42, 24 Am. .Kep. 691.

· · ..~. . ; · Action. by Sheldon against Smith and others, on a partner.. : , ·,r' , · · ship indebtedness. Prior to June, 1867, Eld.ad Smit.h , lsaao
:. ·\..? • ·· Place and Francis B. Owen were partners in trade under the
·s·
firm name of Place, Smith & Owen, and as such became in·
debted to defendants In error fn the sum of nine hundred and
sixty-nine dollars on book account.
In the month mentioned the firm was dissolved by mutual
consent, Place purchasing the assets of his copartners and
agreeing to pay off the partnership liabilities, including that
to the defendants in error. On the second day of the following
month Plnce informed the defendants in error ot this art'angement, and that he had taken the assets and assumed the liabili·
ties of the firm, and they, without the consent or knowledge of
Smith and Owen, took from Place a note for the amount of
the firm indebtedness to them, payable at one day, with ten
per centum interest. They did not agree to receive this note
in paymegt of the partnership indebtedness, but they kept it
and continued their dealings with Place, who made payments
upon it. The payments, however, did not keep down the
interest. Pla ce, in 1872. became insolvent and made an assignment, and Smith was then called upon to make payment of the
note. This was the first notice he had that he was looked to
for payment. On his declining to make payment, suit was
brought on the original indebtedness and judgment reoovered.
. .: .,:
'-.:

~
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0. & W. M. Draper, and 0. I. Walker, for plaintiff in error.
Meddaugh & Df"iggs, for defendant in error.
Coor.EY, C. J. The legal questions in this case arise upon
the above stated facts. The position taken by the plaintiffs
below was, that as they had never received payment of their
bill for merchandise they were entitled to recover it of those
who made tb.e debt, the giving of the note which still remained
unpaid being immaterial. On behalf of Smith it was COO·
tended that, by the agreement between Place and his copart·
ners, the latter, as between the three, became the principal
debtor, and that from the time when the creditors were in·
formed of this arrangement they were bound to regard Place
as the principal debtor and Smith and Owen as sureties, and
that any dealing of the creditors with the principal to the
injury of the sureties would have the effect to release them
from liability. And it is further contended that the taking of
the note from Place, and thereby giving him time, however
short, was in law presom·ptively injurious.
Upon this state of facts the following questions have been
argued in this court:
1. \Yas the note given by Place in the copartnership name
for the copartn.e rship indebtedness, but given after the disso·
lution, binding upon Smith and Owen?
2. If Smifh and Owen were not bound by the note, were they
entitled to the rights of sureties? And,
3. Did the taking of the note given by Place discharge Smith
and Owe~ from their former liability?
On the first point it is argued in support of the judgment
that when a partnership is dissolved the partner who is in·
trusted with the settlement of the concern should be held to
have implied authority to give notes in settlement. On the
ot·her hand, it is insisted that in law he has no such
authority, and that if he assumes, as was done in this case,
to give a note in the partnership name, it will in law be his
individual note only.
Whatever might be the ca.se if the obligation which
was given bad been a mere a.clmowledgment of the amount
due, in the form of a due-bill or I. 0. U., we are satisfied that
there is no good reason for recognizing in the partner who is
to adjust the business of the concern any implied authority to
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execute such a note as was given in this case. This note was
something more than a mere acknowledgment of indebted·
De8S; and it bore interest at a large rate. It was in every
respect a new contract. The liability of the parties upon their
indebtedness would be increased by it if valid, and their rights
might be seriously compromised by the execution of paper payable at a considerable time in the future if the partner intrusted with the adjustment of their concerns were authorized
to make new contracts.
It was assumed in F. ~ M. Banlc VB. Ket·cheval, 2 Mich. 506ts19, that the law was well settled that no such implied authority existed, and we are not aware that this has before been
queatiooed in this state. See Pennoyet" vB. Dav·id, 8 Mich. 4:07
ante. We think it much safer to 1·equire express authority
when such obligations are contemplated, than to leave
one party at liberty to execute at discretion new contract-s of this nature, which may postpone for an iudetlnire
period the settlement of their concerns, w.hen a settlement is
the Vf!rY purpose for which he is to act at all.
For a determination of the question whether Smith and
Owen were entitled to the rights of sureties, it seems only necessary to point out the relative position of the several part.ies
as regards the partnership debt. Place, by the arrangement,
had agreed to pay this debt, and as between himself and Smith
and Owen, he was legally -bound to do so. But Smith and
Owen were also liable to the creditors equally with Place, and
the latter might look to all three together. Had they done so
and made collections from Smith and Owen, these parties
would have been entitled to demand indemnity from Place.
This we believe to be a correct statement of the relative rights
and obligations of all.
Now a surety, a:s we understand it, is a person who, being
liable to pay a debt or perform an obligation, is entitled, if it
is enforced against him, to be indemnified by some other person, who ought himself to have made payment or performed
before the s_urety was COntpelled to do' SO. It is immaterial in
what form the relation of principal and surety is establisbed 1
or whether the creditor is or is not contracted with in the two
capacities, as is often the ('ase when notes are given or bonds
taken; the relation is_fixed by the arrangement and equities
between the dPbtors or obligors, and may be known to the

. ..
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creditor, or wholly unknown. If it i.e unkoown to him, ·his
rights are in no manner atfeeted by it; but if he knows that
one party is surety merely, it' is only just to require of him
that in any subsequent action he may take regarding the debt,
he shall not lose sight of the surety's equities.
That Smith and Owen were sureties for Place, and the latter was principal debtor alter the dissolution of the copartnership seems to us unquestionable. It was then the duty of
Place to pay this debt and save them from being called upon
for the amount. But if the creditors having the right to proceed ugainat them all, should take steps for that purpose, the
duty of Place to indemnify, and the right of Smith and Owen
to demand indemnity, were clear. Every element of suretyship is here present, as much as if, in contracting an original
indebtedness, the contract itself had been made to show on
its faee that one of the obligors was surety merely. As
already stated, it is immaterial how the fact is established, or
whether the creditor is or is not a party to the arrangement
wWch establishes it.
This view of the position of the parties indicates clearly th~
right of Smith and Owen to the ordinary rights and _equities
of sureties.· The cases which have held that retiring partners
thus situated are to be treated as sureties merely have attempted no change in the law, but are eptirely in harmony
with older authorities which have only applied the like principle to different states of facts, where the relative position
of the parties as regards the ~ebt was precisely the same. W c
do not regard them as working any innovation whatever. The
cases we particularly refer to are Oakeley va. Paslu:ller, 4 01.
& Fin. 207; Wilson vs. Lloyd, L. R., 16 Eq. Cas. 60; and Mtllef·<f.
t:B.

Thorn, 56 N. Y ., 402.

And it follows as a necessary rel!lult from what has been
stated, that Smith and Owen were discharged by the arrangement madf> by the creditors with Place. They took his notton time, with knowledge that Place had become the principal
debtor, and without the consent or knowledge of the sureties.
They t.hPreby endangt>rt>d the S(>Curity of the sureties, and 8!'\
tbe event bas proved, indulged Place until the security became
of no value. True, they gave but very short time in the ftrat
insflance; but, as was remarked by the vice-chancellor in Wilson vs. Lloyd, L. R., 16 Eq. Cas. 60, 71, "the length of time
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makes no kind of difference." The time was the same in FeZ..
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lows vB. P1·entiBB, 3 Denio (N. Y.), 512, 45 Am. Dec. 284, where
the surety was also held discharged. And see Okie vB. Spencer,

2 Wha~rt. (Pa.) 253, 30 Am. Dec. 251. But that indulge-nce
beyond the time fixed was contemplated when the note was
given is manifest from the fact that it was made payable with
interest. In a legal point of view this would be immaterial,
but it has a bea r·ing on the equities, ~nd it shows that the
creditors received or bargained for a considel'ation for the very
indulgence which was granted, and which ended in the insol·
vency of Place. When they thus bargained for an advantage
which the suretiP.R are not to share with them, it is neither
right nor lawful for them to turn over to the sureties all the
risks. This is the le~al vie'w of such a transaction, and in
most cases it works substantial justice.
The judgment must be reversed, with costs and a new trial
ordered.
The other justices concurred.
Judgment reversed.
•
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. BARNES vs. BOYERS.

.'
,·

" Supreme Oou.d of West Virginia, 1890.
84 W.Va. 803, 12 S. E. Rep. 708.

-. ·· Action of debt by Barnes against Boyers and Harden as
·· partners. Plea. of payment, and also a special plea that Boyers
& Harden bad dissolved partnership; that on such dissolu.tion
Harden had assumed and agreed to pay all the debts of the late
firm, and, among others, the one sued upon; that after the
claim bad become due and while Harden was solvent, Boyers
in pursuance of the statwte ·had erpreS'Siy requested the
plaintitf to sue Harden for the claim; that plaintiff had
neglected to do so; and that Harden had since become insolvent. The statutes of the State provided that a surety might
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request the creditor to sue the principal debtor, and that if the
creditor failed to do so within a reasonable time he shoQ.ld
thereby forfeit his claim against the surety, but against the
principal debtor the creditor's rights remained unimpaired.
Code of W. Va.. Ch. 101, §§ 1, 2.
J·udgmen:t for plaintiff and Boyers appealed.
J. A. H agge'rty, for Boyers.
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U. N. Arnett, Jr., and W. S . Haymond, for plaintiff.

LucAs, · J. (After referring to a defect in the notice and
t•equest served by Boyere, under the statute, upon the plaintiff.)
But, independently of this defect, it will be observed that all
the rights and remedies against the principal debtor are carefully guarded in these sections, and are to remain unimpaired.
And the question is whether both partners did not remain
ooullid to the creditors of the firm as principals notwithstanding the dissolution and agreement whereby, as between them• selves, one of them became primarily li..a.ble, and the other took
the position of his security. It is not in the power of joint
debtors to change their relations to a common creditor, with·
out his consent, and the plea does not allege that the plaintlJ!
was ever consulted or ever consented to any such arrangemeDt.
In fact, be ignored the notices which were served upon jlim,
as I think he had a right to do.
The case of Jo•hn8on vs. Young, 20 '\V. Va., 614, which has been
cited in support of a contrary doctrine, goes no further in the
syllabus than to decide that where one CYf two partners purchases the interest of the other in the partnership property,
and assumes an-d agrees ro pay the partnership debts, as to
·such debts the former becomes in equity the principle debtor,
and the latter ·a surety. This oannunciation must be taken in
connection with the a.pplication to the oa.c tual facts of that
case, which did not, in any manner, involve the questioo we
are now discussing, as to whether the copartners can, by any
priVIate arrangement between themselves, change tbcir relations, as principals, to the commoo creditor. It is true there
aare some expressions in the opinion (see Id. 657), which intimate suoh seeming concurrence in the doctrine contended for
by the plaintiff in error; but, on the other ih and, there is
quoted, with approval, an extract from Buchanan vs. Olark, 10
Gratt. (Va.) 164, which states the correct doctrine in terse and
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unambiguous language, ·a s follows: "As between tbe partners
e.nd ·t lle creditor, they were all equally bound; and no understanding a·n d agreement between themselves could change
that relation so as to impair his rights."
'llliis is the doctrine of the early text-books, and it is the ,
later English doctrine. Story lays it down thus: "In the
ftrst place, the dissolution of a partnership, whether it be by
the voluntary -act or will of the parties, or by the retirement
of a partner, or by mere aftlux of time, will not in any m-anner
change the rights of third persons as to any past contracts and
transactions with or on account of the ftrm; but their obligation and efficacy and validity will remain the &ame, and be
binding ·upon the partnership in the same manner as if no
disBOlution bad taken place." See Story, Partn., sec. 334.
'.rhus be s tates the general rule; and upon this particular
illustration which we are now considering he is no less emphatic. "It frequently happens that, upon the retirement o.f
one partner, the remaining partners undertake to pay the
debt, and to secure thP. credits of the firm. This is a mere
matter of private arrangement and agreement between the
partners, and can in no respect be admitted to vary the rights
'of the existing creditors of the firm. But in all cases of this
sort it may be .stated as a general doctrine tha.t, if the armngement is made l.."nown to a creditor, and he assents to it, and
by his subsequent acts or conduct or bindilig contract: he
agrees to consider the remaining partners as his exclusive
doebtors, he may lose all right and claims against the retiring
partner, egpecially if the retiring partner will sustain a prejudice, and the creditor will receive a beneftt, from such acts,
conduct, or contmct." ld. sec. 158.
So, also, Collyer says: "Of conrse, any arrangement between the partners themselves can not limit or prevent their
ordinary re9p0nEribilities to third persons, unless the latter
assent to such arangement." I Colly. p,a rtn. c. 17, sec. 407.
Again be says: "In order that one liability may be replaced
by another, by agree-ment, it is essential that the person in
whom the correlative right resides should be a party to the
agref•ment, or should a,t all events show by some act of his
own t~at he accedes to the substitution. If A, being inJebted
to B, transfers his liability to C, and B does not assent to the
transf~r. his rights are wholly unaffected; be will neither
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acquire auy right against C, nor lose his former rlgbt against
A. As regards B, the agreement between A and C i-s ru inkr
alios acta, and it does not in any way benefit or prejudice him.
But if B assents to the arrangement come to between A and
C, and adopts C as his debt'Or instead of A, then A's liability
to B is at an. end, and B must look for payment to C, and to
him alone. To apply this to cases of partnership, let it be sup·
posed that a firm of three members, A, B, and C, is indebted to
D; that A retires, and Band C, either alone or together wH·h
a new partner, E, take upon themselves the liabilities of the •
old firm. D's right to obtain payment from A, and B, and Cis
not affected by the above armngement, a·nd A doe-s D'Ot cease
to be liable to him for the debt in question." 2 Colly. Partn.
c. 24, sec. 596.
Mr. Parsons is, if possible, still more emphatic. He says:
"No dissolution of any kind affects the rights of third partlt's
who have bad dealings with the partnership without their con·
8E"'lt. This is a universal rule, without any exception whatever. Undoubtedly the partners may agree .o<!s they please
about their joint property, and all the parts of it, and so they
may about their joint obligations; and ali such agreements
are vaUd, so far as they d-o not affect the rights of strangers,
·bu.t where they do, they are w·h'Olly void. Thus three partners
may agree today to dissolve ·a nd to divide all the property in
a certain way, specifying that one shall have this, an-other
that, and the third that thing. Or they make such an agree·
ment about some one or more things, and not about all. And
these agreements determine the property in ·these things
effectuaiiy as to the partners themselves. But they are all
responsible in solido for the debts due by the firm, and ali the
joint property of the firm is just as liable for the joint debts
after such division or settlements among themselves as it was
before. So, too, it is very common for the partners to agree~
not only that one of them may settle and wind up the partner·
ship concern, but t·hat one or more shall wind it up, and for
that purpose shall have in full property all the goods or funds
and business, or .a certain part of them, and shall pay all the
d€'bts, and this be undermkes to d"O. Such an agreement is so
far binding on the pat·tners that, if either of the others is
obliged to pay a d ebt thus assumed by a partner, uhe par-tner
paying may hnve his action for the money a~ainst the partner
wbo undet·took to pay; but, so far as the creditors are con·
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cemed, all the partners remain just as responsible to all the
cred'itors after such '8.n agreement as they were before." Pars.
P.a rtn. (3d Ed.) 428.
.
It is very true that, notwitlmtanding the unanimity of the
text-books upon this subject, .some very respectable decisions
are to be found, both in lDngland and in the United States,
which hold otherwise, and decide that, when onee tbe retiring
partner •has brought to the notice of a creditor the fact thnt
the remaining member bas rereived all the assets and undertaken to pay the debts, such creditor is bound to recognize the
new relation of prin'Cipal and surety existing by operation of
la:w; and if requested by the retiring partner to oollect his ·
claims, and he refuses or neglects so to do, if at the time of
the requeet the principal was solvent and a.b le to pay, but
thereafter becomes insolvent, :the retiring partner is discharged. Per-haps the leading American case w·hich th-us holds
is Colgrove vB. Tallman, 67 N.Y. 95, 23 Am. Rep. 90. That case
is fortified by, if not founded directly upon, 'the English case
of Oalreley vB. PaBheller, 10 Bligh. (N. S.) 548, in which the opinion was delivered by Lord Lyndhum. But this case (Oalreley
VB. Pasheller), bas been much shaken, if not entirely overruled,
by the more recent English decisions. According to the statement of the case in the recent and able work on Partnership
by Mr. Bates, that case (Oalreley VB. PasheZler),is the very reverse
of Miller VB. Miller, decided by this court in 1875, and reported
in 8 \V. Va. 542, and the latter case is binding upon us, while
the old English case (1836), would only be per.sua.sive. The
whole array of authorities, both English and American, upon
both sides of the question, are collated by Mr. Bates, who
himself evidently· inclines to the sounder opinion, supported,
as it is, as I have shown, by all of the older text writers. 1
Bates, Partn. sees. 533, 534.
Having roncluded, for the reasons stated, that the special
plea was bad, the circuit court erred in n·ot sustaining the
demurrer to it, but did n.o.t err in rejecting all the evidence
tending to .support it, and the judgment must therefore be
affi1·med.
Affirmed.
NoTE: Compare with th~ preoeding case-Smith tiS. .Sheldon. See also
the note to that case. To the same diect as Barnes vs. Boyers, is Shapleigh Hardware Co. vs. Wells, 90 Tex. 110, 87 8. W. Rep. 411 (denying

Smith vs. Sheldon).
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GROTTE vs. WElL, et al.

Sup1·eme Court of Neb1·aska, 1901.
62

y.
.:

~eb.

478, 87 N. W. 173.

Error to district court, Douglas county; Dickinson, Judge.
Action uy Samuel N. W eil & Co. against Charles Grotte.
Judgment for plaintiffs. Defendant brings error. Affirmed .

0' Neill & Gilbert, for plaintiff in error .
C. A. Goss, for defendants in error.
DuFFlE, C. Charles Grotte, the plaintiff in error, and Katy
Grotte, were partners engaged in the wholesale liquor business
in t.be city of Omaha, and in July. 1895, the partnership bec11me
indebted to Wei! & Co., of Cincinnati. On October 2, 1895,
Ch11rles Grotte sold his interest in the business t<> his copartner,
Katy Grotto, she on her part agreeing to pay all outstanding
liabilities of the firm, and to hold him harmless from the same.
October 3, 1895, wbat appears to be a circular letter \vas sent
to 'Neil & Co., in which it was stated that Charles Grotte bad
retired from the firm, and bad no further interest~ thereiu, and
that tho uew management bad a..qgumed and would pay 1111 indebtedness. Thi~ letter was received by \Yeil & Co., in due
colll·so of mail. On October 4th, Charles Grotte wrote a per·
sonallcttcr to \Veil & Co., in which be stated that be had t·e.tired from the firm of Grotte & Co., and soliciting employment
ag- tmn•ling salesman for tbem. To this letter Weil & Co.,
replhl on October 6th, in which letter they called aUention to
tho indebtedness of Grotte & Co., and said, "You are aware
you are re~ponsible to us for this debt." l\farch !l, 18%, the iudehtcllnes!:i due \Veil & Co. bad been reduced to $2!)G.SO, and
ou t.lmt date Knty Grotte executed her n ote to Weil & Co. for
tho amount, Matthew A. Hall becoming surety thereon. This
note was taken by the law firm of .lfcCabe, W ood, Elmer &
::\lcGilton, to whom \Veil & Co. bad sent the account for collection. \Ve wish to remark here that the plaintiff in error insistb that \Veil & Co. took this note in payment of the a<'count,
while ucfendants in. error claim that the note was taken as collateral security, and without prejudice to the right of \\reil &
Co. to sue the account any time. T he note when received by
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W eil & Co., was discounted at a bank in Cincinnati, and at its
maturity the Cincinnati bank sent it to Omaha for collection,
where it was protested for nonpayment, returned to the Cincinnati bank, and taken up by W eil & Co.
The account of Grotte & Co., was credited with the amount
of the note when received, and the account closed, but, upon
the note being protested and . returned to Weil & Co., th~
account was charged with the amount of the note. On again
coming into possession of the note, Weil & Co., sent it to their
attorneys in Or.naha for collection, and , when payment was demanded of Hall, the surety, he requested the attorneys to commence suit on the Account, promi~ing, when judgment was obtained, to purcha~e the judgment. At a later date, and 88
testified to by Hall and McGilton, who bad the note in 'charge,
Hall gave his personal check for the amount of the note, not 88
payment, nor to be sent to Wei! & Co., but as an evidence of
his good faith in agreeing to purchase any judgment that
might be obtained against the members of the firm of Grotte &
Co., on the account, it being underst{)o(l that McGilton was to
bold the check in his own possession until afte1· the trial of the
cause. Suit was brought on the account in the county court
against the firm of Grotte & Co., and the individual members
thereof, and judgment entered for the plaintiff in said action.
Charles Grotte appealed to the district court, and the court,
after the evidence was closed, directed the jury to return a
verdict for the plaintiff, and from a judgment ent~red on this
verdict the plaintiff in error has brought the case to this court.
After the entry of judgment in the county court, Hall borrowed
money from one :Montgomery, with which he purchased the
judgment from Weil & Co., and took an assignment thereof to
Montgomery.
Several errors are assigned, but the material question for our
consideration is whether the court erred in directing a verdict
for the plaintiffs. If the court was right in directing a verdict,
the other errors assigned and argued are immaterial. The
plaintiff in error is undoubtedly right in his contention that
after a sale of his partnership interest to Katy Grotte, one of
the considerations of which was that she should assume and
pay the firm indebtedness, she, as between themselves, became
the principal debtor, and he a surety. Did Charles Grotte
occupy the relation of a surety to \Veil & Co.?
At the time Grotte & Co. purchased from Weil & Co. the
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goods on nccount of which this ind<'btedness was contracted,
the firm of Grotte & Co., Charles Gt·otte and Katy Grotte, the
individual mem hers of the firm, were each and all primarily
liRble for the debt, and the question i~, can two parties, each
being primarily responsible to a ·creditor for the payment of a
debt, change the relation of one of them by some agreement
among themselveM, and to which the creditor is not a party, in
such a way that one of thOse shall become a surety only for the
payment of the debt, and change the relat-ion existing between
them ancl the creditors so as to require the creditor to deal with.
the party as though he had been a surety only at the inception
of the account ? This is still an open question in this stat~, and,
as the courts of the country are divided, we are at liberty to
adopt the rule that we see fit, and one which we think is the
better rule. The following cases ho!d that partners, by an
agreement among themselves, may make one partner a surety
for the payment of the firm creditor~, and compel the creditors,
in the collection of their claim, to deal with him upon the strict
rules applicable to the rights of a surety: Stone vs. Chamberlin, 20 Ga. 259; Huope~ vs. McCan, HI La. Ann. 201; Barber
vs. Gillson, IR Nev. 89, 1 Pac. 45~; Bell vs. Hall, 5 N.J. Eq.
477; Millerd vs. Thorn, 56 N. Y., 402; Colegrove vs. Tallman, 67 N. Y. 95, 23 Am. Rep. 90; Gates vs. Hughes, 44
Wis. 332.
The cases holding a contrary doctrine are: Mason vs. Tiffany, 45 Ill. 392; ·W illiams vs. Boyd, 75 Ind. 286; Aiken vs.
Thompson, 43 Iowa, 506; Ra-wson vs. Taylor, 30 Ohio St.
38!l, 27 Am. Rep. 464; TVhittier vs. Gould, 8 Watts, 485;
Norton vs. Richards, 13 Gray, 15: ltfcCoy vs. Jack ( W.
V a. ) 34: S. E. 991. The general rule relating to all contracts
i8 that the parties thereto cannot change their relation to each
other except by a new contract to that effect, b8.8ed upon some
new consideration. This rule, in its application to cases like
the one under consideration, is spoken of by Judge Story in the
fo1lowing language: "It frequently happens that upon the retirement of one partner, the remaining partner undertakes to
pay the debts and secure the creditors of the firm. This is a
mere matter of private arrangement and agreement between
'the partners, and can in no respect be admitted to vary the
rights of existing creditors of the firm." Story, Partn. § 15S.
We do not wish to be understood as holding that the creditors of a firm, upon learning that one partner had retired, will
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not be held to the duty of acting.in good faith in the management of security placed in his hands for tha payment of his ·
claim, or in the preservation of liens and in the application of
payments made. Should the creditors fail, after notice, to perform these duties, and such failure result in damage to the retired partneor, it might well be regarded in a court of equity as
cause to release him, at least to the extent of his damage. In
such case the terms of the contract have not been changed, but
the fact that new relations had arisen botween the partners, by
which one assumes, as between them, the burdens of all,
might well call upon the creditors to act in such a way as not
to injure the retiring partner. We cannot, however, go to the
extent of holding that a contract upon which two persons agree
with a third to be jointly and primarily liable for a debt can be
changed by the agreement of the debtors themselves so as to
require the creditor to accept one as a principal debtor and the
other as surety for its payment. With this as our view of the
law, and with the remark that we cannot discover in the record
any bad faith on the part of W eil & Co. in the steps taken for
the collection of their claims, it becomes unnecessary to examine
other matters discussed in the brief of counsel for the plaintiff
in error.
We might say, however, that it appears to us that there was
no consideration whatever existing for the note given by .Mr.
Hall. The evidence is undisputed that, when the note was
taken, McGilton, who held the note for collection, refused to
make any agreement for the extension of time, and expressly
reserved the right to sue the account whenever he saw fit. It
was expressly agreed that this note should be held as collateral
security, and a sale of the note by Weil & Co., if to discount it
means that a sale was made, W(JUlu simply ue a conver::~ion of
the note upon the part of \Veil & Co. The evidence is also un- .
disputed that the check gh·cn by Hall was not to be used in the
payment of this claim, but was to be held by McGilton in the
nature of a security that Hall would perform bis agreement,
and buy whatever judgment Weil & ·co. might recover upon
their account against Grotte & Co. and the partners of that
firm. We discover no error in the record, and recommend that
the judgment of the district court be affirmed.
ALBERT and AMES, CC., concur.
PER CURIAM. For the reason stated in the foregoing opinion,
the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
NOTE.-See Mechem's Elem. of Partn. §§ 274-276.
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OASE vs. BEAUREGARD.
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Supreme Oourl of the United StaM8, 1818.

. )(."
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.> ,

u. 8. 119, 25 L. Ed. 870.

Action in equity brought Julr 10, 1869, by Cue, u reeeh'er
of the First National Bank of New Orleans, against Beauregard, May, Graham, Binder, Bonneval, Hernandez, the New
Orleans & Carrollton R. R. Co., and the Fourth National Bank
&f New York, to recover a debt of f237,000, which be claimed
wa.s due from, and .had been contracted by, Beauregard, May
and Gra·ham as copartners; and to have certain transfers of
pa.rtner9hip property set aside and the property subjected to
the payment of the debt.1 He claimed that the First National
Bank, being creditor of the ftrm, thad a lien upo-n the partner·
ship property and priority in payment out of the ftrm assets;
that the ftrm and the individual partners were insolvent; and
tthrut the deed'S referred to ln tlle opinion were in fraud of the
rights of the Bank and should ·be set aside.
Complainant's bill was dismissed ·b elow and he a.ppeala.
J. D. RoU8e and 01uJ8. Oae, for appellaot.
John A. Campbell and H. 0. Miller, for appellee.

Asst. Atty. Gen'l. Smith, for the United States.
Mr. Justice STRONG dElivered the opinion of the court. The
object of this bill is to follow and subject to the pa.ymeDt
J

For other aspecta of the aame controversy, aee Bank ve. Carrolltott

Railroad, anu,
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<>f a partnershi-p debt property which formerly belonged to the
partner:lhip, but which, bef<>re the bill waa filed, had been
transferred to the defendants. There is little if any control'E:Tsy respecting the facts, and little in regard '00 the prinCiples of equity invoked by the complainant. The important
question is whether thoee principles are applicable to the facta
of the case.
No doubt the eftoots of a partnership belong to it as long as
it 00111tinuea in exi8t:ence, and not to fhe lndividool.s who
oompose it. The right of eaeh partner extends only to a
share of what may reiil'ain after the payment of the detblts
of the firm and the BErttlement of its accounts. G.rowing
out of this right, or Mlther included in it, is the right to
brave the partnership property applied to the payment of the
partnership debts in preference to those of any individual partner. 'Dhis is an equity the partners 'h ave as between themselves, ood in certain circumstances it inures t<> the benefit of
the creditors of the firm. The latter are said to have a privilege or preference, sometimes loosely denominated a lien, to
·have the debts due to them paid out of the assets of a firm
in course of liquidation, to ~he exclusion <>f the creditors of its
several members. Their equity, however, is a derivative one.
It is not held or enforceable ln their own right. It is practically a subrogation to the equity of the individual partner, to
be made effective <>nly through him. Hence, if he is nQt in
a condition to enforce it, the creditors of the firm ca,nnot be.
Rice vs. Barnard, 20 Vt. 479, 50 Am. Dec. 54. Appeal of the
Yo0rk County Bank, 32 Pa. St. 446. But so long as the equity
of the partner remains in him, eo long as he retain·s an interest
in the firm assets, as a partner, a court of equity will .allow
,the creditol"B <>f the .firm to avail themselves .of his equity, and
enforce, through it, the application of those assets primarily
to payment of t}le debts due them, whenever the property
comes under ita administration.
It f.s ·indispensable, ·however, to ~mcll reLief, when the creditors are, as in the present case, simple-contract creditors, that
the partnership property should be within the control of the
court and in the course of administration, brought there by
the bankruptcy of the firm, or by an assignment, or bY. the creati-on of a trust in some mode. Thia is because neither the partners nor the joint creditors have any specific lien, nor la there
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any trust that can be enforced until the property h•a s passed
in cttStodiam Zegi3. Other property can be follow ed only after
a judgment at law has ·b~n ()btained and an execution lras
pt·oved fruitless.
So, if before the inteJ:1)0sition of the court is asked the property has ceased to belong to the p.artner~9hip, if by a bona fide
tr-ansfer it -b as becQJlle the several proper.ty either of one
partner or of a third person, the equities of the pat·tners are
extinguished, and c'Onsequently the derivative equities of the
creditot·s are at an end. It is, t herefore, always essentia~ to
any prefet·ential rigllt of the ct·editors that there shall be
property owne-d by the partnership when the cla.im for preference is sought to be enforced. Thus, in EfJJ parte Ruffin (6 Ves.
119), where ft•om a pnrtnership of two persons one retired,
assigning the partnership property to the other, and taking a
bond for the value and a covenant {)f ind'Emlllity against debts,
it was ruled by Lord ELDON Hl'a.t the joint creditora bad nQ
equity attaching upon partnership effects, even remaining in
specie. A:nd such ·has been the rule generally accepted eve!'
since, with the single qualification that the assignment of the
retiring partner ia not mala fide. Kimball vs. Thcnnpson, 1:1
Mete. (Mass.) 283; Allen vs. Tile Gent1·e Valley Company, 21 Conn.
130, 54 Am. Dec. 333; Ladd vs. Gri,swold, 9 Ill. 25, 46 A m . Dec.
443; ..9mith vs. Edll'rtrds, 7 Humph. (Tenn.) 106, 46 Am. Dec. 71;
Robb vs. Mudge, 14 Gray. (Mass.) 534; Baket"'s Appeal, 21 Pa. St.
76 ; Sigler vs. KnofJJ County Bank, 8 Ohio St. 511; W -ilcox vs.
K ellogg, 11 Ohi.o 394.
'l"be joint estate is converted into the separate estate of the
assignee by force of the conh-act of assignment. And it makes
nQ difference wh ether the retiring partner sells to the ol'her
partner .or t o a third person, or whether the sale is mad!€ by
him or under a judgment against him. In either case his
equity is gone. These principles are settled by very abundant
authorities. It remajns, therefore, only to consider whether, in
vi-ew Qf the rules thus settled a.nd of the facts of rhis case, the
oompl:ainant, tbr{)ug.h any one of the partnei."S, has a right to
follow the specific property which formerly belongW to the
partnership, and compel its application to the paymen·t of the
debt due from the firm to the bank of w.hich he is tille receiver.
'J.'he partn·er-sbip, while it was in existence, was composed of
three persons, May, Graham, and Beauregard, but rt bad
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<'easE>d to exist before this suit was commenced. It was entire))· insolvent, and all tb~ partnership effects bad been transft•rred to others for valuable considerati<>ns. None <>f the
pi"'p€'rty was ever within the jurisdiction of the court f.or
administration:
On the ~tb of .May, 1867, Graham, one <>f the partnere,
assigned all Ms right and interest in any pr~y and effects
o.f the partnership, and whatever be might be entitled to under
the artioles thereof, oogetber with all debts due to. him from
the partnership or any member thereof, t<> the Foorth National
Bank of the city of New York. By su,bsequent assignments
made on the 14th and 16th of May, 1867, May, the seoond part.
ner, tran.sf~rred all his intereat in ·t he partnership property to
the United States, and by the same instrument transferred to.
the United States, by virtue o.f a power of attorney which be
held, the interest of Graham. On ·t he 21st of August, 1867, the
United States 90ld and transferred their Interest obtained
from May and Grah'8m in all the partnership property, Including real estate, to Alexander BonnevaJ, Joseph Hernandez,
and George Binder. On the 15th of Oct®er next follo.wing, an
act of fusion was executed between the New Orleans and Oarrollton Railroad Oompany, Beauregard, Bonneval, Hernandez,
and Binder, by which the rights of all the parties became
vested in the J.'lailroad oompany, snbject to the d~bts and liabilities of the company, whether due or claimed from the
lessee or the stockholder&
'.rh.e eff~ct <>f these tran-sfers and act of fUtrion was very
clearly to convert the partners-hip property into property held
in severalty, or, .at least, to terminate the equity of any partner to require the application thereof to the payment of thejoint debts. Hence if, as we have seen, the equity of the part·
nership creditors can be worked out only through the equdty of
the pal't~rs, there was no such equity of ·t be partners, o.r any
one of them, as is now claimed, in 1869, when this bHl w.as filed.
No one of the partners could then .insist that tbe property
should be 11pplied first to the satisfaction o.f the joint debts,
f<>r his interest in the pa.rtnership a:nd its 8.88ets ·b ad ceased.
Bo.ker'1 Appwl, 21 Pa. St. 823. That was e. case where a finn
•b ad consisted <>f five brothers. Two of them withdrew, di&Poa·
in~ of their interest in the partnership estate and effecte to the
ather thret>, the latter agreeing ·t o pay the debts of the 1lrm.
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Some time after, one of the reiillllining three sold his intereet
in the pa.rtnership property to one of the remaining two partners. The two remaining, a.f ter contracting debts, made an
as~ignment .of their partnership property oo pay the debts of
the last firm compo.sed of the two; and it was held that the
creditors of the first two firms had no righ:t to claim any portion of the fund last assigned, and that it was distributable
exclusively among the creditors of the last firm. So in MeNu"
VB. Strayhorn (39 Id. 269), it was ruled that though the general
rule is that the eqn.ities of the creditors are to be worked out
'through the equities •of the pa.r.tners, yet where the property
is parted with by sale sevenally made, aud neither parmer ·bas
dominion or possession, there is n-<Ything through wrb ioh the
equities of the creditors oa.n work, and, thererore, there is no0
case for the application of the rule. See, also, Ooooer'B
Appeal, 29 Pa. St. 9, 70 Am. Dec. 149, unless therefore, the
conveyances of the partners in this ca-s e and the act of fusion
were fraudulent, the bank of whieh the oo~p1ai:nant is receiver
OO.s no claims upon the property now held by the New Orleans
and Carrollton Railroad Oompany, arising out of the facts that
it is a creditor of the part:nenrhip, and was such a creditor .
when the property belonged to the firm.
The bill, it is tme, charges that the several transfers of t)le
partners were illegal and fraudulent, without specifying
wherein the fraud oonsisted. 'rnle charge seems to be ·anly a
legal conclusion from the fact tblat some of the transfers were
made for the payment of the private d-ebts of the -assignors.
Oon'Ceding such to ·have been the case, it was a fraud upotn the
other partners, if a f.mud at all, rather tbJa'Il upotn the joi-nt
creditors,-a fraud which those pa~ers oould waive, and
which was subsequently waived by the act of fusion. Besidee,
that act made provision for some of the debts of the patrtDerehip. And it bas been ruled -t hat w•here one of two partners,
with the consent of the other, sells and oonveys one-half of
the effects Qf the firm to a third per9on, and the other partner
afterwards sells and conveys the <>t,h er half tJo the same person, such sale and conveyances an> not prima facie roid, aa
against creditors of the firm, but are prima facie valid against
all the world, and can be set aside by the creditors of the firm
only by proof that the transactions were fraudulent as against
them. Kimball ~•· Thompson, 13 Mete. (:Mass.) 283; Flack va.
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Charron, 29 Md. 311. A similar doctrine is asserted in some
of the other cases we have cited; and see 21 Conn. 130. 1111
the present case we find no such proof. We discover nothing to
impeach the bona fides of the transaotioo, by which the prop·
eflty became vested in the railroad company.
T.bus far we have consid·e red the case without reference to
the provisions of the Louisiana Code, upon which the appellant relies. Art. 2823 of the Code is as follows: "The partnership proper:ty rs liable to the creditors of the partnership
in preference toO those of the individwal partner." We d'O n-ot
perceive that this provtsion differs materially from the genetul
rule of equity we have stated. It creates no specific lien upoo
partnership property, w·h1ch oontinues after the property has
ceaBed to belong to the partnership. It does n-ot forbid bona
fiiU oon·version by the partners of the joint property inro ri~rbts
in severalty, held by third persons. It relates to pa.rtnership
pr'Operty ·al011e, and gives a rule for mrarshallini such pt•opeJ·ty
between creditors. Ooncede that it gives to joint creditors a
privilege while the property belongs to the ·partnership, there
is n'O subject upon which it can act when the joint ownership
of the pat•tners bas cea~. Art..3244 of the Code declarea
tba.t privileges become extinct ''by the extinotion of the thing
8ubjeot to the privilege."
W:hatt we have -said is 9uftlcient for a determination of the
oaee. If it be urged, as was ·barely intimated during the argument, that the propel'lty sought to be followed belongs in
equity to the bank, or is ci.othed w.ith a trust for the bank,
because it was purchased with tht- bank's money, tb.e answer
is t•lain. There is no satisfactory evidence that it wu thus
purchased. It cannot be idootified as the subject totheacquisiti-on of which money ·belonging to the •bank was applied.
The bank has, tJberefore, n'O specific claim upon the property,
nor is there any trust which a court of equity can enforce;
Sllnd it was well said by the circuit justice, that, with'Out some
constituted trust .{)r lien, "a creditor bias only the right to
prosecute his claim in the ordinary courts 'Of law, and have it
adjudic"nted before ·he can pursue the property of his debtor
by a direct proc~·eding" in equ.ity.
Decree affirmed.
NOTE: See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., § 289.
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<i3 N.J. Eq. 186, 17 Atl. Rep. gs, 14 Am. St. Rep. 711.

, . I•. • • . :·on July 17, 1883, John C. Farr, having a lumber businese at
·. '·· .·)~ Hoboken and a manufaoturing business at Asbury Park,
· .:,' ,....... : ~.. f.ormed a partnership as to the latter business with J. B.
· -:· 1 ·.•··· Hagerman and J. 8. Fielder, under the firm name of J. C. Fa.rr
• "'· ·c.. ~
& Co. Hagerman and Fielder gave Farr their note for the
. ·
"
interests they acquired in the Asbury Pa.rk business. On
'-!' .7
October 29, 1883, the new firm was embat·raaaed financially and
.
. · '
dissolved. Hagerman and Fielder assigned to Th.rr all their
....
interests in the business, and Farr returned their notes atnd
agreed to pa.y the debts. Qn November 30, 1883, Farr assigned
all his property, onder the statute, to Arn.old, for the bene-tit
of credirors. In the early part of 1884, the Second National
Bank of Red Bank obtained judgments against the members
of t he firm of J. C. Farr & Co., for debts due from that firm,
and caused executions to be levied on what had been t he property of that firm. The bank afterwards filed a bill to set
aside the tr8Jllsfers from Hagerman and Fielder to Farr, and
the assignment of }'arr to Arnold on the g·round that they
were fraudul€'Dt as agajnst the creditors of J . C. Farr & Co.
The court below held the transfers by Hagerman and Fielder
to Fa rr to be void.
Appeal.

;·• ..
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Gilbert Collins, for appellant.
A. 0. Hartshorne, for Hagerman and Fielder.

J. 0. Applegate and F. W. Hope, for the Bank.

DixoN. J. (After disposing of other mattenJ.) In equity a
partnersh-ip is for some purposes deemed a single entity. Thus,
when !'he property involved in the business of a pa.rtnership
Is to be arpplied by a court of equity to the payment of debts,
that property is treated ae belonging, not to the persons composing the firm, bot to a distinct debtor, the partnership, and
is u'Bed first to liquidate the debts contracted in the busineu
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of that debtor, and only tbe lrorplus, if any, is surrendet·ed to
the individual partners. This equitable practice rests upon
the presumed intention of the pa.rtners themselves, and .hence
iii primarily considered as their equita.b le right against .each
other. Oonsequen.Uy, since the decision of Lord ELDON in E:t~
parte. Ruffin, 6 Ves. 119, it bas been generally held thai the
partners could put an end to this right, and that if, by their
agN:'ement, the partnerspip is dissolved, and its property is
assigned to Qne ·Of their number, or to a stranger, as his ow·n,
without reservatioo Qf the right, the right w have partnership
debts paid 'OUt of that property is extinot. Growi.ng out of
this right of partners has arisen a corresponding equity in
partnership creditors to have their debts ftr!Jt satisfied out of
the firm property, which is n{)w deemed a -subgtantial element
Qf their demands. Generally it may be said that 1bis equity
of cred·itoM continues only so long as rh-e right of the partners
against eaoh ot·her ~ubsists, and perishes when that terminates; but this is not universally true, for this equity may
survive t:be right tQ which, Qrdinarily, it is attached. In this
respect it resembles the cla.im which the general creditors of
an individual ·have upon his property. It is neitller an e-state
Il'Or a lien. It is, ordinarily, but a right by lawful procedure
to acquire a lien during the ownership of the debtor; yet, under
certain circumstances, that lien may be aequired after the
debtor'-s ownership has ended. This results from the. provisi'OOls of the. ancient statute for the prevention of frauds and
pe1·juTies, by f.orce of which, when a person has alienated his
property with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors,
the rights of those creditors reirulin as if no alienation had
taken pla.ce, except again-st the claims .of bona fide purchasers,
for good consideration, without notice. Equity applies this
statute to a partnership, its property ·a nd oreditol'S, just as it
w-ould in case Qf an individual, and therefore, wh.iJe gene~ally
it is true that a partnership may defeat the equity of its creditors by the alienation of its property. and consequent ex.tinguiehment of the rightt of its partners inter sese, yet, if the
alienation be effected with i'Iltent to hinder, delay, or defraud
the ftrm creditors by defeating their equity, the claims of
creditors will be unimpaired, and the property will be treart:ed
as partnership assets, unleBS it shall OO.ve passed ilnto the
bands of those whom the statnte protect.. This dooctrine ·hal&

.,
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repeatedly been recognized in the courts of New Jersey. Thus,
in Matlack vs. James, 13 N.J. Eq. 12G, two members of a ftrm
consisting of four persons conveyed their undivided half of
land, held f.or partn·e rship purposes, to an outsider, i.n payment
of their Lndividual debt to him. OhanceUor GREBN, finding
that the conveyance was designed to defeat the equitable
claim of partnership creditors, adjudged it void, and apPlied
the whole proceeds of the laild to paying those creditors. In
Bank vs. Sprague, 21 N. J. Eq. 530, 544, Mr. Justice VAN
SYCKLE, &peaking for this court, plainly intimated an opinion
(the case not calling for a decision on the point) tba.t an ~nsol·
vent firm oould not defeat this equity of partnership creditors
by ghing to credi:OOrs of the individual members a prior ~ie:n
on partnership property, and referred to Chancellor W ALWORTH's opinion in Kirby vB. Schoonmaker, 3 Barb. Ch. •1, 49
Am. Dec. 160, as supporting t·hat doctrine by·sound reasoning.
The l-anguage of the chancellor thus approved W1lB: "The
copartners certainly have the rig.ht to dissolve the partnership,
and divide the property of the ft~ between them, provided
·there is DO mtenrtion of delaying or ·hindering their creditors
in the oollecfun of debts. • • • The case wou·ld have
been entirely different if oopal"tners, who were in90lvent, and
UJDruble to pay the debts of the firm, ei~r ou.t of their copartnership effects or of tbcir ind.i vidual property, bad made an
assignment of the property Qf both to pay the individual debt
of one Oil the copartners only; for an insolvent copartner, who
waas una,ble to paty the debts which t~h·e firm owed, w.ould be
guHty of a fraud upon the joint crediot.ors if 'he autlh10rized biB
share of the property of the firm to be applied to the ·paymoot
of a debt for which ne>it·her be nor his prope.rty was liable at
law or in equity." So, in Van Dm·en vs. Stickle, 24 N. J. Eq.
331, affirmed by this oourt, 27 N. J. Eq. 498, it was declared
tbnt a voluntary transfer by a firm of notes owned by the partnership to the wife of one of the partners was fraud-ulent as
to partoerS'hip creditors, and the notes in the rumde of the
wife were d~creed to be partner9bip assets. To the like effect
is the langua.ge of Mr. Justice DEPUE, delivering the opinion
of this oourt in Clements vB. Jessup, 36 N.J. Eq. 569: "Part- .
nersbip creditors, in equity, have an in:b erent priority of claim
upon partnership property over individual creditors, and a
transfer of partnership property by one partner, with the
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consent of the <rl'her partners, or by all the partnem1 to pay
individual debts, is fraudulent and void aa to firm creditors,
unless the firm was then solvent, a111d .had eufficien.ct property
remaining to pay the partnership debts."
The ea.se before ·us comes clearly within the reach of this
principle. At the time of ·t he transfer by Hagerman a.nd
Fielder to Farr the i.nsolvency of each of these persoos, a.nd
of the firm of J . C. F'arr & Co., wa.e patent to them all, a.nd,
indeed, w'8.8 the moving cause of the transfer. They all mew
that, in the oondition of affairs th·e n existing, none of them
could meet ma.turing obligations, and it was in the hope of
fadlitating an extension or compromise wrth creditJors that
the transfer was m~de. The transfer embraced all the part.
nership property. If valid in all respects, it appropriated the
shares of Hngerman and Fielder to the p:t:ymernt of the debt8
of Farr, for which those shares were previously .n ot liable,
8lld left Hagerman and Field·e r witboout any property whatever, aa we gather from the testimony, to ·pay their debts.
Inevitably, therefore, by defeating the equity -of tlh·e pa~er
ship oreditors, it '\\o-ould hinder them in the collection of their
just claims. It is a r~atSonable in·ferenoe 'that these partners
'illltended this ma.nife~t effect of their ac-t, ru1d coosequently
th~ assignment by Hagerman and Fielder to Fa,r r must,
aooording to the t·e rms of the statute, 'be deemed vo.id a.s
against the partuer.shi:p creditors. Not only upon the grom1d
of a oomm.001 intent to hinder partnership creditors, r!iu.,;
inferred from the kn'Owledge which all parties must have hnd
of the necessary consequences of rhe ·t ransfer itself, ·but also
up<m the ground that the tra.n.s fer was made without VIJiua.}?le
ooneideration,-was volu.nta.ry in the legal sen.se,-it should
be decreed invalid a~inst the partnership eredH.ors, all of
whose debts were then in existence. Haston vs. Castner, 31
N.J. Eq. 697. 'Dhe OOMideratioo n'Ominally given by Farr fu
Hagerman tand Fielder was the surrender of their 1l0tes a.nd
.hie oovenant to indemnify them against firm creditors. But
according to the testimony tbose ruotes were payable on·ly ou1:
of the profits a-ccruing to H.agermnn and Fielder from the
ftrm of J . C. F-arr & Co., and as that firm had fa.iled, .and was
dissolved without realizing any profits, the n{)tes ·had become
absolutely valueless. Farr's Mvenan1t t{) indemnify d(~ not
ooustitute a valuable consideration, sinoe he may be relieved
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on the toml failure of th~ transfer for whic-h it
was made. 2 P·om. Eq. Jur. §§ 751, 969; notes to Basset "'·
'No81Corthy, 2 Lead. Cas. Eq. 82; Hcwglt,wotd vs. Mut·phy, 22 N.J.
Eq. 531. It thus appearing that, notwitbstanding this
transfer, all the rights and remedie,e of the creditors of
J. C. Farr & Oo. remained against the firm property in
in the hands of Farr, we are brought to consider the assignment to Arnold for the beneftt of Fa.rr's creditors. With
respect to this assignment, the following proposi.tioo.s may,
I think, be ma.inJta.ined: FirBI, ·that the creditors O'f J. C. Fa.rr
&'Co. are included among its beneficiaries; second, that it conveyed, not only the propt:rty of Farr as an individual, but also
tha:t which had been the property of J. C. FaN & Oo.; third,
tba.t It conveyed this latter pr<Yperty subject to thP P.Quity of
~e creditors of that firm; and, fourth, that, so conAtrued, the
assignment cannot be successfully impeached by the complainant.
The first proposition is unquestionable. T·he creditors of J.
0. Farr & Co. were all credit-ors of Farr, far whose benefit
the assignment was expressly made. ·
In oomridering the eecond proposition, it must be remembered that at the time of this transfer Farr WllUI in reality the
owner of ~ property previously belonging to J. C. Farr &
Co. He had become so by the conveyanc-e from 'h is partnt~Nl,
whlob then nobOO:; had disputed, so that tb:e assignment to
A rn·old of stll the property ownofl!oli by Farr induded in its tenns
the firm property. This was made still clearer by the inven·
tlory annexed, which "J)ecified in detail the property a:t Aebury
Park. Even if the transfer from Hagerman and Fielder t1.1
Farr be disregarded, still it will appear that the assignment
to Arnold included the property of J. C. Farr & Co.; f-or, in
view of the faot that it purported to oonvey suoh property,
the conduct of Hagerman •a nd Fielder precludes their denial
of its efficiency. They both knew t:hat Farr was about to
assig-n the firm property to Arnold; they both, wit'bout objec·
tion, delivered over that property to Arnold in pursuanee of
Farr's a'Ssign·ment; they both took part in the management
of that property under Arnold as assignee; and neither o!
them ra.ised any question as to Arnold's title until after -credit·
ors of J. C. Farr & Co. bad proved their debts .under the
assignment. Whether, in these circumstances, we look f.or a
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ratifi<'ation by Hagerman .and Fielder of the transfer of firw
property by Farr as their partner and agent, or fo:r a transfer
directly by the joint act Qf all the par1:n€'rs, or for a.L& estoppel
preventing Hagerman and ~~ielder from denying tllat the
a.s signment conveyed the effects inventoried and delivered,in any view the property oQf J. C. Farr & Co. passed to the
assignee.
1'ouching the third proposition, that this property was OOfllveyed subjeot to the equity of the firm creditors, it w-ould be
beyond cavil, had the assignment shown upon its faee a conveyance of the property of Farr, and also of J. C. Farr & Co.,
foQr the benefit of creditors. As was said by Chief JUJ8tice
HoRNBLOWER, in Scull vs. Alter, 16 N. J. Law, 147: "If it is
a·n assignment, not only of the partnership effects and property
of the firm, but also an individual and several assignment by
the members of their respeotive and sep:1 rate estates, then it
ml1St be treated as such. The estates and debts must be marshalled; the partnership effects applied in the first instance
to 1he partne-rship debts; the effects of eaeh member applied
in the first instance 1o the payment of ·his r.epar.ate debt.s."
See, also, Garretson vs. Brown, 26 N. J. lAlw, 425, 435. But
as this assignment speaks ()f all the property embrnoed in it
as belonging to Farr alone, a d·i fferent view might be taken of
it. Usually, indeed, courts ha.ve held tha.t an assignee for the
benefit of cre-dit-ors i.s not a purchaser for value1 but takes the
propct·ty subject to all equities that would have br en valid
against the assignor. N()tes to Basset vs. Nosu:orthy, ~ Lead.
Oar5. Eq. 87. Many o:r the decisions to this effect, how<'ver.
have gone upon a theory that debts pr.oved under •the .a ssignment are uot ex-tinguished exc(\pt so far as they are pnid b~r
dividends, or that a pre-existing debt is not a valuable co:nsiderati•on f.or a conveyance; and as neither of these theories is
ten1:l ble in New Jersey, there mny be found sufficiN,.t re.a!;ons
for holding, in this state, that a cred-iror proving U'D·df"'.' an
assignment should be regarded in equity as favora:bly as a
purohaser f.or value, alth()lllg.b, im Vandoren vs. Todd. 3 N. J.
Eq. 397, .the opposite doctrine prevailed.
But coD'ceding to the a.sS'i.gnee and to the individ·nal credit·
()r-8 of Farr, who have proved their debts, the rights of pur·
chasers for value, they still are bound by the equity of t he
firm creditors, for they had notice of that equity. "The rule,"
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Prot. Pomeroy (2 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 753), "is universal and
elementary liba.t if a purchaser in any term receives notice of
prior advel'Be riglbts in and to the same ,gubjeot-matter, before
he lbas oompletely acquired or perfected his own interests
under the purChase, his posHi.on as bona fide purdhaser is
thereby destroyed, even though he IINLY have paid a valuable
oonsidera.tion." That Arnold, before the aBSignment, and all
tbe personal creditors of Farr before they proved their claims,
were n-otified thlat t he Asbury Park property ha.d belonged
·to J . 0. F a rr & Co., and ·had been tran13fet'red to Farr when
that firm and all its members were ialsolvent, is fully esta.b~i shed ,by the evidence itn the cause. 'llhis ·n otice beftore the
assignment was 11cquired by Arnold fr.om conversations with
F arr, and by At·nold and many, if n<Yt ~all, of Farr's individual
creditors, through inquiries m11de by Eaton and Lfljwson, a
oommittee appoin ted by the creditors to investigate the aflairs
of Parr rund J. C. Farr & Co. After ~he assignment, but before
any debts were proved, -such notice was still more defin-itely
oommU1licated to all of Farl"s credit<>~, through the report
of their committee, in which the assets and liabilities .of Farr
and of J. C. F arr & Co., respectively, are distinctly stated.
'llhis report also plainly indicates an understrulding or expectation that the property assigned would be marshalled between
the credit-ors of Farr and 1.1he cr·edirors of the firm. It was
mad-e Ja.nuary 19, 1884, while the first olaim proved was pre·
sen,ted to the assignee J'3.Duary 28, 1884. Fuller notice than
this report oontn ined of the equity of the firm creditors could
DJOt well be given. Hence those oredi·bors are still entitled to
have the partmersbip p roper-ty applied to the payment of .their
de bts, in preferen ce to t he debts of Farr's indivldua:l .creditors.
The fourth proposition denies ·the right of the oompla.intlJlt
to im peach this assignment. The assignment was in the form
san'Ctioned by out• statute. It was for the benefit of all credit·
ors who were ent i tied t.o a ny share in the pl'!operty assigned ;
H created no preferences; and it p r.ovided for no delay beyood
what was neocessary f<Jr t he execution of the trust which it
properly dedared. Althoug~h such assignments do hindet·
credit'Ors from obtaining that priority of lien which OOberwi se
their vigilance might secure, yet they are not on that aocpunt
within the meaning and swpe .of the statute whiCJh aYoid~
transfers to defraud creditors. 2 Pom. Eq. JuT. § 994, note.
MyB
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The assignment wu perfected rb efore the entry of oomplainant's judgments, and, as it operated to divest the le_gal title
of rhe debtors, the -complain-an·t's executions did not beoome a
lien. 'l'ite assignment, as we construe it, placed all the creditors of the sa.me class upon an equal footing, and in such case.
t·q uality is equity. Consequently both in law and in equity, the
l·owpla.i nant is bound.
Tile oonclusiOIIl (}f the matter i:s that the property of Farr
and the property of J . C. Farr & Co. should be maMhalled between ·t:lle creditors of those two debtors, respectively. • • •
, Let the decree appealed from be reversed, and a deoree be
.: ~ ·utered in accordaoce with these views.
'. -1-' . , Unanimously reversed.
.' \.~ •·· .. \
NoT& I See Mechem'tJ Elem. of Partn., § 288.
..
. \,.~
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'78 Wis. 572, 47 N. W. Rep. 179, 28 Am. St. Rep. 423.

.• '

'f" ·· ~J. , ··A~iction for conversion of goods.
' ..t .... J ,. ,~111der a cllatt('l mortgage given
1
' •

~·

: .>.·.,., .

.J

·, , ).. ~

•

Plaintiff claimed the goods
by the firm of Hage Bros.
H<>fendnnt, as sheriff, had levied upon the goods at the suit of
unsecm·ed creditors of the firm. Other facts are stated in the
opinion. Plaintiff had judgment below and defendant appeal&.
R. S. Reid, for appellant.

W. Goss, for respondent.
CoLm, 0. J . The plaintiff's right to recover the value of the

goods in controversy depends entirely .upon the validity of a
chattel mortgage given to him by the Ha~e ~ros. , dated May
;~, 1886. If that mortgage is valid, ns against the creditors of
tile firm, the judgment is correct. The object ion taken to this
mortgage is tllat it was not given to secure the payment of a
vartnersbip debt, and is ther·efor·e void as to th e fit'Dl creditors.
We think tile jury must lHn·e fourHL 111Hh•r· the cll;u·ge of the
court, that the mot·tgage was gi\'en to secure the bona fi,(U
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indebtedness of the firm, and that there was no fraudulent
intent in giving it. That there was evidenee tending to establish these facts cannot be successfully denied if the plaintiff's
testimony is to be believed; for he testified, in substance, that
he loaned Iver Hage f600 in June, 1884. and that before Ohrist·
mas, 1885, .h e looned both I ver and Torger f200 more. In
June, 1884! lver and one Canudson were in partnership, and
the plaintiff said the f600, which he loaned Iver Hage, was
used by them to purchase goods for the firm. It does n~
clearly appear that Iver made the loan of $600 for the tirm of
Hage & Canudson, though probably the loan inur-M to the
benefit of the firm. The plaintiff does say that Uanudson had
nothing to do in borrowing the $600 from him, by which he
means, as we understand his testimony, that Canudson did
not act in the matter. This, ¢ course, might be true, and
still it might be tile fact that Iver acted for the firm in making
the loan. It satisfactorily appears that the firm had the benefit of the loan, and that the money was a·pplied to purchase
goods for the firm. But, it is said, non constat, but this f600
was Iver's contribution to the capital stock of the partnership.
But the matter, as to whether this debt was one tlJat the firm
was liable to pay, does not rest upon the facts above stated.
It appears that, in the spring or summer of 1885, Torger Hage
purchased the interest of Canudson in the firm, and that then
be and Iver botJh promised to pay the plaintiff the f600 loan.
Now, if it be assumed that the ~GOO wns ot·iginnlly lo;wed to
Iver, and tha:t it was his individual debt, yet as the money had
been used to purchase goods for the firm, could not the partners, when the new firm was organized, assume this debt and
bind the firm to pay it? There is nothing to show that the
firm was insolvent at this time. and we suppose it might bind
the firm to pay the individual debt of one of the par-tners. We
do not understand that such an application of the assets, or
such a liability assumed, would be a fra.ud upon par-tnership
credHors, if the firm was eolvent and able to IMtY its othe-r debts
at the time. The learned cireuit court d·i:stinctly charged that,
if the debt was the individual debt of Iver Hage, it must have
been assumed by the partnership S<> as to bE-c{)me a firm liabil·
ity, in order to sustain the mortgage which was subsequently
given. But; that a solvent firm might assume the individual
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debt of one of the partners, and agree to pay it out of the partnership property, and give a valid mortgage on its stock for
that purpose, providing the transaction was free from fraud,
Is clear. So that, if, at the time the new firm was organized,
the debt became the parinership liability by the firm's assuming It anq agreeing to pay it, then the claim stood upon the
same footing as any other firm debt. This is not the language
of the charge but is its meaning, and the sense in wblch the
jury must naturally have understood it. It seems to us the
court was right in this view of the law. There can be no doubt
tha.t the jury were satisfied, from the eviden·ce, that, when
the new firm was organized, this $600 loan was assumed by the
firm and became the partnership debt of Hage Bros.; and it is
not claimed that the firm was insolvent at that time. If the
firm was insolvent, it could not assume the individual debt of
a partner, and secure its payment by a mortgage upon the
partnership property, as such am act would be in fraud of the
partnership creditors, who had the right to be first paid, and
eo the jury were instructed.
As to the $200 which the plaintiff loaned Hage Bros. about
a month before Christmas, in 1885, there can be no qpestion
but that it was a partnership debt. It is argued that, if the
'600 loan had in fact become a partnership debt, the books of
Hage Bros. should have shown a credit for that amount in
favor of the plaintiff, or that a note or some security should
have been given to the plaintiff as evidence of the firm liability.
Correct business methods would doubtless have required some
entry of the transaction upon the books of the firm, b·ut the
business seems to have been done very loosely, the parties
having confidence in each other, and trusting to the oral agreement. It does not appear that there wae an entry made of
the f200 on the firm books, or any note given for it, though,
unquestiona;bly, it was a loan to the firm of Hage Bros. The
court iMtructed the jury that the facts that the booke of Hage
Bros. did not show a credit in favor. of the plaintiff for his
money loaned, and that no note was given nor security taken,
n()r agreement made as to when the money was to be repaid,
were circumstances to be weighed when considering the credibility of the plaintiff's testimony. These were proper matters
to be considered in determining the question as to whether the
debt was a valid partnership liability, or whether the chattel
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mortgage was given fctr any fraudulent purpose. The mortgage was given, as we have said, on the 3d of May, 1886. At
that time the firm CJf Hage Bros. was embarrassed and in failing circumstances. But the mortgage was given by one partner, in the absence of the other partner, to secure an existi~g
firm liability. Could not such a security be given to aecure
an honest bona fide debt, where there was no· inten.t to cover
up property for the benefit of Hage Bros., or to defraud their
other creditors? We suppose the plaintiff bad the right to
take the mortgage and secure himself, even though the other
creditors might suffer by his doing so. One creditor has thtrigbt to induce a failing debtor to pay or secure his debt, and
the fact that this might lessen the ability of the debtor to pa~
other creditors does not necessarily avoid the payment or
invalidate the security. The mortgage was given to secnre
the payment of $910.61, the amount of the firm debt, and the
property mortgaged was not worth much more than that sum.
There is an objection that the property was not sufficiently
described in the mortgage, but we think the objection is not
well taken. The schedule referred to, and attached to the
mortgage, cl~arly identifies and describes the property
embt'3.ced in the instrument. It does describe the articles in
the "show cases" with sufficient fullness to indicate what property was intended to be covered by the mortgage. The mortgage was given by Torger Hage on behalf of the firm, in the
· absence and without the knowledge of the other partner, Ive1·
Hage, who was absent in Dakota. We suppose one pat·t'IH~l·
may, without the consent of his oopartner, being absent, J»ty
a debt or execute a mortgage in the name of the firm upon
partnership property, to secure a firm debt. The power of
each partner to bind the firm fairly extends to such a trans·
acti<m, nnless restricted by the articles of copartnership, and
it does not appear that there was any such restriction on the
power of the partner in this case. It was clearly within the
scope of the implied authority of Torger to execute the mortgage, as much as selling the goods or collecting the debts due
the fit:m. This proposition seems too plain to require discussion. The mortgagee, deeming himself insecure, took ~Pa
sion at onoe of tbe mortgnged property, as he had the right to
do, and employed Torger, as agent or clerk. to sell the goods
and pay over the proceeds to him, to be applied upon the mort-
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gage debt. There is no legal objection to such an arrange·
went. It certainly did not create any secret trust, as counsel
suggests. The plaintiff might employ the mortgagor to sell the
goods for him and pay over the proceeds of all sales made.
The action is for a wrongful conversion of the goods, alleged
in the complaint to be of the value of $1,147.41. The defend·
ant, as sheriff, seized the goods under attachments issued in
favor of the creditors of the firm of Hage Bros. In the answer
the defendant denies that the goods were "of any other or
greater ·value than $917.63." This, fairly c-onstrued, must be
deemed to refer to the mortgaged property mentioned in the
<:omplaint. A point is made that the value of the property
was not proven on the trial. It certainly appears that the
property did not exceed the amount due upon the note and
mortgage, and, in view of the admission in the answer as to
the value, we think ne further proof as to that fact was neces·
sary. The recovery was less than the value stated in the
answer and the· interest thereon, to the commencement of the
action. This disposes of all the material questions. The case
, Reems to have been fairly submitted, under proper instructions
·~\·:.s to the la:w for the guidance of the jury, and the judgment of
I 1he circuit conrt must be affirmed .
'
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GODDARD-PECK GROCERY. CO. vs. McCUNE.

·.

S-upreme Oourl of Mi8souri, 189S.

:.

1i2 Mo. 426, 25 S. W. Rep. 904, 99 L. R. A. 881.

.· \ . ·, • ·· \.'Thta case was certified to the supreme court from •t he St.
,/· . " ' Louis court of appeals for the reason that one of the judges of
that court was of the opinion that the decision filed in that
·o ourt was in conflict with the decision in the case of Sexton vs.
·.· A.nderaon, 95 Mo. 373, 8 B. W . 564. The opinion of the oourt
~·
of appeals is reported in 47 Mo. A pp. 307. The statement of
THoMPSON, J., of said court, is as follows: "John McCune pre..
sented for allowance against the assigned estate of the part·
nersbip firm of Edwards & 'W igginton a promissory note,
~

\.

~

\

.
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made b118Jd ftrm on the ftnrt da1 of July, 1889, for $2,0HOt
payable one day after date, to his order, and bearing interest
from date at the rate of eight per eent per annum. Calvin Wig·
ginton also presented a oote of the same date and tenor for
the sum of $1,926. The assignee allowed both of these notea,
and certain other credit0l"8 of the firm appealed to the circuit
court. The circuit court disallowed the notes, and from its
judgment disallowing the notes in favor of McCune this appeal
ls prosecuted. The case was, by consent of parties, submitted
to the court without a jury, and oo declaration of law was
asked or given. 1lt appeared in eviden·ce that the partne:rship
tlrm of Edwards & 'Wigginton was founded in March, 1889~
and made an assignment for tbe benefit of Its creditors In
July, 1890. The business was a retail grocery store. The
basis of the business wu a stock In trade owned by the appel·
lant, McCune, which McCone sold to~ Edwards in 1887 for
f2,600. When Edwards took Wigginton in aB a partner, in
March, 1889, the stock was invoiced at between $3,300 and
13,400. They were to be equal partners, and the arrangement
was such that Wigginton purchased a half interest in the stock
1n trade and business for $1,626, and then each partner put
into the business in cash the sum of $300. The indebtedness.
of Edwards to McCune was originally evidenced by three
unsecured promissory notes, maturing, respectively, in six,
twelve, and eighteen months from date. Edwards had borrowed other mooey of McCune, and had made such payments
that on the 1st of July, 1889, the indebtedness of Edwards to
McCune stood at $2,000. Xhe $1,926 that Wigginton put into
the firm, as above stated, was entirely borrowed from his
father, Calvin Wigginton. Of this f900 was a note, due one
day after date, and bearing interest at the rate of six per oent
per annum; f500 was a like note, and the rest was not eviden·ced by any note. Thus it was that the interest of each
partner consisted entirely of borrowed capital; that Edwards
still owed this claimant, McCune, $2,000 for his in·terest in the
partnership capital and business; and that Wigginton, for his
interest therein, owed his father $1,926. We proceed oo the
view that what each partner had thus severally borr~wed to
purcha.ee his interest in the business wae an indivJdaal, and
not a pe.rtnership debt. The firm seems to have lost money
almoet from the start, and McCune, becoming uneasy~
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requested Edwards to take ~p the individual notes of Edwards,
held by McCune, with the note of the firm. At the same time
Wigginton, Sr., thought that if McCune was going to have
finn paper for the indi'fidual note of Edwards, he, Wigginton,
oi1ght to have firm paper for what was due him from his son,
as already stated. It was according~y arranged between the
partners, a~d these individual creditors, respectively, that the
two creditors should have firm papers; and on _the first day
of July, 1889, the firm executed its note to McCune in settlement of the individual notes of Edwards, and also its note to
\Vigginton, Sr., in settlement of the individual debt <Jf Wigginton, Jr., t~ him. The testimony leaves no room to doubt
tbalt t'his was done in contemplation of a possible suspension,
and the avowed purpose of it was to put these individua'l creditors, in t'he event of a suspensi~n, on an even footing with firm
creditors. Edwards testified: 'It was this way: I had a
gre&Jt deal of sickness, and had lost on grain I had bought, and
McCune insisted on some plan of securing him. He was willIng to aid us tide over our dimculties, if in any way to make
himself safe,-to take joint note for the firm's note. I spoke
to Wigginton, my partner, about it. He a.t the same time
owed his father a like a.mount, or very near it. He insisted
that he would want to secure his father as well as John
McCune, so we mutually agreed to give them the firm's note for
the amount of each claim. Both of these notes were given at
the same time.' Further on Edwards testified: ~We gave a
firm note, so that, in case of death or failure, they would share
and fare like our other creditors.' On the same poin't the
other partner testified: 'We saw the business was losing
· money; saw no prospect of times getting better, owing to the
competition on each side of us; and we did not care to favor
one person and not others. We wanted to treat everybody
alike.' When the firm failed, some six months later, its liabilities, lncludin.g these notes, footed up to about f5,600. Its
assets were invent~ried at f3,149.95, but the assignet N>-alized
only the sum of '770 from the sale of the entire stock of goods
under order of the court at public auction, and had succeeded
In col1ecting only f70 of the f626 due the firm from Its customers. Of these liabilities about f1,500 were due to merchants
from whom it had bought goods."
Fagg & Ball, for appel1ant.
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ent.
BuRGEss, J. (After stating the facts.) 1. No principle of
law is better settled than that, .in the administration of an
insolvent partnership estate, the assets of the firm must be
applied to the satisfaction of the firm creditors to the exclusion
of the creditors of the individual partners. Hundley VB. Fan·is,
103 Mo. iS, 15 S. W. 312; Bank vs. Brenneisen, 97 Mo. 148, 10 S.
W. 884, and cases cited in each. The principle we think equally
well settled by the more recent decisions of this court, as well as
by the weight of judicial authority in 'O'ther jurisdicUons, that
the assets of an insolvent firm, before dissolution, may, with the
consent of all the partners, be applied to the sa.tisfaction of all
the individual debts of the members of the firm, when done in
good faith. 8eztM vs. Anderson, 95 Mo. 380, 8 S. W. 564; Rey. bum vs. Mitchell, 106 Mo. 365, 16 S. W. 592, and cases cited in
each; Beger VB. Thomas, 107 Mo. 635, 18 S. W. 33. As Ph-elps vs.
JfcNeely, 66 Mo. 555,27 Am. Rep. _398,is in conflict with the cases
last cited a.nd the great weight of authority, it should not be
folJowed, amd is overruled. Jonea vs. Lusk; 2 Mete. (Ky.) 356;
Oeorge vs. Wam8ley, 64 Iowa 175, 20 N. _W. 1; Schaeffer vs.
l<'i.thian, 17 Ind. 463; Kirby vs. Schoonmaker, 3 Barb. Cb. 46, 49
Am. Dec. 160; Kennedy VB. Bank, 23 Hun, 494; In re Kahley, 2
Biss. 383, Fed. Cas. No. 7,593; Warren VB. Fa.rmm-, 100 Ind. 5!Jj;
Trentman t>B. Swartzell, 85 Ind. 443; Case vs. Bwuregard, 99 U.
S. 119; P-urple vs. Farrington, 119 Ind. 16t, 21 N. E. 543; Pepper vs. Peck, 17 R. I. 55, 20 Atl. 16; Anderson vs. Norton, 15 Lea
14; Huiskamp vs. Wagon Co., 121 U.S. 310, 7 Sup. Ot. 899; Cotfinvs. Day, 34 Fed. 687. In the case at bar the firm notes were
given in satisfaction (Jf Individual debts long prior to the dissolution of the partnership, and that t-ransaction cannot be
declnTed fraudulent at law on the ground simply that the firm
was at the time insolvent, OT was made so by the a:ct of making
these notes.
2. If the partners composing the firm of Edwards & Wigginton had by agreement, in gOQd faith, mortgaged ~r assign('d all
the assets of the firm, for the purpose of securing or paying the
de-bts owing by them individually to McCune and Wigginton,
respectively, though with the intention of giving them a preferen.ce (lvP.r the firm creditors, t·he transaction could · not be

1
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impeached. If, on the other band, they had given these individ·
ua.l creditora a mortgage on the firm property, and to secure
their individual debts, with the understanding that they should
continue in possession of the property, and sell and dispose of
it in the usual oourse of business, the mortgage woold have
been fraudulent and void as ro the oth~ creditors. The object
in giving these notes in the name of the firm to McCune and
Wigginton w·a s not to give them a preference over the partnership creditors, but was to put them all on an equal footing,
eo that they might share alike in the distributioo of the firin's
aaeets 1n case of the firm's assignment. So long as a firm
exists, it has the same right to dilitpose of the firm assets that an
Individual has of his own property, providing always that such
disposition is bona fidej but, if no lien has been created by it
on its firm assets, and the firm 8.88igns, as in the case at bar.
then the firm creditors must be first paid. That the debts of
McCune and Wigginton, w·hen first created, were the individunl
debts of the members of the firm of McCone & Wigginton,
teems clear. ''Where there is a separate loan of money to one
of several joint adventure:rs for the purpose of founding a part·
oership or joint adventure, the firm, when formed, will not be
lla.hle for the e.dvance, for the case is not distinguisha;ble
from one where several persons are to contribute their
separate proportions nf money towards a common fund
for joint purposes, and each is to borrow and does bor·
row hie own share upon his own aeparalte aooount and
credit. In short, in all cases of this eort, in order to bind the
firm, the intended partner must either have bad an original
authority to purchase goods or borrow money upon the joint
aocoun·t , and have exercised that authority by a purchase or
loen on their account ; and not on his own exclu·
sive credit, or the transaction must have been subsequently ratified and adopted by the fil'm as one for
which they were originally liable, or for which they now
elect to give their joint security." Story, Partn. § 148. See,
also, Dcmally va. Ryan, 41 Pa. St. 306; Wild t'B. Erath, 21 L<l.
Ann. 17~. The doctrine that firm assets must be first appplied
to the payment of the firm's debts is a principle of administra·
tion adopted by the courts when from any cause they are called
upon to wind up tbe firm business, and find that the members
i .. tve made no disposition. or charge up()n its assets. This is
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accomplished by marshalling the a&&ets, by applying the partnership property to the partnership debts. The right gf the
ftrm credit<>rs "is worked out through the partners," tbe mean·
lng of which is th-at they may demand t·he primary application
of the firm aS>Sets t6 the payment of tooir debta. Schmidlapp vs.
Currie, 55 Miss. 597, 30 Am. Rep. 530. As the right of the firm
creditors ie "worked out through the partners," it D€'(>
eBSarily follows that whatever the firm, with the conseDJt of all its members, does in good faith with
the partnership property, is binding upon them. If, then,
the firm bad the right to assume, by and with the oonaent of .
•both of its members, the individual debts due by them respectively to McCune and Wigginton, when this wu done, and they
gave the fi~m notes, and thereby assumed their payment, they
became firm debts, and should share pro rata in the distribution of the proceeds arising from the sa.le of the partnership
assets with the other finn creditors. This is sa.id to be the conversion C1f debts, so that, if they were separate debts of therespective partners, they become, by the oon8e'Dt of the memberaof
the firm, the joint debts of all the partners, and will thereafter
be treated as such. Story, Partn. §§ 368, 369; Ea: parte Peele, 6
Ves. 601; E:r parte Jackson, 1 Ves. Jr. 131; Siegel vB. ChidSctJ, 28
Pa. St. 279. That the firm had the rig'h.t to assume the individual debts of its members and thereby convert them into debts
of the firm, in the absence of fraud,,and that the i·ndividual
indebtedness was sufficient oonsideration for such promise by
the .firm, the authorities abundantly show. Siegel VB. Chidsey,
BUpra; Casevs. Ellis (Ind. App.) 30 N. E. 907. From these con·
sidera.tione we are of the opinion the judgment of the court of
appeals should be reversed, and the cause remanded to that
court, with directions to reverse the ju¢gment of the circuit
court, and remand the cause for a new trial in conformity with
the opinion of this oout1. It is ao ordered.
All concur.
NOTB: See Meohem'a Elem. ot PartD., § 288, and cues there cited.
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Bill by Jackson Bank against R. W. Durfey and others to
set aside two deeds of trust. There was a decree for defendants and plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

Nugent & Me Willie for appellant.
E. E. _Baldwin and Williamson & Potter, for appellees.
CooPER, C. J. The appellant, a firm creditor of the appel- ,
lees, Durfey & Ascher, exhibited its bill in chancery, seeking
to annul as fraudulent two ~ertain deeds of trust whereby the
firm assets were incumbered to secure the individual debts of
the partners. The evidence, fairly construed, discloses these
facts: Durfey, one of the partners, was indebted to the defendant Caldwell in the sum of S5,000, and Ascher, the other partner, was indebted to Hart in the sum of 85,550. The firm and
the indidduals composing it were insolvent. On October 3d,
Durfey executed a deed of trust on all propertY owned by him
individually and upon his individual half interest in certain
property, specifically described, owned by the firm, to securethe debt due by him to Caldwell. On the same dHy Ascher
executed a deed of trust conveying his individual property and
his individual half interest in certain property specifically
described, owned by the firm, to secure the debt due by him to
Hart. The book accounts, and certain horses which had been
bought for resale, were not included in the conveyance; but
the stock kept in livery, the carriages, feed, and other appurtenances, were all incumbered. Forfeiture of both conveyances
was fixed for the same debt, -January 1st following, -at
which time, the secured debts remaining unpaid, the trustees.
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\vere authorized and directed to make sale of the mortgaged
property, and out of its proceeds to pay the secured debts. The
mem bors of the firm testified that they expected, by the collection of tbe outstanding book accounts, by the ~le of the stock
not iucluded in the deeds, and from the profits of the business,
to pay the finn debts; but a careful consideration of the evideucH ~ntb.fies us that at the time the deeds were executed the
finn and its members were hopelessly insolvent, and that no
expectation could reasonably have been ent~rtained that the
firm debts could be paid after the firm property had been deYoted to the individual debts of the partners. What followed
the execution of the deeds was at best the struggle of men hoping against hope, and postponing for a short time the ineYita.ble
end.
The issue is thus sharply presented whether it is lawful for
the members of an insolvent firm to convert the joint estate to
the individual debts of its members, leaving the firm debts unpaid. The question bas never, so far as we are advised, been
before the court, though expressions may be found, suggestive
of the inclination of some of the judges who have been members of tbe court, that the dominion of the partners over firm
property is not limited by the existence of firm debts and the
insolvency of the firm. In Schm£dlapp vs. Currie, 55 Miss.
. 5!J7,-a ca:-e of a solvent firm,-Judge Chalmers, while carefully limiting the decision to the question involved ( i. e. the
right of a solvent firm to devote firm assets to the payment of
the debts of one of the members), cites with ~pparent approval
the ca!-5cs of Rice vs. Barrw.1·d, :W Vt. 479; Bank vs. Sprague,
20 N._J. Eq. 14;-Allen vs. Center Valley Co., 21 Conn. 130;
autl Sigler ·vs. Bank, 8 Ohio St. 511,-which clearly hold that
an insolvent firm may devote firm assets to the debts of its in·
dividual members; and also Whitton vs. Smith, Freem. Ch.
(l\Ii~s.) 231; Freeman vs. Stewart, 41 Miss. 139; Carter vs.
Beaman, 6 Jones ( N. C.) 4-!; Ex parte Ruffin, 6 V es. 119;
and Campbell vs. 11/ullett, 2 Swanst. Ch. 550, -which are
sometimes cited as supporting the same view.
In Bank vs. Klein, 64: :Miss. 141, 8 South. 208, it was sought
by the creditors of a banking firm to subject to their demands
tho proceeds of certain life policie~ upon the life of one of the
members in favor of his wife, the premiums on which the bill
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· averred had been paid with firm money while the bank was insolvent. The answer denied the insolvency of the firm at the
time the premiums were paid, and there was no evidence on the
point. The case was decided on this point. Judge Arnold,
however, in delivering the opinion of the court, gave expression
to an emphatic dictum, that the insolvency of the firm and its
members would not have changed the result. In addition to
the cases citecl by Judge Chalmers in Schrnidlapp vs. Currie,
he referred to the ca~:=es of Case vs. Beaw·egard, 99 U. S. 119,
and Rooch vs. Brannen, 57 Miss. 490. In neither Whitton vs.
Sm1"th, Freem. Ch. (Miss.) 231; Freeman vs. Stewart, 41
Miss. 130; Rooch v s. Bran11en, 57 Miss. 490; Schmidlapp vs.
Currie, 55 Miss. 5~17; nor Bank vs. Klein, supra,-wa.s the
question now involved presented for decb:ion. In all of these
the nature of the rights of partner~hip creditors to resort to firm
assets for the satisfaction of their demands was considered, and
the dcciRions in the cases in which the point was involved show
that the right, being a derivative one, and resting on the rights
of the partners, bad been lost by the waiver of the partners,
under the circumstances of the particular cases. The question
involved is res nova in this state, and we deal with it as such.
The authorities, with practical uniformity, agree that the
right of partnership creditors to have the p!lrtnership property
applied to the payment of partnership debts is a derivative one,
resting upon the equities of the partners as between each other.
The · conflict of decision arises with the question whether the
partners may, by convention, waive their rights, and convert
the joint estate into severalty, thus subjecting it to the debts of
the individual members, or, by direct appropriation, apply the
joint estatEl to such rlebts. It is quite generally held that this
may be done so long as the partnership is Aolvent, and a going
concern. Some courts seem to hold. that if the partnership,
though insolvent, is yet engaged in the prosecution of its business, it may thus deal with the partnership estate; and others,
that thiR may be done even though the .partnership is insolvent,
contemplates dissolution, and converts the joint into separate
estate8 for the purpose of applying it to the individual debts of .
ita member~; .
In Case vs. Bea·w~ega,-d, fl!) U. S. 11 !J, the insolvent members of au insolvent firm hau applied all the partnership prop-
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erty to the payment of their respective individual debts. Th&
firm creditors sought to subject it to their demands, but relief
was denied upon the ground that the right of firm creditors was
a derivative one, and could not be enforced except so long as
the partners themselves retained their liens upon the property.
Speaking on the precise point, the court said: "The bill, it is
true, charges that the several transfers of the partners were
illegal and fraudulent, without specifying wherein the fraud
consisted. .The charge seems to be only a legal conclusion from
the fact that some of the transfers were made for the payment
of the private debts of the assignors. Conceding such to have
been the case, it was a fraud upon the other partners, if a fraud
at all, rather than upon the joint creditors; a fraud which those
partners could waive, and which was subsequently waived by
the act of fusion."
The clear effect of this decision is that it is not a fraud upon
partnership creditors ~or an insElvent firm to devote the joint
estate to the payment of the separate debts of the partners,
leaving no proviHion for the firm creditors. In no other case
we have seen has the question been presented where the con·
version of the whole assets into separate e~tates or the devotion
of all of them to individual debts was involved. The reasoning
of other courts, however, in the following ca8es, would seem to
c.onduct to the same conclusion as that reached in Case vs.
Beauregard: Sigler vs. Bank, 8 Ohio St. 611; Rice vs.
Barnard, 20 Vt. 479; Allen vs. Center Valley Co., 21 Conn.
130; Winslow vs. Wallace, 116 Ind. 324, 17 N ~ E. 92:3; Purple vs. Farrington (Ind. Sup. ) 21 N. E. 543; Fletcher vs.
Sharpe (Lanier vs. Wallace; Ind. Sup.) 17 N. E. 923. See,
also, other cases, probably holding to the same effect, cited in
notes to section 560, 1 Bates, Partn.
But the decided weight of authority is that, while the right
of firm creditors to go against the firm property in postponement of the right of creditors of the individual members is a
derivative right, and rests on the right of the members of the
firm, and while that right is lost by the bona fide waiver of
their rights by the partners, it is not lawful for the members of the
firm, in contemplation of insolvency, to divert the firm property,
and apply it to the payment of the debts of the individual members, or to convert the joint estate into estates in severalty, to
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prevent its being seized by firm creditors. Ex parte ofayou,
4 De Gex. J. & S. 664; Ex parte Snowball, 7 App. Cas. 534;
Cron vs. Cron's Estate, 56 Mich. 8, 22 N. W. 94-; Cribb vs.
},forse, 77 Wis. :l22, 46 N. W. 126; Willis vs. Bumner, 60
Wis. 622, 19 N. W. 403; Menagh vs. Whitwell, 52 N.Y. 146;
Phelps 1'8. },fcNeely, 66 Mo. 554; Reyburn vs. Mitchell, 106
Mo. :w5, 16 S. W. 59:l; Roop vs. Het-ron, 15 Neb. 73, 17 N.
W. :J;):J; .•-11·nold vs. Haget·man, 45 N.J. Eq. 186, 17 Atl. 93;

Darby vs. Gilligan, 33 W. Va. 246, 10 S. E. 400; Shackeljo1·d vs. Shackelford, 32 GrRt. 503; Bank vs. Sprague, 21 N.
J. Eq. 530; French vs. Lovejoy, 12 N. H. 458; Flack vs.
Chm-ron, 29 Md. 311; Clmi~ents vs. Je/lsup, 36 N.J. Eq. 569;
Elliott vs. Stevens, 38 N. H. 311; Gallagher's Appeal, 114
Pa. St. 353, 7 Atl. 237; Patterson vs. Seaton, 70 Iowa 689, 28
N. W. 598; J. Para. Partn. § 196; Bates, Partn. § 56!.J; Jones,
Mortg. §§ 1~-23; BeRch, Mod. Eq. §§ 707, 788; Hare &. W.
note to Silk v.'l. Prime, 2 White & T. Lead. Cas. Eq. pt. 1, 353.
The principle contro11ing in these cases is stated with precision
by Judge Dixon, delivering the opinion of the court in Arnold
vs. Hagerman, 45 N.J. Eq. 186, 17 Atl. 93. We quote from
that opinion at large, as we adopt and affirm the reasoning of
the court: "II) equity, a partnership is for some purposes
deemed a single entity. Thus, when partnership property invested in the business of a partnership is to be applied by a
court of equity to the payment of debts, that property is treated
as belonging, not to the persons composing the firm, but to a
distinct debtor, the partnership, and it is used first to liquidate
the debts, and only the surplus, if any, is surrendered to the
indi-vidual partners. This equitable practice rests upon the
presumed intentions of the partners themselves, and hence is
primarily considered as their equitable right against each other.
Conf';('quently, since the decision of Lor<l Eldon in Ex parte
Ru.tfin, 6 V es. 11 !l, it has been generally held that the partners
could put an end to their right, and that if, by their agreement,
the partnership is dissolved, and its property is assigned to one
of their members or to a stranger, as his own, without reservation of the right, the right to have partne11:1hip debts paid out of
that property is extinct.''
·
"Growing out of this right of partners, has arisen a corresponding equity in partnership creditors to have their debts
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first satisfied out of the firm property, which is now deemed a
substantial element of their demands. Generally, it may be
said ihat t.his equity of Cl"{'ditors continues only so long as the
right of the partners against each other subSists, and perishes
when that terminates; but this is not universally true, for this
equity may survive the right to which it is ordinarily attached.
In thia respect it resembles the claim which the general creditors of an ipdividual have upon his property. It is neither an
estate nor a lien. It is ordinarily but a right, by lawful procedure, to acquire a lien during the ownership of the debtor.
Yet, under certain circumstances, that lien may be acquired

after the debtor's ownership has ended. This results from the
provisions of the ancient statute for the prevention of frauds
and perjuries, by force of which, when a person has aliened his
property, with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors,
the rights of those creditors remain as if no alienation had
taken place, except against the claims of bona fide purchasers,
for good consideration, without notice."
"Equity applies this statute to a partnership, its property and
. creditors, just as it would in the case of an individual; and
therefore, while it is generally t.rue that a partnership may
defeat the equity of its creditors by the alienation of its property,
and subsequent extinguishment of the right of its partners
inter sese, yet, if the alienation be effected with intent to binder,
delay, or defraud the firm creditors by defeating their equity,
the claims of creditors will be unimpaired, and the property
will be treated as partuer8hip assets, unless it shall have passed
into the hands of those whom the statute protects." In
Clements vs. Jessup, 36 N. J. Eq. 569, it was said: "Partnership creditors, in equity, have an inherent priority of claim
upon partnership property over individual creditors, and a
transfer of partnership property by one partner, with the consent of the other partners, or by all of the partners, to pay indi·
vidual de ut~, is fraudulent and void as to firm creditors, unless ·
the firm was then solvent, and had sufficient property remaining to pay the partnership debts."
The recognition of this equity in favor of firm creditors does
not impair any proper exercise of the power of the partnership
over its property or affairs, nor bring within the control of a
court of equity all partnerships which are insolvent in fact, or
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in a condition of temporary inability to meet their obligations.
The apprehension of this result seems to have been influential
in leading the court, in Sigler vs. Bank, 8 Ohio St. 511, to
a(]opt the opposing view. But the statute against fraudulent
conveyances does not operate to control the lawful dominion of
individ~als, though insolvent, over their property; nor does
mere insolvency confer jurisdiction upon equity to take charge
of and administer their estates. And yet it cannot be denied
that the statute does restrain the insolvent from disposing of his
estate for the purpose of withdrawing it from liability to his
creditors. Why should a different rule be applied to an aggregation of individualR than to them separately? The inquiry
must in either case be whether the purpose and effect of the act
is lawful, and it may be done by the individual or by a firm; if
unlawful the act is egually void, as to the creditors injured,
whether it be done by the one or the other.
But, it is again said that it c~nnot be a fraud for one to devote whatever right or property he has to the payment of an
honest debt. This is true if one devotes his own property to
his own debts; but is it not a. fraud in law if A. appropriates
his property to pay B's debt, leaving his own unpaid? Take
the case at bar. Durfey & Ascher appropriated one half of
their joint estate to pay Ascher'R debt. Now, if this was all
that had been done, it would be manifest that the creditors of
Durfey could treat the conveyance as fraudulent, because it
would have been a clear donation by Durfey to the creditors of
Ascher, at the expense of his creditors, he being insolvent. But
it is said that Ascher at the same time conveyed his interest in
the other half of the joint estate to the .c reditors of Durfey, and
so each conveyance became a consideration of the other, and
each partner received a full consideration for his relense of his
right as a partner. The reply is that a full consideration does
not make a contrad otherwise unlawful valid. If A. agrees
to do one unlawful act if B. will do another, of what avail is it
that each should reap a benefit from .such an act of the other?
Durfey had a right to have the partnership property applied to
the partnership debts, and Ascher had a like right. While
these reciprocal rights existed, they were of value as property
rights of the debtors to a certain class of creditors; i. e. firm
creditors. Now, it is manifest that for the very satisfaction of
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their demands the rights themselves are waived, and attempted
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to be obliterated.
We are unable to perceive any just principle upon which the
right of a debtor can be recognized to thus deal with his estate
for the very purpose of obstructing his creditors. It .is to be
noted, also, that neither partner could make a cent by the tt·ansaction. Five thousand dollars' worth of property will pay only
•5,000 of debts, whether its proceeds be applied to partnership
or individual liabilities. The partners would, in either event,
after the payment of debts of either class, owe precisely the.
same sums. To permit the consummation of the scheme would
be of no benefit to them. Its sole effect would be to withdraw
the property from one class of creditors who had created the
joint estate, bad given credit on the faith of it, and had a right
to resort to it, and to permit its appropriation to another ~lass,
who dealt with the individuals composing the firm, with a full
.X knowledge that all they could ge~ out of the partnership assettJ
: •
was what remained after payment of the debts. The complain·
1
\l-· ·.," ·a nt is entitled to the relief prayed by its bill. The decree is re,}·· "-'" .. v.ersed, and cause remanded.
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4 B. Monroe (Ky.) 488, 41 Am. Dec. 241.

·· ...: Error to the Woodford circuit.
'
-:' ~ · Judge BRECK delivered the opinion of the court.
.} · . .. ·
William Oldham and John Mitchum, in 1833, made a joint
' _. · ·· . ··' purcha~e of a lot, in the town of Versailles, with a steam mill
., ' , .• '
and cotton factory thereon, and engaged as partners, under the
firm and style of Oldham & Mitchum, in the manufacture of
flour and meal and cotton yarns. Mitchum, for large advance.
ments alleged to have been made, for and on account of the
partnership, and in t'he purchase of the property, claims a prior
lien upol) it, over the, mortgagees and at.taching creditors of Old·
ham for his individual liabilities. The validity of the claim
·

\-~
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thus set up by Mitchum constitutes the important question for
determination.
'fhe facts as to the advancements by Mitchum, for the fir.m,
in the prosecution of the partnership business, and in t.h e purchase of the property in contest, and also as to the validity of
the claims, as against Oldham individually, asserted by his
mortgagees and attaching creditors, having been agreed by the
·parties, the next inquiry is whether the property belonged to
the firm as partnership property?
The proof is that it was a joint purchase of the property,
each paying an equal proportion of the purchase money, except
as to about $GOO of Oldham's half, for which be and Mitchum
gave their notes, the latter as security, and which were subsequently paid, in part, by the firm, and the residue by Mitchum.
The conveyance was made to them jointly. Mitchum a~leges
that the property was joint stock property, and belonged to
the firm of Oldham & Mitchum. This allegation is not deuie4
by the adverse claimant. The fact is agreed, on the part of the
mortgagees, that at the date of tlie mortgage they knew the
property was used as joint property of the firm of Oldham &
Mitchum.
In view of all the facts arid circumstances, w·ithout farther
inquiry, we think it may be assumed that the property was
purchased with a view to constitute it joint stock of the firm,
and that it was so considered, treated and held.
Regarding it as such, has Mitchum a prior lien upon it to be
reimbursed for his advancements before the mortgagees and
individual creditors of Oldham can come in? The question, we
apprehend, has not been decided by this Court, and so far as it
depends upon a concurrance of authority elsewhere may be regarded as unsettled.
That one partner has an equitable right to have his owu
clailllB upon the firm, for advancement and also all the firm
debts, discharged out of the personal estate of the firm, before
the assignee or separate creditor of tb~ other partner can come
in, has long been recognized as the settled law. But whether
this equitable rule should be applied to the real estate of partners, is a question upon which there have been conflicting opinions and decisions, both in England and this country. Of eminent English chancellors Lord Thurlow has been on one side
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and Lord Eldon upon the other of this vexed question. The
former is reported at first to have said, in the case of Thornton
vs. Dixon, (:3 Br. Ch. Rep. 198) "he had always understood
that when partners bought lands for the purp08e of a partnership concern it was to be considered as part of the partnership
fund," and that consequently the real estate in that case must
be considered as personal estate, and distributable as such.
Upon reargument, however, his lordship changed his opinion:
The contest in that case was in reference to land upon which
mills had ~been erected for partnership purposes, the partners
being paper makers. The property was used in the business of
the concern, and was, therefore, like the one under consideration,
a very strong case in favor of the principle of regarding the property as personal estate. The question in the case referred to
arose between the surviving partners and the representatives of
a cleeeased partner. Balm.m·n vs. Shm·e, 9 Vesey, Jr. 500,
and other English cases might be cited based upon the opinion
of Lord Thurlow in Thm·nton vs. Dixon.
Lord E ldon is reported to have entertained a different opinion
and to have said, in the case of Selrig vs. Davies, 2 Dow 242,
"that all propet·ty involved in a partnership concern ought to
be considered as personal," and afterwards, in the case of
7'otcus, et. al., vs. Devines, et. al., reported in appendix to
Mont~gue on Partnership, so decided-vide note to the case of
Thornton vs. Dixon and the authorities there referred to.
This subject is also very fully ~xamined by Gow on Partnership, 47-52, and the opinions and decisiong of English and
American jurists referred to. Also by .Chancellor Kent (3
Kent's Commentaries, 37-45). •
In America, the decisions upon the question have also been
conflicting.
In New York, in Coles vs. Coles (15 John. 159)-and the
same principle has been recognized in other cases-it was decided that the rules and principles which govern and regulate
the dispORition of partnership property, did not apply to real
estate, and in the absence of special agreements between the
parties, real estate owned by partners was to be considered and
treated as such, without any reference to the partnership. A
more qualified view of the subject has been taken by the judiciRry of Virginia and Pennsylvania (in Ford vs. Heron, Hen.
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and Mun. 316; Serg't and Rawl. 438). In South Carolina and
Connecticut real estate owned by partners is considered and
treated as personal estate: Winslow vs. Ohiffele, Harper's
Equity Reports 19; Sigourney vs. Munn, 4 McCord 51~; 7
Connecticut Reports 11.
The only plausible reaRon which we have anywhere seen advanced, for the distinction taken between the real and personal
estate of partners, is that as to real estate the attention of the
purchaser is directed to the record, which is presumed to furnish correct information as to title. But not so as to personal
estate, the title and right to which are presumed to be with the
possession.
We will not undertake to decide that cases may not occur in
which the reason assigned in favor of a bona fide purchaser,
without notice, would not be entitled to weighty and controlling consideration. But we are of opinion this case is not of_
that character-the property in contest was used in the business of the firm- the partnership was constituted for the very
purpose and object of using it. That it was in the possession
and used as the joint property of the firm, was known to the
mortgagees before they obtained their mortgage from ·O ldham.
In view of the whole case, we are of opinion that the property
in contest should be treated as personal estate and be first subjected to the payment of the claim of Mitchum, and such being
the decree of the Court below, it is therefore affirmed.
NOTE. -Bee

Mechem's Elements of Partn., § 278.
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7 Ohio St. 180.

The or1gin11l proceeding was a petition for an order of distribution Of the St>parate or individual assets of
insolvent
debtor, ·a s between separate and partnership ored-itors.
It :lippears from the record, that about the 13th of June.
1854, Peter Munay, an insolvent debtor, made an assignment
of alibis estate, t•eal and perBOnal, to the plaintiff, in trugt foT
the pa~· ment of his individual creditors, in proportioo to the
Amount of their respective demands. Though possessed of a
large and valuable estate, it had been found insufficient to pay
his scpara te debts and liabilities, in full. At the date of his
failure Mld assignment, he was a partner with John W. Dever,
in a mercantile firm. under the name and style of Dever &
Murray; whioh firm 'had also beoome insolvent, and likewise
Dever; and the firm bad made an assignment of the partnership propertv and a sser~, aboct the same time, to John .Mernnda, one or tne defendants, in trust for the paymen t of the
joint debts or liabilities of the firm.
ln this condition of affairs, the parlnership creditors,
although they had filed thei r claims with the aBSignee ot'the
firm for thei1· distJ·ibutive shares out of the partnership prop('rty, claimed the right to be admitted to a participation in tb&.
dividends of the separate estate of Murray, pan passzt with
his individual creditOTs; while the la·tter denied the right, and
insisted that his separate estate shall be applied to the srttisfaclion of his individual debts in preference to hj-s partnership
debts.
It appeared further, that Murray, besides advancing his part
of the capital of the firm, also loaned money to the fitw to a
large amount, for which he held the obligation of t he firm,
Which obligation, by the assignment of Murray, came i.nto
the hands of the plaintiff, who present ed the aame to t he
assignee of the firm, and claimed to have the same paid out of
the ~ets of the firm, pari passu with the other pactnet-ship
debts. The other creditors resisted this, and plaintiff asked a.n
order of distribution to t hat effect out of part:aersh.ip assets.

an

~..,

.....'P---:

Booous vs. ?.ba.umA...

681

Defendant11 demurred to the petition. The court below BU&taint>d the demurrer, and gave judgment in favor of the defend·
ants. And 'this petition in error is filed to review and reverie
that judgment.
W. White and S. c£ R. Mason, for plaintitl'.
Anthony c£ Goode, for defendant Meranda.

Conover" Craighead, for defendants Tracy, Irwin & Co.
C. J. Two questions are presented for determm.
tion in this case. 1. The first is, whether in the distribution of
the assets of in80lvent partners, where there are bm.h indt·
vidual and partner.ship assets, the individual creditors of a
partner are entitled to be first paid out of the individual effects
of their debtor, before the partnership creditors are entitled to
any di!rtribution therefrom. It is well settled that, in the distribution of the assets of insolvent partners, the partnership
oreditors are entitled to a priority in the partnership ~1fects;
so that the partnership debts must be settled before auy division of the partnership funds can be made among the individual creditors of the several partners. This i~ incidenrt to
the nature of partnership property. It Is the right of a part·
ner to have the partnership property applied to the purposes
of the firm; and the separate intterest of eaoh partMr in the
partnership property is 'h is share of the surplus after the payment of the partnership debts. And this rule, whioh gives the
partnership credit()rs a preference in the partnership effC'Cts,
would seem to produce, in equity, a coiTesponding and correlative rule, giving a preference to the individual creditors of
a partner in his separate property; so that partnership credito.rs can, in equity,, only look to the surplus of the separate prop·
erty of a partner, after the payment of his individual debts;
and, on the other band, the individual creditors of a partner
can~ in like manner, only claim distribution from the debtor's
interest in the surplus of the joint ,fund, after the satisfaotio~
of the partn~hip creditors. The correctness of tllis rule, 'however, has been much controverted; and there bas not been
always a perfect concurrence in the reasons assigned for it
by those oou.rts which have adhered to it. By some, it ha.s been
said to be an arbitrary rule, established from considerations
of convenience; by others, that it rests on the basis that a
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{>rimary llablllty attaches to the fund on which the credit was
given~that

in contracts with a partnership, credit is given on
the supposed responsibility of the firm; while in contt-act.\1 with
a partner as an individual, reliance is supposed to be placed on
his separate responsibility: 3 Kent Com. tiu .•\.ud agnin, others
have assigned as a reason for the rule that the joiu t ~tate is
supposed to be benefited to the extent of every credit which is
given to the firm, and that the S('parate estate is, in lil.c manner,
pt·esumed to be enlarged by the debts contract-ed by the iudivid·
ual pa1·lnei•; and that there is consequently a clear equity in
t:onfining the creditors, as to preferences, to each eS'tate t•espeot·
, ively, which ha.g been thus benefited by thei 1· transactions;
McCulloh vs. DashieU, 1 Harr. & Gill (1\Jd.) 96, 18 Am. Dec. 271.
But these reasons are not entirely satisfactol'y. So important a
t•ule must have a better foundation to stnnd upon than mere
considcrotions of convenience; and practically it is undenia·
ble that those who give credit to a partnership look to the indi·
vidual· responsibility of t·he partners, as well as that of the
firm; and also, those who contract with a partner in lJis eep·
a1·ateo capacity, place reliance on his vnrious resources or
means, wheth('r individual or j{)int. And inasmuch as indi·
vidual debts are often contracted to raise means which are put
into the business of a partnership, and also partnership effects
often withdrawn from tbe firm and appropriated to the sepa·
mte use of the partners, it cannot be practically true that the
s t·pat·ate estate bas been benefited to the extent of every credit
giv<>n to each individual partner, nor that the joint estate baa
t•etuined from the separate estate of each partner the benefit
of every credit given to the firm. Unsatisfactory reasons may
weaken confidence in a rule whlch is well founded.
What then is the true foundation of the rule whioh gives
the individual creditor a preference over the pa.l't.nership cred·
ito1·, in the distribution of the separate estate of a partner?
'l'o say that it is a rule of general equity, as bas been somelimes said, is not a satisfactory solution of the difficulty; for
the very question is, whether it be a rule of equiiy or not. In
the d istribution of the assets of insoln'nts, equality is equity;
an d to say that the rule which gives the individual creditor a.
pt·eference over the pru-tneJ·ship creditor in the sepat·ate estate
C1f a partner is a rule of equality, does not still rid the subject
ot diffir.ulty. For leaving the rule to stand, which gives the
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preference to the joint creditors in the partnership property,
and perfect equality between the joint and individual creditors,
is, perhaps, rarely .attainable. That it. is, however, more equal
and just, as a general rule, than any other which can be devised,
oonsis1:ently with the pt•eference to the partnership creditors In
the joinct estate. cannot be successfully controverted. It originated as a consequence of the rule of priority of partnership
creditors in the joint estate, and for the purposes of justice,
became necessary as a correlative rule. With whatt semblance
of equity could one class of creditors, in preference to tbe rest,
be exclusively entitled to the .partnership fund, and, concurrently with the rest, entitled to the separate estate of each part.
ner? The joint creditors are no more meritorious than the separate creditors; a.nd it frequently happens, that the sepa·r ate
debts are contracted to ra.ise means to carry on the partnership
bU:S.iness. Independent of this rule, the joint creditors have,oas a
general thing, a great advantage over the separate creditors.
Besides being exclusively entitled to the partnership fund, they
take their distributive share in the surplus of the separate
estate of each of th.e several pa1'tners, after the payment of the
scpal'ate creditors of each. It is a rule of equity, that where
one creditor is in a situation to have two or more distinct secur- ,
ities or funds to rely on, the oourt will not allow him, neglect- ·,
in~ his other funds, to attach himself to one of the funds to the }
prejudice of those who have a claim upon that, and no oth~r to ·
de~nd on. And besides the advantage which the joint credit-.
ors have, arising from the fact that the partnership fund is
usually much the larg(•st, as men in trade, in a great majority
of eases, embark their all, or the chief part of their property, in
it; and besides their distributive rights in the surplus of the
separate estate of the other partners, the joint creditors have a
degl'ee of security for their debts and facilities for reoovenng
them, which the separate creditors have not; t'hey can sell both
the joint and the separate estate on an execution, while the
separate creditor can sell ·only the separate property and tbe
interest in the joint effects that may remain to the partners.
after the acoounts of the debts and effects of the firm are taken.
as between tt:.e firm and its creditors, and also as between the partners themselves. With all these advnntages in favor of partnership creditors, it would be grossly inequitable to allow them the exclusive benefit of the joint fund,

I
I
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and then a concurrent right with individual creditors to an
·equal di"stribution in the separate estate of each partner.
'Wh-at equality and justice is there in allowing partnership
credi-tors, who -h ave been paid eighty per cent on their debts,
out of the joint fund, to come in pari pa88U with the individual
creditors of one of the partners, whose separalt:e property will
not pay twenty per cent to his separate creditors? How oould
that Pe said to be an equal distribution of the assets of insolv·
ents among their creditors? It is true that an occasional case
may arise where the joint effects are proportionably less than
the separate assets of an insolvent partner. But, as a general
tiling, a very decided advantage is given to the p-artnership
creditors, notwithstanding this preference of the individual
creditors in the sep-arate property. And that advantage, arising
out of the nature of a partnership contract, is unavoid-able.
Some general rule is necessary; and that mu!Jt rest on the basis
of the unalterable preference of the partnership creditors in the
joint effects, and their further right to some claim in the separaJte property of each of the several w.rtners. The preference,
therefore, of the individual creditors of a partner in the distribution of his separate estate, results, as a principle of equity,
from fhe preference ef partnership creditol'B in the partner&bip
fundcs, and their advantages ion having different funds to resol't
to, while the individual creditors have but the one.
It ·baB been argued that partnership contracts are 1everal
as well as joint, and consequently have an equal legal
·right with separate creditors upon the individual property of a. partner. But the right of partnership creditors
against the separate property of individual plrtners _ in
proceedings at la-ze, is not in controversy. The question
·h ere relates to the relative eq-uitable riglds of two classes
of creditors in the distribution of the estates of insolvents. Much of tbe coll'fusion upon this subject has probably arisen from confounding the abstract rights of creditors in
proceedings a1 law, with their relative rights to an equitable
adjustment in marshalling the assets of insolventS in chancery.
The rule here adopted appea·ra to h-ave been followed in
England for near a century and a half. We find it distinctly
recognized in fhe case of E:JJ pa-rte Crouxler, 2 Vernon 706, decided in 1715. And in E:D parte Cook, 2 Peere Williuma 500,
Lord Chancellor KINa declared it settled as a rule ot conveo-
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it>nce in bankruptcy that joint creditors should be first paid out
of the partnership estate, and the separate creditors out of the
separate estate of ea.eh partner; and if there be a surplus of the
joint estate after paying the joint creditors, the share of each
vartner should be distributed to his separate credit<>rs; and if,
on the other band, there should be a surplus of the separate
E"State of a. partner after the satisfa<rtion of his individual creditors, it should be a·p plied·to any deficiency ()f the joint funds
in the sati-sfaction of the partnenfuip debts. Lord HARDWICKB
followed the same rule, in Etc parte Hunter, 1 Atkins 228. But
it appears that in EtD parte Hodgson, 2 Bro. ch. c., decided in
1785, Lord THURLOW made an innovation on the rule in bank·
ruptcy, declaring that there was no distinction between joint
and separate creditors; that they ought to be paid out of the
bankrupt's estate, andnis moiety of the joint estate; and that
the j<>int creditors ought to oome in pa1·i passu with the separate creditors. This ruling of Lord THURLOW appears to .have
had reference to proceedings at law, and in bankruptcy, for it is
said that, consistently therewith, it was competenrt: for the
assignees to confine the joint creditors, where there was a joint
eetate, to that fund exclusively, by tiling a bill in equity against
the other partners, and obtaining an injuntOtion on the order
in bankruptcy. But how far fb.is innovation went, in practice,
to affect the ultimate rights of the parties, is wholly immaterial, in~smuch a.e Lord LouGHBORouoa, in Etc parte Elton, 3
Ves. Jr. 238, in the year 1796, restored the rule which previously
prevailed, holding thwt the rule introduced by the case of Hodgson was inconvenient, inasmuch as every order which he
passed in bankruptcy, giving a joint creditor a dividend out of
the separate estate of a partner, would give rise to a bill in
equity, 001 the part of the separate creditors, to restrain the
'
order, and secure the application of the separate estate to the
srutisfaction of the separate debts; and although it was adjudged that a joint creditor might prove his clalm under a separwte commission, yet he could not receive any dividend ther~
from, until the amount of his distribution in the joint fund
could be ascertained, and the claims of the separate creditors
sati'8fted. And the opinion of the Lord ChaucelJor, in this case,
puts an end ·to the asseTtion, which has been sometimes made,
that this rule was peculiar to proceedings in bankruptcy.
Tou.ching this, he said: "If it stands as a rule of law, we must
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conl'idf'r, what 1 have alwavs understood to be settled by a vast
l"'::u·iety of cas£>s, nat only i~ bankn:ptcy, bu't upon general equity,
that the joint esta te is applicable to partnership debts, and the
sE-parate estate to the separate debts." Again, in speaking of
th~ inconvenience of Lord TRU~Low's rille, he said, "Wha.t I
order here to-day, sitting in bankruptcy, I S'ooll forbid toonorrow, sitting in chancery; for it is quite af COUI"8e to stop the
dividend' on a biJl filed. The plain 1·u~ of distribution i8 that each
estate shall bear its own. debts. The equity i8 so plaitt, that it is of
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Lord EI.DON, with some characteristic doubts and misgivings, consistently followed this rule of his immediate predecessor: Gray vs. OhiBWell, 9 Ves. 118; Dutton vs. Morri8on, 17
V es. 194, 207. And it has ever since remained the settled lSJW
of England, applicable, rl.ot simply to proceedings in bankruptcy, but as a general rule of equity, In the distribUJt:ion of the
assets of insolvents.
· The supposition that this rule arose from any provision ol
the statwtes concerning bankruptcy, in England, is a mistake;
it was long and well settled as a rule of equity, before any
statute was en·a cted touching.this subject. It does not appear
to have been sanctioned by any positive enactmeDt until the
statute of 6 Geo. IV, c. 16, § 16.
'
It.is not a little remarkable that this rule of equity, so long
settled and acted on in England, should have encountered so
much opposition as it has in the oourte of the several states in
this country.
In Pennsylvania the rule was discarded, by a majority of the
court, in the case of Bellt'.'J. Newman, 5 Serg. & R. 78, decided
in 1819. And the rule adopted in that case was that where a
surviving partner dies indebted to partnership and also to individual creditors, and leaving joint assets and also separate
assets, the separat e creditors should receive as much out of the
separate property as the joint creditors could receive from the
separate portion or share of suCh partner in the joint property;
and that, then, the balance af the sepa-rate property should be
divided pro ~among both classes af creditore. This wu
placed partly on the ground of equity, and partly oo the ground
of a etatute directing equality of distribution of the aseets of
deceued penona. Judge GIBSON. however, dissented, insi.tinc
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forcibly on the rule adopted in England, as a general principle
.founded in equity.
And it has been insisted that this ease did not etrictly fall
within the application of the principle, inasmuch as the e!Jtate
to be distributed in that case was the estate of a surviving
partner, ag·ainst which the claims of the joint creditors were as
purely legal as thoee CJf the separate creditors. And Chief
Justice TILGHMAN remarked, in the opinion in the ease, that
"no rule was intended to be laid down W·hich may affect oases
differently circumstanced."
The ca8e of Sperry's Estate, 1 Ashmead (Pa.) 347, did not
directly affeot: the question, inasmuch as it came fully within
the e;xception, that where there is no joint fund, and no solvent
partner, the separate and joint creditors should be paid ratably
out of the separate estate. The question was again brought to
the attention of the court in that state, in Walker VB. Eyth, 25
Pa. St. ~16, where the cour1 express the opinion that it is a rule
of equity " that, where there are partne1·ship and separate
creditors, each estate should be applied exclusively to the payment of its own creditors, the joint estate to the joint creditors,
a.nd the separate estate to the separate creditors." But the
qu~ti.on was not directly decided, the decision of the case being
put upon another ground. So that the general principle, in a
case proper for its application, is said to remain still an open
question in Penn£~.ylv3J}ia: 1 Amer. Leading Cases, 483.
In Virginia the question was presented in 1848, in the case
of ·Morris's Adm'r VB. Mot·ris's A.dm'r, 4 Grattan 293, and was
ela:borately d.iscussed on both sides, but the court wus equally
divided on the question of the adoption of the rule as a
general nl'le of equity, and the decision of the case was pu.t on
othPr grounds.
In New Jersey, in tthe case of Wisham vB. Lippincott, 19 N.J.
Eq. 353, the rule was doubted as a general princir •.., ot equity,
altbough not decided.
In Vermont, in the ca~Se of Bardwell VB. Perry. 19 Vt. 292, 47
Am. Dec. 687, the rule was disoo.rded as a principle CJf equity,
with this qualifiration, that the sep:111tte creditors could require,
in equity, that the joint rreditors should first exhaust the partnership funds, bef()re coming in with the sepa.ra.te creditors of
a partner for a pro rata dis·t ribution out of his separate estate.
It does not appear that the doctrine ()f the English oourts on
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this subject was ever adoptt>d as a rule of equity by the oourts
in M~acbusetts; but it is said that a statulte was enacted in
that state, in 1~38, providing, as a rule for the diBtl"ibutlon of
in.aolrents' estates, that the net proceeds of the separate estate
shnlJ go to the separate creditors, and that of the partnership
<."StatE> to the joint creditors. ·
'IhP. rule appears to have been discarded in Conne.oticut, in
the case of Camp vs. Grant, 21 Conn. 41, 54 Am. Dec. 321; e.nd
also in Mississippi, in the case of Dahlgren tiB. Duncan, 7 Sm. &
)-J. ~~; but adopted in Alabama in Bridge tiB. McCullough, 27
Ala. 661.
In ~ew York it has been adjudged that "the role of equity
was uniform and stringent, that the partnership property of a
firm shall all be applied to ·the partnership debts to the exclusion of the creditors of the individual members of the firm;
nnd that the creditors of the latter a·re to be first paid out of the
separate effects of their debtor, before the partnership creditors can claim anything therefrom;" Jackson tiB. CorneU, 1
~andf. Ch. 348. The history CYf the English rule was eoonewhat
reviewed. by Chancellor KENT, in Mwrray os. Murray, 5 John.
(N. Y .) Cb. 60, and, upon full consideration, adopted ae a rule
of t>qulty, by ChanC(>llor WALWORTH, in Wilder tiB. Keeler, 3
Paige (N.Y.) 167,23 Am. Dec. 781; Payne os. Matthews, 6 Paige
1!), ~9 Am. Dec. 738; H utch.inson tiS. Smith, 7 lb. 26.
The sa.JU(~ doctrine was adopted by Chancellor D:ms.&.ussuaE,.
in South Carolina, as early as 1811, in WOadrop tiB. Ward, 3
Des. Eq. 203; and also by the Supreme Court of New Hamp- ·
shire, in Jarvis os; Brook8"23 N.H. 136.
'r.he subject was very fully reviewed in the Court of Appeals
of Maryland, in McCulloh vs, Dashiell, 1 Harr. & Gill 96, 18 Am.
Dec. 271, wherein it was settled in that State that in equity the
individual creditors of a partner were entitled to a preference
on~r the joint creditor& in the distribution ot the separate
estate of their debtor.
And the same doctrine was settled by the Supreme Oourt
of the United States, on full consideration, in Murrill tiS. Neill,
R How. 414. And it ·b as been ladd dl>wn generally by the elementa·ry writers, both in England and in this oountry, aa a set·
tied rule of equity.
Story in his work on PartneMhip,ch.l5,§§ 365a.nd366, says:

.
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"This principle of equity jurisprudence, that the joint creditors shaH be entitled to a priority of payment out of the joint
effects, and the sepamte creditors to a like priority out of the
separate effects, before the other class of creditors Shall be entitled to any portion of the surplns, is not, perhaps, u·n der all
its aspects, so purely artificial, as it .bas sometimes been suggested to be; at least, it has been often relied upon, as the
dictate of natural justice."
It itl true, the same author, In § 377, of hie aame work,
qualifies this opinion as follows:
"'This rule, although now firmly established,' 'stands as
mucll, if not more, upon the general ground of authority, and
the maxim, stare decisis, than upon the ground of any equitable
reasoning,' and further, that 'After the repeart:ed doubts which
have been expressed upon the subject by the most eminent
judges, it is not, perhaps, too much to say that it rests on a
foundation as questionable and a·s unsatisfactory as any rule
m the wbole system of our jurisprudence.'" And he adds:
"Such as it is, however, it is for the public repose thalt i1
should be left undisturbed, as it may not be easy to BUbstitute any
other rule, which would uniformly work with perfect equality and
equity in the mass of intricate transactions connected with com·

mercial operart:ions."
Kent, i·n his Oommentartea, 8 vol., 65, says:· "The
joint creditors ·have the primary claim upon the joint
fund in the distribution of the assets of bankrupts or insolvent
pa.rtners, and the partnership debts are to be settled before ·
any division of the funds takes ·place. So far as partnership property has been acquired by means of partnership debts,
those debts have, in equity, a priority of claim to be discharged;
and the separrut:e creditors are only entitled in equity to seek
payruentt from the surplus of the joint fund after Baltisfaction of
the joint debts. The equity of the rule, on the other han.d, equally
t·equires that the joint creditor• should only look to the surplua of
the separate estates of the pa·rtners, after payment of the separate
debts. It was a principle of the Roma.n law, and it has been

acknowledged in the equity jurisprudence of Spain, England,
and the United States, ·t hat partnership debts must be paid out
of the partnership estate, and private and separate debts out at
the private and seporate estate of tlle individual partner. If
the par.tnerahlp creditors cannot obtain payment out of the
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partnership estate, they cannot ln equity reeort to the private
and separate estrute, until private and separate creditors are
arutisfted; nor have the creditQrs of the individual partners any
claim upon the partnership property, until all the partnership
creditors are sa tlsfied."
It is aTgued, however, that this doctrine wu overruled in
Ohio, in the case of Gr01venor va. Amtin, 6 Ohio Rep. 104, 25
Am. Dec. 743. It is true, that the reason-ing of the court in the
opinion is tQ that etfect; but the case decided falls within one
of the ackn<YWledged exceptions to the rule. Where the part·
nersbip has become inSQlven.t, and there are n.o partnerehip
assets for distribution, and n.o living solverut partner, it bas
been uniformly conceded that the principle of the rule doee not
apply. The case of Groavenor vs. Austin was a bill in equity by
the creditors of the firm of Seymour Austin & Calvin Austin,
for a distributive share with the individual c.reditora of Seymour Austin out of the assets of ·his separate estate in the
hands of his administrator. There were n:o partnership assets,
and both parties had died insolvent. This was n<rt a case,
therefore, for the application of the principle under consideration, and Judge LANIII, in delivering the opinion, B!lys, as to
this rule: "Thle Oourt are of opinion, that if any suc'h rule
exist, it muet have been of frequent application, and thus have
become familiar to the profession. Yet no case is found in the
books, except the one In 9 Vesey, and the South Ca·r olina cn.s<>,
that touches su:ch a doctrine, unless cases founded on the sta.tutes of bank.ruptcy. A claim so novel in a case neceflsarily of
such oommoo occU:ITe'llce, must be lilrtened to with caution
amounting to jealousy," etc. Touching the subject Qf tMs obitet·
opinion, the following remarks of the Supreme Oourt of the
United States, in Murrill va. Neill, supra, are in point:
"The rule in equity governing the administration of insolvent
partnerships is one of familiar acceptation and practice; it is
one which will be found to have been in practice In this country
from the beginning of our judicial history, and to have been
generally, If not universally, received. This rule, with one or
two eccentric variations in the English practice w·hich may be
noted hereafter, ls believed to be identical with that prevailing
tn England, and is this: that partnership creditors sh.:'lll, in the
first instanoce, be satisfied from the partnership estate; and separate or private credit00"8 of the individual partners from the-
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separate nnd private estate ot the partners with whom they
have made private and individual contracts; and that the private and individual property of the parlneM shall not be applied in extinguishment of partnership debts, until the separate \
and individual creditors af the respective partners shall be
paid. The reason and foundation of this rule, or its equallty '
and fairness, the oourt is nGt called on ro justify. Were these
less obvious than they are, it were enough to show the early
adoption and general prevalence of this rule, to stay the hand
of inn'Ova.tion at this day; at least, under any motive leu strong
than the most urgent propriety."
It has been argued that the statute in this State, relative to
the equal distribution of the estates of dece!ased persons, and
allro the statute providing that all assignments of property in
oontemplation of insolvency, giving preferences to creditors,
had established, in this State, a policy inconsistent with the
rule in question. These statutes were certainly never intended
to have such an effect. The equality required by them is
su·bo.rdinate to the settled equities and priorities of different
grades and classes of creditors; It was manifestly not. the de·
sign of these statutes to change the nature of partnership contracts, and abrogate the preference of partnership creditors in
the distribution of the partnemhip a89ets. And as this was
oot d.one, the rule of equality adopted in equity, requires the
OOITesponding preference oo be given to the individual creditors of each partner in his separate elfta.te.
2. The remaining matter for determination, in this case
involves the inquiry, whether, in case of an indelrtedness for
money len.t to the partnership by a partner who afterward
becomes insolvent, the separak> credi-tors of the latter shall be
enUtled therefor to a pro mta distribu.tion with the partnership
creditors, out of the joint fund. It is claimed that the liability
of tlw firm to a partner for money loaned is a partnership
debt, and that the individual creditors of that partner are, in
equity, entitled to an equal distribution therefor, out of the
partnership property. On the other hand, it is claimed that
as each partner is individua1ly liable for the debts of the firm,
and ae no partner can be allowed to participate with his own
creditors in <the distribution of a fund, the sepa·rate creditors
of a partner, ns they can only claim through the rig'Ms of
their dE-btor, cannot be allowed such participation with the
joint creditors.
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It was at one time ·held to be the law, on the authority of
adjudieatlone by Lord TALBOT and Lord HARDWIOKJD, that if a
partner baa loa.ned money to the partnership, or the partner·
ship has loan.e d money to the separate est31te of one of the
partners, acoording to the equitable rule of distribution of the
assets after insolvency, in the former case, the separate creditors of the partner would be entitled to an equal share out of
the joint assets to the exteDt of the debt created for the money
lent; and that, in the latter case, the partnership creditors
would be entitled to payment to the same extent, out of tbe
individual estate of the partner: E:» parte Hunter, 1 Atk. 223;
Story on Part., § 390. But this doctrine has long since been
overruled; and the oontrary ap~ars now to be well settled.
In Etc parte Lodge, 1 Ves. Jr. 166, Lon! THURLow held that
the assignees on behalf of the joint estate oould not be entitled
to distribution out ()f the separate estate of Lodge, for money
which he had abstracted from the partnership, unless he had
tnken it with a fraudulent intent to augment his separate
estate. And in E:» parte Harris, 2 Ves. and Beam. 210, 212,
Lord ~LDON said: "There has long been an end of the law
which prevailed in the time of wrd HARDWIOKl!l, whose opinion
appears to have been that if the joint estate lent money to the
separate estate of one partner, or if one partner lent to the joint
estate, proof might be made by the one or the other, in each
case. That bas been put an end to, among other principles,
upon this certainly, that a partner .cannot come in cornpetitioa
with separate creditors of his own, nor as to the joint estate
with the join.t creditors. The consequence is, that if one partner lends £1,000 to the partnership, and they become in-solvent
in a wee_k, be cannot be a creditor of the partnership, though
the money was supplied to the joint estate; eo, if the partner·
sbip lends to an individoa·l parrtner, there can be no proof for
the joint again91: the separate eE~tate; that is, in each case no
proof to affect the creditors, though the individual partnera
may certainly have the right against each other."
This doctrine proceeds upon the prin:ciple that, in the distribution of the assets of insolvents, the equities of the credit·
OTS, whether joint or separate, must be worked out through
the medium of the partners; th31t creditors can only step into .
the shoes of their immediate debtors in reaching their effects
where there are conflicting claims; and that, inasmuch as an
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individual partner oould not himself oome in and oompete
wi•th the partn~rship creditors, who are in fact his own oredilt·
~rs, in the distribution of the fund, and thereby prejudice
those wb.o were not only creditors of the partnership but also
of h1D18elf; therefore the separ~te creditors of a partner oould
not enforce any claim to a distributive share of the joint effects
against the partnership creditors, which could not have been
enloroed by the partn.e r himself for his own benefit. Story on
Partnership, § 390. The rule, however, that these several
funds are to be thus administered as they stood at the time of
the insolvency, is to be received with this important limitation, that i.t does not apply in case, either where the effects
obtained, creating the debt, were taken from th~ separate
estate to augment the joint estrute, or from the joint eetwt:e to
aug.ment the separate estate, fraudulently, or under circumatan-oes from which fraud may be inferred, or under which it
would be implied.
In the case before us, however, i•t is not pretended thrut the
irm obtained the borrowed money from Murray improperly.
The separate creditors of Murray, therefore, are not, on
account of this claim for money lent by Murray to the firm,
entitled to participate with th~ partnership creditors in the distribution of the joint effects.
Judgment of the common pleas reversed; and ordered that
the separate effects of Peter MuNay be distributed pro mta
Arst among his individual creditors, before any application
thereof be made to the payment of the partnership debts of
Dever & Murray; and that the partnership effects be applied
first to the payment of the partnership debts, irrespective of
the claim of the partner, Peter Murray, for money loaned by
him to the firm.
All of the other justices concurred.
NOTE: See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., §§ 293, et ~eq.
Compare with the Casf'S following.
See also. 2 Bak>s on Partn., § 825, where this oaee is referred to as the lPad·
lng case, setting forth the' rPasons assigned for the various rulings. See also
the note to McCulloh vs. Dashiell, 18 Am. Dec. 280, where .Rodger• va.
Mft'(lfllia, and many other caaee are referred to.
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BLAIR vs. BLACK.
8uprem6 Oourt of South Oat·olina, 1889.
11 8. Car. 846, 9 fi. E. Rep. 1088, 17 Am. St. Rep. 80.

Action to set asiJe an assignment for creditors as void
because of preferences. Decree below for defendants and
plaintiff appeals.
On January 29, 1889, James W . Blaek and Ja<'ob K. Carpente-r, of the old mercantile firm of Black & Carpenter, and
also of its successor, Black, Carpenter & Davies, made an 8.8·
signment of both their individual and partnership ·p roperty for
th<(l payment of their debts to John G. Black, as assignee and
trustee. J. L. Davies, one of the latter firm, did not Bign tlle
o1·ig-inal deed of assignment, being a·b sent at the time it was
exe><'nted, but ratified it some days later, and indeed executed
another deed, conforming substantially to the first. The
assignment provided that the property and assets of the individual members of the respective firms should be first applied
to the payment of the individual debts of the members of the
firm, a-nd that the property and assets of the firms, respectively,
should be first applied to the debts of the partnership, and that
if a surplus should remain af·ter paying the debts of th.e one
class, then such surplus should be paid to debts of the other
c.lasa, and so reciprocally of the other class. The aBSignment
also provided that, if there should not be sufficient funds to
pay the debts, the assignee should pay them ratably, or such
as should, with 30 days from the date of the assignment, agree
to accept the terms of it, and to release the parties from all
liability on their debts a.nd claims, etc. The cases stated above
were instituted by creditors of the respective firms for the
purpose of setting aside the deed of assignment, and, being
identical in object and purpose, were ~nsolidated and heard
together.
0. B. Spencer and W. B. McCaw, for appellant.;
Hart cE Hart, for appellees.

McGoWAN, J. Several grounds were urged euftlcfeDt, aa ·
alleged, to set aside t'he aasignment, and subject the property
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to the claim of creditors according to law, but, from the view
which the court takes, it will not be necessary to consider any
of the objections except the one chiefly relied on by the assailing creditors, viz., that in violation of section 2014 of the general statutes, which denounces assignments giving preferences
as "abs~lutely void," this assignment gives undue a.nd illegal
preference to individual over copartnership creditors, in
excluding the partnership creditors, after exhausting the partnership assets, from coming in and participating with the individual creditors in the individual property of the members of
the different firms; the proposition relied on bcing that, under
the law of this state, the individual creditors are not entitled to
be paid first out of the individual property, but have only an
equity to require that the partnership creditor should exhaust
the assets of the firm, and, after that is applied, they are then
e-ntitled, as to any balance due them, to share equally and
ratably with the individual creditors in the individual assets.
While, on the other band, in support of the assignment, it is .
urged that the rule is that the joint debts are primarily payable out of the 'joint effects, and are entitled to a preference
over separate debts; and so, in the oonverse case, the separate debts are primarily payable ou-t of the separate effects, and
as to that posse.ss a like preference, and the surplus only, after
satisfying such priorities, can be reached by the other class of
creditors, so that rea.l·ly the only question involved is one purely
of law. What was the law of this state upon the subject when
the assignment was executed?
The cause oa.me on to be beard by Judge KERSBA w, who,
making a full and interesting review of the authoritie~ both in
the English and American. oourts, in la:w and in equity, held
that the question a.s to priority of the individual over the partnership creditors in the individual property of the members
of the firm was still an open question in this state, and "furthermore t'h.at the departure from this settled rule of administration of partnership assets, where there a:re individual claims
and individual property, is wholly founded upon the case of
Wardlaw vs. Gray, Dod. (S. Car.) Eq. 110, and that wholly upon
a total misconception of the English cases cited to support it.
\Yitlt great deference to the opinions of the eminent jurists
w h\lse decisions are here reviewed, I am impelled to the con·
olusion that in the case under consideration the individual
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property is first applicable to the individual debts, nnd that tht>
provisions upon that subject in the assignment are in strict
conformity to the established rule, and therefore constitute no
improper preference,"-and dismissed the complaint& From
this decree the plaintiff's partnerah~p creditors appeal to this
court upon the ground, inter alia, that it was error of law to
hold "that, as between the pat1:nership creditors of a ftrm and
the individual creditors of its members, the individual assets
are first liable to individual debts before any application
thereof may be made to partnership debts, and for not holding
that if, after applying partnership assets to partnership debts,
nny portion of such debts should remain unsatisfied, such pot·
. tion should C()me in ratably with the individual debts of the
several members as agajnst their individual assets," etc.
The question is certainly an important one, which in the
affairs of business life may arise daily, and it should be,
if it has not already been, clearly and fully settled, so that all
may know what t'he law is to which their ~tione should be
colllformed. It is true that there has been much diacu.ssion and
some d·ifference of opinion on the subject involved, not, as it
seems to us, arising so much from the inherent difficulty of
the subject, as from an artificial role originally adopted in the
English bankrupt courts, mainly, as it would seem, Qn account
of its simplicity and convenience¢ application, viz., .that partnership creditors are entitled to partnership property, and 6
conver1o, individual creditors are entitled to individual property,--41 rule of which Judge STORY says: "It is not too much
to say that it rests on a foundation as questionable and unsatisf·a ctory as any role in the whole system of our jurisprudence."
Story, Partn. 577. As we understand it, no rule upon the subjeot has ever been declared by positive statute, either in
Engla.n.d or America; but whatever rale there may be has
grown up entirely from the dicta of elementary writers and
adjudications of the courts supposed to be founded on some
principle. But so far as concerns this "role of reciprocity,',.
as it is sometimes called, it does not eeem to us to have been
based upon any principle or general equities of the parties.
All agree that the partnership creditors have an equity to
exhau&t the partnership assets, for the double reason that they
haTe two funds, and the individual members have no interest
until the partnership is settled. But the same cannot be said

.-
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of the individual creditors. They are not creditors of the firm
at all, but only of their individual debtor, whose individual
property, including his clear share of the firm, Is liable for aH
his debts alike, both partilership and individual. It strikes ua
that there is nothing in the relations or the equities of the
respective classes to authorize or justify the application of the
convenient Procrustean rule of "reciprocity." But it 1e
argued that the circuit decree is in conformity with th~ Englilh
rule, and we should follow it, without regard to its ree.BOO.. or
equity, and disregard our own cases, which have made a depart·
ure from it, for the sole reason tbat lt was error to ma)te that
departure, and it should be corrected by returning to the rule.
~~lthout going back to ascertain what is the preclse rule
adopted in the English courts of bankruptcy and chancery,
it is quite clear that, as far back as the case of Wardlaw VB.
Gra.y (1837), cited in the circuit decree, the doctrine waa
an.noun.ced in this state "that a partnership creditor baa the
right to resort either to the partnership property or to the aep·
arate property of the parties; but, as a party having hro funds,
he may be compelled by the separate creditors of one of the
paTtners to exhaust the partnership property before he pro·
ceeds against that of an in!fividual partner," etc. Whetller
this d~cision did or did not run counter 1lo what is said to be
the English rule upon the subject, it is quite as clear that it
bas never been expressly overruled; but on the contrary baa
been recognized and followed, and at the time of tbe execution
of the assignment under consideration was, as we think, the
, law of the state; In OOtcan vs. 1'ttnno, Rich. (S. Car.) Eq. Cas.
369 (1832), it was held th.at, "though partnership effects should
be first applied to partnership debts, yet, after these are
exhausted, a judgment against the partners as sucb binds the
sepa:rate estate of each partner from its date." In Fleming
vs. Billings, 9 Rich. Eq. 149 (1856), it wa.s b~ld that "copar·tner· ·
ship creditors are first to be paid out of the copartnership fund,
and if that prove insufficient then tlley are to come in with the
private creditors [respect being had to liens], as against the
individual property of the copartners." In Gadsden VB. Oars~,
ld. 252, 77 Am. Dec. 207 (1857), it was lleld that " the individual
creditors of a partner have not such exclusive right to be paid
out of his individual prOJ.H:•t·ty as to render fraudnlE>nt an
assignment of it for the benefit of the creditors of the fit·m.
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Pal'lblership creditors having two funds to which they can ·re·
sort, and Individual creditors of the partners having but one,ttlhe private property of the debtor,ineluding any balance which
may remain to him from the firm, after its affairs are settled,such individual creditors have.an equity to compel the partner·
ship creditors t() reeort first to the partnership nss(>ts; but,
after they are exhausted, the partnership creditors have as
good right t() be paid out of the private property of a partner
u his individual creditors," etc. In this case Chancellor
JoHNSTON remarked that it "was in conformity to Wardlaw .
vs. Gray, with which we see no reason to be dissatisfied." In
WilBon t>8. McOonMU, 9 Rich. Eq. 500 (1857), it was held that
"Where a copartner, having a separate estate, dies, t)le copartnership creditors ·have the right first to exhaust the copartship estate, aDd, if that proves insufficient to pay their
demands, then they are to be paid from the separate estate of
the copartners, pro ra-ta with his separate creditors." In
Adtcku vs. Lowry, 15 S. C. 128 (1880), it is true that an intimation is given that the question might be still open, but toot
was not intended to decide anything. The remark was: 11But,
even if this were so, there would still remain the very impor· ·
ta.nt and interesting question whether the s~pa.rate creditors of
Bratton would not have in equity a preference over the partnership creditors to the separate assets of Bratton, etc. But
inasmuch as this question was not raised in the court below,
and has not been argued here, we do not propose t() enter upon
its oonsideration now," etc. In Htttzlet· vs. Phillips, 26 S. C.
136, 1 S. E. Rep. 502, 4 Am. St. Rep. 687 (1886), it was held
"that partnership creditors, after exhaustin~ partnership
assets, are entitled to share the separate property of the part·
ners pro rata with unsecured individual creditors." The chief
ju!;tice reviewed all the authorities, 81lying, among otbetl
thin::!s: "We think the true doctrine is as stated by the circuit
jndge with resp~ct to the right of the sepm·at<> creditors, if any
PCJUity exists in his b('ha-lf, suc.h ·88 two funds • • • to
throw the copartnership creditors on the partnership assets in
1he first instance; but, after the partnership assets bave been
fully and fairly exhausted, to come in p1·o rata with the &epa·
rate creditor. This seems to ·be the weight -of authority with
us. Besides a debt contracted by a copartnership is not only
a debt of the firm, but a debt, in substance, of each individual
61
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member of the Arm, and the property of the Arm a.nd C>f each
member is liable for it. But t'he property of the firm is not
liable for the separate debt of a member; only the interest of
the member is liable; whioh is nothing until the finn debts are
paid," etc. We think this case finally settled the law in this
state. But, as if to put the matter beyond all dispute, the
very last work, upon the subject of partnership, published t)lis
year (1889), expressly approves and cites from tbis case, as containing the proper exposition of the law upon the subjeot, both
on principle and authority. The author says: "The insolvent,
by his inability to meet his liabilities, is not the less, but a 11
the more, a debtor. He owes to his creditors, not the property
itself, nor any other asset, but merely the price of the property.
The debt is personal, with·o ut any lien or preference for it~ pay·
m-ent out of the debtor's estate. The individual partner is, how~ver, not less liable for a finn debt than is the firm itself. Tlll·
several liability of the partners is no less a oonstituenrt of the
partnership obligation than is their joint obligation. Both
spring from the root of partnership. The joint creditors, therefore, are entitled at law to share the separate eatalte of a part·
ner with his individual creditor-s," etc. See Par& Partn. § 108;
citing Hutzler vs. Phillips, and other cases.
"\\' e have not the least idea that the parties intended to do
amythingwrong, but the assignment was not in conformity with
the law as we understand it, ·a nd had the effect of creatin~
preferences not allowed by law. The judgment of this court
is that the judgment of the circuit court be reversed, and the
ooses remanded to the circuit court for such further proceedings as the parties may be advised, in &'Ccordance with the conclusions herein announced.
SIMPSON, C. J., and MclvEa, J., concur.
I
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NOTB: See Mechem•a Elem. of Partn., § 294, aad oaaee cited.
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NORTHERN BANK OF KENTUCKY vs. KEIZER.

Kentucky Court of Appeals, 1866.
2 Duvall (Ky.), 169.
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: I
JuDGE RoBERTSON delivered the opinion of the court:
J. W. and W. C. Houghton, who had been partners in the
manufacture of bagging and rope, and owned between them
much more individual than partnership property, apprehending
their inability to pay all their debts, on the 11th of January,
1862, assigned all their partnership and individual property to
C. M. Keizer in trust, to apply the partnership property to the
payment of their partnership debts, the individual property to
the payment of their individual debts, and then to distribute
among all the creditor~:~, pro rata, the residue of the individual
fund, if any should remain after full payment of the individual
debts.
It appears that, under such a distribution, neither class of
creditors would receive their whole debts, but thar the per centage of the individual creditors would be much larger than that
of the partnership creditors.
The trustee, apprehending difficulty, and wishing to avoid
unnecessary responsibility, petitioned the circuit court of Fayette to direct the mode of distribution to which all the creditors
should be adjudged as entitled.
The partnership creditors, in an answer and cross-petition
charged that the assignment "was made in contemplation of
insolvency to prefer one class of creditors, and, therefore, they ·
prayed for a pro rata distribution of the entire trust-fund among
all the creditors, without distinction of class."
The individual creditors demurred to that croes-petition, and
the circuit sustained the demurrer.
That the assignment was made ''in contemplation of insolvency" is not denied, and, consequently, if the distribution
which it directs is not such as each class of the creditors was
entitled to by law, it does, inconsistently with the spirit of the .
statute of 1856, prefer one set of creditors over another, and)

s..4
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for that end, must be deemed unavailing, even though· the ap- .
parent preference was not the voluntary choice of the assignors,
but was dictated, as we may presume it Wl¥1, by a belief that
the law itself would make the same distribution, and, therefore,
they could not, if they would, prevent it.
Then the only question is, does the law make the preferences
prescribed by the assignment?
As to partnership property, equity gives to th£> partnership
creditors priority over the individual creditors of the firm.
No doctrine of the modern common law is more conclusively
settled, nor on more rational and consistent grounds.
The compensatory and reciprocal priority of the individual
creditors, as to the individual property,. though not, as the
other, universally recognized, is, nevertheless, in our opinion,
so jVell settled by both reason and preponderating adjudications
as to entitle it to our recognition.
Each partner having an implied lien on the partnership property as a security for the_payment of all the partnership debts,
no individual creditor of any of the partners can subject his
debtor's interest otherwise than cum onere, or, in other words,
could not make his debtor's interest available until all partnership debts sl1a1l have been paid; and, on the equitable principle
of subrogation, each partnership creditor is entitled to the same
lien or priority.
This it3 the law and its reason.
Precisely the same reason does not apply to individual creditors claiming a priority as to the individual property.
But the principle of equality and the equitable doctrine of
marshaling nsRets do apply to their case, and entitle them to
say to the joint creditors "you have kept us out of the partnership effects, and we have a compensatory right to be indemnified out of the separate property of our individual debtors."
This accords with the well-settled rule that, when one creditor
has a right to resort to two funds, and another creditor is restricted either hy him or the law ·to only one of them, the creditor so excluded from 0ne fund has an equitable right to priority as to his only resource, coextensively with his privation.
As to the principle and the extent of this rule as applicable to this
case, there is some diversity among jurists, a small minority
denying such priority to any extent, and a very large majority
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. concurring in its existence, and apparently to the whole extent
of the individual property, if all of it shall become necessary
for full pa_yment of the individual indebtedness.
The gronnd occupied by that minority is, in our opinion,
ind\?fensible on either pdn.ciple or authority; and that occupied
by the majority is so well maintained by both principle and
adjudged cases as to command the recognition of it as the only
true ground to some extent.
But, between those extremists, we are satisfied, that, while
one class is altogether wrong, the other class is not altogether
right.
The rationale of the individual priority neither requires nor
authorizes an extension of it, under all circumstances, to the
whole of the individual property until the entire individual debt
shall have been paid, nor the application of it at all when the
partnership creditors do not assert, but waive, their priorfty

as to the partnership property, and thereby leave the whole
estate, of all classes, unincumbered and subject to all cred·
1"tors alike, without distinction of class.
If the exhaustion, by the partnet'Ship creditors, of the partnership property, should pay only fifty per cent., and the individual property should be sufficient to pay the whole of the individual debts, why should the class having an unqualified .
right to resort to both funds be required to accept only half of
their debt, and the class having a more restricted right be ad·
judged entitled to the whole of their debt? Were this the law,
1t would. be an anomaly without either analogy or reason. But
the doctrine of equal reprisal is the only one that is either con· ·
sistent or sustained by controlling or satisfactory authority.
It is not true, as sometimes SHid, that the reason of those
relative priorities is, thHt the partnership creditors trust the
partnet'Ship property, and the individual creditors trust the individual property.
The truth is, that each class of creditors look to both claRSeS
of property, and, unle~s they conflict, each have a right to sub·
ject both individual and partnership property.
Looking at the philosophy of the law, we do not doubt that
the individual priority·e:rists to the extent of the individual loss
w ben partnership effects are taken or claimed by partnership
creditors, and that extends no further.
We are also satisfied that the few adjudged cases and many

•
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obiter sayings, which, on a superficial analysis, might;. seem to
carry it further, do so on no recognized or consistent principle,
and in a very indefensible manner, and should not be regarded
as settled authority in this court. We, therefore, feel that it is
both our judicial privilege and duty to recognize and apply
what, on n survey of multitudinous cases and dicta, .we believe
to be the true doctrine, which is, that, if partnership creditors
exhaust the partnership estate without full payment, the individual creditors have the reciprocal right to make as much of
their debt out of the individual estate, and if, then, any individual property should remain undisposed of, it shall be distributed pari passu among all the creditors, regardless of
class.
Consequently, as the assignment in this case directs a distribution essentially different from that just defined as legally
rightful among all the creditors, the distribution must be made
according to law, as herein indicated.
,.
Wherefore, the judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded
_
) · for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
;
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Kentucky Court of .Appeals, 1880.

' '

79 Ky. 188.

The First National and Fayette National
Banks at Lexington discounted, each, certain notes signed by
the firm of H. Gilbert & Co., Thomas Mitchell, and 8. P.
Kenney. The notes read :
JuDGE PRYOR.

"•10,000.
LEXINGTON, KY. , Dec. 11th, 1877.
"One hundred and twenty days after date we, or either of
us, jointly and severally, promise to pay to the order of the
F~yette National Bank ten thousand dollars, with interest at
the rate of eight per cent. per annum, from date until paid,

65!

CASES ON PARTNERSHIP.

without defalcation, for value received, negotiable and payable
at the Fayette National Bank of Lexington, Ky.
"(Signed) H. GIL.B ERT & Co.,
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"THOS. MITCHELL,
"S. P. KENNEY."

Thos. Mitchell and S. P. Kenney, whose names appear to
these notes, were both members of the firm of H. Gilbert &
Co. S. P. Kenney, on the 11th of March, 1878, executed a
deed of tl'Ust to the appellee, J. H. Shropshire, for the payment,
pro rata, of his creditot'S "in the order and with the preference
only prescribed by law as to the liens of individual and partQership creditors." About the same time the firm of H. Gilbert & Co., becoming embarrassed, by an agreement with
creditors assigned to the appellee the firm effects in trust, for
firm creditors. In making a distribution of the assets of the
firm of H. Gilbert & Co., the appellants, the Fayette National
Bank and others, presented their claims, and received a pro
rata dividend amounting to 31 per cent. The trustee Shropshire (appellee) having filed his petition in equity for the settlement of these trusts, the appellants, after receiving their dividends of the firm assets, presented their claims, and demanded
of the assignee, Shropshire, their pro rata dividend of S. P •.
Kenney's assets in the distribution to be made to his (Ken·
ney's) individual creditors. It is admitted that the individual
estate of Kenney will only pay about 30 per cent. upon the
claims against it, and as the appelhmts bad received from the
firm of H . Gilbert & Co. a greater dividend, the individual
creditors of S. P. Kenney insisted that appellants could take
nothing from Kenney's individual aHBets until the individual
creditors had recei ,.ed as great a dividend as had been paid the
appellants out of the firm assets. The chancellor below adjudging in favor of the individual creditors, the case is here on
appflal from that judgment.
It is insisted by counsel for the appellants, that as the individual signatures of Mitchell and Kenney appear to these notes,
that the obligation imposed on them both a partnership and an
individual liability; "that the holders of the notes possess all
the equities of both partnership and individual creditors." This
is the single question to be considered in this case.
We are met at the threshold of the investigation with the
suggestion that the purpose of requiring the individual signa-
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Co.

tures of two ·o f the members of the firm of H . Gilbert &
to
the notes was to create both a partnership and an individual
liability, so that the appellants could assert all the equities belonging to both classes of creditors. What the intention of the
parties was at the time these notes were executed is to be gathered alone from the face of the instrument, and an agreement
to the effect that the individual estate of the members of the
firm should be liable will not be permitted to effect the equities
of either partnership or individual creditors. If in a firm liability the firm creditor bas received bis part of the firm assets, the
chancellor will close the hands of such a creditor until the individual creditor is made equal with him; so the question at last
is, was this, as between the parties to the paper, the debt of the
firm? This court, in the case of the Northern Bank of
Kentucky vs. Keizer (2 Duvall), says: "It is not true, as sometimes said, that the reason of these relatiYe priorities is that the
partnership creditors trust the partnership property, and the
individual creditors trust the individual property. The truth
is, that each class of creditors look to both classes of property,
and unless they conflict, each have a right to subject both the
individual and partnership property., That the individual
creditors of Kenney regarded the solvency of the firm and its
business eapital as an additional security to their claims to the
extent of Kenney's interest in the firm, and the appellants looked
to the individual as well as the firm assets for the payment of
the several notes, we think are facts that may be safely asassumed.
There was certainly no lien created on the individual estate
of Kenney by his signature to the notes, upon which distribu·
tion is sought, nor is it questioned that the parties had the right
by contract to Cl'eate liens that the chancellor could not impair
or distegard, or strengthen their claims by having the name of
a stranger to the firm as surety; but it is maintained that although Kenney is individually liable, because he is a member
of the firm, still there is a legal right, or an equity, arising in
favor of the partnership creditors in this case that would not
have existed in the absen·ce of Kenney's individual signature.
It is conceded that a several and joint liability exists by reason
of the firm signature, and that Kenney's individual estate could
be subjected to tbe payment of the several debts, as well as his
interest in the pat•tnership; but haviug evinced a purpose to
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make himself individually liable, and appellants having accepted
the notes with Kenney's individual signature to them, that such
a liability might be created, it is urged that be must be regarded in this·equitable distribution of assets as both a partnership and an individual debtor. This we think he was without
signing his name to the paper, and that the appellants were
both partnership and individual creditors; but when, at their
own instance, they were subrogated to the rights of the partners, and given an exclusive lien on the assets of the firm for
the payment of their debts, when asking equity they will be
required to do equity.
T4e chancellor would be reluctant to adopt such an unjust
and unequal principle of distribution if no equitable rule existed
with reference to the marshalling of assets, when, by reason of
the lien of the partners, courts of equity have worked out a lien
for partnership creditors, and when asked to do so, have given
them a preference, because their claims were debts owing by the
firm, and on condition that they should not participate in the
distribution of the individual assets until the indh;dual creditors, if any, are made equal with them, we are asked to discard
this rule, and create other equities, for no other reason than t.hat
the individual name of a member of the firm appears to the
note. The same obligation exists to pay, and the same assets,
firm and individual, are liable in either case, with or without
the individual signature, and no conflict as to rights arises until
the appellants have enforced an equity that gives them all the
partnership assets to the exclusion of the individual creditor.
and now insist that equity of the individual creditor is gone by
reason of the agreement that the debtor was to be individually
liable. That this is a partnership debt is evidenced by the fact
· that it has been presented to the commissioner or assignee, and
the firm assets applied to its payment, and this, together with
the position in which the names appear on the paper, authorizes
such a conclusion. If the notes had been signed by each individual partner, reciting that it was for the benefit of the firm,
could there he any doubt as to its being a partnership liability,
and subject to all the equities of the partners in the distribution
of the firm assets? The obligee, in such a case, if he desired,
could assert his lien through the partners, and having done so,
the chancellor would not give him this preference, and then
permit him to share in the distribution of the individual assets
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without accounting for what ho had received from the firm . It
is immaterial how the partner's name gets on the paper; if it is
a partnership debt, and the firm primarily liable as between it
and the individual_ partner, it is a firm liability, and if the
creditor asserts his claim against the assets of the insolvent
firm, he will be estopped to say that the equity of the individual
creditor is to be disregarded , or that such an equity never
existed, because the individual signing made the individual
partner liable, either as principal or surety. A court of equity
delighting in equality-would strive to prevent such a distribution instead of seeking a mode for obtaining it.
Whether or not the rule in England against double proof in
the administration of bankrupt estates is recognized as authority here, is not material to inquire. It is certain that, under
the rule est-ablished in the case of the Northern Bank of Kentucky vs. Keizer, '2 Duvall, the firm creditor is entitled to distribution out of the individual estate of the debtor after the individual creditor bas received as much as the firm creditor.
The rule established in that case is :
1. That each partnership creditor, on the equitable principle
of subrogation, is entitled to the same lien the partners have.
2. They are not compelled to assert, but may waive that priority, and thereby leave the whole estate subject to all creditors
alike.
3. If the parq.ership creditors exhaust the partnership assets
without being paid in full, the individual creditor bas the right
to make a like amount out of the individual assets, and when
this is done, the individual estate remaining will be distributed
among all the creditors (partnership and individual) in proportion to their respective debts.
This rule does not apply, of course, where the creditor has
obtained liens by contract, or where strangers to the partnership are sureties for the firm, the chancellor having no greater
right to disturb tmch liens and contracts than the common law
judge; but one partner will not b~ allowed, by becoming a
surety for a firm debt, to change the equitable doctrine of subrogation, so as to give the partnership creditor all the firm
assets, an~ then allow him as much of the individual estate of
the partners as his individual creditors receive in the distribution. The rule in Keizer's case is both just and equitable; and
if the debt is that of the firm, as between it and the individual
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partners, the position or manner in which the individual name
of a partner appears on the paper is immaterial, and will not
\ be permitted to disturb equitable rules so well understood in the
/~settlement and distribution of insolvent estates.
~ ~.- '('. Northern Bank of Kentucky vs. Ke1'zer, 2 Duvall; Hibler
!
. )~':v :)
·· vs. Davis, 13 Bush; Logan vs. Anderson, 18 B. MonrOe.
. . ...· ~ \r"'Judgment affirmed.
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'

MITCHELL, J. Prior to the loth day of July, 1884, Stoughton A. Fletcher, Thomas H. Sharpe, Ingram Fletcher, and
Albert E. Fletcher were partners, carrying on a general banking business in the city of Indianapolis, under the firm name of
' Fletcher & Sharpe. The firm became insolvent. and upon the
·· ·application of one of the partners William Wallace, Esq., was,
·'on the date above mentioned, duly appointed by the superior

court of. Marion county to take charge of the assets of the firm
as receiver.
During the pendency of the receivership, Winslow, Lanier
~ · '.- · ,'. & Co., Bankers, ofthe City of N cw York, filed an intervening
\' petition in which they represen.ted that .the firm of Fletcher &
Sharpe, was indebted to them in a large amount, which indebtedness watJ evidenced by two promissory notes executed by the
firm, and secured by the separate endorsements of three of the
partners individually. The intet'\'enors asserted the right to participate ratably in the assets of the firm, and also to be preferentially paid any balance of their claim remaining unpaid, out
of the proceeds of certain individual property which, they
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averred, those members of the firm who had become liable as en
dorsers, had transferred to a trustee, for the benefit of the firm,
prior to the declaration of insolvency, and which, it was alleged,
had since been transferred to the receiver. There was a hearing upon issue taken, and upon due request the court found the
facts specially, and stated conclusions of law thereon, adverse
to the claim of the intervenors for a preference.
The only facts specially found material to the determination
of the questions involved are, in substance, that on the 21st day
of January, 1 8~4, the persons above named, having carried on
the banking business as partners under the firm name of
Fletcher & Sharpe, for the period of 10 years or more, entered
into a new partnership agreement, at which time, as subsequent
events proved, the firm, as well as the individual members
thereof, although owning a large amount of property, were of
doubtful solvency, if they were not, inqeed, actually insolvent.
Two of the partners, viz., Ingram and Alber\ E. Fletcher,
were each largely indebted to the firm, the debt of the firstnamed being 8448,286, while that of the last-named amounted
to *300,000 or thereabouts. Each of the above named partners
owned a large amount of individual property, which they, as
well as the other members of the firm, believed would sell for
more than sufficient to pay the amounts due from them, respectively, to the firm.
It was accordingly ~tipulated. as part of the new agreement,
that Ingram and Albert E. Fletcher should severally convey
and transfe~ all their individual property, real and personal, to
a trustee in tru~t. to be sold and convertE:>d into money by the
firm , and the proceeds applied to the liquidation of their respective debts due the firm, and the residue, if any, placed to the
credit of each as capital stock. It was also agreed that Thomas
H. Sharpe, one of the partners, should convey the undivided
one-half of a certain bank building owned by himself and the
two Fletchers above named, as tenants in common, to the firm,
subj~ct to an incumbrance which it .was stipulated the firm
should pay. In pursuance of t.be agreement above mentioned,
and upon the consideration therein named , and no other, the
several partners, their respective wives joining, made conveyances of their individual real estate, according to the terms of
the new agreement, the conveyance by Sharpe having been
made to the firm on the 23d day of January, 1884, while the
deeds from the Fletchers to the trustee were executed on the

. ..
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2d day of February, 1884. The trustee subsequently conveyed
·
the Fletcher property to the receiver.
The value of the property conveyed by Ingram and Albert
E. Fletcher did not, in either case, equal the amount due from
them, respectively, to the firm. The court finds-that the conveyances were made in good faith, in order to provide for the
payment of debts actually due the co-partnership from the -several partners, and to enable the firm to pay ita debts, and carry
on its business. Afterwards, in April and June, 1884, Fletcher
& Sharpe made two notes, one for t25,000, the other for t20,000,
both payable to the firm of Fletcher & Sharpe. These notes
were indorsed by the firm, whose indorsement was followed in
regular course by that of Thomas H. Sharpe, Ingram Fletcher,
and Albert E. Fletcher. Upon the note so indorsed, the intervenors, Winslnw, Lanier & Co., loaned to the firm of Fletcher
& Sharpe the amount of money specified in each note, respectively. The intervenors. did not know of the conveyances above
mentioned, made by the several partners to the firm of Fletcher
& Sharpe at the time of making the loan, the indorsement of
the partners.having been accepted ip order to obtain the security of their personal liability on the notes. No inquiry was
made by Winslow, Lanier & Co. concerning the individual
property of the several members of the firm of Fletcher &
Sharpe, nor were there any representations made by any member of the latter firm in that regard. Subsequently a receiver
was appointed by the Marion superior court, who took possession of all the property and assets of the firm, including the
property conveyed to the firm, and to the rec-eiver, as above
mentioned, in pursuance of the partnership agreement made on
the 21st day of January, 1884.
The question is whether or not, upon the foregoing facts, the
intervenors were entitled to priority of payment over other firm·
creditors, out of the property conveyed to the·firm by the several partners. There seems to be no dispute, as, indeed, there
could not well be, upon the proposition that a creditor who
holds a not-e of which a firm are the makers, and one or more
members thereof indorsers, has in his hands a valid, joint obligation against the firm, and at the same time a distinct, several,
and separate obligation against tlwse who signed as indorsers.
This result flows from the fact that the contract of an h;1dorser
is entirE~ly independent and distinct from that of the maker,
ea.ch contract being in itself, when tLe indorsement is in regular

.,
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course, conclusive in its legal import. The creditor holding a
note so made and indorsed may therefore pursue his remedy
against the partners as makers, and he may also proceed
against those individually liable as indorsers. When the property of the firm, or the individual estates of the members bound
as indorsers, is being judicial1y administered, the creditor is
entitled to participate with the partnership creditors in the joint
estate, and be may at the same time avail himself of any appropriate remedy be would other~vise have against the indorsers,
or their respective estates. He may receive dividends from the
joint estate as a partnership creditor and from the separate estate of the partners liable on their contract of indorsement, as
ati individual cred'itor. Wilder vs. Keeler, 3 Paige, 167-176;
Mea·d vs. Bank, 6 Blatchf. 1~6; Emery vs. Bank, 3 Cliff. 507;
In re BradlP.y, 2 Biss. 515; In re Babcock, 3 Story, 399.
This is upon the principlo that one wl;lo holds two independent
obligations as security for a debt is entitled to avail himself of
both until the debtor is once completely satisfied.
Having established the right of a creditor, ·who holds the
note of a firm, indorsed by some or all of its members, to participate in the joint estate of the partners, to the exclusion of
individual creditors, as well as in the separate estate. of the indorsers, to the exclusion of partnership creditors, and resting
their ultimate right for preference on this proposition, counsel
for the intervenors plfmsibly contend that since the conveyances
of their individual property, made by the several membe.rs of
the firm of Fletcher & Sharpe in pursuance of the new partnership agreement, were intendetl merely aa security for debts due
from those members to the firm, such conveyances, although
absolute in form, constituted in fact only mortgages. Therefore, it is eaid, the property thus conveyed remained the individual property of the several members, subject only to a mortgage in favor of the firm, notwithstanding the conveyances.
Hence, the argument proceeds, the rights of the partnership
creditors having become fixed and vested in the partnership
property by the appointment of a receiver, the correlative
rights of the individual creditors in the individual property, being compensatory, must have become fixed and vested in the individual property of the several members at the same time.
The conclusion is said to follow; since the intervenors, who
occupy the double character of individual and partnership creditors, have thus obtained a vested right in or lien upon the indi-
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vidual as well as the partnership property, that neither the insolvent firm of Fletch~r & Sharpe, nor the receiver, will be
bound to assert the prior mortgage in favor of the firm, upon
the separate property of the individual members, as against the
subsequent lieu of the intervenors, who are also creditors of
the firm. The joint creditorg represented by the receiver, it is
said, have no rights except such as they derive by subrogation
from Fletcher & Sharpe, and since the latter could not have
come into competition with the intervenors, their own creditors,
in obtaining payment out of the individual property conveyed
as above, their joint creditor cannot do so. It is undoubtedly
true that a debto1· will not be permitted to avail himself of a
prior security, if to do so would defeat the collection of a debt
which he is legally or equitably bound to pay.
Where property is incumbered as security for the payment of
two debts, if the holder of the first lien is under a duty ultimately to pay the debt secured by the second, it would be
manifestly inequitable to permit him, in case the property was
insufficient to pay both, to set up the prior lien, to the cliscomfit.ure of his own creditor. Thus, if a partner borrow money on
his individual security or credit, although for the use of the
firm of which he is a member, while he might haven partnet·'s
liE\n infer sese, be has none against the firm creditors, because he
him~Plf owes the joint debts due the creditors of t.he firm.
2
LincH. Partn. 683; Ketchum vs. Durkee, 1 Hoff. Ch. 53ft
Upon like principles, the assignee of the last series of notes secured by mortgage is entitled to preference over the mortgagee,
who retains a pt·ior not~, in case the latter became liable for the
payment of the last note by his contract of indorsement. Wilbur vs. Buchanan, 85 Ind. 42; 2 Jones, Mortg. § 1701.
The facts found by the court, however, do not make the present a case for the application of the principles above stated.
\Vithout conceding that the conveyance of their separate property by the individual members of the firm of Fletcher &
Sharpe, in pursuance of the agreement above refen·ed to, and
dissenting entirely from the view that the appointment of a receiver of the assets of the firm in any way affected the relation
of the individual creditors to the separate property of the sev·
eral members, so as to give those creJitors a vested right in or
lien upon the separate property of the partners, yet, if these
points were conceJed to the intervenors, we are unable to see
how it woulJ aiJ their purpose, unless the conveyances referred
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to were invalid and of no effect as against individual creditors.
Whether the deeds operated as absolute conveyances, or as
mortgages, there is no question but that they were executed
some months prior to the appointment of the receiver, and before the intervenors became creditors either of the firm of
Fletcher & Sharpe or of any of its individual members. Nor is
there any dispute but that the conveyances were made either to
pay or secure actual subsisting debts due from the owners of
the property, respectively, to the copartnership.
The property having been transferred to secure the payment
of bona fide debts due the firm long before the receiver was appointed as soon as a receiver was appointed it vested in
him for the benefit of the creditors of the firm. The effect
of the conveyances very clearly was to convert that which
was theretofore individual property into property belonging to
the firm. Debts due from the individual members of a partnership, like other debts due the firm, become assets in the
bands of a receiver, who stands in some respect as assignee
of the firm property, and are to be collected and applied to
the payment of firm debts accordingly. If such debts are
secured by mortgage, granting that the conveyances in question
constituted mortgages only, or otherwise the security, like the
debt, stands for the benefit of the firm creditors, unless the
security was taken in violation of the rights of individual creditors. The inquiry thus ultimately comes to this: is a conveyance of separate property, executed in good faith by a partner
to secure a debt owing by him to the firm of which he is a
member, valid as against the individual creditors of the partner?
Upon principle and authority this question must be answered in
the affirmative.
It is settled everywhere that when the assets of a partnership,
or the individual property of the members of a firm, are brought
under the jurh~diction of a court for judicial administration,
the equitable rule of distribution will be applied, and the partnership assets will be devoted, firs~, to the payment of the firm
debts, and the individual property of the several partners to
theh· individual debts, respectivl3ly. But where the partnership
assets remain under the control of the partners, they have the
power to appropriate any portion of it to pay or secure the individual debts of the members of the firm. Thus, in F-isher vs . .
Syfers, 109 Ind. 514, 10 N. E. Rep. 306, this court said:
"Where debts are fairly owing by either partuer individually,
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the mere 'p reference of individual over partnership creditors, by
the execution of a chattel mortgage in the firm name, or by
authority of tho partners, upon the property of the firm, i~ not.
of itself such a fraud upon the partnership creditors as will
authorize the setting aside of the chattel mortgage at the suit of
the creditor." Bank vs. Spmgue, 20 N. J. Eq. 13; Kirby vs.
Sr.hoonaker, 3 Barb. Ch. 46; Kennedy vs. Bank, 23 Hun, 494:;
Jones, Chat. 1\fortg. § 44; In re Kahley, 2 Biss. 383.
So, in the same decision, it is said : ''The rule that obtains
in the distribution of the estates of partners, and under which
partnership creditors are entitl~d to priority of payment out of
the partnership assets, is an equitable doctrine for the benefit
and protection of the partners, respectively. Partnership creditors have no lien upon partnership property. Their right to
priority of pay.ment out of the firm assets, over the individual
creditors, is always worked out through the liens of the partners." Warren vs. Farmer, 100 Ind. 593; Trentman vs.
Swa.rtzell, 85 Ind. 443. Upon the death of one partner, or
where the firm becomes bankrupt, or where the partnership
assets are being administered by a court, the rule of equitable
distribution is applicable to its fullest extent. Where, however,
tho partners have the possession and control of their own property, they have the right to make any honest dispof!ition of it
they see fit. Each has the right to waive his equitable lien,
and together they may sell, assign, or mortgage the property
of the firm to pay or secure either an individual debt of one of
the partner~:~ or the debts of the firm.
The equity of the creditors is a derivative one, and arises out
of the principles of subrogation, entitling them to enforce the
equities subsisting between the partners, so long as the right of
any of the partners has not been waived. But the partners
may waive their rights either in the partnership property or
that owned by them individually. Dunham vs. Hanna, 18
Ind. 270; Case vs. Beauregard, 99 U.S. 119, and cases cited.
It being thus settled that partners, while they remain in the
possession and control of partner~hip property, and before it is
brought under the jurisdiction of a court for administration,
may create liens upon the property, or appropriate it to pay or
~ecure the individual debts of the partners, the correlative right
(Jf an individual partner, to deal in like manner with his own
::;eparate property, and appropriate it to pay or secure his own
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debta to the firm as a debt owing by the finn to a third person,
would seem to follow aA a matter of course.
Thus, in Jackson vs. Cornell, 1 Sandf. Ch. 348, speaking of
a general assignment by an insolvent partner, in which the
assignor gave preference to certain creditors of the firm, to the
exclusion of his own, the vice-chancellor said : " Let the partner actually apply his own property as he thinks proper while
he administers it himself, but when he avails himself of the
lenient provisions of our law, .which enables him to prefer sue~
creditors as he pleases, on making an assignment, and to select
his own trustee, let us require him to avoid violating the plainest principles of equity." This decision, while holding that a
court of equity will neither tolerate nor administer a general
assignment by a partner of his separate property, in which he
prefers partnership over individual creditors, nevertheless fnll1
recognizes the right of a partner to "apply his own property as
be thinks proper, while he administers it himself."
The limitation upon the power of partners or of individuals to deal with or dispose of partnership or individual prop. erty while it remains in the possession and under the dominiou
of the owners, must in either case, be that the disposition or appropriation be honestly made, without any fraudulent intent to
divert the property from the payment of their bona fide debts,
as to injure their creditors, and with no purpose to secure some
benefit to themselves, presumably, by the arrangement. That
the disposition results in the payment of one bona fide debt to
the exclusion of another creditor, whose demand is equally
meritorious, is of no consequence. Bedell vs. Chase, 34 N. Y.
386; Gregory vs. Harrington, 33 Vt. 241; Covanhovan vs .
Hart, 21 Pa. St. 495; SmUh vs. Selzer, 114 Ind. 229, 16 N. E.
Rep. 524.

Whatever a partner may do with his individual property in
respect to paying or securing debts of the firm, it cannot be
doubted that he has the right, as ~as done in the present case,
to appropriate it to the paymen.t or security of his own debt to
the firm of which he is a member. We are thus led to the conclusion that the conveyances by the individual members of their
separate property to the firm of Flet,cher & Sharpe, whether
those conveyances be regarded as having been made in payment of or as s~curity for debts due the firm, or whether they
be considered as advancements mane hy the several partners to
th o capital stock of the finn, were vali<l nn1l dTt'cl1:: :! :··: :~ ··:t i: ·· l
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individual creditors, to transfer a vested interest in the propert.y
thus conveyed to the firm as of the date on which the convey·
ances were executed.
Having seen that the conveyances iu question were executed
while tho se\~eral partners were in control of and administering
their own property, long before the assets of the firm ~arne
under juuicial administration, and that the conveyances constituted Yalid transfers of the property therein described to the
firm, it results that the individual property out of which the intervenors claim the right to be preferentially paid, was legitimately part of the assets of the firm of Fletcher & Sharpe when
the receiver was appointed. The appointment of a receiver,
the firm being insolvent, operated to all intents and purposes as
an assignment of the firm assets, with all the securities incident
thereto, for the benefit of the firm creditors. This being so,
there is no principle of law or equity upon which it can now be
'
·said that the firm creditors shall be estopped to avail themselves
of the benefit of property which the firm had the right to acquire, and which it had acquired (whether in payment or as
security is immaterial) upon an adequate consideration paid.
Whether, in case the controversy were between the intervenors and Fletcher & Sharpe, the latter could he estopped to assert
their prior right to the property in question, we do not now decide. Fletcher & Sharpe having become insolvent, and having
in effect assigned their partnership effects for the benefit of their
creditors, the receiver representing an equal equity, and, having
the legal title in dispute, cannot be postponed to the claims of
an individual creditor. Where the equities are equal, he is in
the situation of advantage who holds the prior legal right. It
is only necessary to say, in conclusion, that we have fully considered what bas been said in relation to the fraudulent character of the conveyat10es referred to, as to future creditors, and
without stating our reasons at large, our conclusion is that it
does not appear, either iu the facts found or in the evidence,
that the contention of the intervenors in that respect is maintained. The conveyances seem to have been made in good
faith for the benefit of the creditors, without any reservation
or advantage to the grantor. The judgment is therefore
affirmed, with costs.
NOTE.-See Mechem's Elem. of Partn. § 288.

This case is also cited as Lanier vs. Wallace.
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Bill In equity.
Royal \Villinms and James A. Norton, copartnen under the
firm name of \Villiams & NoTton, upon their own petition, weTe
individually and as c.-opartners dulyadjudged insolvent debtors.
' The assets of the partnership, amounting to one dollar and
nineteen cents only, were absorbed by the expenses of selling
the same. Norton's individual estate had oo assets, while Wil·
Hams', after deducting legal coets and charges, amounted to
eleven hundred and s€'\'enty-seven dollars and thirty-six cents.
Against .the partnership estate, clahn.s amounrting to more
than twenty-two hundred dollars were proved; agajnst Williams' individual estate eleven hundred and thirty-three dollars
lllld sixty-seven cents; and against Norton's, no claims.
Before the court CYf insolvency the partnership creditors
claimed a pro rata dividend from the separate estate of Williams pari passu with hls individual creditors; but the judge
denied the claim and decreed ttha.t the assignees should distr·ib·
ute those assets among the individual creditors. Thereupon
the complainants brought this bill (claimed by them to be
authorized by the insolvent stn.tute of 1878, c. 74, sec. 11, as
amended by stat. 1879, c.. 154, sec. 3), somewhat in the nature
of an appeal from the deeree of the judge 00 insolvency; and
the parties have brought the case before us on an agreed statement, reservi ng the question of jurisdiction of thls court, which
is expressly raised.

William L. Putnam, for the plainti1fs.
George 0. Hopkina, Charles P. Mattock8, and Strout c£ Holme'
and E. P. Payson, tor different defendants.

J . (After disposing CYf the question of jurisdiction,
continues.) 2. The next qu&<rtion is, was the decree of the
court of insolvency correct in ordering a distribution of Williams' individual assets among his separate creditors, to the·
VIRGIN,
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exclusion of the oomplainants, the creditors of the firm. The
respondents rely upon the provisions of sec. 54, stat. 1878, e. 74,
and certain oases cited of their brief.
It is familiar history that as early as 1715, I.nrd Oh. HAR·
counT ·laid down as the rule of administering the joinJt and separate estates in bankruptcy, that the joint est:aore Shall b~
applied in payment of the partnership debts, and the separa,te
estaJte, of the fJeparate debts, any surplus of either estate
being carried over to the other. Ex parte Crotcder, 2 Vern. 706.
This doctrine was followed by Lord Ch. Knw, in Ex parte Cook,
2 P. W·m s. 500. Bnt it seems tihlat this rule was departed from
by Lord THURLow, who let in creditors of the firm concurrently
with the separate creditors, upon the separate estate, upon the
~round that they were equally cred!itors of the firm and of the
·partners. E0 parte Cobham, 1 Brown's Oh. 576; Ex parte Hodgson, 2 Brown's Oh. 5; Ex parte Page, 2 Brown's Ch. 119. The
OOI"'Iler rule was restored, however, by Lord LouGHBOROUGB
(E0 parte Elton, 3 V es, 239; E0 parte A bell, 4 V es 837), oonfirmed
by Lord ELDON; (E0 parte Clay, 6 Vesey 813; E0 parte Ta4U, 16
Ves. 193), rund it has been the prevailing general rule ever since
drn England. Lindl. Part. (3d. En. ed.) 1201; &bs. Bank. 584;
ColJy. Part. (Perkin-s' ed.) 775-6; Lodge t'B. P1·itcha1·d, 1 De G. G.
a111d S. 609; and in this country as well. Among the numerous
cases, see Wilde.r vs. l(ecler, 3 Paige (N. Y.) 167, 23 Am. Dec.
781; Payne vs. Matthews, 6 Paige 19, 29 Am. Dec. 738; Murray
f'B. Murray, 5 J~hns. (N.Y.) Oh. GO; 3 Kent, '64, 65; Story Partn.
sees. 376-378. In 1·e Manoick, 2 Ware 233 ; Pars. Partn. 480, et
seq. and n~tes. Tbis rule was also adopted in the U . S. Bankrupt Law, 1841 (5 F. S. stat. 440, 448, sec. 14); U.S. Bankrupt
Law, 1867 (sec. 36, R. S., U.S. sec. 51~1); in the Insolvent Laws
of MassaohuseUs ( 18~8, sec. 21), and in the Insolvent Laws CYf
this state, staJt. 1878, c. 74, sec. 54. Jarois f'B. Brookl, 23 N. H.
136.
This rule applies to the estates as they exist when the parties
are declared bankrupt or insolvent, and n~t before; for the
el'editors of the firm have no lien upon its property which can
prevent the partners from bona fide chnn~ing its character
and converting it into the separate estate of one of them prior
tbereto. Ex parte Ruffin. 6 Ves. 119; Case vs. Beauregard, 99
U. S. 119, anteJ· Robb vs. ]fudge, 14 Gray (Mass.) 534.
The reasons assigned for giving the partnership creditors the
preference over the joint estate in bankruptcy have been varl-
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one. But the view generally taken founde it not upon any lien
or superior claim which they primarily have, but upon a
privilege or pre.ferenee sometimes denominated a lien derived.
from the equitable rjght which each partner, who being liable
for an the partnership debts and whof*> interest in its propel"ty
being simply his share of the residue after payment of its debt:IJ
and S('ttlements of its accouiLts, consequently has tha,t the
partnership property shall go to pay its debts in prefe~
to those of any individual partner. Case vs. Beauregard, supra;
Johnson vs. Het·sey, 70 Maine 74,35 Am. Rep. 303; Washburn vs.
Bellows Falls Bm1Tc, 19 Yt. 286, 288. It baa also been 'said that
this priority in joint assets and equality in the separate are
founded on the fact that the partnership creditors trusted each
and all the partners, whire the separate creditor trusted butt
one; and that natural justice warrants the mar·sballing of the
aesets so as to give the former the preference. Brock vs. Bate·
man, 25 Ohio St. G09. That it is familiar law that a credi·t or of
a partnership, having recovered a judgment against it, may
&aJtisfy his execution against partnership property O'r against
the individnul property of any of the partners (Juchero vs.
Axley, 6 Cranch (U. S.) 34, 40; Eger-y vs. Howard, 64 Maine 68,
73; Washburn t•s. Bello-tos Falls Bank, supra), and in the case of
intervening insolvency, having two funds, from which to satJsfy his claim, the principle familiar in marshalling asst-ts or
securities oomes in and compels him to exhaust the fuoo to
whiob he lias the ('Xclusive right before he be allowed to oom·
pete with a creditor who bas a claim only on one of the funds.
E.r. parte Elton, 3 Ves. 240; 1 Story Eq. sec. 558. Lord Jus·tice
Tun:-iER said: "T.bis rule may perhaps proceed upon this: that
the joint estate is clearly liable both at law and in equity for
the joint debts, at law, by reason of the survivorship, a.nd in
equity by virtue of the rights of the partners, inter se, to have
it so applied; and that tlle separate estate is as clearly liable,
both at law and in equity, for the St'parate debts; and that the
· car·rying over the surplus of the one estate to the other,
although it may not strictly work out the rights, may afford
the best meau of adjusting the complications which arise
from the joint estate being liable for the separate debts only
ao far as the interest of the partners from whoon the debts
may be doe may extend, and from the separate estates, if
taken for the joint debts, having recou1·se o¥er against the
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In re MARWICK.
. _,. r¥'
~' t.t ....-q ./''
11
. t aour,t 18-¥'.
Ll:
""-!II' • ':::< ':'( :...l-~ • ~.(- ' . .,.; u:.s. D.~st nc
,,.·_ . . -" ..?"..?' I'~ -.,.,
: . ~ .;·-- XS~ . ~ "'• -~.:/r
2 Wa.re 238, Fed.~- 9181.

.r:.

.. ·-~.-/// V" 7,_ .... ~r
·: ;:--"_> ....r\.Y- This was a case of objection to a proof of a

debt. Marwick,
the bankrupt, in May, lR37, entered into a copartnership with
· ·.':l _, ,· one Fre(lerick Davis. and as partners they purchased a quantity
1
, • .~ /
of provisions for the Georgia Lumber Company, to the amount
"'
of $800, for which they drew theit· bill on the company in favor
...
of one Bradbury. Before the bill was paid, the company failed,
,..:- .x- and the failure of the company produced that of the COJ:>artner.} ·:-/"·' ship of Marwick & _Davis, by which the firm was dissolved.
.,""' ~
They afterwards gave their joint note for the ~mm .remaining
due, viz., t740.R8. This note, Bradbury, for a valuable consideration, transferred to Dole, with notice that it was a partner·
ship debt. The assignee of Marwick & Davis rendered in his
account of the joint estate, Oct. 25, 1R44, showing outstanding
demands in favor of the firm to the amount of $13,000, which
comprised the whole assets of the firm and whieb were all represented as utterly worthless. Dule. the creditor, proved biR debt,
June l'i, 1842. The assignee, after rendering his first account,
appli~d for liberty to compromis(' or sell the claim against the
Georgia Lumber Company, which was disposed of for $!0, of
which a supplementary account was rendered, and the amount
paid into court, April 25, 1845, to the credit of the joint estate.
The final account of the assignee of the separate estate showed
assets to the amount of $545.93. Two debts have been proved
and allowed against the estate, one by Charles E. Marwick, for
$084:.0-l, and the debt of Dole. Marwick objected to the admission of Dole's debt against the separate estate.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 16:50 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112102486216
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

·· /

... ., ·

.,

').

District Judge.
'l'wo questions have been raised au<l argued in the present
case. The first i::;, whether the creditors of a copartnership
can, in any case, be admitted to prove their claims against the
WARE,
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separate estate of one of the copart.ners, for the purpose of receiving dividends in concurrence with the separate creditors of
the· copartner. The. second is, whether, admitting that they
mny in some cases, the partnership creditors can be admitted
so to prove under the facts in this case.
The 14th section of the bankrupt act provides, when two or
more persons become bankrupt who are partners in trade, that
separate and distinct accounts shall be kept, in the settlement
of their estates, of the joint effects of the firm and of the separate effects of the several partners, and when the whole expenses
are paid, that the net proceeds of the joint property shall be
applied to the payment of the joint creditors, and the separate
property of each partner shall be applied to the payment of his
separate creditors, and that the creditors of the respective
estates shall be allowed to receive dividends from the other
estate only after the creditors of that estate shall have been
fully paid. This is in substance the rule established by the law,
and it is quite clear where there is both a joint and separate
estate, that the creditors of neither can prove against the other
estate for the purpose of receiving dividends, except from the
surplus remaining after its own proper creditors have been fully
satisfied.·
'
This general rule for marshaling the assets and claims is taken
from the English bankrupt law. But under that system th~re
are exceptions, as well established as the rule itself. One of
these exceptions is where there is no joint estate and no Jiving
solvent partner, as is the fact in the present cas('. In such a
case the joint creditors are allowed to prove and receive dividends against the separate estate, in concurrence with the separate creditors. Story on Partnership, sec. 372. Eden on Bankruptcy, 172. But to bring the case within the exception, there
must be absolutely no joint estate. If there be any, however
smaU, the exception is not aJlowed, and it has been rejected
where the joint estate amounted only.to £1, lls. 6d. And again,
there must be no living solvent partner-and solvent is here used
not in its ordinary sense, that.is, an ability to pay the whole of
one's debts- but in the sense of nonbankrupt partner. For
though he may be in fact insolvent and unable to pay the whole
of his debts, if he be not actually in legal bankruptcy the excep-
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tion,is excluded and the general rule prevails. Ex parte Ja-nsen, 3 Maddocks 229. The principle is, that While there is any
fund, however small, to which the joint. creditors may resort,
they cannot oome agR.inst.the separate estate in competition with
the separate creditors; and though a person may be insolvent,
if he be not in actual bankruptcy, and thus divested of all llis
property, he may still have the ability to pay part of his debts,
and this possibility is held to be enough to exclude the joint
creditors from sharing in the separate estate of the bankrupt
part.n er, except in the surplus after the separate creditors are
paid.
Such is the general rule under the English bankrupt laws,
and such the character of the exception to the rule, which it is
supposed may be admitted under our law.' Our statute has
adopted the general rule, without taking notice of any of the
exceptions. It does not appear to contemplate the case of there
being no joint property, and as it passes it by in silence it may
be a grave question whether it does not leave such a case open
to the application of the general principles of equity. But as
there is a joint fund in the present case, it is immaterial whether
it does or not, unless the court may look behind the fact of
_ there being a joint fund, to the manner in which it has been
created. It appears from the proofs in the case, or the facts
which are admitted, that the assignee rendered in his first account of the partnership estate in October, 1844, in which the
whole of the assets, consisting of outstanding demands, are
represented as worthless; that afterwards he applied for liberty
to compromise or collect a debt, on which he obtained $40, Rnd
rendered into court a supplementary account; and it further
appears that the money to take up this note was actually advanced by Charles E. Marwick, as creditor of the separate estate. Now the argument is that if the exception to the general
rule of marshaling the assets and debts, established under the
English bankrupt system, may be admitted under our statute,
then, as it is founded on the general principles of equity and
distributive justice, a creditor of the separate estate ought not
to be permitted to defeat the equity of the joint creditor, by
purchasing for a small sum a partnership demand, for which ·
nothing could have been obtained but for this purpose. Allowing the premises on which the argument is founded to be cor-
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Teet, it does seem to present itself with some force to the equitable consideration of the court. The effect in the _present case
will be, that the separate creditor will receive nearly the whole
of his claim and the joint creditors but a small percentage, if
~ach is restricted to his own appropriate fund . .
But after considerable reflection I have come to the conclusion, that, admitting the assumption on which the. argument is
founded, it cannot prevail. In the first place, if this matter is
viewed as a struggle between the two classes of creditors, it is
a strife on the part of the separate creditors, not de lucro captando, but de damno vitando. A creditor may, without any
grave imputation in the forum of conscience, be allowed all fair
and legal means to avoid a loss, though it may incidentaily be
at the expense of another creditor. And though it is a maxim
in equity jurisprudence that equality is equity, yet the court
holds the maxim subordinate to legal priorities, which one party
may by his diligence acquire over another. And further, the
whole subject of marshaling ~he assets and claims between the
joint and separate creditors in bankruptcy involves some of the
most difficult problems that occur in the whole range of jurisprudence. It has hitherto been found impracticable to establish
any general rule that will meet the equities of all the various
cases that come up in prn.ctice; and the courts have been finally
compelled, instead of subjecting the whole to a rigorous analysis and extracting a system of rules which will carry out the
principles of natural justice, to cut down the difficulties byestablishing a general rule, which at first seems conformable to
general equity, and then to limit and qualify it by a number of
arbitrary exceptions, in order to meet the particular equities of
particular cases. Eden on Bankruptcy, 169, 174. Story on
Partnership, sees. 374, 382.
This system is admitted to be not entirely satisfactory; it has
sometimes been departed from and again restored, and is now
adhered to, not because it is in all respects conformable to the
principles either of positive law or of natural equity, but partly
as a rule of conyenience, as it has been sometimes called, and
partly because no system has been hitherto preaented as a substitute, which is not found to be encountered by equal difficulties. Dutton vs. Morrison, 17 Vesey 193. Ex parte Elton,
3 Vesey 238.
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If, then, we admit that the equitable doctrines of the English
courts, iu the administration of their bankrupt law, are app1icable under our Htatute, how will the case stand? In the first
place, if this fund had been brought into court in consequence
of the purchase of this note by any other person than a separa~e
creditor, it is clear there would have been an end of the case.
What difference does it make that he has advanced the money,
and thus Cl'eated the fund? It was the duty of the assignee to
make the most of the assets. If, with the knowledge that '40
could be obtained by the transfer of this note, he had rendered
it into court as worthless, he might have been compelled to pay
the money out of his own pocket. The fund would then have
been produced in this way, and theo joint creditor would have
been in the same condition he is now. It was not for the
aSI!lignee to inquire who the purchaser was, or what were his
motives in making the purchase. And even suppose that he
might have done this and refused to ~11 to a separate creditor for
such a purpose. the creditor might have gone to the debtor and
furnished him the money to take up the note, and thus indirectly obtain the same result. And indeed this seems to have
been the course adopted in the present case; for the note was
nominally taken up by one of the company, who was liable upon
it, though the money was advanced by the creditor." So that if
we were to adopt the principle of going behincl the fact of there
being a fund, to inquire whether that had not boon inequitably
creat.ed by the management of the separate creditors, the court
would at once be involved in inextricable difficulties.
The object of this inquiry is to reach the supposed equity of
the case, by making a more just and equal distribution of the
assets behveen the different classes of creditors, and to prevent
the separate creditors from creating out of worthless assets a
small fnnd for the sole purpose of preventing the joint creditors
from sharing with them the separate assets. But after all, is
not this supp<>f'ed equity more apparent than real? Each cla.ss
of creditors originaJly t.rusted to different funds and different
responsibilities, one to the social and one to the separate responsibility. The general equity would therefore seem in all cases
to confine each c1ass of creditors to that fund which they primar~
ily trusted, unless in a case where there had been a fraudulent
or improper abstraction from one estate for the purpose of in-
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creasing the other. And this is the general rule, not only in
bankruptcy, but in geaeral equity. Each class of creditors has
a right of prior payment out of the estate to· which he is supposed to have given credit, and the other class can only go
against the surplus. If a creditor of one partner attaches partnership property, his attachment only holds the right or interest which the parties shall be found to have in the property
after an account is taken and the joint creditors are paid. Kent's
Com. 64- 5, Note c, 5th edition. Story's Partnership, sec. 863.
The equity of each class of creditors against their proper fund,
certainly seems to be stronger than that of the other class who
never could have looked to it for their security, except so far as
there might be a surplus after discharging its own proper liabilities.
The general rule, therefore, has its foundation in natural
~uity, and it is established by the law. The law itself makes
:.10 exception . Now, admitting the case of there being no joint
estate to be a casus omissus, not contemplated and therefore
not within the purveiw of the law, it certainly covers all cases
where there is a joint fund, without inquiring into its origin.
And-it is a rule in the construction of Btatutes, that when the
statute covers the whole case in all its circumstances and make
no exceptions, none can be made by the court.
0
'

0

. My opinion, on the whole, is that the proof cannot be admit~ ted against the separate estate, in competition with the separate
creditors.
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meDt for which plalatitfs elabned priority wu recovered iD
lfU7 aga.iDBt E. P . Taylor, upon his indhidua.l debt. The judgment for whic'b defendantS claimed priority was recovered in
1842 against Taylor indh'idually and as surviving partner, and
was founded upon an indebt~ness of his late firm. Both judgmeats were oocketed in Erie county, wherein Taylor owned
l'eal property in his individulll right. In 1850 executions on
both judgmelllts were i8sued to the eher.ift of Erie county, and
he proceeded to make sale of this real property. At the sale
the plaintiffs gave notice of their claim tha.t .their judgment, by
rea5oo of its being founded· on T.aylor's individual debt, and
bcing tberefore a lien on his individual property, had a preference, so 1lar as '!the property offered for sale was concerned, over
the other though ee.rlier judgment founded on a partnership
debt. Taylor owned no other individual property available to
plaintiffs, but there was partnerehip property avai.Ja:ble to the
.other judgment creditors. The sheriff refused to recognize this
claim, and sold the proverty to the defendant. The ptain.titfs
then brought this suit to establish tbe priority claimed by
them; but the supreme oour:t 8118tained defendant's demurrer
to the oomplaint.
8. G. H avm, for the appellant&

a. Tucker, for the respoodent.
J. It is a settled rule of equity that as between the
joint and separate creditors of pa.rtnere the partnership property is to be first applied to tbe payment of the partnership
debts, and the sepa:ra.te property of the individual partners to.
the payment of their separate debts; and that neither class of
creditors can claim anything from the fund which belongs primarily to the opposite class, until all the claims of the latter are
satisfied. This, however, i8 a rule which prevails in oourts of
equity in the distribution. of equitable a.ssetlJ only. Those
courts ·have never aesumed to exercise the power of setting
aside, or in any way interfering with, an absolute right or
priority obtained at law. In regard 1:o all such cases the rule is,.
Equitaa sequitur legem, 1 Story's Eq. Jur., § 553.
In Wilder vs: Keeler, 3 Paige (N. Y.) 171, 23 Am. Dec. 781,
Oha.n-cellor WALWOR'l'H says: "Equitable rnles are adopted by
this court in the administration of legal assets, except so far
u the law has given an absolute preference to one class of cred··
SELDEN,
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itors over another." So in the ooee of Averill "'· Louca, 6
Harb. (N.Y.) 470, P.&IGJB, P. J., eays: "Courts of eqll'ity, in-the
ndministration of 888ets, follow the rules of law in regard to
lega.l assets, and recognize and enforce all a.nteoede!K liene,
daimt!, a.nd charges existing upon the property, accol"ding to
their priorities." This is 'also conceded in the case of .Afc(Jullo'A
"'·Dashiell, 1 Bar. & G. (Md.) 96, 18 Am. Dec. 271, where the
whole doctrine Gf the distribution In equi-ty ot the joiut and eepara.te property of partners is very elaborately eDUilined,
ARCHER, J., by whom the opinion of the court waa delivered,
there says: "At law the joint creditors may pursue both the
joint and separaste eeta.te to the extent of each, for the aa.tt•
faction of their joint demands, which a.re at law oonstdered
joint and severa•l, wi~hout the possibility of the interposition of
any restraining power of a court of equity.." But especially
must it be bt>yond the power ot such oourta to interfere, where
an 8Jbsolute right of legal priority is given by fOIICe of a poeitive
statute, u in· case of a judgment. Chancellor w .lLWORTB, m
Mower"'· Kip, 6 P·aige (N.Y.) 88, 29 Am. Deo. 748, ays: "The
rule of this court is to ghe e«eoct to the lien of a judgment upon
a legal title, so 1iar as it can be enforced by exeowtion at la.w."
AM there is no doubt t·hat at law the judgment for a pe.rtnerahip debt attaches and becomes a lien upon the real eetate of
each of the partnE."M!!, with tlle Mme effect ae ff such judgmen1:
were for the separate debt of such partner, it is obvious, from
the preceding authorities, -that the theory upon which the complaint In this case was drawn le erroneous. The principle tba.t
the separate property of an individual partner is to be finrt applied to the paymt-nt of his separa.te debts hta.a, aa we have seen,
never been held to give priority, aa to such property, to a subsequent judgment for an individuaJ over a prior judgmE."'rt for
a partnership debt. It is true that courts of equity will eometimes give to a mere equitable lien, which is prior in point of
time, a preferen-ce over a subsequent judgmen4:; bnt this will
be done only where such prior lien is specific in W:s character,
as in the case of White t71. Carpenter, 2 Paige (N.Y.) 219. The
mere general equity of the separate ereditOl'll to have thedr
debts first paid out of flle individual property ()f the partners
does not amount to a lien at all, much lese a lien of the klnd
necessa.ry to give it a preference over a judgmeut for a partnership debt.
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The plaintiffs cannot, under the averments in the complaint,
avail themselves of that principle of equity which enables a
creditor having a lien upon one fund only to compel a creditor
who has a lien not merely on the same fund, but al90 upon
another, to resort first to the latter, to the end tha:t both may
be paid. If the complaint ·bad averred thart there was suftlcien1 partnership property, upon which the defendant's judgment was a lien, to satisfy such judgment, it is possible thatt,
under the principle referred to, the plaintiffs might 'have been
eDJtitled to some relief; and in tha·t evenrt it would not have
been a valid objection to the complaint that it did n<Yt: ask for
the relief appropriate to the case. But the averment in the
complaint is simply 1!hat there is sufficient estate of the
deceased partner, Hiram Pratt, to satisfy tlle defend·a nt's judgment.
This averment brings the case directly within the dootrin~
laid down by Lord ELDON in Ea1 part6 Kendall, 17 Ves. ti20. He
says: "It A has a right to go upon two funds, and B upon one,
having both the saane debtor, A shall take payment from·tba.t
fund to which he can resort exclusively, th81t by t!hoee meallS
of distl'ibution both may be paid. That rtakes place w4here
bath are creditors of the same person, and have demands
against funds the property of the same person. But it wu
never said that it I have a demand against A and B, a creditor
of B shall compel me to go against A witb·o ut more, as if B
himself could insist that A onght to pay in the first inetanoce
as in the ordinary case of drawer and a.oceptor, or principal
a·n d surety, to the intent that all obligations arising out of
these oCOODiplicated relations may be 88Jti~fied. But it I have a
demand again-st both, the creditors of B have no right to compel me to seek payment from A, if not fou·nded in some equity,
giving to B the right for his own sake to oompel me to seek payment from A."
The point has also been expressly decided in tlhis state in
the case of Dorr t>B. Shaw, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) Cb. 17. The on·ly
difference in principle between that case and this is thalt there
it did not appear that the joint debtors were pa~ra. This,
however, is a difference which opera•tes against the clrum of
the plaintiffs ·here. Where two individuals, not partners, are
jointly indebted, it might seem to be just to presume thart:
each owed ooe-half of the debt, and to thalt extent, therefore,
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there might be an equity in favor of the one owing a.n indi·
v.idual debt to have 80 much ot the joint debt paid by biB
oodebtor. But in regard to partners, it is now well settled,
upon an ana:logous question, tha.t no such presumption can be
indulged. Formerly a judgmenrt: oreditor C1f one of two part·
aers might levy his execution upon property belonging to the
ftrm, and urpon t'he presumption that the interests of the part·
ners were equal, might proceed to sell and appropriate one-half
ol the avails to the satisfaction of his debt. This, however,
was long since overruled.
In the case of Dutto·n vs. Morrison, 17 Ves. 193, Lord ELDO~,
in discussing this question, says: "It may be represented thaJt:
the world cannot know what is the distinct interest of each
(i. e., eac·h partner), .a nd therefore it is better that the apparen•t
Interest of each should be considered as his a.ctual interest.
But oourt.s of equity have long held otherwise." He then lays
down the rule ever since acted upon, that the creditor in such
a C8Jie must wait until the partnership accouuts are settled
before he can claim anything from tlle partnership property.
The prineiple here asserted by Lord ELDON is directly a.pplicable to the present case. It is, that no inference can be srufely
drawn from the mere exrernal relations of partners to the
world as to the situation C1f their affairs inter 16, and that in all
judicial proceedings involving the latter an investigation is
first to be made; and such is the variety and frequent oomplexity of pm·tnership dealing8 that any other rule would
obviously lead to gross injustice. It ialmpossible,.therefore, in
this case to assume, without any averments on the subject in
the complaint, that the estate of the deceased partner Pratt
ought, in equity, to· pay any portion of the defendant's judg·
ment. Hence, upon the principles laid down by Lord ELDON,
and universally acted upon by cotll"ta of equity, the complaint{:
is clearly insufficient.
The judgment of the supreme ooul't, therefore, should be
affirmed, wit11 costs.
All the judges concurred.
Judgment aflirmed.
NOTal See Mechem's Elem. of Partn,,
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tc7\.·"Co.rt of .Appeals of New York, 1811.
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~·court in the first judicial department, affirming judgments en-
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tered in favor of defendants upon the reports of a referee.
These actions were brought by plaintiff, as sHeriff of the city
and county of New York, to reach the avails of certain property alleged to belong to the firm of John E. Shawhan & Co.,
which plaintiff claimed under and by virtue of attachments
against said firm in suits brought against it by firm creditors.
· Ou the first of July, 1867, John E. Shawhan, C. Mendall
and A . H. Palmer, of St. Louis, Missouri, advertised themselves as copartners, under the firm name of John E . Shawhan
& Co., and they continued business in St. Louis ostensibly
under that name until October, 1~67. In reality, Mendall and
Palmer were not partners, but merely clerks in the employ of
Shawhan, receiving salaries as such. The latter owned all the
property. This secret arrangement was unknown to the creditors of.the nominal firm.
Shawhan failed in October, 1867; instituted proceedings in
bankruptcy, and was adjudged a bankrupt in the district court
of the United States foc the eastern district of Missouri. The
defendants were appointed his as~ignees . At the time of the
failure, certain agents in New York, of the nominal firm, had
in their hand~ the avails of property shipped to them to sell on
commission. The proceeds of this sale were included by Shawhan in the schedule of assets filed in his proceedings in bankruptcy. Certain of the firm creditors thereupon commenced suits
by attachment against the members of the firm, which writs of
attachment were placed in plaintiff's hands for execution, and
by virtue thereof he attached the moneys arising from the sales
in the hands of the agents, and after the obtaining of judgments, these actions were brought ~gainst the agents to compel
the payment of the funds in their hands as aforesaid. By orders
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of interpleader in the actions, the present defendants, theassignees in bankruptcy, were substituted as defendants, and
the moneys were paid into the United States Trust Company to
abide the judgment.
The referee found, in substance, that Shawhan, when he became bankrupt, was the sole owner of the funds in controversy,
and that the same passed, by the assignment in bankruptcy, to.
his assignees, and the subsequent leviet:J by plaintiff were inoperative and void, and he thereupon directed judgments in
favor of defendants, which were acoordingly entered.
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John C. Dimmick for the appellant.
Benjamin Odell for the respondents.
CHURCH, C. J. This case presents a somewhat novel phase
to the disputed and much litigated questions growing out of the
respective rights of individual and partnership creditors to partnership property, and the remedy for enforcing such rights ..
As between themselves, Mendall and PnlmE:'r, were nominal
partners merely, Shawhan having the entire interest in the
property and in the profits of the business.
There is no dispute that Mendall and Palmer by holding
themselves out as partners were personally liable for the debts
of the firm, although they in fact had no interest in it. (Story
on Partn., sec. 64.) But there is no question of personal liability in the case. The firm failed and Shawhan went into bank. ruptcy, and this is a contest between his assignees in bankruptcy to property nominally held by the firm, but really
belonging to Shawhan by virtue of the original arrangement
between him and Mendall and Palmer by which they were to
be nominal partners and an attaching creditor of the firm. I
fully concur with the legal propositions in the opinion of the
learned referee, and if they are decisive of the case the j udgments must be affirmed. According to the authorities upon
the subject as they now exist, each partner by virtue of his
community of interest, in case of insolvency or dissolution of
the firm, has a lien upon the partnership effects for the discharge of all the partnership debts, and this equity may be
made a.vaiiable for the benefit of creditors to secure a preference in the payment of partnership debts. It is suid that although the creditors have no lien they have "something
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approaching to a lien" of which they may avail themselves to
secure an equitable preference. (Story on Partnership, sec.
3(.>0.) And an attachment or execution for a partnership debt
will take precedence over process on an individual debt by virtue of this quasi lien derive<! through and dependent upon the
lien of each partner upon partnership effects to have the partnership debts paid. ( ld., 361, and cases cited.) It is a part of
the same theory that this equitable lien of each partner is for
his benefit only, and that by a transfer bona fide of his interest
in the partnership effects to his copartner, the lien or equity is
gone and the creditors can derive no rights through or by
reason of it. In other words, the creditor's right is derivative
only, al}d if by any valid arrangement or agreement the partner deprives himself of it, the creditors can derive none through
him. It has accordingly been held, that if one of two partners
transfers in good faith to the other all his interest in the partnership effects, and in consideration of-the payment of partnership debts, his equity or lien to have the partnership debts paid
is gone, and he has only the personal security of his copartner,
and that the latter becomes the absolute owner of the property,
which is equally subject to individual as to ~rtnership debts,
and the partnership creditors lose their derivative right of lien
by the transfer of the partner through whom alone they could
derive it. ( 32 N. Y. 65; 8 Barb. 593.) This theory, it must
be confessed, seems artificial and indefinite, but it has been
generally arlopted by the courts, and is a modification in favor
of partnership creditors of the old notion of a tenancy in common.
Mr. Parsons, in his work on Partnership ( p. 355), in an able
review of the general subject, has suggested a further modification in the same direction assimilating partnerships more nearly
to corporations, aml it is not improbable that the growing importance of the relation may induce the adoption of some change
by which the rights and equities of partnership creditors shall
be more certain, and independent of the action of the partners
themselves. Mendall and Palmer never had this equitable lien,
because by the original arrangement between them and Shawhan he was the absolute owner of the property with power of
disposition. Their legal position was that of surety for Shawhan, without any of the rights of a partner, and having no such
rights, they could transmit none to creditors. It would follow
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that the prope11.y in the bands of Shawha.n was individual property and passed to his assignees. Upon this ground the referee
found for t.be defendants, and found correctly, if the facts which
actually existed are controlling.
But there is another view of the case which I think deserves
attention, and that is, whether Shawhan himself, or his assignees,
are in a position to deny to the partnership creditors all the
rights which they would have had if Mendall and Palmer had
been actual partners. Can he deny that they were partners in
fact, not merely to the extent of personal responsibility, but also
as possessing the equitable right necessary to enable partnership creditors to secure their just preference? Shawhan advertised to the world that they were partners. The attachment
creditor dealt with them as such. Had he not a right to rely
not only on their personal responsibility, whatever it was, but
upon this equitable security upon the partnership effects; and
are we not bound to assume that he did so rely ?
It may be said that they could at any time have transferred to
Shawhan their whole interest, and thus deprived the partnership
creditors of this right. If the transfer had been made in good
faith such might have been its effect, and the creditors could not
lawfully complain. But this was not done. A transfer in contemplation of bankruptcy, or one made with intent to deprive
the creditors of their equitable lien, would have been void. It
is only in case of insolvency or dissolution that the lien attaches.
While the business continues and' the firm is solvent, neither
the partners nor creditors have any lien except by the ordinary
process of judgment and execution. Nor would an original
contract, I apprehend, be allowed to stand against partnership
creditors, which provided, in case of bankruptcy, that one of
the partners should own the whole property, and thus expose it
in advance to individual creditors. ( Id. sec. 358.) The question is, what did Shawhan assert by his acts and declarations
in respect to Mendall and Palmer, and what had the attaching
creditor a right to understand that. he Mserted? Was it that
they were nominal partners merely, or that they had invested him
with the absolute title to all property owned or to be purchased?
There is not a circumstan~ in the ca86 to favor such au inference. On the contrary they appeared to be partners possessing
the ordinary rights and subject to the usual obligations. It is
to be presumed that Shawhan intended the public should so
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understand, and that the attaching creditor did eo regard them.
It may be urged that such an arrangement might lawfully be
made, and consequently that all persons dealing with the firm
did so with a knowledge of it subject to thiR right. This is the
most plausible view for the defendants, but I do not regard it
as conclusive. The point is, in what position did Shawhan
place Mendall and Palmer by his acts and declarations? It is
not what possible contract they might have made, but from
Shawhan's acts how had the public a right to regard them?
I think that the fair and reasonable inference which any
business man dealing with the firm would draw from the acts
and conduct of Shawhan, would be that he had admitted MendaB and Palmer as partners, with the ordinary rights and subjoct to the usual obligations incident to that relation. If so, we
cannot say that the attaching creditor did not deal with the
firm; and give them credit partly on the supposition that he
would be entitled to the preference which he is now seeking to
enforce. It is not unusual to give a firm credit, when the same
credit would be withheld from either of the individuals composing it, because of this known right of preference to partnership
effects. If I am right in translating the acts of Shawhan as a
deliberate and definite reprE'.sentation that Mendall and Palmer
were partners, with the usual rights a·n d obligations, and that
, the attaching creditor properly so regarded them, and gave the
firm credit upon the faith of it, it follows as a 'necessary legal
sequence that he cannot be permitted to deny it to the injury of
the creditor upon the principle of an estoppel in pais. It is
conceded that no right could be derived through the nominal
partners, because they possessed none, and whether they claim
or renounce all partnership rights is of no consequence. The
rights of the attaching creditors must rest upon the legal inability of Shawhan to deny that they possessed the rights requisite t.o sustain the creditors' claim to this money.
The principle of estoppel is too well understood and too firmly
settled to require the citation of authorities. De Zell v&. Odell,
(3 Hill 215) is a leading authority in this state, but the principle has been repeatedly adjudicated since. The rule is always
applied to enforce integrity and fair dealing in the business concerns of life. It prohibits one from denying his declarations to
the injury of another who has acted upon the faith of them,
and it applies as well to acts and conduct as to declarations.
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I think also that the app!ication of the rule to a case like the present is in accordan,ce with public policy, and is calculated to subserYe the ends of justice. We cannot, of course, know what
the facts of this particular case are, but it is palpable that a
contrary rule might in many cases work great fraud and injustice. If secret agreements of an unusual character, creating
relations directly at variance with those which are apparent,
can deprive partnership creditor~ of that preference which the
law declares just, and expose the property to the individual credi·
tors of one of the partners, gross frauds could be committed not
only, but the confidence of the commercial community would
be impaired and the business interests of the country suffer.
All secret arrangements between partners to the injury of third
·persons are void.
·
Shawhan being estopped from denying the rights of the
attaching creditor, his assignees are also estopped. They have
no other or superior rights to him, and they are vested with the
property subject to all equities against it in his hands. (2 Story
R., 360, 6::JO; James' Bankrupt Laws, 36; B~nedict's U. S.
Dist. Court R., 347.) It was admitted upon the argument that
if Mendall and Palmer had been in fact partn~, the defendants would have had no title. The same results must follow if
they are in a position with reference to the property where they
cannot deny the partnership. These views lead to a reversal of
both judgments.
All concur.
Judgments reversed.
NOTE.-See Mechem's Elements of Partn., § 299.
See Thayer t·s. Humphrey. 91 Wis., 276, 64 N. W. 1007, 80 L. R. A. M9;
also VanKleeck vs. McCabe, 87 Mich. 599, 49 N. W. 872 (reported as Van
Kleeck vs. Hammell in 24 Am. St. R. 182).
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165 Mass. 812, 48 N. E. 100.

. • vt>
Bill in equity against Wood, W. H. Leatherbee, C. W.
Y ~· /
"'"Leatherbee and Harry F. Faden alleging that plaintiff is the
\'
, :~ ,1.){ holder of a note signed by Harry F. FadE'n & Co., and that
.l: \.} ~•-. V \'defendants except Wood were all the partners of Harry F.
f'\~ .. -.~-'Faden & Co. That defendants Leatherbee claim to be the
,...__.r Y ,:r
only actual partners, but that Faden, when plaintiff took the
.,>~ \t \ .
note, was held out, both by himself and defendants Leatherbee,
as a partner in the firm. That the firm, at the time of making
r...,
the note, at the time when plaintiff discounted the same, and
.•~ ;._.>: •
continuoue;ly thereafter to the time of the insolvency proceed<>~~..?\~•~ '}' ing hereinafter stated, conducted a lumber business in Waltham
: .~\... · ' (
and advertised to the public under the name of Harry F. Faden
....- .. •.;· ~, ~ Co. That during all this time defendants carried on the
~... ~ /~ lumber busine~s in Boston under the name of William H .
... -·\ ~ v \.>, Leatherbee & Son. That defendants Faden and the Leather·, ,.-'" ' .-(" ..• · / kes represented to the plaintiff when the note was discouuted
...., ........
'.· that Faden was a partner in the firm of Harry F. Faden & Co.,
·
'"
~· ~'
\· ··• \
which was a separate and distinct firm from Wm. H. Leat.her...
bee & Son. That this representation was made to secure cre{lit
and that plaintiff relied thereon. That when the note was
made and when it was discounted Harry F. Faden & Co., was
possessed of large assets wbich it continued to own without
su hstantial change in value down to the time of the assignments hereinafter stated.
That after the not~ was discounted and before the same was
due defendants Leatherbee, doing business as Wm. H. Leathet·bee & Son, mnde an assignment of all their assets for the
benefit of creditors and undertook to include therein all the
pro~rty theretofore represented as belonging to Harry F. Faden & Co. ·
That thereafter upon the petition of a creditor of the firm of
Wm. H. Leatherbee & Son that firm was adjudged insolvent

¥
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Supreme Court of Massachusetts, 1896.
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WOOD,etal.
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and defendant '¥ood was appointed assignee. That all of the
property of 'Vm. H. Leatherbee & Son, including all the property of Harry F. Faden & Co., was transferred by defendants
Leather bee to Wood, under a. compromise agreement, for the
benefit of the creditors of W m. H. Leather bee & Son. That
the property of Harry F. Faden & Co. in the hands of Wood
was more than sufficient to pay all the creditors of the firm of
Harry F. Faden & Co. That Wood was about to sell the property of Harry F. Faden & Co. for the purpose of distributing
the proceeds among the creditors of the firm of W m. H. Leatherbee & Son in accordance with the compromise agreement and
that plaintiff ·having no adequate remedy at law prayed that
Wood might "00 enjoined therefrom and might be directed to
apply said property, or as much as might be necessary, to the
payment of plaintiff's claim, or that Wood be directed to render
an account of said property, to marshal the same as assets of
Harry F. Faden & Co., and to apply them to the payment in
full of the creditors of Harry F. Faden & Co. before p"a ying
the creditors of Wm. H. Leatherbee & Son any part thereof.
Defendants demurred; demurrer was sustained and plaintiff
appealed.

R. T. Babson, (G. L. Mayberry with him) for the plaintiff. _
H. W. Chaplin, for the defendants.
ALLEN, J. On the averments of the bill, it must be assumed
that Faden was an ostensible but not an actual partner, and
that the property which the plaintiff seeks to reach and apply
to the payment of its debt was in fact owned by the two
Leatherbees. Assuming that Faden was and is personally
liable to the plaintiff as o8terisible partner, on the ground of estoppel, it is contended that this has the effect to entitle the
plaintiff as a. creditor of the ostensible firm to have the property
which was in the possession and use of that firm applied to the
satisfaction of the creditors of that ostensible firm in priority to
creditors whose claims are only against the two Leatherbees.
There are some decisions which support or favor this view.
Kelly vs. Scott, 49 N. Y. 595. Hillman vs. Moore, 3 Tenn.
Ch. 454. Whittt•o1·th vs. Patterson, 6 Lea (Tenn.) 119. But
the weight of authority and the better reason, as we think, are
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the other way. The estoppel is a personal one. An ostensible partner cannot be included in insolvency proceedings instituted by the actual partners. Hanson vs. Paige, 3 Gray 239.
He cannot interfere in the management of the partnership business, and obtain an injunction or a receiver. Nutting vs. Colt,
· 3 Haist. Eq. 539. Kerr vs. Potter, 6 Gill 404. He has no
lien on the partnership assets. Stone vs. JfanRing, 3 Ill. 530.
The long established eq.uity of joint creditors to be paid in
piority out of the joint funds is usually said to be by way of
substitution to the rights of the partners inter sese, and where
no such right exists then the creditors have no such equity.
This doctrine is so firmly established that it is too late now to
question it. Story, Eq. Jur. 675, 1253. Howe vs. Lawrence,
9 Cush. 553, 558, 569. Harmon vs. Clark, 13 Gray 114, 121.
Robb vs . .Jfudge,14 Gray 534, 539. Case vs. Beauregard, 99
U. S. 119, 125. Fitzpatrick vs. Flannagan, 106 U. S. 648,
654. Huiskamp vs. Moline 1Vagon Co., 121 U. S. 310, 323.
Saunders vs. Reilly, 105 N.Y. 12, 19, 20. Brown vs. Beecher,
120 Penn. St. 590, 607, 608. Washburn vs. Bank of Bellows
FaUs, 19 Vt. 278. Rice vs. Barnard, 20 Vt. 479. Couch·
man v.'J. Maupin, 78 Ky. 33. Farley v.'J. Moog, 79 Ala. 148.
Golden State & Miner's Iron Works vs. Davidson, 73 Cal.
as9, a9Z. Grabenheimer vs. Rindskoff, 64 Tex. 49. It has
also been held in England that, when trustees who are authorized to carry on business contract debts, their creditors can only
resort to the trust fund when the trustees are entitled to be in·
dernnified therefrom, and that the creditors reach it only by
being substituted to the equities of the trustees. See In re
Johnson, 15 Ch. D. 548, and Dowse vs. Gorton, 40 Ch. D.
536, cited in Mason vs. Pomeroy, 151 Mass. 164, 167.
In applying the foregoing doctrine to cases where a person is
ostensibly, but not actually, a member of a partnership, and is
therefore under a personal estoppel to deny his liability, it
follows that a creditor who by reason of this estoppel can maina personal action against him cannot extend this estoppel so as
to bind the property which was in the possession and use of the
actual partners. The ostensible partner himself has no equity
to have this property applied to the payment of the claims upon
which he is liable; and therefore the creditors holding those
claims, who are merely subrogated to his rights and equities,
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have no such equity. Kerr vs. Potter, 6 Gill 404. Glenn vs.
Gill, 2 Md. 1. Reese vs. Bradford, 13 Ala. 837, 846. Scun's
Appeal, 115 Penn. St. 141. York County Bank's Appeal, 32
Penn. St. 446. Swann vs. Sanborn, 4 Woods C. C. 625.
The result is, that the decree sustaining the demurrer and
.dismissing the_ bill was right.
Decree affitmed.
NOTE. -See

Mechem's Elements of Partn., § 299.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 16:50 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112102486216
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

•

XVL
•

DISTRffiUTION OF ASSETS BETWEEN PARTNEBB.

WHITCOMB vs. CONVERSB.

Supreme Oou.rt of Massachusetta, 1875.
lUt Mass. 88, 20 Am. Rep. 811.

Bill In equity by Whitoomb, a partner In the la.te ftrm. ot
Converse, \Vhitcomb & Co., against ConTerse, Stanton and
Bla.dgen, the other partners, to compel contribution to make
good the losses of the firm. The firm was organized January
2, 1871, to continue one year under articles which provided that
Converse was to oontribute $25,000, receive 7~ thereon, give
such time to t'he bueiuess as he was able, and receive onefourth of the net profits; Whitoomb was to oontribute '$50,000,
have 7% interest, give all his time and take one-fourth of the net
profits; Blagden and Stanton were each to contribute all his
time and receive one-fourth of the net profits. Whitcomb put
in f25,000 of the agreed f50,000. The partnership was diSBOlved
by mutual coni!lent March 9, 1871, and Whitcomb was aufhorized to close up the business. He did so and claimed a 1068 to
the firm was shown of $25,000, for which he claims oontrlbu·
tion. Blagden is insolvent and unable to pay any part of the
loss. Stanton brought the bulk of the business to the ftrm,
a.nd he contended that he was not liable to make good any of
the losses, and, if liable, was not liable to make good any of the.
amount which Blagden ought to make good. Cauae reaerved
for opinion of supreme oourt.
0. T. RuueU, for plalnt:i1f.

G. 0. Shattuck and 0. W. Holmes, Jr., for Stantaa.

WBITCOXB vs.
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C. J. In the absence of controlling agreement, part·
ners must bear the lossea in the same proportion as the profits
of the partnership, even if one oontributea the whole oapital,
and the other nothi.ng but h18 labor or !lervices: 3 Kent'a Com.
28, 29. Whether a 1osa of capital il a partnership loss, to be
borne by all the partners, depen4U upon tbe nature and ertent
of the contract of partnership.
It, as la not unfrequeDtl1 the caae iD a partnership for a
8ingle adventure, the mere use· of the capital is contributed by
one partner, and the paTtnerahip is in the profits and losses
only, the capital remains the property of the .individual partner
to whom it originaUy belonged, any 1088 or destruction of it
falls upon him as the owner, and, as it never becomes t!he prop·
erty of the partnership, the partnership owes him nothing in
consideration thereof. Story on P8l'ltn. §§ 27, 29; Htron vs. Hall,
1 B. Monr. (Ky.) 159, 35 Am. Deo. 178.
But where, as i8 usual in an ordinary mercantlle partnership,
a partnership is created n.ot merely in proftta and losses, but in
the property itself, the property is transferred from the original
owners to the partnerlfh-ip, and becomes the joint property of
the latter; a corresponding obligation arises 001 the pa.l"t of the
partnership to pay the value thereof to the individuals who
originally contributed lt; snob paym£lnt oannot indeed be demanded during the continuance of the partneraMp, nor are the
contributor!!!, in the absence of agreement OT usage, entitled to
intere!rt, but if the assets of the partnership, upon a tlnalsettlemen.t, are insufficient to satisfy this obligation, all the partners
must bear it in the same proportion as other debts of the part·
nership. Julio vs. Ingalls, 1 Allen (Mass.) 41; Bradbury "'·
Smith, 21 Me.117; Barfield.vs. Loughborough, L. R. 8 Oh.l; In re
Anglesea Colliery Oo .., L. R. 2 Eq. 379, 387, s. o. L. B. 1 Oh. Ap.
555; Nowell vs. NoweZZ, L. R. 7 Eq. 538; In re Hodgea DiltUlery
Oo., L. R. 6 Ch. Ap. 51; 1 Lindley on Pa.rtn. (3 Ed.) 696, 827, 828.
Only two cases were cited in the learned argument far the
defendant Stanton, in which opinions inconsistent with this
view have been expressed. The one is Everly"'· Durborow, 1
l.Rg. Gaz. Rep. 127, a niri prim decision, with no reference to
au~horities except an early edition of Lindley on Partnership,
which has been ooiTected by the leemed author, .W npra, OOIJloo
formably to the adjudged casee. The other Ia OfJf'Mron .,..
Watson, 10 Rich. (S. Car.) Eq. 64. That was a bill in equity to
GRAY,
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settle tbe affairs of a partnership, to whi~h Camel"'n had ~n
tributed labor and Watson capital. The master, to whom the
case wa.s referred, allowed the claim of Wa:t&On for 8() much
ot the capital a.s·he had not withdrawn during the continuance
of the partnership, but diea.llowed his claim for i.D.rterest ~re
on; pp. 68, 73. Cameron excepted to the allowance of Wataon'•
claim for capital, and Watson excepted to the disallowance ol
interest. The chancellor, before wboon the exeeptions were
heard in the first inetance, ovel'T'Uled the exception of Oa.rneron,
and also that of Watson as reganred int~est before the di880lution of the pa.rtnerehip, but SUiltained it so far a.s 'W allow 'him
interest after the diseolution, pp. 80-90, 95, 96. The court of
npp~ls, although in one part of its opinion appearing to diecountenance Watson's claim for capital, ended by confirming
the master's report in every pa'l'lticula.r, pp. 103, 107, 108. So
that the final judgment, while i.t disallowed Wa:tson'e claim
for interest, established his claim for capital, and waa in exact
acrordan.ce with our cooclusion.
In the cue at bar, the partnership was not for a single enterprise, but for the transaction of a oommiesion business in New
York and Boston for a year. Converse and Whitcomb contributed the wlwle capital in unequal proportions. Converse
was to contribute "such time as he may be able to give"; and
Whitcomb and the other two partners, Blagden and Stanton,
were each "to contribute all his time to the business." Those
pa.rtnei"S who contributed the. capital did not contribute merely
the use thereof, but the capital itself, and we~ by the exprees
agreemen·t to receive interest thereon a.t rates specified in the
articles of copartnership. The paNneTS were by agreement to
receive each one-fourth of the net profit&, and by implication of
law mu~t share the losses in the same proportion. The capital
cootributed became the property of the partnership; and lfue
paTtnership, consisting of all the partners, became liable to
Whitoomb and Converse reepeotively for the amount of capital
paid in by them.
Blagden, one of rt:he partners, being insolvent and unable to
dischat·ge any part of tOO obligation, it must rest in equity upon
the three solvent partners in equal proportions. Whitmata. w.
Porter, 107 MaM. 522; 1 Lindley on Pa.rtn.. 789, 790.
Decree for ·the plaintift accordingly.
NOTE: See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., §§ 80&, 808.
Compare with the following case.

'
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Lea, 160, M Am. Rep. (0'7.

Bfll for partne.-shlp accounting between Shea and Donahue.
They became partners under written agreement for one year
"as merchants in making, buying and selling all kinds of tinware, stoves, pumps, etc." "And to constitute a fund for the
purpose Timothy Shea has paiEl in ~ stock one thousand dollars, which will constitute a common stock, to be used and employed between us in buying goods, war~ and merchandise.
John Donahue being a practica:l workm1l:D and having CODBiderable experience in the above oomed business, it is agreed tftlat
he will give the business his entire personal attention and the
benefit of his experience, to place against the cash furnished by
said Shea. We are to bear the expenses and losses jointly and
share the profits equally. The capital stock is oot to be withd,rawn by either party until the end of the term, but to be employed as capital unless otherwise mutually agreed between .
us in writing." The business was in fact carried on for. abou.t
three yeaTs. 'Upon the settlement, Donahue claimed to be entitled ro one-half of the capital advanced by Shea. The chancellor decided against Donahue, and he appealed.
J. W. Green, for oomplainant.
H. H. Taylor, for defendant.

CooPER, J. (After stating the faets.) The oontentlon of the
defendant is, that by the terms of the agreement he was entitled wt the end of one year to an equal share of tl\e profits
of the busineliiS, and to one-half of the capital advanced by his
partner, and this, a:lthough it goes without Baying he would
retaln a:Il ·h is practical experience which was to be placed
against the ca&h fu.rnished by his partner. But the agreement
~s that the partners are only to "share the pr¢lts equally," not
the profits and the capital. And the profits of any business are
only whwt remains after deducting debts and expenses, and the
capital paid in. Lindley on Partn. 791, 806. The provision that

6~6
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the capital stock shall constitute a oommon stock to be used in

buying the materials and wares of their tralde, merely designates the mode in whloh irt is agreed that the capital shall.be
invested. And the further provision that the· capital stock
shall not be withdrawn by either party until the end of the
term, was only intended to restrain the partners from drawing
funds from the business so as to trench upon the capital while
the partnership continued. '!'here is nothing in the article of
ag.reement io take .the case out of the ordinary one of a paNner·
ship in profit and loss upon unequal capitals.
Of course the articles of a partnership may expressly provide
for a.n equal division of the assets, upon a dissolution, notwith·
standing an unequal advance of capital by the respective part·
ners. The same resu1t may follow a oon.tinuous course C1f deal·
ing upon a baBi.s which implies such equal division. For if
there is no ev:idenoe from which any different concJUBion ea to
what was agreed can be drawn, the shares of all the partnen
will be adjudged equal, upon the favorite maxim .o f chancery,
that equality is equity. But, as Mr. Lindley tells us, the rule
is when the paMilel'8 htave advanced unequal capitals, and have
agreed to share profits and losses equally, without m-ore, that
.each partner is entitled ·ro his advance before division, and a
deficiency in the capital must be treated like any other loes,
and barne equally by the partners. Lindley Partn. 807.
The only autoor.ities adduced by the learned co~nsel of the
defendant, in support of hiB contention in this case, are to the
effect thart: property brought into the partnership business by
the members of the firm, or bought with capital advanced, be·
oomes partnership property, and may be disposed (1/ as such by
one of the partners under his general powers as a member ot
the firm. And so H: does beyond all question, for the very
object of conrtributing capital, either in property or money, is
to secure a partnership stock for the purpose ot carrying on the
common bu.si.n.ess. But th~ fact has nothing to do with the
settlement between.the paNners of their accounts at the end of
the partnership. "By the capital of a partnership," says Mr.
Lindley, "is meant the aggregate of the sums contributed by
its membe!"B for the purpose of commencing or carrying on the
partnership business. The capital of a pa.rtnership is not
therefQore the same as its property; the capital is a sum fixed by
- the agreements of the partners, whilst the actual assets of the
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ftrm vary from dtay to day, and include everything belonging to
the ftrm and having any money value. Moreover, the capital
of each partner is not neceesarily the amount due to him from
the ftrm; for not only may he owe t!he ftrm money, so thart: less
than his capital is ·d ue to him, bo.t the ftrm may owe him money
In 1lddition to his capital, e. g., for money loaned. The am()unk
of each partner's oapital ought therefore always w be accurately stated, in order to avoid disputes upon a ftnal adjustment of
accounts; 81Ild t~ is more Jmportant where the ca.pimls of the
partners are unequal, tor if t!here is no evideuce aB to the
amounts oontribUJted by them, the shares of tile whole assets
will be tre.a ted as equal." Lindley Parttn. 610. [1 Ewell's Lind·
ley, 2d Am. Ed. 320.] Tlle same author adds in another place:
"When it is said that the &hares of partners· are prima facie
equal, although their capitals are unequal, what is meant is
t!h8lt the losses of capital, like other losses, must be shared
equally, but it is not meant that oo a ftnal settlement of accounts capitals contributed unequally are to be treated as an
aggregate fund which ought w be divided between the partners In equal shares." Lindley, Partn. 67. On the contrary, in
biB chapter devoted to partnership accounts [2 Lindley, Prurtn.
2d Am. Ed. 402], he expressly tells us that the assets of a part·
nership should be applied 88 fOll()WS:
"1. In paying the debt!J and liabilities of the ftrm to non-partners.
"2. In paying to ea-ch partner ratably what is due from the
ftrm to him for ed:vanees as distinguished from capital:
"3. In paying to each partner rart:ably what is due from the
ftrm to him in respect of oapital.
"4. The ultimate residue, if any, will then be divisible as
proftt between the partners in equal shares, unless the contrary
can be shown."
In accordance with t!heee principles, the following decision
has been made by the supreme ooul"t of New York in a case
cited in a note to page 610 of Lindley on Partnership: "Where
by the terme of :the agreement the defendant famished the capital stock, and the ·plaln4:iff oontributed his skill and serviees,
and the proftts of the oopa.rtnersbip were to be equally dividf'd,
the plaintitf is not entitled to any part ~f t!he capital stock on a
eettlemen.t of the affairs of ·t he partnership. He has no interest
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in any part of the eapital exceptfDg ao far • ln the progreee ol
the buslDeae the eame may haTe been converted into proftte."
Ccmroy t~l. Campbell, 13 Jonee & Sp. 326. The caae, lt will be
notlct>d, is exactly lD point. And to the eame effect in priaclple
are Whitcomb 118. CotttJerse, ll9 Maas. 38, 20 Am. Rep. 811,
ante~· Knight 118. Ogden, 2 Tenn. Cb. 47'3, and SltepAerd, Ex
parte, 3 Tenn. Oh. 189. No case has been found to the contrary.
Ohuncellor'e decree aftirmed.
NOTBs See Heohem'a .Elem. of Partu., I§ 805-801.
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In error to the circuit court of the United Sta~s for 'the east·
ern district of Michigan.
This is a writ of error to a judgment in favor of the defendant A. W. Comstock in a suit brought by Swain T. Chick and
William T. Chick, copartners as Chick Bros., citizens of Massachusetts, against Henry S. Robinson, Richard G. Elliott, and
Andrew W. Comstock, copartners as H. S. Robinson & Co.,
on a note o{ the firm for $2,166.70. A verdict and judgment
were entered against HenryS. Robinson and Richard G. Elliott without controversy. Andrew W. Comstock defended
against the note on the ground that he was a special partner,
under the statutes of Michigan, and was not liable on the note.
The sections of the statutes of Michigan providing for limited
partnership will be found in Howell's Annotated Statutes, as
follows:
"SEo. 2342. Limited partnerships may consist of one or more persons,
who shall be called general partners, and who shall be jointly and severally responsible as general partners now are by law, and of one or more
persons who shall contribute a specific amount of capital, in cash or other
property, at cash value, to the common stock, who shall be called special
partners, and who shall not be liable for the debts of the partnership, beyond the amount of the fund so contributed by them respectively to the
capital, except a.s he reinafter provided."
· • SBo. 2844. The persons desirous of forming such partnership shall
make and severally sign a certificate, which shall contain: ( 1) The
name or firm under which the partnership business is to be conducted.
( 2 ) The general nature of the business to be transacted. ( 8) The
names of all the general a.nd special partners interested therein, distin·
guishing which are general partners a.nd whieh are special partners, and
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their respective plaoes of residence. ( 4) The amount of capital st..)Ck
which eaoh special partner shall have contributed to the oommon stock.
( 5) The period at w.h ich the partnership is to commence, and the period
when it will terminate.
"SEO. 2345. Such certificate shall be acknowledged by the several persons signing the same, before some officer authorized by law to take the
·acknowledgment of deeds, and such acknowledgment shall be made and
certified in the manner provided by law for the acknowledgment of deeds
for the conveyance of lands.
"SEc. 2346. The -certificate so acknowledged and certified shall be
filed in the office of the county clerk of the county in which the principal
place of business of the partnership shall be situated, and shall be re·
corded at length by the clerk in a book to be kept by him; and such book
shall be subject, at all reasonable hours, to the inspection of all persons."
"SEc. 2348. At the time of filing the original certificate and the
acknowledgment thereof, as before directed, an affidavit of one or more
of the general partners shall also be filed in the same office, stating that
the amount in money, or other property at cash value, specified in the
certificate to have been contributed by each of the special partner11 to the
common stock, has been actually and in good faith contributed and applied to the same.
•·SEc. 2849. No such partnership shall be deemed to have been formed,
until such certificate, acknowledgment and affidavit shall have been filed
as above directed; and if any false statement be made in such certificate
or affidavit, all the persons interested in such partnership shall be liable
for all the engagements theoreof, as general partners."
" SEO. 2354. The business of the partnership shall be carried on under
a firm in which the name of one or more of the general partners only
shall be inserted, with or without the addition of the words 'and oom·
pany,' or any other general term; and if the name of any special partner
shall be used in said firm with his consent or privity, or if he shall personally make any contract respecting the concerns of the partnersliip,
with any person except the general partner, he shall be deemed and
treated as a general partner.
"SEO. 2355. During the continuance of the partnership und~r the pro·
visions of this chapter. no part of the capital stock ther~f shall be withdrawn, nor any division of interest or profits be made, so as to reduce said
capital stock below the sum stated in the certificate above mentioned;
and if, at any time during the continuance, or at the termination of the
partnership, the property or assets shall not be sufficient to pay the partnership debts, then the special partners shall severally be held responsible
for all sums by them received, withdrawn or divided, with interest there·
on from the time when they were so withdrawn or divided respectively.'
"SEc. 2364. A special partner may from time to time examine into the
state and progress of the partnt~rship concerns, and may advise as to their
management; be may also loan money to. and advance and pay money for
the partnership, and may t~e and hold the notes, drafts, acceptances, and
bonds of or belonging to the partnership, as security for the repayment of
such moneys and interest, and may use and lend his name and credit a:s
security for the partnership. in any business thereof, and shall have the
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same rights and remedies in these respects as any other creditors might
have.

It appears by the evidence that Henry S. Robinson and
Richard G. Elliott, as general partners, and Andrew W. Comstock, as special partner, entered into a partnership agreement;
that the certificate was duly signed and acknowledged, stating
the facts required in section· 2344, and, among them, that
Andrew W. Comstock as special partner had contributed to0,000 to the common stock. Henry S. Robinsou, one of the gelb
eral partners, in accordance with section 2348, made an affidavit
on the 1st of May in which he stated "that the amount stated
in said certificate to have been contributed to said limited partnership by said Andrew W. Comstock has been actually contributed by him and bas been received by said limited partnership,
and applied to the assets thereof." The certificate and affidavit
were filed on the 2d of May. The plaintiffs contended that
Comstock was liable as a general partner, for two reasons:
( 1 ) Because the statement in the affidavit was false, in that
at the time of filing the certificate the amount in cash specified
in the certificate to have been contributerl by Comstock, the
special partner, to the common stock had not been actually and
in good faith contributed and applied t.o the same. ( 2) Because Comstock, the special partner, had personally made contracts for the firm, and thus rendered himself generally liable
.as partner, under the statute. At the close of the evidence the
court submitted both issues to the jury, but before a verdict
was returned the trial judge withdrew the first issue from their
consideration, instructing them 'that there was no evidence that
the amount of $50,000 was not contributed in good faith in cash
by Comstock as early as :May 2d, as certified in the affidavit.
Upon the second issue the jury found for the defendant.

Harrison Geer and F. W. Whiting, for plaintiffs.
Michael Brennan and Henry A. Haigh, for defendants.
Before TAFT and LURTON, Circuit Judges, and THOMPSON,
District Judge.
TAFT, Circuit Judge. The main controversy in this court is
whether there was any evidence which should haYe be€'n submitted to the jury tending to show that Comstock did not, as
certified in the affidavit of Robinson, actually in good faith con-
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tribute in cash the t50,000 to the stock of the company on the
2d day of May, 1893. The affidavit was dated the 1st of May
but it seems to be conceded by the counsel for plaintiff in error
that if the money was contributed before the affidavit was filed
this is a sufficient compliance with the statute. The concession
is justified by the decision of the court of appeals of New YOI"k
in White vs. Eiseman, 134 N. Y. 101, 31 N. E. 276. See,
also, Ropes vs. Colgate, 17 Abb. N. C. 136.
The plaintiff produced the books of the partnership, which
show that on May 1st Comstook was credited by capital stock
with the payment of 830,000, on May 24th with the payment of
tl0,155, and on June 3d with $9,845, making a total of t50,000
On August 1st he is credited by interest with 8657, and was
paid that amount. The interest thus credited and paid to him
is at the rate of 6 per cent. on 830,000 from May 3, 1893, on
810,155 from May 4, 18t13, and on 89,845 from June 3, 1893, all
down to August 1st. This evidence taken from the books was
objected to on behalf of defendant Comstock. He testified that
he had never seen the entries in which the credits for his
special capital were entered before coming into the court room,
and that he did not begin to look into the books until two yeare
after the firm was organized. By section 2364 a special partner is given the power "from time to time to examine into the
state and progress of the partnership concerns, and may advise
as to their management." It seems to us that entries in tbe
pn:rtnership books which are open to his inspectiQn, and with
respect to wbi~b he may advise, are at least prima fade evidence against him of transactions of the firm. It has been so
held under a similar statute of New York. Bank vs. Huber,
75 Hun 80, 26 N. Y. Supp. 961; Kohler vs. Lindenmeyr, 129
N.Y. 498, 29 N. E. 957; Hotopp vs. Huber (Sup.) .UN. Y.
Supp. 991.
.
Elliott, one of the partners, testified that Comstock contributed $50,000 in checks, $30,000 of which were deposit:OO. to the
credit of the firm, and paid on the 2d day of May. Two of the
ehecks were not deposited or collected on the 2d of May. A
check for $10,155 was collected on the 24th of May, and theremaining check, for $9,845, was deposited and collected on the
3d of June. E!Jiott testified there was no agreement, so far as
he knew, that these checks were to be held, but that they did
not deposit them because they did not need the money. Rob·
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inson tAStified that everything was contributed, in what he considered cash items, on the 1st day of May. He said there was
no due-bill of Comstock, but he had an indefinite· impression
that in the payments there was a note of F&ITand, Williams &
Clark for $10,155. Elliott and Robinson were called by the plaintiffs. It further appeared that a note of Farrand, Williams &
Clark for tlO, 155, due to Comstock, W88 paid on May 24th at
the Commercial National Bank, where it had been deposited
by Comstock for collection, and that the note had been sold by
the Commercial Bank ro the Alpena Banking Company, Comstock's bank, and that when the note fell due the assistant cashier of the Commercial National Bank paid Comstock by giving
his check for that amount to H. S. Robinson & Co.
Comstock testified in his own behalf. His statement W88
that be gave t50,000 in checks, t30,000 of which were collected
on the 2d of May. He testified that he bad a note of Farrand,
Williams & Clark for $10,155, which he brought down with
him from Alpena, where he lived, intending to put it in as part
of his co~tribution, together with a certified check on. the
Alpena Banking Company, of which he was president and part
owner, for $9,845; that when be examined the affidavit and
found the statement therein that the contribution had been
made in cash, be did not' use the note, but another check on
the Alpena 'Banking Company for $10,155, and certified it as
president of that banking company. He testified that there was
110 agreement by which his certified checks aggregating t20,000
should be held, but that when be found on the 24th of May that
his check for 110,155 bad not been deposited. and collected, he
concluded that it would save trouble to 'take up his check, and
use the money collected on the Farrand note for that purpose.
This be did. He says be objected seriously to the failure to
credit him with interest on $50,000 from May 1st, when he delivered all the checks, that he called the attention of Robinson
to the injustice, and that the failure to rectify the error was
due to the financial difficulties .of the firm which so soon
followed.
It appears clearly without contradiction, that the checks were
good upon the day upon which they were delivered to H. S. Robinson, and would have been paid, had they been presented, on
that day . . The question is whether the circumstances that they
were not presented until the 24th of May and the 3d of June,
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that the payment of the 24th of May was made at the time
when the Farrand, Williams & Clark note was paid, and that
interest was not charged in favor of Comstock on the books of
the company on the $20,000 until the 24th of May and the 3d of
June, do not tend to justify an inference of fact contrary to
the positive statement of Robinson, Elliott and Comstock, that
there was no agreement to hold the checks until the 24th of
May and 3d of June. If there bad been such an ageement to
hold the checks their use by Robinson would clearly not have
been an actual contribution in good fait.h in cash as of May 2d.
In the absence of such agreement, .ComstOck was entitled to
interest on $50,000 from May 1st, because he could · not be
charged with the delay in collection, as between the partners.
The question is a close one, but we think that in view of the
positive statement of Robinson and ElJiott, called by the plaintiff, and of Comstock, called in his own interest, that no such
agreement existed, in view of the uncontradicted explanation
by Comstock as to the mode in which the entriffl happened to
be made, in view of the uncontradicted statements by Elliot
that the checks were deposited when they were needed, the inferences to be drawn from the book entries and the charge of
interest creaie only a. scintilla of evidence supporting the view
that there was any agreement between the partners as to the
withholding of the check. · The evidence relied on by the plaintiffs amounts, when carefully and calmly considered, to nothing more than a suspicion that there may have been some agreement between the partners. We do not think it was enough to
require the court below to. submit the issue raised on the pleadings on this point to the jury.
It is objected that Comstock's checks for $20,000 were not an
actual contribution in cash to the assets of the firm, even if
there w~ no agreement by the gen~ral partners to . withhold
presentation, and even if they were good when delivered to the
general partners. The early decisions construing limited partnership statutes were very strict, and a literal compliance with
the statute was enforced. In some states, notably in .Massachusetts, this construction of such a law is still maintained.
Haggerty vs. Foster, 103 Mass. 17. In others a more reasonable ,-iew has been taken of late, and aU that is required is a
substantial compliance with the provisions of the statute, in
good faith. Manhattan Co. vs. Laimbeer, 108 N. Y. 578, 15
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N. E. 712; White v s. Eiseman, 134 N.Y. 101, 31 N. E. 276.

This is tbe rule of construction adopted by the supreme court
of Michigan in enforcing the statute. Hogan vs. Hadzsits,
113 Mich. 568, 71 N. W. 1092.
Comstock's checks were certified, and it is expressly held
by the court of appeals of New York that such instruments
are equivalent to cash. lVhite vs. Eiseman, 134 N. Y. 101,
31 N. E. 276. But it is said that as the certificate was by
Comstock, the president of the Alpena Banking Company, of
his own check, the check was not certified in such a way as to
bind the company. We shall not enter upon a discussion of
this objection, because we are of opinion that a check, though
uncertified, if good when delivered and paid when presented,
is a contribution, i11 cash in good faith, although it may not be
presented until after the filing of the certificate. If the check
is good the general partners may obtain the money upon it at
any time. If the drawer is dishonest, and subsequently
reduces his bank balance so that the check is diahonored, that
is conclusive evidence that the delivery of the check was not
payment in cash in good faith, and the penal liability of the
special partner accrues. The payment of checks as cash is in
accordance with a well-known and reasonable usage of merchants, and we can see no reason why the statutes concerning
limited partnerships should not be construed in the light of
that usage. In the case of In re Palliser, 136 U. S. 257, 10
Sup. Ct. 1034, Mr. Justice Gray, speaking for the supreme
in a criminal statute, a8
court, defines the word "cash,"
follows:
"The word 'ca~:~h,' in this statute, as in common speech,
means ready money, or money in hand, either in current coin
or other legal tender, or in bank bills, or .checkR paid and received as money, and does not include promises to pay money
in the future."
This, it seems to us, is a sufficient support for our conclusion.
Doubtless the weight of authority in the construction of limited
partnership statutes is to the contrary; but, as already sairl,
the trend of modern cases is towards a more liberal and sen~ib}e
view of such statutory requirements. Their purpose is to secure
the actual payment of the money into the capital of the firm,
and, failing that, to hold the special partner to a general Hability. It seems to us that our construction of the statute secures
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this end, ud it does not entrap the honest and unwary into un-

expected liabilities, by enforcing a stricter rule as to what are
cash paymenta than obtains in the commercial community.
There is nothing in the decisions of the supreme court of Mich·i gan upon this statute which prevents our giving such a construction to it as we think its language and its policy require.
Rothchild vs. Hoge, !3 Fed. 97. The judgment of the circuit
court is affirmed.
~
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Oourt of Appeals of New Y01·k.

1877.

69 N. Y . 148, 25 Am. Rep. 158.

.

Actioo against three defendants, as alleged partners, on two
promissory notes. The defendant Abendroth alone defended,
claiming that he was liable only as a special partner under the
statute of limited partnerships.
The certificate for the formation of a limited partnership was
filed in the county clerk's office on the 23d day of December,
1870, and dated that day, and signed and acknowledged by all
the defendants. It stated that the partnership was to commence on the 1st day of January, 1871, and that the special
partner, Abendroth, "has contributed the sum of ten thousand
dollars in cash, as the capital to l:>e used in said business." An
affidavit was annexed, sworn to by the two general partners,
stating that the sum specified in the certificate, as contributed
by the special partner, has been actually and in good faith paid
in cash. Abendroth testified that the papers were signed on
the 23d of December, 1870, and that he on that day gave his
check for the $10,000, dated December 31, 1870, which was
paid on presentation, Jauuary 2, 1871. The court directed a
verdict for plaintiff, subject to the opinion of the General Term.
which gave judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendant
Abendroth appealed.
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.Samuel Hand, for defendant.
Oarliale Norwood, Jr., for plaintiff.
RAPALLO, J. (Omitting a portion pertaining to a matter of
practice.) The main questions in the case are whether the
statement in tbfl certificate of the formation .of the limited partnership of Griffith and W undram, dated and filed on the 23d
of December, 1870, that William P. Abendroth, the special
partner, had contributed the sum of ten thousand dollars in
cash as the capital to be used in the business of the firm, was
true, an,d whether the affidavit of the general partners, sworn
to on the same day, that the sum specified in said certificate to
have been contributed by the special partner as the capital
stock of said firm, had been actually and in good faith paid in
cash, is borne out by the facts proved on the trial. A negative
answer to either of these questions necessarily leads to an
affirmance of the judgment. 1 R. S. 763, § 8.
The certificate and affidavit speak as of the day of their da~.
They are not promissory, but state what had then been done.
Unless therefore the capital had on that day been actually paid
in cash, the statements cannot be said to be true. Neither the
honest intention of the parties that it should be paid at or before
the time appointed for the commencement of the partnership,
nor their good faith, manifested by the actual payment in cash
at that time, can remedy the defect, if the payment had not
been actually made in cash when t.he certificate and affidavit
were made aud filed. The statute peremptorily requires an
affidavit that the capital has been actually paid in cash, and
withholds its protection from the special partner if the affidavit
be not true. The object of this provision is to secure certainty,
and to prevent equivocal transactions in the formation of these
partnerships. Nothing but cash satisfies its requirement. No
engagement or security, however good, can be substituted even
temporarily, and the affiuavit of t~e actual payment must be
filed with the certificate. However honest the intentions of
the parties may be, if this affidavit is not absolutely true, the
consequences prescribed by the statute must ·follow, and they
cannot be averted by a subsequent payment, nor by the consideration that no injury re~nlted to any creditor from the affidavit not being true when made.
The payment in tl1is case was made by a cheek of the special
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partner, dated, and therefore payable, on the 31st of December,
1870. This clearly was not cash on the 23d, when it was
delivered to the general partners and the affidavit was made.
It was a mere obligation or order payable in future. It was in
fact paid on presentation on tho 2d of January, 1871. This
shows that the parties intended no fraud, and the reason for resorting to this fonn of proceeding is explained by the fact that
the partnership was not to commence until the first of January,
1871, which fell on Sunday. Nevertheless it was not the fact
tha~ the special partner bad actually paid the sum specified in
the certificate, in cash on the 23d, when the affidavit was made,
He bad merely given an order for its payment on the 31st.
Although doubtless it was the bona fide intention that the
check should be paid on the 31st, yet many contingencies might
have occurred to prevent its ever being paid.
It is strenuously contended on the part ·of the appellants that
the statute does not require that the capital contributed by the
special partner be paid to the general partners before the day
fixed for the commencement of the partnership; that where, as
in this case, the papers are filed before that day, it is sufficient
that the money be deposited in the bands of any third party;
that the presumption is that the special partner bad the money
in bank on the 23d of December, when be drew the check, and
that he had placed it there for the purpose of being paid on the
31st to the general partners as his contribution of capital, and
therefore the statement that it had been actually paid was true.
If the special partner bad paid the money to the bank to the
credit of the general partners, or deposited i~ with any third
party for the express purpose of being paid to the firm at the
commencement of the partnership, and had appropriated it to
that purpose in such manner as to part with all control over it
himself, there would be much force in the argument that this
was a payment of his contribution of capital. But assuming
that he had the money in bank on the 23d, and that he intended
that it should be applied to the payment of the check (facts of
which there was no evidence), still it was there to the credit of
the special partner. It remained his property and subject to his
draft and control, notwithstanding the check which be had given.
The check was put in evidence, and was not certified, nor
could it have been certified until the 31st. He could bave
drawn out the money at any time in the interim, or counter·
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manded the check. The money might as well have been in his
own pocket, and was so in contemplation of law. A person
cannot be said to have paid money thus situated. All that cau
be said is that he had provided it, and intended that it should
be paid when the time came; but he had done no act placing it
irrevocably beyond his own control.
The capital was in fact paid on the 2d of January; but no
affidavit of that payment was filed as required by the statute.
The affidavit prematurely made on the 23d could not be made
true by that subsequent payment.
The parties have made a careless, though no doubt innocent,
mistake; but they have failed to comply with the statute, and
the special partner is therefore deprived of its protection. If
the court had the power to rectify such a mistake, it would
gladly do so in this case; but it does not possess the power.
The judgment must be affirmed.
All concur, except CHURCH, C. J., and EARL, J., dissenting, ALLEN, J., not sitting.
J udgrnent affii'Ined.
NOTE.-See Mechem's Elements of Partn., § 818.
See note to this oase in 25 Am. Rep. 168.
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HENKEL vs. HEYMAN.
Supreme Court of Illinois.

1878.

91 Ill. 96.

Appeal from the Appel1ate Court of the First District; the
Hon. Theodore D. Murphy, presiding Justice, and the Hon.
Geo. W. Pleasants and Hon. J. l\f. Bailey, Justices.
This was an appeal by Henkel from a judgment against him
on demurrer in a suit brought by Heyman against Henkel, E.
Hartman and S. Hartman to charge them as partners on a bill
of exchange. In the lower court Henkel pleaded as a defense
the formation of a limited partnership in which he was the
special partner, incorporating iu his plea in full the various
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agreements, certificates, affidavits, etc., which may be found io
the report of this case.
We quote only the following:
That on said second day of March, 1877, the said defendants
took the said certificate of limited partnership, together with
the said acknowledgment and the said certificate of Emanuel
Hartman and Simon Hartman that the said sum of t15,000 in
money bad been paid toward the capital stocli: of said partnership, and the said affidavit of the said Emanuel Hartman to
the truth of the said last mentioned certificate, to the office of
the county clerk of Cook county, and there delivered the same
to the said county clerk of Cook county, and requested of him
that he file and record the same, and paid the said clerk of
Cook county his fees therefor.
The following allegation in brackets is the amendment afterward allowed :
(And the said Henkel avers that the said clerk, neglecting
his duty in the premises, did not file and record said papers,
as required by law, but returned them to the said defendants,
after ~aving the charge and custody of the same for a time
sufficient to file and record the same, and that said papers were
then, on said third day of March, by said defendants taken
from the office of said clerk, a'!'ld thereafter remained in the
custody and under the control of the said defendants~ ]

Messrs. Monroe, Bisbee &: Ball, for the appellant.
Mr. .Adolph Moses, for the appellee.
Mr. Justice SCHOLFIELD delivered the opinion of the Court:
The common law did not admit of partnerships with a restricted responsibility, and the statute, therefore, authorizing
limited partnerships must be substantialJy complied with, or
those who associate under it will be liable as general partners.
Bowen vs. .Argall, 24 Wend, 496; Smith vs. .Argall, 6 Hill
479; same again in 3 Denio 435; Richardson vs. Hogg, 38
Penn. St. lli3; .Andrews vs. Schoot, 10 Id. 47; Van Ingen vs.
Whitman, 62 N.Y. 513.
Our statute in relation to "Limited Partnerships" requires
that the certificate showing the formation of the partnership,
when properly acknowledged, shall be filed in the office of the
county clerk and recorded at large, etc., and that there shall
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also be filed in the same office, at the same time, "an affidavit
of one or more of the general partners, stating that the amount
in money, or other property at cash value, specified in the certificate to have been contributed by each of the special partners
to the common stock, has been actually and in good faith contributed an<;! applied to the same." And it is expressly provided that ''no such partnership (i. e. limited partnership) shall
be qr emed to have been formed until such certificate, acknowledgment and affidavit shall have been filed as above directed."
Rev. Stat. 1~74, p. 678, §§ 6, 7, 8.
The averment in this plea comes far short of the requirement
of the statute. The statute requires that the certificate, acknowledgment and affidavit shall-be filed-that is, placed to be
kept (13 Vin . . Abrid't. 211) in the office of the clerk of the
county-and not, as averred, merely temporarily deposited
thP-re. Had the certificate, acknowledgment and affidavit been
left with the county clerk, with directions to file them, his refusal to comply with the directions would not, doubtless, have
affected the rights of the parties. In that case the parties
would have done all that t.hey could have done to comply with the
law. But here the papers are taken away by the parties themselves. By their own voluntary act they prevent the papers
from being on file.
But counsel insist the statute does not require that the certificate, acknowledgment and affidavit shaH be kept on file;
and that the rules applicable to deeds, etc., filed for record
must apply to these documents.
The statute uses no qualifying language in regard to the
filing of these papers. It does not say they shall he filed "for
record," or "until. recorded," but that they shall be filedj· and
the certificate so acknowledged and certified shall also be recorded-but the affidavit of the partners is not required to be
recorded. See ReY. Stat. 1874, p. 67t\, §§ 6, 7.
Deeds, mortgages and other instruments relating to or affecting the title to real estate, are required to be recorded, and the
statute makes them void as to creditors and sub~quent purchasers without notice, until they are filed for t·ecord, and the
t·ecord is made evidence of the deed or other instrument in behalf of all persons not having th~ original in possession. In
those cases the sole object of the filing of the instrument is, to
enable it to be recorded. After filing and until the recording
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the deed or other instrument is, itself, constructive notice; after
the recording, the record affords such notice.
As before observed, the language here does not indicate that
the filing is to be temporary merely, but permanent. Like the
filing of a declaration, and other papers required in practice to
be filed, it would seem the papers filed are to become part of
the permanent records of the court.
Bi.tt even if we were prepared to hold that the object of filing
is only temporary-to allow the papers to be recorded-it would
be impossible, under this plea, to hold that Henkel has done
all that the law required him to do, to limit his liability.
It is averred the papers were not filed and recorded, by reason of the neglect of duty by the clerk; but it is also averred that
the papers were taken away from the clerk's office by Henkel,
and that he has since retained their possession, and it is not
.averred that he did not know they were not filed and recorded
when he took them away. This averment, under au old and
familiar rule of pleading, must be taken most strongly against
the pleader (1 Chitty's Pleadings, 7 Am. ed. 578}; and so we
must conclude, when he took the papers away, he knew they
were not filed and recorded.
No case cited by counsel goes to the extent of holding that
the mere neglect of a clerk to record a paper' will justify a party
in knowingly taking it away from the office unrecorded, and
in dispensing with all further effort-s to have it recorded. If he
knew the papers were not filed and recorded, he was inexcusable
in taking them away from the office in that condition. It was
his· duty, and the law gave him ample remedy to compel the
clerk to file and record the papers.
We think the plea was clearly insufficient and the demurrer
to it was properly sustained.
The judgment below is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
NoTE.-See Mechem's elements of Partn. , § 313.
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et al. vs. COLBURN, et al.

Supreme Court of Massachusetts, 1900.
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176 Mass. 110, 67 N. E. 218.

Action by one Durgin and others against Colburn, Fuller &
Co. to recover 8459. 65 with interest from May 4, 1899, being
the balance due upon a promissory note for t3,000 made by the
partnership of Colburn, Fuller & Co. The defendants composed the partnership, and claimed that it was a limited one,
formed, renewed and conducted in accordance with the laws
of the commonwealth, and that Frances E. Colburn was a special partner and not liable for said note. The court found for
plaintiffs, and reported the case to the supreme judicial court.
Judgment on findings.

Hurlburt, Jones & Cabot for plaintiff.
Johnson, Clapp & Underwood for defendant.
BARKER, J. One of the questions raised is decisive of the
case. Upon the others we express no opinion. When the
partnership was renewed, no contribution to its capital was
made by the special partner, except that 'o f continuing in the
firm her interest in the assets of the expiring partnership. This
interest was then substantially less in value than her orignal
contribution of $100,000 to the capital of the expirin·g firm,
owing to the impairment of it~ capital by losses in its business,
and without taking into account the amount paid out as interest
on the special capital. The certificate of renewal is to the
effect that the special partner had contributed the sum of $100,000 in cash to the original limited partnership, and that the
sum so contributed is continued by her in the partnership as
her contribution of capital upon the renewal. The defendants
then believed that her interest in the partnership was of the
value of $100,000, but the fact was otberwh~e, and the case
contains no statement of any just ground for this belief.
Limited partnembips are creatures of the statutes. The
present case is governed by St. 1887, c. 248, § 3, amending
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Pub. St. c. 75, § 7, by adding a new provision as to renewals.
Our first enactment as to limited partnerships (St. 1835, c. 48)
requires the actual cash payment of a specific sum, as capital,
to the common stock by the special partner, and the making,
acknowledgment, recording and publication of a certificate
stating, among other things, uthe amount of capital which
each special partner has contributed to the common stock.''
St. 1835, c. 48, §§ 3, 5. Upon every renewal a certificate
thereof was to "be made and acknowledged, recorded and
published," in the same manner provided for respecting the
original formation of the partnership. St. 183~, c. 48, § 6.
The provision made by the section last cited remains substan·
tially unchanged until the enactment of St. 1887, c. 248, § 3.
See Rev. St. c. 34, § 6; Gen. St. c. 55, § 6; Pub. St. c. 75, § 7.
Up to that time it had nbver been considered in a ca~ involv·
ing the obligations of a special partner in a renewed limited
partnership, but had been mentioned merely in Lancaster vs.
Choate, 5 Allen 5ao, 538.
The language of Pub. St. c. 75, § 7, was this: "Upon every
renewal or continuation of a limited partnership beyond the
time originally agreed upon for its termination a certificate of
such renewal or continuation shall be made, acknowl~dged,
filed and published in like manner as herein provided for the
certificate of its original formation." The statutes of Pennsylvania and of New York had a similar provision, to which was
added a declaration that every such partnership otherwise renewed or continued should be deemed a general partnership.
Act Pa. March 21, 1836, sec. 11; 1 Rev. St. N. Y. p. 765, § 11.
The language of these two provisions is identical, and is this:
"Every renewal or continuance of such partnership beyond the
time originally fixed for its duration shall be certified, acknowledged and reco1·ded, and an affidavit of a general partner be
made and filed, and notice given in the manner herein required
for its original formation, and every such partnership which
shall be otherwise renewed or continued shall be deemed a
general partnership." In the -year 1885 this provision had been
held, in Pennsylvania, to require that when a limited partner·
ship was renewed the special capital must be unimpaired.
Haddock vs. kanufacturing Corp., 109 Pa. St. 372, 382, 1
Atl. 174. On the other hand, in March, 1886, a special term
of the supreme court of New York, by a decision afterward
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sustained, in effect, by the court of appeals, bas held that the
fact that the flpecial capital bad been wholly loet at the time of
the renewal did not make the renewal firm a general ~rtner15hip. Ropes vs. Colgate, 17 Abb. N.C. 136; Bank vs. Colgate, 120 N. Y. :3~1, ~ ·iN . E. 7!l9, 8 L. R. A. 712.
Whether or not these contradictory constructions of a
statute substantially like our own, then contained in Pub. St.
c. 76, sec. 7, were known to the legislature of 1887, when it
amended our statute, we are not informed. However this may
Lave been, the amendment then added can have but one meaning. In saying, hy 1::3t. 1887, c. 248, sec. 3, "No such renewal or continuation shall be made unless the capital contributed by the special partners i~ equal in amount or
more than the aggregate capital the special partners originally
contributed," the legit>lature, by the words ''equal in amount,'"
meant equal in value as a resource or asset of partnership.
This is the m~t natural signification of the language of the
amendment, which never could have been used to show that
the original section was intended to allow a limited partnership to be renewed with special capital impaired or lost, and
without a fresb contribution. Money originally contributed as
capital of the fit·m, and then lost in its business, is not thereafter capital of that firm, and cannot be contributed as capital
of the renewed firm. If the only contribution then made to
capital is the interest of the special partner in the old firm, depreciated in amount by a substantial impairment due to losses
in business, it cannot be equal in amount to the original contribution.
- · · ·The present <'ase is,one in which the pen1ons who made the
certificate of renewal had good ground for believing that there
bad been no impairment of the original capital, and we do not
decide that if, at the expiration of a limited partnership, the
partners believed, with good reason, that the whole capital was
intact, and so agreed to aud certified a reuewal upon that basis,
the mere fact that it thereafter turned out that there bad been
an impairment not then ascertained or ascertainable would
make the renewal contrary to the statute. Here the certificate
of renewal was made upon the theory that the continuation of
the interest of the special partner in the assets of the expiringfirm was a contribution to the capital of the new firm equal in
amount to that originally contributed. But becautse the capital

-
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had been substantially impaired by losses in business, and no
fresh capital was then contributed, the statute was not complied
with, and all the members of the new firm are subject to the
liabilities of general partners. St. 1887, c. 248, § 4:, Judgment for the plaintiff on the finding.
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JAFFE vs. KRUM.

..

.·.

Supreme Oourt of Missouri, 1886,
88 Mo. 669.

Appeal from St. Louis Court of Appeals.

Affirmed.

Hough, Overall &: Judson for appellant.
W. B. Douglass, W. H. Scudder, Jr., for respondent.
BLACK, J. The agreed facts show that 0. M. Jaffe and
William Robertson made a limited partnership under the statu~
of this state, the business to be conducted under the name of
William Robertson, Jaffe being the special partner. All the
statutory prerequisites were complied with. The special partner thereafter advanced to the firm $1(),503. 96 as a loan, having
previously paid in his ~ntire contribution, as agreed upon in the
written partnership agreement. Thereafter the partnership
became insolvent, and Robinson, for the firm, made a deed
of voluntary assignment. Jaffe, who bad his demand allowed
by the assignee, now claims to be entitled to share pro rata
with the other creditors as to his demand arising from the loan.
The assignee denied to him this right, and so did the trial
court.
The general scope of the statute with respect to limited partnerships is to provide how they may be formed, to exempt the
special partner from personal liability for the debts, to deprive
him of all power to manage the affairs, and to determine when
and under what circumstances he shall be held as a general
partner. Section 3409 is as follows: "If the partnership be-
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comes insolvent, no special partner shall be paid 88 a creditor
of the firm, or receive the benefit of any lien in his favor as
such, until the other creditors of the firm are satisfied." The
common law determined the rights and liabilities of partners in
general, and tlmt law governs in those limited partnerships
where no contrary provision is made by the statute. Marshall
vs. Lambeth, 7 Rob. (La.) 471; Ames vs. Downing, 1 Bradf.
321.

Now, there is no room for doubt 88 to what the section
of the statute above quoted means. In case of insolvency
of the partnership it excludes, or rather postpones, the
c;pecial partner as a creditor until the other creditors are satisfied. Advances made by him to the partnership by way of a
loan are c1early within its terms. It cannot be confined in its
operation to the advances made by way of contribution to the
capital under the articles of partnership. That would render
the section wholly useless, for without it there is nothing in the
statute which would permit the s~cial partner to share with
the other creditors as to his part of the capital invested. The
whole scope of the act is to the effect that he subjects that to
the hazards of the enterprise. The lawmakers have used emphatic language, and we have nothing to do but abide by their
words. Other courts have reached the same conclusion upon
statutes in substance the same as the one under consideration.
Wh·i te vs. Hackett, 20 N.Y. 179; Mills vs. Argall, 6 Paige
577; Ward vs. Newell, 42 Barb. 482; Dunning's Appeal, 44
Pa. St. 150.
The judgment in this case is affirmed. All concur.
Nou.-See Mechem's Elements of Partn., 810-316.

;

CASES ON

P ARTNERSBIP.

SHARP vs. HUTCHINSON.

Oourt of Appeals of New York.

1885.

100 N. Y. 688, 8 N. E. 600.

George H. Forster, for appellant David J. Hutchinson, im'....

pleaded, -etc.

Mr. Robertsons, for ;espondent, James H. Sharp.
J. In April, 1880, the defendants attemp~ to form
a limited copartnership for the purpose of carrying on business
in the city of New York under the firm name of Hogg &
Patterson; the defandant HutcbinBon being the special partner.
Thereafter the plaintiff sold the firm certain goods, and this
action was brought against all membel'B of the firm to recover '
the price of such goods. The defendant Hutchinson alone defended; setting up as his answer the formation of the limited
copartnership, and claiming exemption from liability, under the
statute, as a special partner.
The plaintiff iin his complaint alleged a cause of action against
the defendants as copartnel'B, making no mention of the attempt
to form a limited copartnership, and upon the trial he proved
the sale of the goods to the firm, and then introduced in evidence the certificate and papers filed for the formation of the
limited 'copartnership, from which it appeared that Hutchinson
contributed to the capital of the firm $10,000, and then he
offered to prove that he in fact contributed only $8,000. Upon
the objection of Hutchinson's counsel, this proof was rejected,
upon the sole ground that it was not within the issue. The
view of the trial judge was that the complaint, instead of
treating Hutchinson as a mere general partner, should have
been based upon the statute alleging the special defects in the
formation of the limited copartnership.
In this there was error. If the proof bad been received, it
would have sho'wn that Hutchinson never in fact became a
special partner, but that be was from the beginning a general
partner, and liable as such. Rev. St., pt. 2, c. 4, tit. 1, sec. 8.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 16:50 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112102486216
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

EARL,

SHARP VS. HUTCHINSON.

719

The cause of action against him was not based upon the
statute, but upon his common law liability as a general partner; and hence it was proper, in setting forth in the complaint
the facts constituting plaintiff's cause of action, to charge him
as a general partner, and then, upon the trial, to show that he
was such by any comJ>f!tent proof.
The general term was therefore right in reversing the judgment of the special term, and its order should be affirmed, and
absolute judgment ordered for the plaintiff, with costs.
All concur.
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NoTE.-See Mechem's Elements of Partn., §§ 810-816.

INDEX.
ACCOUNT,
duty of partner to account for clandestine profits: Latta VB. Kil·
bourn, 260.
ACCOUNTING,
between partners: f?ee ACTIONS BBTWEXN PARTNERS; CAPITAL.
between partners and creditors; See APPLICATION OJ' ASSETS.
of illegal transactions: Woodworth va. Bennett, 48; Craft VB. Me·
Conoughy,48. ·
·
reopening after long time: Valentine VB. WyBOr, 500.
ACCOUNTS,
duty of partner to keep: Webb VB. Fordyce, 276.
ACCOUNT STATED,
action between partners upon: Wycoff VB. PurneU, 286.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT,
See STATUTE OF LlKtTATIONS.
ACTIONS,
nonjoinder of partneras party: Cleveland VB. Woodward, 888.
ACTIONS BETWEEN PARTNERS,
1. AT LAW, when can be maintained: Wycoff vs. Purnell, 286; Bullard
vs. Kinney, 288; Carpenter vs. Greenop, 296; Beede VB. F'ra$er, 800;
MangnelB VB. Shaen, 290; Cole vs. Reynolds, 292.
endorsee of note given by firm to partner may sue firm; Carpenter VB.
Greenop, 296.
firm cannot sue other firm having common partner: Beede VB. F'ra·
ser, 800.
for failure to launch firm as agreed: Hill vs. Palmer, 308.
for dissolving contrary to agreement: Bagley vs. Smith, 305.
2. IN EQUITY, for accounting and settlement: Spear vs. Newell, 811.
Pirtle t•s. Penn, 318; New vs. Wright, 819; Shannon VB. Wright, 817.
ADMISSIONS,
of a partner, when bind the firm: Sweet vs. Wood, 882.
to bar operation ofstatuteoflimitations: See STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
ADVERTISEMENT,
See NOTICE OF DISSOLUTION.
AGENCY,
as test of partnership: Co:c vs. Hlckman, 102, et seq.
AGENT, (See PowERS OF PARTNERS: LIABILITY).
partner as agent of firm: Chester VB. Dickerson, 88; Sweet vs. Wood,
882, et seq.; Pitkin vs. Benfer, 888, et seq.; Van Keuren vs. PaMnf·
lee, 588, et seq.
(721)
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APPLICATION OF ASSETS,
ostensible but no real partnership, Kelly vs. Scott, 682; Bank vs .
• Wood, 688.
to claims of firm creditors: C~ vs. Beauregard, 596; Arnold w.
Hagerman, 602; Bage VB. Campbell, 609; Goddard·Peck Grocery
Co. VB. McCune, 618; Rlxlgers vs. Meranda, 680; Blair vs. Black,
644; Harris vs. Peabody, 667; WinslOt.o t18. Wallace, 658; Menagh vs.
Whitwell, 667; Jackson Bank vs. Durfey, 619; Northern Bank m.
Keizer, 600; Fayette Bank vs. Kenney, 658; 1'4 re Marwiclc, 672.
ARTICLES OF PARTNERSHIP,
duty of partner not to violate: Murphy V8. Crafts, 27~; McFadden
VB. Leelca, 280.
ASSETS,
See Fnul NAXBj GooD WILL; R&AL EsTATE.
ASSIGNEE,
of partner cannot sue firm, when: Bullard w. Kinney; 2&1.
of note, may sue firm, when: Carpenter vs. Grunop, 296.
of bankrupt partner, suit by: Hal~~ey vs. Nortmt, 44:1.
ASSIGNMENT,
when valid as to firm creditors: Amold vs. H~"· 802.
as assets, by surviving partner: Lindner vR. Adams Cou"tv Bank,
~28.

ASSIGNMENT FOR CREDITORS.
power of partner to make: Slw.ttu.ck vs. Chandler, 868.
By surviving partner: Durant vs. Pierson, 625.
.ASSOCIATIONS,
if not for peouinary gain, not paltnerahip: ~ vs. .Bobaon, 1 ; Burt
V8. Lathrop, 4.
ASSUMPTION OF DEBT,
of partner by firm: Hage w. Campbell, 609; Goddard-Peck Grocery
Co. t-'8. McCune, 618; Jackson Bank V8. Durfey. 619.
of firm by continuing partners: Cobb vs. Benedict, 1)57; Grotte VB.
Weil, 592.
BANKRUPTCY,
distribution of aaset:a upon: See APPLIOATIOM OF AssBTS.
dissolves firm: Halsey vs. Norton, 447.
BILLS AND NOTES: See NBGOTIABJ,BIMSTRUUNTS.
Power of partner to make: Pease VI. Cole, 844.
BOND.
power of one partner to execute: Foa: VB. Norton. 862.
BORROW,
power of surviving partner: DuJ:'(lnt VB. ~. 525.
BUYING GOODS,
powers of partner as to: Boardman vs.
843; Johnston vs. Dutton, 871.

Adam~,

839; Porter v.. Curry,

INDEX.
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CAPITAL,
contributions to. what may be: GriJ!Uh vs. Buffum, 883; Whitcomb
v~. Converse, 692; Slula VB. Donahue, 695.
rights of partners in: Whitcomb vs. Converae, 692; Shea vs. Donah1&e,
695.
·.
how divided on dissolution: Id.
loeses of, how made good: I d.
CARE,
degree of, required between partners: Imley m. Shire, 270.
CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION,
not a partnership: Que~ vs. .Robton, 1.
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CLANDESTINE PROFITS,
made by partner inure to firm, when: Latta vs. Kilbotwn, 200.
COLLECTION,
power of partner as to means of: Clarke VB. Walla~. 868.
COMMERCIAL PARTNERSHIP: See TRADING Flu.
powers of partners in: Pease vs. Cole, 844.
COMMUNITY OF INTEREST,
as test of partnership: Spaulding vB. StubbingB, 149; Magovem m.
Roberuon, 154. Morgan va. Farrel, 171.
COMPENSATION,
for extra _sen·ioes, partners no implied r~ht to: Lindsey VB. Stranahan, 279.
COMPETITION,
when partner not to trade ia oompetition with his finn: lAtta
Kilbourn, 280.

v•.

CONFESSION OF .JUDGMENT.
power of partner to make: Morga• va. Bich4"rd8on, .861.
CONSULT,
duty of partner to consult with oopartner: Yorb vs. To.~. 278.
CONTEMPLATED PARTNERSHIP,
does not constitute one: Atkins VB. Hunt, 79; 8ailor8 VB. Ni:J:onJones Printing Co., 86; Kerrick VB. Stevens, 87 Duryea VB. Whit·
comb, 89; Grijftth vs. Buf!um, ~.
(X)NTINUING BUSINESS,
by surviving partner under will: Valentine m. WuBor, 500; Jones vB.
Walker, 509.
CONTRIBUTION,
right of partners to:

Hest~ VII.

Lowrey, 400; McFadden vs. Leeka, 280.

CONVERSION,
of firm int,o individual property: Arnold VB. Hagerm4n, 602; Case VB.
Bet.Juregard, 596.
of individual into firm liability: Hage vs. Caf¥bell, 609; Goddard·
Peck Grocery Co. VB. McOune, 618; JaclcMm Bank va. Durfey, 619.
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CORPORATION,

may not enter into partnership: Whittenton Mill8 vs. Upton, 68;
Cat8kill Bank VB. Gray, 78.
CORPORATION-DEFEG'TIVE,
See DEFECTIVBLY ORGANIZED CoRPORATIONs-DE FACTO CoRPORA·
TIONS.
CREDITORS,

c&JTying on business of debtor, whether partners:

c~ V8.

Hick?nan,

102.
CREDITORS OF FIRM, (See APPLICATION OF AssETS.)
rights of, in partnership assets: Durant t'B. Pier80tt, 525 et seq.
DAMAGES,
from partner for violating artioles: Murphy vs. Crafts, 275.

for disaolving contrary to agreement: Bagley vs. Smith, 800.
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DEATH OF PARTNER,

dissolves partnership: Hoard vs. Clum, 444; Insley VB. Shit·e, 270.
effect u·p on e.ctions: Hess vs. Lowrey, 400.
DECEASED PARTNER,

liability of his est&te for partnership debts: Doggett vs. DiU, 518;
Pope va. Cole, 519.
DECLARATIONS,

of partner wh.e n bind firm: Sweet vs. Wood, 332.
DE FACTO CORPORATION,

what necessary to constitute: Eaton t)8. Walker, 8; Finnegan t'B.
Noert:riberg, 18; Owensboro Wagon Co. vs. BliBR, 22.
DEFECTIVELY ORGANIZED CORPORATION,
when members of liable as partners: Eaton vs. Walker, 8; Finnegan
vs. Noerenberg, 18; Kaiser vs. Lawrence Savings Bank, 16; Guckert
vs. Hacke, 20; Owensboro Wagon Co. VB. Bliss, 22.
DILIGENCE,

required between partners: Imley vs. Shire, 270.
DISPUTES,

between partners, dissolution for, when: Howell
Gerard t•s. Gateau, 460.

VB.

Harvey, 448;

DISSOLUTION, ,

by S&le:
by death : Hoard vs. Clum, 440.
by bankruptcy: Halsey t·s. Norton, 447.
power of one pe.rtner as to: Johnson t'B. Dutton, 871 ; Solomon vs.
Kirkwood, 455.
what will justify in equity: Howell vs. Harvey, 448; New VB. Wright,
819; Gerard vs. Gateau, 460; Shannon vs. Wright, 817.
reasonable notioe of: I d.
e.ction in equity for: New vs. Wright, 819.
notioe of. how given: Solmnan vs. Kirkwood, 4M; Austin vs. Hol·
land, 464; Dickinson vs. pickinson, 477; Rose vs. Coffleld, 469;
Askew vs. Silman, 474; Scarf vs. Jardine, 484; TM.yer vs. Gou, 492.
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DIS.~OLUTION -Continued.

effect upon liabilities of all partners: Barnes vt. Boyers, 587; •Soorf
vt. Jardine, 484.
effect on powers of partners: Durant 1:8. Pierton, 625; Humphru•
VB. Chastain, 582; Van ~euren V8. Parmelee, 588; Pennoyer V8.
David, M3; Feigley 1lB. Whitaker, 660; Scarf t'8. Jardine, 484; Wil·
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8on t•s. ·waugh, 546.
action for wrongfully causing: Bagley V8. Smith, 805; Howell tl8.
Harvey, 448.
DORMANT PARTNER, (See UNDISCLOSED PARTNEll).
liability of: Pitkin vs. Benfer, 888; Griffith V8. Buffum, 886; Chuter
V8. Dickerson, 88.
notice of •·etirement of: Bank t•B. Bergstrom, 481.
DOWER,
in partnership realty: Robinson Bank V8. Miller, 195: Paige vs. Paige,
217.
DUTY OF PARTNERS,
to act in good faith: Latta VB. Kilbourn, 260.
to be diligent: .In8let/ V8. Shire, 270.
not to violate articles: Murphy vs. Crafts, 275.
to keep aooounts: Webb vs. Fordyce. 276.
to cousult with copartners: Yorks m. Tozer, 278.
election of debtors: Scarf m. Jardine, 484.
ENTITY,
firm as: Arnold vs. Hagerman, 602.
EQUITY,
actions in: See ACTIONS.
dissolution in: See DISSOLUTION.
distribution of assets in: See APPLICATION OF AsSETS.
ESTOPPEL, (See HOLDING OUT).
to deny partnership: Fletcher VB. Pullen, 166; Morgan vs. Farrel, 171 ;
HahJ.o vs. Mayer, 179; In re Kreuger, 188.
EVIDENCE,
what admissible to prove partnership: Jacobs vs. Shorey, 164; Fletcher

vs. Pullen, 166.
EXECUTOR, ( See SURVIVING PARTNER ) .
of deceased partner, continuing business creates new firm: Insleyv8.
Shire, 270.
rights against surviving partner: Valentine w. Wy8or, 500.
EXPRESS PROMISE,
when necessary to sustain action between partners: Wycoff vs. Purnell, 286 and note.
EXTRA COMPENSATION,
for extra services, partner cannot claim: Lind8ey V8. Stranahan, 279.
·FALSE IMPRISONMENT,
by one partner, when binds firm: Rotenkrans w. Barker, 405.
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FIDELITY,
duty of partner to hia firm: Latta vs. Kilboum, 260.
FIDUCIARY RELATION,
between partners: Latta vs. Kilbourn, 260.
FIRM CREDITORS,
rights of, in firm property: Case t~&. Beauregard, ~96; Arnold vs.
Hagerman, 602; Gocl.cUJrd-Peck Grocery Co. vs. McCune, 618; Rodgers vs. Meranda, 680; Blair VB. Black, 644; Harri!J t~&. Peabody,
667; Meech t~&. All~,677; Wimlow VB. Wallace, 658; Jackson Bank
vs. Durfey, 619;-Bank VB. Keizer, 650; Bank vs. Kenney,~; In re
Martoick, 872.
FIRM NAME,
rights respecting: William8 vs. Farrand, 222; Snyder Mfg. Co. vs.
Snyder, 240.
FRAUD, (See TORT).
of one partner binds firm, when: Chuter vs. Dickeraon, 88; J~B
VB. Shorey, 164-.
as justifying an injunction and receiver; Shannon vs. Wright, 817.
FUTURE PARTNERSHIP,
when becomes operative: Atkins vs. Hunt, 79; Sailors va. Ni:conJona Printing Co., 85; Kerrick va. Stevens, 87.
GOOD FAITH,
duty of partners to eaoh other: Latta vB. Kilbourn, 260; Insley V...
Shire, 270.
GOOD WILL,
what constitutes and how protected: Williams VB. Farrand, 222; Snyder Mfg. Co. vs. Snyder, 240; Trego vs. Hunt, Zi7.
GROSS PROCEEDS,
sharing of, as teet of partnership: Beecher VB. Bush, 118; Harvey t!&.
Chi.UU, 129; Morgan VB. ·Farrell, 171.
HEIRS,
rights against surviving partner: Valentine vs. Wysor, 500.
HIRING OF PROPERTY,
by one partner: Sweet VB. Wood, 832.
HOLDING OUT, (See EsTOPPEL).
liability as partner by: Burnett vs. Snyder, 15'1; Fletcher va. Pullen,
166; Morgan vs. Farrell, 171; Hahlo vs. Mayer, 179; In re Kreuger,
188.
HOTEL,
lessor of hotel, whether partner with proprietor: Beecher t'B. Bwh,
11!:1.
HUSBAND AND WIFE,
as partners: Artman vs. Ferg~n, 61 ; Suau VB. Cajfe, 64.
ILLEGALITY, (See PuRPOSES OF PARTNERSHIP).
of purpose of partnership: Woodworth VB. Bennett, 48; Craft vs. McConaughy, 48.
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INFANT,
rights and liabilities as partner: Adams VB. BeaU, 51; Bush VB. Linthicum, 56.
INDEMNITY,
duty of partner to indemnify copartner for 108868 oaused by former's
violation of articles: Murphy VB. Crafts, 275.
partner <'.an not claim, for unauthorized acts: McFadden vs. Leeka,
280.
INDISSOLUBLE PARTNERSHIP,
ce.nnot exist: Soloman VB. Kirkwood, 455.
INDIVIDUAL ASSETS, (See APPLIOATION OF ASSETS).
prior claim of individual creditors in: Rodgers vs. Meranda, 680.
Blair VB. Black, 644; Winslow VB. Wallace, 658; Bank VB. Keizer,
650; Bank t'B. Kenney, 658; In re Marwick, 672.
INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY,
of each partner for whole debt: Haralson VB. Campbell, 480; Mason
VB. Eldred, 483; Judd Oil Co. VB. Hubbell, 481.
INDIVIDUAL PROPERTY,
of partner may be taken for firm debt: HaraUO'n vs. Campbell, 480.
INDORSEMENT,
implied power of partner to indorse: Clarke vs. Wallace, 868.
after dissolution: Humphrie8 vs. Chastain, 532.
INJUNCTION,
to restrain the use of firm name: (See F1RH N.un:.)
to protect good will: (See Goon WILL.)
INSOLVENCY,
distribution of assets upon: (See APPLIOATION OF AssETS.)
INTENTION,
to become partners, how far effective: Atkins V8. Hunt, 79; Sailors
vs. Ni:ron Printing Co., 85; Kerrick vs. Stevens, 87; Duryea vs.
Whitcomb, 89.
JOI~DER,

of partners as parties: Hess vs. Lowrey, 400.
JOINT CREDITORS,
rights of to firm Wl8ets: (See APPLICATION OF ASSETS.)
JOINT OBLIGATION,
of individual partners when a partnership one: Berkshire Woolen
Co. V8. Juillard, 389.
JOINT PlJRCHASERS.
for re-sale, whether partners: doope V8. Eyre, 96; Harvey vs. Childs,
129; Spaulding vs. Stubbings, 149.
JOINT AND SEVERAL,
partnership debts are in equity: .Doggett vs. Dill, 518.
not at law:· Mason vs. Eldred, 433.
JOINT STOCK COMPANIES,
Laney vs. Fitlkel, SB.
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JUDGMENT.
against partners, in what form: Oil Co. vs. Hubbell, 481.
merges obligations, when: M<UOn m. Eldred, 488.
confession of, by one partner: Morgan tl8. Richard8on, 861.
LAND, (See REAL EsTATE).
partnerships to deal in: Cheater vs. Dickerson, 88.
may be created by parol: Id.
LIABILITY, (See POWERS OF PARTNERS; NEGLIGENCE; TORT).
of partners is joint: Oil Co. tiS. Hubbell, 431 ; Maaon tiS. Eldred, 438.
of firm, for acts of partner: Sweet m. Wood, 882; et seq.; Pitkin m.
Benfer, 88, et seq.
release of one releases all: Hale vs. Spaulding, 440; Goodnow tiS.
Smith, 441.
LIEN,
of firm creditors on firm assets: Case vs. Beauregard, 596; Arnold vs.
Hagerman, 602, et seq. ; Winalow va. Wallace, 658.
how loet: Smith va. Edwards, 568; Croone vs. Bit'tn8, 565; Menagh
vs. WhittoeU, 567; Stahlm. Oamers, 579.
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
general provisions: Chick VB. .Robinaon, 699.
necessity of compliance with statute: Chick vs. Robinaon, 699; Durrant m. Abendroth, 706; Henkel w. Heyman, 709.
renewal : Durgin VB. Colburn, 718.
special partner cannot claim as firm creditor: JaJfe VB. Krum, 716.
where defective may be sued as general partners: Sharp vs. Hutchinaon, 718.
LOAN,
whether constitutes partnership: Grace vs. Smith, 98; Harvey VB.
Childs, 129; Meehan vs. Valentine, 185; Waverly Bank tiS. Hall, 1~;
Spaulding m. StubbingB, 149.
MAJORITY,
power of: Johnston VB. Dutton, 371; Leavitt vs. Peck, 375; Wipper·
man vs. Stacey, 376; Latta VB. Kilbourn, 260.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION,
by one partner binds firm, when: Rosenkrans vs. Barker, 405.
liALPRACTICE,
by one partner, firm liable when: He88 VB. Lotcrey, 400.
MARRIED WOMEN,
as partners: Artman vs. Fergu&On, 61; Suau vs. CaJft, 64.
MARSHALLING,
of assets oetensible but no real partnership: Kelley v•. Scott, 682; Bank
VB. lf'ood, 688.
of assets: (See APPLICATION OF ASSETS.)
of a<JSets: on what principle: Rodgers V&. Meranda, 680; In rt Martvick, 672.
of assets when no common fund: In re Marwick, 672.
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MERGER,

of partnership debt in judgment: Mason VB. Eldred, 438.
MINORITY. (See MAJORITY).
MISCONDUCT,

of partner, when justifies dissolution: New vs. Wright, 819; Howell
vs. Hart:ey, 448; Gerard vs. Gateau, 460.
MIS)lANAGEMENT,

liability of partner to partner, for: Insley vs. Shi1·e, 270'.
MORTGAGE,

implied power of one partner to make: Hage vs. Campbell, 609.
NAME, (See FIIW NAME).
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in what name firm bound: Berkshire Woolen Co. 1..'8. Juillard, 889;
Hastings Nat. Bank vs. Hibbard, 892.
two firms of same name, which bound: Hastings Bank VB. H£bbard,
3ll2.
NEGLIGENCE,

of one partner, liability, of firm for: Hess vs. Lowrey, 400.
liability of partner to partner, for: Insley vs. Shire, 270.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS,

power of partner to make: Peaae vs. Cole, 344; Dowling vs. Euhange
Bank, 356.
NET PROCEEDS,

sharing in,

a.~

test of partnership:

Morgan vs. Farrel, 171.

NEW CONTRACT,

partner no power to make after dissolution: Humphries vs. Chastain,
532; Van Kew·en vs. Parmelee, 588; Pennoyer vs. David, 548; Feig·
ley vs. Whitaker, 550; Wilson ·vs. Waugh, 546.
NEW PROMISE, (See STATUTE OP LWITATIONS).
NON -JOINDER,

of partners: Clev-eland VB. Woodtoard, 888.
NON-TRADING FIRM,

power of partner in, to make negotiable paper: Pease vs. Cole, 344;
Dowlin{J t•s. Exchange Bank, 856.
NOTICE,

by one partner that he will not be bound by contemplated acts of
another: Johnston t•s. Dutton, 871; Leavitt vs. Peck, 875; Wipper·
man vs. Stacey, .376.
NOTICE OF DISSOLUTION,

what sufficient: Solomon vs. Kirk"Wood, 455; Austin VB. Holland, 464;
Dickinson vs. Dickinson, 477.
to whom required: Austin t•s. Holland, 464; Dickinson vs. Dickinson,
477.
effect of not giving: Dickinson vs. Dickinson, 477; Scarf VB. Jardine,
484; Thayer vs. Goss, 492.
burden of proving : Bank VB. Bergstrom, 481.
by dormant partner: · I d.
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NOVATION,
neoeseary to discharge retiring partner: Barnu w. JJor~er•. 681.
PARTNER,
who may be : (See INFANT ; MARRIED WOKEN ; CoRPORATION.)
powers of : (See POWEBS OJ' P ARTNxBs. )
liability of : (~LIABILITY.)
dutiee of :
DuTY OJ' P ABTNERS.
as firm creditor, priority oYer individual creditors: Devine vt . MiJchum, 626.
PARTNERSHIP,
what constitutes: Queen vs. Robson, 1 et teq.
burden of proving: Dunham vs. Loverock, 6. ·
for what purpose may be organized: Ohesterva. Didcenon, 88, etseq.
who may organize: Adam. vs. Beal, 51, et uq.
construction of contracts for: Atkim vs. Hu1~t. 79, et teq.
what contracts create: Grace VR. Smith, 98, et teq.
interest in property of : Bank VI. CarroUton Railroad. 187, et seq.
firm name and good will of: Williams vs. Farrand, 222, et seq.
rights and duties of members of: Latta vs. Kilbount, 260, et teq.
actions between members of: W1JCOJf w. PurneU, 286, ets,..q.
powers of partners : Sweet vs. Wood, 882, et seq.
liability of firm : Pitkin vs. Benfer, 31:J8, et seq.
nature and extent of partner's liability : Haralson w. Campbell, 480,

et teq.
diaeolution of : Hoard vs. Clum, 444, et seq. .
ooneequencee of dissolution of : Hawkint w. Capron, 489, et seq.
distribution of assets of, on dissolution : Case va. Beauregard, 596,
et teq.
capital of, how distributed between partners: Whitcomb vs. Converae,
692, et seq.
PARTNERSHIP ASSOCIATIONS LIMITED :
Staver & Abbott M'f'g. Co. VB. Blake, 28.
PARTNERSHIP AT WILL,
. right to diBBOlve : Howell V8. Harvey, 448; Solomon vt. Kirkwood, 455.
PARTNERSHIP, MINING.
what constitutes: Childers t'B. Neely, 84.
PARTNERSHIP TRANSACTION,
what is : Berkshire Woolen Co. t-'8. Juillard, 889.
PART PAYMENT,
(See STATUTE OJ' LDUTATIONS. )

POWERS OF PARTNERS,
to make admissions : Sweet va. Wood, 83~.
to hire property : Stoeet t'B. Wood, 832.
to subecribe for stock: Barnard VB. Plank Road Co., SM.
to engage in other business : Banner Tobacco Co. 118. Jeni8on, 886.
to ezecute negotiable instruments: Pea& VI. Core, 844.
to confess judgment: Morgan m. Richardson, 861.
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POWERS OF PARTNERS-Continued.
to execute sealed instruments: F~ VB. Norton, 862.
to make assignment for creditors: Shattuck vs. Chi:Jndler, 868. .
to sell property: Lowman vs. Sheets, 867.
to bind firm as surety for third per~)DS: Clark VB. WaUace, ~.
to mortgage firm property : Hage vs. Campbell, 609
to enlarge scope of business: Boardman vs. Adam8, 889.
by ratification: Banner Tobacco Co. 't'B. Jenison, 886.
right of partner to limit, by previous dissent: Johnston. vs. Dutton, 371;
Leavitt vs. Peck. 87~: Wipperman vs. Stacy, 876; Dawson, Black·
more & Co. vs. Elrod, 880.
after dissolution to make note: Dickinson vs. Dickinson, 477. In re
Kreuger, 188.
after dissolution, to make admissions or promises: Van Keuren vs.
Parmelee, 533, et aeq.
after dissolution, to endorse paper: Humphries vs. Chastain, 582.
to prevent operation of statute limitations: Van Keuren vs. Parmelee,
588; Jt'eigley VB. Whitaker, MO; Pennoyer VB. David, 548; Wilsonvs.

Waugh, 546.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT,
relation of, as test of partnership: c()(C VB. Hickman, 102; Beecher 118.
Bush, 118; Harvey tiB. Cllild8, 129; Meehan vs. Valentine, 135.
PRINCIPAL AND SURETY,
relation between retiring and other partner who assumes· firm debts:
Smith vs. Sheldon, 588; Barnea vs. Boyers, 587; Grotte VB. Weil, 592.
PRIORITY,
in distribution of assets: (See APPLICATION OF ASSETS; INDIVIDUAL
ASSETS.)
of partner who is firm creditor: Det-ine vs. Mitchum, 626.
PROFITS, (See CLANDESTINE PROFITS).
sharing of, as test of partnership: (See SHARING PROFITS.)
PR0141SSORY NOTE, (See NEGOTIABLE INSTRUME."m>).
PROPRIETARY INTEREST, ( 8ee CoJOIUNITY OJ' INTEREST).
as test of partnership: Magovern VB. Robertson, 154; Spaulding vs.
Stubbings, 149.
PURCHA~E.

(See BUYING).
by one partner binds firm, when : Grijftth vs. Buffum, 885.

RATIFICATION, (See POWERS OF PARTNERS).
by other partners of act of one part~er: Banner Tobacco Co. vs. Jenison, 886; Porter vs. Curry, 848.
REAL ESTATE,
when deemed assets: Robinson Bank V8. Miller, 195; Paige VB.
Paige, 217; Shanks vs. Kkin, 211; Nat. Union Bk. V8. Nat. Mech.
Bk., 204; Devine VB. Mitchum, 626.
power of one partner as to: Shanks VB. Klein, 211.
when deemed personalty: Shanks VB. Klein, 211.
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RELEASE,
Release of one releases all: Hale ~·· Spaulding,
Smith, 441. •
RECEIVER,
in actions for dissolutions: New vs. Wright, 819.
without dissolution: Shannon VB. Wright, 817.
RESTRAINT OF TRADE, (See ILLEGALITY).
partnership to effect: . Craft vs. McCohoughy, 48.

44Q;

Goodnow

VB.

REVOCATION,
by one partner of authority of the other: Johnston vs. Dutton, 871;
Leavitt us. Peck, 375; Wipperman us. Stacy, 876.
of partner's power by dissolution: Humphms, vs. Chastain, 5S2;
VanKeuren 1.'11. Parmelee, ~88.
RIVALRY,
not to be, between partner and his firm : Latta vs. Kilbourn, 260.
SALE, ( See POWERS OP P ARrir&RS).
implied power of partners to m&ke: Lowman VB. Sheets, 867.
BALE OF BUSINl!SS,
effect upon firm name: (See F:uut NAKE.)
effect upon good will: (See GooD WILL.)
SCOPE,
doty of each partner to keep within: Latta vs. Kilbourn, 260; Murphy VB. Crafts, 275; McFadden vs. Leeka, 280.
not to be enlarged without consent: McFadden VB. Leeka, 280.
may be enlarged by consent: Boardman vs. Adams, 889.
what not sufficient to enlarge: Latta vs. Kilbourn, 260.
firm not entitled to profits of one partner in dealings outside: Latta
VB. Kilbourn, 200.
SEALED INSTRUMENTS,
execution by one partner: Fox vs. Norton, 862.
SECRET PARTNER, (See DoRKANT PARTNER).
what oonstitutes: Grace vs. Smith, 98; Jacobs vs. Shorey, 164.

SEPARATE ESTATE,
of partner how applied: (See APPLIOATION OF AssETS.)
SHARE OF PARTNER,
what oonstitutes: Bank VB. Carrollton Railroad, 187; Staats
Bristow, 192; Sindelare vs. Walker, 194.
how a.soertained: Jd.

V8.

SHARING PROFITS,
as a tellt of partnership : Grace vs. Smith, 93; Coope vs. Eyre, 96;
Waugh vs. CanJer, 99; Cox 1.'8. Hickman, 102; Jacobs VB. Shorey,
164.

SOLICITING CUSTOMERS,
ofoldfi.rm: (See GooD WILL.)
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SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE,
not usually granted of partnership agreements: Buck vs. Smith, 822.
sometimes granted: SomerlYy vs. Buntin, 826.
ST4TUTE OF FRAUDS,
whether will prevent parol partnership to deal in land: Chester vs.
Dickerson, 88.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS,
power of partner after dis30lution, to remove bar of: VanKeuren vs.
Parmelee, 5SS; Feigley vs. Whitaker, 550; Pennoyer vs. David, 548;
Wilson tiB. Waugh, 546.
STIPULAl'IONS, (See ARTICLES OF PARTNERSHIP).
between partners, duty of partner to observe: Murphy vs. Crafts, 276;
Me Fadden vs. Leeka, 280.
SUBPARTNERSHIP,
.
rights and liability of subpartner: Burnett vs. Snyder, 157.
SUBSCRIPTION FOR STOCK,
partner's power to make: Barnard vs. Plank Road Co., 834.
SUITS, (See ACTIONS).

SURETY, (See PRINCIPAL AND SURETY).
implied power of partner to bind firm as: Clarke t.•s. Wallace, 868.
when retiring partner is, as to other who assumes debts: Smith vs.
Sheldon, 688; Barnes vs. Boyers, 587; Grotte VB. Weil, 592.
SURVIVAL OF ACTIONS,
after death of one partner: Hess VB. Lowrey, 400.
SURVIVING PARTNER,
right to possession of assets: Hawkins t.'B. Capron, 499; Valentine VB.
Wysor, 500.
right and powers of: Valentine VB. WyBor, 500; Lindner VB. Adams
County Bank, 528; Durant VB. Pierson, 525.
as a. trustee: I d.
liability of, for firm debts: Doggett vs. Dill, IH8; Pope VB. Cole, 519.
power of, to dispose of assets: Lindner VB. Adams County Bank, 528.
to borrow money: Durant VB. Pierson, 525.
power to dispose of firm real estate: Shanks vs. Klein, 211.
liability of, for mismanagement: Insley VB. Shire, 270.
TENANTS IN COMMON,
not partners: Dunham vs. Loverock, 6.
TORT,
of one partner binds firm, when: Hess vs. Lowrey, 400; Rosenlcran.
vs. Barker, 405; LimpuB vs. Lon. Gen. Om. Co., 410; Strang vs.
Bradner, 418; Jaffray vB. Jennings, 416; Locke vs. Stearns, 42~;
Lathrop VB. Adams, 425.
TRADING FIRM,
power of partner in, to make bills or notes:
Dowling 1!8, Exchange Bank, 856.

Peas~

vs. Uole, 844;
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TROVER,
by surYiving partner for possession of assets:
499.

Hawl.:ins m. Capron,

TRUST FUNDS,
when firm liable for: Englar vs. Offutt 898.
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UNDISCLOSED PARTNER. (See DORMANT PARTNER).
liability of: Griffith vs. Buffum, 885; Clet:eland vs. l'Voodward, 888.

